http://www.newindpress.com/Newsitems.asp?ID=IEL20030912054427&Title=B+R+E+A+K+I+N+G++++N+E+W+S&rLink=0 PTI NEW DELHI: Maintaining that there are no hitches in the country's missile programme, the government has said the 700 kms short-range and 1,500 kms medium-range surface-to-surface Agni I and Agni II missiles are being inducted into the armed forces. On the progress of the Agni missiles programme, top Defence Ministry officials said, "these missiles are where they were". Defence Minister George Fernandes recently stated in Parliament that the Agni I and II were in the process of being inducted. On whether India would go ahead with the test firing of the 3,000 kms long-range Agni missile, the officials said the "tests would be undertaken at an appropriate time". More Prithvi missiles were be procured from the State owned Bharat Dynamics Limited, they said when asked about reports of Army and IAF refusing to induct the surface-to-air Akash missiles. In an apparent move to counter Opposition attack in parliament about huge funds remaining unutilised by the three armed forces, the Defence Ministry on Friday released a list of equipment procured since 2001 and the new defence deals cleared recently. Topping the list will be the deal to acquire the much-delayed Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers, frontline T-90 tanks, state-of-art-sensors, advanced UAV's and assortment of radars to fill the gaps in the sky with a new range of Galiel and Travor light weapons for the infantry.
Nice thread with Good Relevant Topic , guys give big K Graduate a hand in collating info and analysis
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/sep/20navy.htm Josy Joseph in New Delhi | September 20, 2003 12:10 IST
India needs to build atleast 3000 Prithvi's and a 500 - 1000 AGNI I & II's to take on Pakistani nukes on a first strike. Plus India has to develop atleast 100 AGNI III's to keep Chinese under check. I am sick of Paki nuclear threats. PRE EMPT Pakistani nukes and give them a surprise with complete military readiness. India playing dangerous games in Pak: Musharraf K J M Varma in Islamabad | September 20, 2003 21:54 IST http://us.rediff.com/news/2003/sep/20pak.htm Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has accused India of playing 'dangerous games' in Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan, which could provoke Pakistani retaliation and raise the spectre of a nuclear conflict. "They must know that we can retaliate in a big way and they should know that," an agitated Musharraf told Canadian newspaper Toronto Star in an interview published on Saturday. Also see: Logic of root causes of terror dangerous: Vajpayee "They should never presume that they can do things and they can go unchecked," he said, adding that the "risk of full-fledged conflict with India can never be ruled out in South Asia." He, however, denied that Pakistan is planning a nuclear war against India. "No sane person can ever sit and plan that there will be a nuclear confrontation...we must never even think of that," he said in his characteristic blow hot, blow cold style. "However, what is dangerous is whether there will be a conflict between India and Pakistan which can then lead on to a nuclear exchange," he said in the interview, published ahead of Musharraf's visit to Canada on September 25.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_392710,00110004.htm Indo-Asian News Service Chennai, September 27 Austrian political scientist Anton Pelinka's book Democracy Indian Style says that present day India is more Subhas Chandra Bose's dream than Gandhi's vision. "It is industrial, it is modern, it is socialist, it is change driven, it walks the secular tightrope. It has put aside Mahatma Gandhi's tenets of non-violence and is a nuclear power," Pelinka said. He said the country was more "Bose's India" by virtue of its being a nuclear power as "Bose was not convinced that the best way to fight British colonialism" was by non-violence. He wanted to wrest freedom from the colonial rulers. Pelinka's book explores Bose's impact on India before and after independence and how the controversial leader of the 1940s shaped this nation's political culture. Speaking at a lecture at the Asian College of Journalism, organised by the Madras Book Club in Chennai, Pelinka drew parallels between Gandhi's proteges Nehru and Bose, calling the former "Gandhi's good son" and Bose, the "prodigal son". Pelinka, a professor at the University of Innsburk and director of the Institute of Conflict Research in Vienna, researched extensively on the life and times of Bose in Austria, Kolkata and Washington. Bose, he said, "was a secular nationalist and a socialist moderniser. He understood that Indian identity was above religion, caste and language." Bose led the Indian National Army (INA), formed by Indian nationalists to win India's independence from the British Empire. "He maintained a certain balance of power even in his INA by having one Sikh, one Hindu and one Muslim general," said the author. The book has been published by Transaction Publishers and translated by Rene Schell. It also talks of how Indian democracy is not only moulded by India's hoary past but also shaped by its encounter with the West.
'Chinese missiles can reach any Indian city' http://headlines.sify.com/2485news4.html?headline='Chinese~missiles~can~reach~any~Indian~city' Chandigarh: Stating that every Indian city was within the reach of Chinese missiles, RSS chief K S Sudershan accused the successive governments at the Centre of paying "little attention" to developing or procuring modern weapons. "China has developed missiles with which they can target every Indian city. In contrast, till India develops missiles with a range of 3000 km and above, the nearest Chinese town is going to be out of bounds for us," he said addressing a seminar on Integrated Management of National Security. "Only now we have started procuring the weapons systems, which we should have had years earlier," Sudershan said. "Over the centuries, we have suffered due to our humanitarian attitude and the belief that why should anyone use weapons against us when we will not be the first to attack. Why we suffered several defeats in history is due to our faulty thinking," he said. "When enemies who waged wars against us had guns, we used to fight them with swords," the RSS chief said. "Over the years, we paid little attention to developing or procuring modern weapons system because of which our enemy had an upper edge. We also did not concentrate much on the need to have an efficient intelligence gathering mechanism." The need of the hour was to equip not only the military with modern weapons system, "but also our para-military and police forces who has a crucial role to play in launching counter-offencive operations," he added.
India needs to build atleast 3000 Prithvi's and a 500 - 1000 AGNI I & II's to take on Pakistani nukes on a first strike. Plus India has to develop atleast 100 AGNI III's to keep Chinese under check. I am sick of Paki nuclear threats. PRE EMPT Pakistani nukes and give them a surprise with complete military readiness. ____________________________________________________________________ I m a firm believer that India should have at leats 1000 nukes and Agni vairents of missiles. We should be able to threaten the existance of any one who supports Pukes in their behaviour toward Indian and all the terrorist activities coming out of puke land. Since they try to show it as Islam versus others, the isalmic countries, especially Wahabi Puke masters should be warned of the consequnenses of Nuke war as if there is unacceptabale damage ,there wont be such thing as Islamic country/ entity left. i think the threat to very existance of these entities will change their behaviour and thinking as they have show the sign of sanity once big hammer is shown. Having said that, we need to have trillion dollar economy first as it will give whole world big stake in India and its safety as well as enough $$ to make the above happen. In fact trillion dollar economy will make Pookes irrelevant without firing shot. prem
Targeting of Indian nukes If you look at the demographic distribution of pakistan, most of pakistan is desert 60% of Pakistan lives near Lahore 20% lives near Karachi The habitable areas of Pakistan is more densely populated than BD Hence about 10 nukes properly placed will eradicate Pakistan Next we must understand that we are dealing with a civilizational enemy, not a national enemy A nuclear attack on India is an attempt at civilisational eradication so the response must be tit for tat Pakistan is simply a tentacle of the Ummah Octopus The Gulf states fund pakistan and L-E-T and radicalise Indian muslims with their madrasas BD shelters anti-Indian Jihadists So it must be realised that most OIC countries are our enemies With Agni-3, the entire Ummah from Egpyt to Indonesia is within range The interesting thing about the Ummah is that most of the Ummah is desert and the Ummah is food deficient and imports food hence targeting their ports and one or 2 key cities will ensure that a nuclear attack on India is met by Ummah eradication Incidentally, Israel has the same policy of Ummah eradication and they are putting their 200 nukes on submarines
India's nuke command chain is in place: Fernandes http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_403616,0008.htm
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/06iaf1.htm October 07, 2003 03:32 IST
rajesh, this initiative has important implications for India as Raja Mohan rightly points out. I will try to put some thoughts down,
Guys, we all know pookes has suicidal tedencies and act rationally only once they are shown big hammer like USA did. We also know they project the conflict ummah vesus kafir and also we all understand that other/some muslims countries support them finnancially and politically on that basis, as no one give a damn that India has 150 millions of muslims living there. As as some one said rightally that they are civilizational threat, how do u suppose to face this challenge unless there is clear cut demonstration and will to show the enemy that we have the capacity to wipe their whole civilization out of existance, if we go so goes the umma or shuuma and rest. For this kind of capabilty we must have big economy as then we can offord to have all kind of options and if the whole world has big stake in Indian economy they will automatically will be on our side and this will open up whole new bag of solutions to treat the problem called pookistan. Once they know that we can destroy them ALL physically , punjabi moslem mind will understand so will their arab/ chinese masters and others. i say buy the time and prepare the remedy and then apply accordingally. i agree that They are going down the tube. They believe they are Islam and its Glory etc etc crap, once we make them realize that their cherished dream of ummah . glory , etc will have no meaning as there wont be any ummah left after we go through them, they will Understand and some to senses and act rationally like normal humans. To have that Danda we must have money first. just my 2 cents thx prem
Prem, Centuries back India was attacked hundred times because we were rich, according to "The Clash of Civilization" book India's international trade was over 37% before 1700. Now it is less then 2%. When our enemies were using gun we were fighting with bows and arrow. Till we can't protect ourself from enemies, we can't grow. Till we are not strong world will not respect us. To protect our trade and improve Indian citizens life, citizens safety should be first priority. Even in our home we use strongest lock to close door so that rest of family feel safe. Nuke are our best bet. Yes, Pakistan and China is busy destablizing India but they are unable to do it because we are strong now. What happened in 1962? Before war west was not openly against India but our defeat changed India's image. Nobody want to tag with loser and US joined hands with China. So we should have strong danda first to have good economy.
Pakistan conducts second missile test in less than a week Tuesday, October 7, 2003 (10-07) 20:59 PDT ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) -- Pakistan on Tuesday test fired a medium-range, nuclear-capable missile, the army said. It was the second such test in less than a week. The army said it successfully fired off the Hatf-4 missile, also known as the Shaheen 1, in the early morning hours. The missile has a range of 435 miles, meaning it can hit most major targets in rival India. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3173362.stm
>>>435 miles will hit most major targets in India ? This guy is geographically challenged. what about Kolkatta, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Thiruvananthapuram etc.etc. No doubt.
Pact on space equipment, N-tech likely IANS[ TUESDAY, OCTOBER 07, 2003 04:15:41 AM ] The US is close to completing an agreement with India that will allow an expansion of trade in high-tech areas, space launch equipment and the nuclear industry, says secretary of state Colin Powell http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/html/uncomp/articleshow?msid=218974 US, India talk nuclear technology transfer By Sultan Shahin http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EJ07Df07.html NEW DELHI – The carrots dangled before India earlier this year to persuade it to send troops to Iraq – a promise by the then United States ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, to sell "defensive nuclear, biological and chemical equipment, special forces gear and P3 Orion Maritime Patrol aircraft" – are beginning to take shape now, even though Delhi has not committed any of its troops. In the face of strong objections from a section of US President George W Bush's administration that high technology transfers to India might fuel the spread of weapons of mass destruction, it is not quite clear yet how far the intense bilateral negotiations have succeeded. The media have not even been told exactly what transpired in the recent meeting between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Bush on this score. In view of the three decades political baggage that the two countries have to contend with, the task cannot be easy. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, resulting in sanctions on high technology transfers. A series of nuclear weapons tests it conducted in May 1998 brought another series of sanctions against high technology transfers from the US. Three sensitive issues have defined the limits of India-US bilateral relationship since 1974: transfer of civilian nuclear technology; cooperation in space research; and sale of dual-purpose technology, which could be diverted to military use. India, which became the first nation to welcome Bush's ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans in May 2001, also hopes to get a share of the technology. A short round of negotiations that has taken place so far is clearly not enough for resolving issues of such far-reaching consequences. Senior officials of the two countries have been busy in the past weeks preparing a broad framework of a nuclear and high technology transfer regime that will allow America to ease restrictions on high technology trade with India in return for credible assurances that New Delhi will prevent the outflow of sensitive technology and material from its soil and put mechanisms in place to preclude the use of imported technology for military purposes. Though nothing concrete appears to have come out so far, these negotiations do reflect a serious political commitment to deal with a long-standing problem in Indo-US relations. One important casualty of the Western desire to monopolize nuclear weapons is public safety. Earlier this year, on March 6, the Indian parliament was informed that India and the US were discussing a mutually-agreed program on nuclear safety cooperation in the direction of resumption of nuclear cooperation between the two sides. Replying to a question, Minister of State in the Department of Space S B Mukherjee said that discussions had taken place on resumption of Indo-US nuclear cooperation between the respective regulatory bodies on a few selected topics. "Our objective is to develop mutually-beneficial international cooperation in the area of nuclear power," Mukherjee said. In the area of nuclear safety cooperation, a mutually-agreed program was being discussed, he said. India and the US revived talks on nuclear safety cooperation with the three-day visit of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman Richard A Meserve at the end of February this year. The talks, initiated in 1994, had been suspended following India's nuclear tests in 1998. But following Vajpayee-Bush talks in November 2001, the two sides agreed to resume the process. The focus of Meserve's visit was cooperation in safeguarded nuclear facilities and identification of specific areas of Indo-US cooperation in the hi-tech areas of peaceful applications of nuclear energy and space research. Several nuclear experts have pointed out from time to time that decades of denying India nuclear technology has forced the country to pursue an indigenous but secretive program which poses the threat of a Chernobyl-type disaster. As India does not accept full-scope international safeguards for its nuclear activities, it has been denied access to technology or equipment from Western countries that follow rules set by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Even the Russian-supplied two light-water reactors for a 2,000 MW nuclear power station in southern Tamil Nadu state did not come with the safety control and instrumentation systems designed by the German engineering giant Siemens, which has set up a plant in Moscow especially for the Russian nuclear equipment industry. The US and its European allies have kept India under various technology transfer regimes since 1974. The May 1998 tests resulted, predictably, in further tightening of technology control regimes. But this has only forced India to develop its own nuclear power technology and safety standards. Despite sanctions, India plans to produce 20,000 MW of nuclear power by the year 2020. India has consistently refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) despite enormous US pressure particularly from former president Bill Clinton's administration. India may be able to withstand the isolation, but fears about dangers to public safety have inevitably grown. A resumption of nuclear cooperation dialogue with the US, therefore, has enormous public safety implications as well. One of India's strategic goals is to be accepted at least as a de facto, if not a de jure member of the nuclear club. From the substance and style of the recent discussions it would appear that this has already happened. At the very least there is a radical shift in the tone and tenor of American interlocutors. Not long ago Clinton announced his intention to "freeze, cap and roll back" the nuclear capabilities of countries like India. But US Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation John Wolf stated earlier this year in July that "there is no near-term prospect of getting India and Pakistan to relinquish their nuclear weapons and missiles". American diplomats have also been saying in private that their government is no longer in the business of telling India not to build a nuclear arsenal. Unlike the more doctrinaire Clinton era, Washington appears now to be promoting in the case of India at least a "one shield, few missiles" doctrine that it also advocates for the US. The implication for India is that it may already have been accepted as a respectable member of the nuclear club, though the US will not give any public indication of that for fear of encouraging other countries that may want the same status. India itself has never aroused fears of nuclear technology proliferation. It has been recognized as a conservative country when it comes to technology export. India's evolving and already close strategic relationship with Iran is, however, another matter. Iran is clearly a nation that wants to and perhaps needs to become a nuclear weapon state in order to retain its sovereignty in a world in which it thinks the sole superpower is a rogue gone berserk. The US has already short-listed Iran as an evil power. No wonder visiting Israeli premier Ariel Sharon objected to Indo-Iranian relations. India, however, considers its ties with Iran non-negotiable. But the present Indo-US nuclear talks are also to determine if India will be allowed to buy the Israeli-made Arrow missile-destroyer. While there is a general acceptance in Washington and Tel Aviv of India's credibility as a non-proliferating nation, there is nevertheless reluctance to export sensitive technologies to a country with such strong ties with a member of Bush's "axis of evil". Incidentally, the remaining member of this famous axis (with Iraq "tamed") is North Korea, with ties to India's bete noire Pakistan. Also, there is concern in Washington that if the US makes India an exception to the various non-proliferation regimes, other nuclear powers like Russia, China and France may all use this as an excuse to sell their missile systems or export other high technology items. What then is going to be the outcome of these talks? Will the two countries be able to sort out the complex issues involved? So far all this remains shrouded in mystery. The only hopeful sign is the relaxed atmosphere in which these negotiations are being held, unlike previous occasions when nuclear talks always used to be tense. The differences between the Indian and US positions flow from the NPT and New Delhi's reluctance to accept "full-scope" safeguards for its nuclear installations. A joint statement issued after the talks between Indian and US officials' talks said that the US had "expressed its readiness to broaden relations in civilian space cooperation". The joint statement said: "The two sides also exchanged views on civilian nuclear cooperation. To this end, the two sides identified proposals which could be operationalized in the near term." The parameters of the current dialogue, it was stressed, "reflect the determination" of the top leadership of both countries. India is taking hope from several media accounts that US officials have uncovered a number of legal loopholes that may allow the US to help India dodge much of the multi-layered sanctions regime.
Hi Mudy, I m all for strong defence and wants coupe of thousands nukes , so that our enemies know the consequences. i know we were attacked repeatidally with all the calamities heaped upon us. But now we are strong enough to repeal any attack but that is not good enough , i think we out to have such strong defence that no one should even dare to do the mischeif. To gather that kind of strength , we must have strong economy which btw way we are on the right track to have that. Military strength without the sound economy is hollow, we ought to have both, but in 21 st century its the economy from which the real strenght flows from as it will buy u anything and i believe that is one of the reasons we are not going to war with pukes as our economy in few years will make them irrelevant and our military strength will grown multifold from what is now. thx prem
The Indo-Iranian-Israeli-US quadrangular games are going to be interesting. India has convinced both US and Israel about her strong bonafides when it comes to terrorism. But both Israel andthe US are still fixated on Iran, partly because of Iran's obsession with acquiring nukes. From Iran's POV , they look upon Pakistan as a potential adversary (more so than Israel) although they will not publicly say so and hence the desire to match Pakistan's nuke status. So the game gets complicated. Of course the heart of the whole problem is the terrorist state. But one of the reasons why TSP is such a pain in the pitoot is that the US(and the UK) insist on propping up that wretched country. The aim of the Indians is to convince the western world that Pakistan is the greater threat to western civilization despite their professions to the contrary. India should somehow convince the west that Iran is a better bet than Pakistan. Unfortunately the reason why the west props up pakistan ( India) remains current even today and is based on the false premise that India remains a greater threat to the west than the Islamists.
Kaushal, If you look from another angle, USA doesn't want to counter Pakistan militarily as it might lead to a paki nuke retaliation against Israel, and most importantly India. Importance of India is not due to any love lost, but the chain reaction it starts.
Let me expand on chain reaction bit. Say, USA offers Pakistan a last chance to curtail all terrorist activities on its soil else face military invasion ala Iraq. Paksitan responds in a 'No.' Military offensice starts. Within a few days PA starts loosing ground and threatens it would launch nukes against India as they can't go down for good freeing India to move up the food chain. So they launch nukes on India. Say, 4/5 big Indian cities are nuked. Death tolls are in 10s of millions - Property loss in billions of dollars. Now the ball's in India's court. What does India do? Realistically all the hard work of the last few decades just went down the drain. It would take another 50 years to get back where we were yesterday. Now who's responsible for this: First of all Pakistan and then China & N. Korea. We not only going to nuke Pakistan but take 'em chicoms down too. So India launches severe retaliation against pakistan, with the idea of erasing them from world map and 10/15 nukes on the chicoms (their east coast cities mainly.) A few of 'em bad toys for N. Korea takes off on board a few Agnis. Now China finds itself a similar situation ala India. So Chicoms do the same type of analysis and decide to nuke India and USA………………….fill it in here the rest……...
Credibility of Paki nukes are big question. No one is sure whether they have miniaturize nuke bomb which can be deliveried by missiles. But they can drop bomb by using planes. Which they can use against India only. But Paki can give these nuke to Saudi or Libya to do dirty work. For US it is better to fix source first, which is Pakistan.
If it's a matter of delivering by planes, I think IAF can take on the responsibility to make sure none gets through. But with missiles we need something: Kali, Durga or some credible ABM system. Even though it's quiet probable that they are nuke-nooded () we cannot take a chance.
http://www.sulekha.com/redirectnh.asp?cid=319024 Interesting that China is not on the list of 10 countries - meither is Russia. How effective is this initiative going to be without China and Russia ? What is interesting is how China is not getting directly involved, passing tech to NK and Pak and having US worry about these guys. Isnt this like the proxy war that pakis are waging against us ??
Time and again India will be faced with the choice of running with the hares or hunting with the hounds and she has to make her choice. She cannot waffle her way out of this. Hard choices have to be made. The US has now recognized that it does not make sense to brand India a proliferator just merely because she has deployed nukes. A country must proliferate in order to be known as a proliferator. India has never proliferated any WMD to any country. India must hunt with the hounds on this one. It is not in her interest to see more proliferation happen. and those who blatantly proliferate must be held accountable. But if the US exempts its buddy from all the rules of proliferation than it is an initiative that can easily be abandoned.
Without China's involvement and commitment there would be no end to proliferation. We may hunt with the hounds - there are lots of advantages in that too. But if the objective is to prevent proliferation then China's involvement is a must. And time and again China has proved to be loose with such technology. Besides that, I hope we wont be *used* to fix the Iranian problem.
India should stay away from any treaty. Treaty is meant to control and US knows very well to abuse and use it. Just ignore it.
This s not a treaty. Simply an 'initiative'. Before anything like a treaty happens a lot of things must happen like India should be a member of the UNSC with veto power and be admitted as a dejure NWS which means all sanctions have to be dropped. We must stop thinking of ourselves as a victim and think like a predator. In all these initiatives there will be alternatives to deal with the Americans. if you dont deal with them India will be out of the loop. And there will be little chance that China (as the up and coming superpower) will get any friendlier with India. The China paki axis will only get stronger. By all means Indians should remain skeptical of the intentions of the west in general and US in particular, but that does not mean India should hide in a cave and hope the problems go away. IOW Indians should 'engage' with the americans in a big way ( not marry them) and keep the world guessing as to her true intentions.
Kaushal, our disagreement is really minimal. Joining such an initiative could have 2 purposes for India. (1) Stop proliferation. (2) Engage US for some other goodies. If we are to join for #2 and that alone then I am cool with this. God forbid, but if push comes to shove we should probably help US fix the Iranian problem if the price is right. But if at all the idea is to stop nuke proliferation this is the worst way of going about it. Joining this initiative or treaty is hardly acting like a predator. The best way to stop China from proliferating is to hand over a few choice warheads to Vietnam and our other friends - that is being a predator - this is not. Stopping pakistan from proliferating is hardly stopping anything. Besides what do you think India is bringing to the table in US's opinion ? We have to understand this in order to demand the right price - we are bringing something that China is not - and somehow I get this feeling that US is perfectly capable on its own to stop pakistan from proliferating. Its something else - dont know what ..
I have always felt that India can impose a naval blockade of Pakistan, and maintain that blockade indefinately until that nation capitulates unconditionally. India has the navy now to impose such a blockade and take out the PN if it challenges the blockade. With such a blockade, nothing goes in and nothing comes out and the nation will grind to a halt. Trade will be zero. Not even trawler fishing. The Karakorum highway to China can be taken out and Pakistan will be left only with Afghanistan as its entry point, and at its mercy. India can also impose a 'no fly zone' and that would end all commercial flights into Pakistan. The nation would then be contained and a slow death begins. All this without an invasion of Pakistan by the Indian army or crossing the LoC.. The onus then falls on Pakistan to escalate the blockade and no fly zone by invading India, or, use its nuclear weapons. This would be unlikely as no one really wants to initiate a nuclear war; for Pakistan it would be certain and total annihilation and subsequent non existence. They really have to choose between living with the blockade or self annihilation. The cost to India and its economy would be minimal. Indeed it will drive the price of oil down with one large nation no longer an oil consumer. Why does this scenario not work?
Taking out Paki nukes If there is a semblance of truth in the following news reports, I would welcome Bharat sending troops to Iraq to operate under US command. This is the minimum condition that Islamic nukes should be dismantled to safeguard peace in the world, after 9-11. It is too dangerous to leave the Islamic nukes in Pakistan intact for the security of USA. Kalyanaraman India, Israel plan strikes against Pak nuke facilities Tariq Saeedi Ashgabat—Sources privy to the latest developments have disclosed that Israel and India might be planning a joint strike against the nuclear assets of Pakistan. The revelation comes right at the heels of a news story carried by Haartez and other major Israeli papers that Israel was all set to launch a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. “Israel had been proposing a surgical strike against Pak nuclear assets since the time Moorarji Desai was the prime minister of India but the real breakthrough only came during Ariel Sharon’s recent visit to India,” said the sources. “Bush and at least three of his principals are convinced that, should anything happen to Musharraf, Pakistan’s nuclear hardware could easily fall into the hands of religious extremists or rogue elements,” said the sources. Speculations have been sprouting up for the last couple of years that India-Israel cooperation against ‘terrorism’ was primarily aimed at Pakistan and the best prevention seen by security advisers was to take out the nuclear structures of Pakistan to tilt the geopolitical equation to India’s side permanently. The idea may have been on the drawing boards for many months but the decision-making circles in India and Israel are transmitting a new sense of urgency now. The sources said, “There may be multiple scenarios but the most probable one could be like this: India and Israel, through their lobbies in the US, would put more pressure on Pakistan to deploy maximum forces on the Pak-Afghan border to prevent infiltration of Taliban. This would be simultaneous with renewed complaints by India that renegade elements from Pakistan were crossing the LoC to commit acts of terrorism in Indian part of Kashmir. India would station more troops along the LoC, under the pretext to monitor cross-border movements, and Pakistan would be forced to match the move. While Pakistani forces would be stretched in two different directions, it would be convenient for India and Israel to launch a single joint strike to take out at least essential elements of Pak nuclear assets.” “It is quite possible that the strike planes could come from an entirely different direction and not from the Indian territory directly,” the sources suggested. “Moreover, nothing happens in isolation. You must look at the whole picture,” the sources added. ‘The whole picture’ may be a fluid concept but there are some facts that could possibly indicate the shape of things to come. Fact: USA, Israel and India are moving fast toward strategic partnership against terrorism. Fact: By 2005, Indian ships in the Indian Ocean would be equipped with Israeli nuclear weapons. Fact: US, India, Israel and Russia are the only four countries that have declared intentions to exercise their ‘right of self defence’ in the shape of preemptive strikes. Fact: Pakistan may be a convenient short-term ally for the United States but India is the strategic partner of choice in the region. http://www.pakobserver.net/200310/14/view/?page=1&id=3 India, Israel planning strikes on Pak nukes C R JAYACHANDRAN/TIMESOFINDIA.COM TIMES INTERNET NETWORK[ TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 2003 01:26:31 PM ] NEW DELHI: Pakistan continues to be concerned about the increased defence cooperation between India and Israel and its latest fear is an Indo-Israel joint strike against Islamabad's nuclear assets. Pakistani intelligence sources, privy to the latest development in the Indo-Israel ties, apprehend that India and Israel might be planning a joint strike against Islamabad's nuclear assets. WRITING ON THE WALL - USA, Israel and India are moving fast toward strategic partnership against terrorism. - By 2005, Indian ships in the Indian Ocean would be equipped with Israeli nuclear weapons. - US, India, Israel and Russia are the only four countries that have declared intentions to exercise their "right of self defence" in the shape of preemptive strikes. - Pakistan may be a convenient short-term ally for the US but India is the strategic partner of choice in the region The decision taken during the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Arial Sharon to India to keep a mutual, watchful eye on "fanatic Islam" has stirred the current fear. According to analysts, for India and Israel the common potential enemy has always been Pakistan – a Muslim nation committed to helping the Arab countries of the Middle East. "Israel had been proposing a surgical strike against Pak nuclear assets since the time of Morarji Desai was the prime minister of India but the real breakthrough only came during Ariel Sharon's recent visit to India (in September)," sources were quoted as saying by Pakistan Observer. "Bush and at least three of his principals are convinced that, should anything happen to Musharraf, Pakistan's nuclear hardware could easily fall into the hands of religious extremists or rogue elements," said the sources. India had mooted the doctrine of India-Israel-US axis with a commitment of evolving a joint strategy to fight international terrorism and the core alliance or triad was given shape during Sharon's India visit. Speculations have been rife that India-Israel cooperation against terrorism was primarily aimed at Pakistan. The best prevention seen by security advisers of both the countries was to take out the nuclear structures of Pakistan to permanently tilt the geopolitical equation in India's favour. It may be remembered that in New Delhi's critical hour of need of the 1971 war with Pakistan, India had sought Israel's help to supply it with the devastating artillery weapon, 160 mm mortars and ammunition, exclusively manufactured in Israel. Pakistan had expressed concern over Sharon's visit, saying increased defence cooperation between India and Israel could destabilise the region. The sources, according to the paper, said, "There may be multiple scenarios but the most probable one could be like this: India and Israel, through their lobbies in the US, would put more pressure on Pakistan to deploy maximum forces on the Pak-Afghan border to prevent infiltration of Taliban. "This would be simultaneous with renewed complaints by India that renegade elements from Pakistan were crossing the LoC to commit acts of terrorism in Indian side of Kashmir. "India would station more troops along the LoC, under the pretext to monitor cross-border movements, and Pakistan would be forced to match the move. "While Pakistani forces would be stretched in two different directions, it would be convenient for India and Israel to launch a single joint strike to take out at least essential elements of Pak nuclear assets." "It is quite possible that the strike planes could come from an entirely different direction and not from the Indian territory directly," the sources suggested. The revelation comes right on the heels of a news story carried by Haartez and other major Israeli papers that Israel was all set to launch a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, the Pakistani daily said. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/html/uncomp/articleshow?msid=232733
http://www.sulekha.com/redirectNh.asp?cid=319144 PYONGYANG, North Korea, Oct. 2 (UPI) -- North Korea tried to sell missile technology and related parts to Myanmar's military government, but the outcome is unknown, Kyodo news said Thursday. Citing an unidentified U.S. government official, the agency said there was "grave concern" over the activation of military exchanges between the two countries that each maintain isolation from the rest of the world. The transaction is believed to have come about due to the matching of interests between Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, which wants to strengthen its military power without depending on so-called Western countries, and North Korea, which wants to explore new sources for acquiring foreign currency. The official did not disclose details such as the type of missile involved in the deal and said U.S. reconnaissance satellites have not picked up any indications the transaction has been completed. Washington suspects North Korea is exporting Scud missiles to Pakistan as well as to Syria and Iran, the report said.
No URL. If you click on link for the above article a sulekhite has posted quoting intelligenceonline.net. Please see the trend I referred to earlier. China is the one we need to worry about - pakistan is nothing. Cut and past follows. www.intelligenceonline.net N.Korea ballistic missiles for Burma likely 14 October 2003: China is very likely backing Myanmar’s covert efforts to acquire long-range ballistic missiles from North Korea to offset the loss of North Korea in case of an US attack, to create a new bogey, and to pin down India from the east. In August, a North-Korean delegation visited Yangon to discuss the missile deal with Burmese military officials, and the talks were carried forward in a second secret meeting between North-Korean military-intelligence officials disguised as businessmen and the Burmese side in Phuket in Thailand. Myanmar is expected to acquire the North-Korean missiles by end-2004, and Burmese military officials have been increasingly seen at nuclear-weapons-related seminars and closed-door meetings in Singapore, Malaysia, and other ASEAN nations. Independently, Myanmar has also approached Russia for a civilian nuclear reactor, and during his meeting with Russian president Vladmir Putin in Moscow, General Parvez Musharraf also apparently pressed Burma’s case for a reactor. Since Myanmar’s economy is in the doldrums and it cannot support expensive acquisitions like nuclear reactors and ballistic missiles, top diplomats say that China is very likely funding Burma, to finding an alternative ally to North Korea which is close to US pre-emptive action. "China fears that its political and military clout will be considerably dented if the US attacks North Korea, which could be followed by a massive US military build-up in the region,” a diplomat said. “The additional advantage of an armed Burma is that it would to an extent contain India, like Pakistan does in the west.”
What u guys think of pukes testing all these imported misiles / they seems to be panicking . thx prem
http://www.msnbc.com/news/765161.asp http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20031020-115059-8319r By Arnaud de Borchgrave UPI Editor in Chief Published 10/20/2003 7:00 PM View printer-friendly version ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Oct. 20 (UPI) -- Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have concluded a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation, an unimpeachable source said Monday. "It will be vehemently denied by both countries," added this ranking Pakistani source known to this correspondent for more than a decade as a knowledgeable insider, "but future events will confirm that Pakistan has agreed to provide KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) with the wherewithal for a nuclear deterrent." In a lightning, hastily arranged, 26-hour "state visit" in Islamabad, Crown Prince Abdullah Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, flew across the Arabian Sea with an entourage of 200, including Foreign Minister Prince Saud and several Cabinet ministers. The pro-American Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan, who is next in line to succeed to the throne after Abdullah, was not part of the delegation. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf met Abdullah at the airport and saw him off Sunday night with a 21-gun salute. In Washington, Mohammed Sadiq, Pakistan's deputy chief of mission, said Monday the report about Pakistan and Saudi Arabia reaching agreement on nuclear cooperation was "totally wrong." "This is against our policy," Sadiq told UPI. "Pakistan would never proliferate its nuclear technology. It's a very clear policy. This was not even discussed in the talks we held with the Saudis in Islamabad this week. It was not even on the agenda. It is out of the question." The Saudi Embassy in Washington did not immediately comment on the report. A joint Pakistani-Saudi communiqué posted on the embassy's Web site concerning Abdullah's visit to Islamabad mentioned only an agreement for "the maximum utilization of the existing economic potential of the two countries." There was no mention of military cooperation, nuclear or conventional. The CIA believes that Pakistan already exported nuclear know-how to North Korea in exchange for missile technology. Last year, a Pakistani C-130 was spotted by satellite loading North Korean missiles at Pyongyang airport. Pakistan said this was a straight purchase for cash and denied a nuclear quid pro quo. This correspondent and the chief of staff of the North Korean Air Force stayed at the same Islamabad hotel in May 2001. "Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia," the Pakistani source explained, "see a world that is moving from non-proliferation to proliferation of nuclear weapons." Pakistan, under the late dictator Gen. Zia ul-Haq decided to pursue the nuclear option following India's first nuclear test in 1974. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is now estimated at between 35 and 60 weapons. The Sunni Saudis have concluded that nothing will deter Shiite Iran from continuing its quest for nuclear weapons. Pakistan, on the other hand, is openly concerned about the recent armaments agreement between India, its nuclear rival, and Israel, a long-time nuclear power whose inventory is estimated at between 200 and 400 weapons. Iran and India, located on either side of Pakistan, have also signed a strategic agreement whose aim is regarded with suspicion in Islamabad. Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zafrullah Jamali is scheduled to fly to Tehran later this week to sound out Iranian leaders on the reasons for the defense deal with New Delhi. To counter what Pakistani and Saudi leaders regard as a multiregional threats, they have decided quietly to move ahead with a two-way exchange -- free or cheap oil for nuclear know-how and expertise. Pakistani pilots have been employed as contract pilots for the Royal Saudi Air Force for the past 30 years. Several hundred thousand Pakistani workers are employed by the Gulf states, both as skilled and unskilled workers, and their remittances are a hard currency boon for the Pakistani Treasury. In their private talks, according to the United Press International source, Abdullah and Musharraf also discussed the possibility of Pakistan supplying troops, not to Iraq, but to the kingdom. Abdullah can see that the world's largest oil reserves look increasingly vulnerable over the next 10 years. By mutual agreement, U.S. forces withdrew from Saudi Arabia earlier this year to relocate across the border in the tiny oil sheikhdom of Qatar. Saudi officials also remind their interlocutors that a closed meeting -- later well publicized -- of the U.S. Defense Policy Board in 2002 listened to an expert explain, with a 16-slide presentation, why and how the United States should seize and occupy Saudi oilfields in the country's eastern province. Richard Perle was then the chairman of the Pentagon-funded Defense Policy Board. Later in 2002, he resigned the chairmanship following a conflict with his business interests, but he remains a member of the influential panel. Perle is also known throughout the Middle East as one of the key architects of Operation Iraqi Freedom and a former strategic adviser to Benjamin Netanyahu while the latter was Israel's prime minister. The denials of any secret nuclear agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the source said, "must be seen in the same context as Iranian denials about its own nuclear weapons plans." Prior to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, along with the United Arab Emirates, were the only countries that recognized and aided Afghanistan's Taliban regime that had been educated in Pakistan's madrasas (Koranic schools). Taliban is now resurgent along the mountainous regions that straddle the Pakistan-Afghan border. Pakistani and U.S. Special Forces have been working the area in tandem since last summer to flush out Taliban and al-Qaida high altitude hideouts. Pakistani officials are also fearful that the Bush administration will leave them in the lurch after al-Qaida leader Osama bin laden has been killed or captured. They also speculate about what the policy would be in the event of a Democratic Party victory in the 2004 U.S. elections. To this day, the Saudi clergy continues to fund Pakistan's madrasas that are a substitute for the country's non-existent national education system. The only schools outside madrasas are expensive private institutions. Pakistan, with a crushing defense burden, only spends 1.7 percent of GDP on education (vs. 8 percent in India and 16.5 percent in the United States). Some 12,000 Koranic schools provide free room and board to some 700,000 Pakistani boys (ages 6 to 16) where they are taught to read and write in Urdu and Arabic and recite the Koran by heart. No other disciplines are practiced, but students are proselytized with anti-American, anti-Israeli and anti-Indian propaganda. By the time they Graduate, the majority is convinced that becoming a jihadi, or holy warrior, is the only way to block America's alleged plans to destroy Islam. Musharraf, in a milestone speech three months before Sept. 11, 2001, denounced the danger of these schools and urged syllabus reform. "We are producing terrorists," he warned at the time. But all attempts at reform have been blocked by the mullahs with the support of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal -- a coalition of the six major politico-religious parties -- that now governs two of Pakistan's four provinces. Musharraf has opted for appeasement of the MMA rather than confrontation. At the state banquet for Saudi Arabia's Abdullah, the principal MMA chieftains were invited and attended. The two traditional mainstream parties were not present. They were pointedly left off the guest list.
My reply to Robert Windrem apropos "Your article dated Oct.18, titled "Pakistan's nuclear father, master spy" which appeared in MSNBC and is linked above by Mudy. http://www.msnbc.com/news/765161.asp
k where is xerox and kalam compared :wacko: mentioning kalam and jehadi xerox machine in same sentance is itself an insult
rhytha,I have added the link in my post. It appears in MSNBC news
Great response K. I would have added that Xerox Khan is a registered member of Laskher-e-Toiba (fact published in various Western media) - a org banned by US Govt. Not to mention, LeT guys fighting 'freedom' in Maryland too. And his role in helping NK, Iran etc with puke nuke prolif., should be a cause of concerns to MSNBC readers in US.
Vishal: 'Officially' the recession in US has http://www.ajc.com/business/content/business/0703/17recession.html. What we have is just a slow jobless recovery and we still aren't out of the woods yet. As far as Bush - he's been given far less than credit than what he deserves - IMHO All which has nothing to do with purpose of this thread - "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security"
I cam across this by happenstance. Arvind Sharma is a professor of Comparative Religion(or something like that) at McGill University. http://www.aasianst.org/Viewpoints/Sharma.htm Their Real Meaning by Arvind Sharma, McGill University -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The real significance of the recent Indo-Pak nuclear tests has been lost in the current buzz around them. The significance which is being attached to them at the moment is at best strategic. Often it does not even rise to that level. India is said to have gone in for tests out of a desire to match China; then Pakistan is said to have felt compelled to follow suit to match India. Even here I think the nations are acting out of motives higher than those of machismo or jingoism. India had to carry out its tests because of its security concerns, and Pakistan, similarly, had to carry out its own tests because of its own security concerns. India needed to feel secure vis-a-vis China, and Pakistan needed to feel secure vis-a-vis India. Thus a geo-strategic adjustment has now taken place in Asia at the higher nuclear level, apart from the usual conventional level. The point worth noting in all this is that the West was powerless to influence the course of events in the subcontinent. The West did not want either India or Pakistan to carry out these tests, and it could stop neither of them. Sixty years ago the West controlled the subcontinent, and now it is powerless to intervene. In 1946 the West had India, in 1998 the West was had by India. A fixation with the Indo-Pak rivalry in this context obscures this remarkable fact, just as a fixation with the partition of the country obscures the fact that, all said and done, and notwithstanding Hindu-Muslim feuding, the British Raj on the subcontinent did come to an end and both India and Pakistan became independent, and co-sharers in this freedom from imperial domination in 1947. The year 1947 therefore signaled the beginning of the end of Western hegemony over the subcontinent. Current events confirm that this process of the recession of Western influence on the subcontinent has now been completed. The fact that it was completed unhindered is significant because, until the recent events, two factors could be identified as possibly hindering, or even reversing it. The first of these is the fact that, after the Second World War, Britain declined as a world power but the United States took its place. Hence the decline of British control over the subcontinent did not automatically entail the decline of Western control over the subcontinent; the United States could have replaced Britain in that role. Current events indicate that this has not happened. The second factor pertains to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the U.S.A. as the sole super-power. This development also could have prevented the subcontinent from slipping out of the West’s control because, as the sole super-power, the U.S.A. could have reasserted Western hegemony over the subcontinent in one form or another. This has not happened either. Thus one can say that the recent developments are historical in significance. The Indian subcontinent began to slip out of Western hands in 1947 and this process has now been completed, in 1998. India and Pakistan may not feel secure vis-a-vis each other but their independence from Western domination has now been secured. It is also worth noting that this retreat of the West from South Asia forms part and parcel of its retreat from Asia in general, with its retreat from East Asia (with the exception of Japan) having been secured already by the rise of China. The differences between India, Pakistan and China make no difference to this retreat, just as differences among England, France and other European countries made little difference to European expansion over Asia and Africa.i am not sure i entirely agree with this, but this is an interesting hypothesis
http://www.abc.net.au/ra/newstories/RANewsStories_992090.htm China insists its nuclear energy cooperation with Pakistan is for peaceful purposes and denies that exchanges with Islamabad violates commitments on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Beijing was responding to questions about a US Central Intelligence Agency report issued last week, which alleged that Chinese firms may be aiding Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. A foreign ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, says China is a party state to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is opposed to the proliferation of weapons of any kind. He further maintains that the nuclear energy cooperation with Pakistan is being carried out under safeguards put in place by the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency. The CIA report claimed Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the first six months of this year.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_464030,00050004.htm Washington, November 18 The United States will use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend South Korea against North Korea, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said. "We understand that weakness can be provocative, that weakness can invite people into doing things that they otherwise might not even consider." Rumsfeld, appearing at a joint news conference on Monday in Seoul with South Korean Defence Minister Ch Young-kil said. A joint statement by the two countries after the talks said that the US commitment to South Korea includes "the continued provision of a nuclear umbrella for South Korea".
Vishal, This is not right thread for the topic...can be moved to other relevant thread. Nevertheless will respond to your post:
Viren, you missed the whole point of what i said. i wanted to say what US does in world is not always just(pardon me if i forgot that there is nothing like "JUST" which exists today.) you said US saved iraqis from saddam.Sir, thank you very much.They did it 20 years late.AND again you missed my point!! US or BUSH never beated SADDAM for saving Iraqis from him.It just happened because it was in US's interest at certain point of time(2003 rather than 20 years ago).So again i slash your credit to US.They don't deserve it.You mistook their self-interest as their desire to liberate iraqis from saddam. yea....the day US/nush joined india against pak,saudi i am full with them. BUT again i will not give credit to US for that.Because US will do that when its convenient and in self-interest for them.Thanks you very much. As far as american media is concerned (as you used words like "CNBC...CNN?") well,its all rubbish.They are well handled and in hands of MNCs.I am telling you again look at fiscal deficit of US.Its managed bcoz world trade currency dollar helps US to maintain it. I think you have much confidence in US economy. well...let me saerch an article which puts my point with proofs.lemme search it again...it was on upi.org
Vishal - maybe we are both saying the same things in a bit different way.
Iran's Likely Atomic Suppliers: Russia, China, Pakistan NewsMax.com Wires Thursday, Nov. 20, 2003 VIENNA, Austria – The International Atomic Energy Agency has identified Russia, China and Pakistan as probable suppliers of some of the technology Iran used to enrich uranium in its suspect nuclear programs, diplomats told The Associated Press on Thursday. The disclosure came as the IAEA's board discussed how to react to Iran's nuclear activities. The board is debating the wording of a resolution that would satisfy U.S. calls for strong condemnation of Iran's past cover-ups and European desires to keep Iran cooperating by focusing on its recent openness. Though Iran has acknowledged nearly two decades of concealment, it has recently begun cooperating with the agency in response to international pressure. As part of that cooperation, it has suspended uranium enrichment, an activity that the United States had linked to what it says was Iran's nuclear weapons agenda. Iran insists it enriched uranium only to produce power. Though acknowledging that some of its enrichment equipment had traces of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, it insists those traces were inadvertently imported on material it bought abroad. Iran has said it cannot identify the countries of origin because it bought the centrifuges and laser enrichment equipment through third parties. The Vienna-based IAEA needs to establish where the equipment came from, however, to ascertain whether Iran is telling the truth about the source of the traces. The diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, declined to say how the agency established the probable origin of the equipment. Pakistan has denied all involvement in Iran's enrichment program. Moscow's public nuclear link with Tehran is a still-to-be-finalized $800 million deal to help build Iran's first nuclear reactor. The United States says the facility in Bushehr on the Persian Gulf could help Iran develop weapons. The Kremlin has said it shares some of the U.S. concerns and has prodded Tehran to accept tighter IAEA controls. Good News, Bad News The IAEA's meeting lasted less than two hours, with discussions set to continue Friday. The discussions were being held behind closed doors, but the agency released a copy of the opening remarks by Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei. ElBaradei told the agency's 35-nation board of governors that he expected it to address "the bad news and the good news." "The bad news is that there have been failures and breaches. The good news is that there has been a new chapter in cooperation," he said. "There is an intensive discussion right now on the draft resolution. The latest version being discussed is quite strong." Still, the agency doesn't know if Iran has tried to build nuclear weapons. That, he told the board, "will take some time and much verification effort." But he welcomed Tehran's recent cooperation with the agency. "The situation has changed significantly since the middle of last month, when a new chapter of implementation of safeguards in Iran seems to have begun, a chapter that is characterized by active cooperation and openness on the part of Iran," he said. The United States had hoped the IAEA board would find Tehran in noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at its meeting. Diplomats described Thursday's talks as "very fluid," suggesting there was an effort to close the gap between the U.S. and European approaches on how to deal with Iran. On Wednesday, Washington rejected a proposed European draft resolution that would urge Iran to continue cooperation with the agency but refrain from harshly condemning it for concealing parts of its nuclear program, saying it was prepared to opt for no resolution rather than a toothless one. Drawn up by France, Germany and one of Washington's closest allies, Britain, the rough draft minimized nearly two decades of covert nuclear programs that the U.S. administration says point to an effort to develop nuclear weapons. Instead, it focused on positive steps taken by Iran over the past few weeks to deflect international suspicions, including suspending uranium enrichment and agreeing to inspections on demand by IAEA inspectors. A senior diplomat, who reported on the meeting on condition of anonymity, said a compromise resolution satisfying both sides was now in the works. Whereas the initial European wording chastised Iran for "failure to fulfill its obligations," new discussion focused on stronger language, either including past "noncompliance" of IAEA agreements by Iran, or finding it in "breach of its obligations." Both would be more acceptable to the United States and its allies, the diplomat said.
UN Probes Possible Iran-Pakistan Nuclear Link November 27, 2003 6:23 p.m. ET By Louis Charbonneau VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear agency is probing a possible link between Iran and Pakistan after Tehran acknowledged using centrifuge designs that appear identical to ones used in Pakistan's quest for an atom bomb, diplomats say. Diplomats said the agency was trying to determine whether the drawings had come from someone in Pakistan or elsewhere. Tehran, accused by Washington of seeking to develop nuclear weapons, told the U.N. nuclear agency it got the blueprints from a "middleman" whose identity the agency had not determined, a Western diplomat told Reuters on condition of anonymity. It was unclear where the "middleman" got the drawings. The U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said in a report Iran told the IAEA it got centrifuge drawings "from a foreign intermediary around 1987." Centrifuges are used to purify uranium for use as fuel or in weapons. Experts say the ability to produce such material is crucial for an arms program and the biggest hurdle any country with ambitions to build a bomb must overcome. Several diplomats familiar with the IAEA said the blueprints were of a machine by the Dutch enrichment unit of the British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco -- a leader in the field of centrifuges. Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, told Reuters he had no knowledge a Urenco design had been used by Iran. "This is new information to me," he said. In a statement to Reuters, Urenco said it had not supplied any centrifuge know-how or machinery to Iran. "Urenco would like to strongly affirm that they have never supplied any technology or components to Iran at any time," it said. PAKISTAN, IRAN DENY NUCLEAR COOPERATION Pakistan, which non-proliferation experts and diplomats say used the Urenco blueprint, and Iran have repeatedly denied any cooperation in the nuclear field. Iran had long insisted its centrifuge program was purely indigenous and that it had received no outside help whatsoever -- not from Pakistan or anywhere else. The father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, worked at the Urenco uranium enrichment facility in the Dutch city of Almelo in the 1970s. After his return to Pakistan he was convicted in absentia of nuclear espionage by an Amsterdam court, but the verdict was overturned on appeal. He has acknowledged he did take advantage of his experience of many years of working on similar projects in Europe and his contacts with various manufacturing firms. But David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and head of the Institute for Science and International Security think-tank, said: "Khan is widely believed to have taken these drawings and developed them." Khan is known to have visited Iran, but the diplomats said there was no proof of a link involving him and his laboratories in Pakistan. The United States accuses Iran of using its nuclear power program, parts of which it kept hidden from the IAEA for 18 years, as a front to build an atom bomb. Tehran denies this. On Wednesday, the IAEA Board of Governors unanimously approved a resolution that "strongly deplores" Iran's two-decade concealment of its centrifuge enrichment program, while praising its promises to be transparent from now on. The IAEA is still investigating Iran's enrichment program in order to identify the origin of traces of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) inspectors found at the Natanz enrichment plant and the Kalaye Electric Co. But when IAEA experts visited Iran's pilot enrichment plant at Natanz earlier this year, they saw it bore the marks of the centrifuges outlined in the Urenco designs, diplomats said. They said Tehran later acknowledged it had used the Urenco designs and recently showed them to the IAEA. Iran also admitted to a massive procurement effort to get centrifuge components. Iran says some of these components, purchased through "middlemen" in the middle of 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, were contaminated with HEU. This, the Iranians say, is why the IAEA found HEU traces at Natanz and Kalaye, where centrifuge parts were tested and manufactured. Diplomats and non-proliferation experts say Iran's centrifuge program based on the Urenco design appears to have been more successful than Pakistan's. They say Pakistan eventually abandoned the Urenco model and chose another one.
While there is nothing earthshattering in this assessment, it is a sober appraisal of India's strategic sector. http://us.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/19guest.htm?headline=Auditing~India's~strategic~sector Auditing India's Strategic Sector February 18, 2004 The defence reforms initiated by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance in the late 1990s produced several welcome changes in the defence policy making process. It led to the creation of a National Security Council to facilitate long-term strategic planning and ensure continuity in the formulation and implementation of security policies. The Pokhran-II nuclear tests in May 1998 and the subsequent decision to pursue weaponisation led to further changes. The government formed a Nuclear Command Authority to manage India's nuclear arsenal. The NCA is the umbrella organisation comprising the civilian leadership and the military infrastructure needed to design and implement India's nuclear policies. The government also created a Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to serve as a single point interface between the armed forces and the civilian leadership. However, the strategic sector comprising of the Defence Research and Development Organisation and the Department of Atomic Energy has been largely untouched by the reforms process. The first step towards addressing this deficiency is to institute a periodic and systematic audit mechanism for the strategic sector. The audit must investigate the economic and technical aspects of the projects currently handled by the strategic sector. Not surprisingly, the defence reforms package did not broach such a concept. The reasons for avoiding such a delicate issue are not hard to fathom. The initial projects undertaken by the strategic sector, especially by the DRDO, ended in failures and such failures were couched in euphemistic terms like 'technology gathering' to cover them up. Naturally the civilian leadership and the strategic sector did not consider the concept of an audit mechanism since it would have opened a can of worms regarding the functioning of the strategic sector. Second, the secrecy surrounding the projects handled by the strategic sector precluded any public scrutiny. Third, top scientists from the strategic sector have served as scientific advisors to the civilian leadership and wielded significant influence on decisions regarding strategic projects. It is therefore possible that successive scientific advisors used their influence to discourage proposals for implementing a comprehensive audit mechanism since it would have been potentially harmful to their interests. Fourth, the DRDO and the DAE are placed on the high pedestal of patriotism and questioning their capabilities is considered tantamount to undermining India's technical competence. Homi Bhabha, A P J Abdul Kalam, R Chidambaram are considered national icons who could do no wrong. The lack of proper oversight over the strategic sector has resulted in the domination of the policy making process by key members of the community involved in the nuclear weapons program and the strategic missile projects. Managers from the strategic sector have become both the advisors and implementers of strategic projects. The civilian leadership therefore receives inputs from the scientists within the strategic sector and does not possess any mechanism to verify the evidence presented by the scientists. The lack of any feedback from independent analysts confines the defence policy-making process to a closed loop. The decision-making process regarding these strategic projects is at best ad hoc and personalised.this is an important point to make and I have made it many times in my posts at BR, but even in BR the adulation level for the nuclear establishment is very high. The lack of an oversight mechanism has also resulted in a highly centralised style of management within the strategic sector. Top managers within the strategic sector tend to take decisions without proper consultations and dissent against the top management is usually stifled. For example, the government has declared a moratorium on further testing based on the advice from former Atomic Energy Commission chairman R Chidambaram. Chidambaram has indicated that the tests in May 1998 yielded sufficient data to preclude any further testing. Several scientists, however, have stated that the safety of India's nuclear weapons stockpile might necessitate further testing. The government declared the moratorium on further testing even before the scientists had a chance to study crater morphology and conduct radiochemical analysis of the nuclear test site. The question that we need to be asking ourselves is whether this lack of accountability of the strategic sector will enhance or hamper India's national security. Budgetary and technical oversight of the strategic sector will greatly assist in improving indigenous defence production in India. An option for increasing such an oversight is to institute a systematic and periodic audit for the projects undertaken by the DRDO and the DAE. Several factors indicate that a periodic and systematic audit process will be beneficial for India's national security. First, any audit process is likely to assist the policy makers in analysing the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a specific strategic project. Quite often policy makers face the 'Make or Buy' dilemma. Crucial choices have to be made between indigenous production and foreign procurement. The strategic sector has done a good job in linking indigenous defence production with a sense of patriotism. As a result, the civilian leadership and the bureaucracy have repeatedly endorsed the claims of the strategic sector regarding its capacity to indigenously produce any item for the armed forces. Although the aim of achieving total indigenous production is a noble one, it is also critical to identify our strengths and weaknesses and develop a more effective defence procurement strategy. Second, an audit will reveal the inconsistencies within the existing strategic programs and will provide means to streamline the system. India's defence projects have long been associated with missed deadlines, excess budget costs, and long development periods. Projects such as the Advanced Technology Vehicle, the Sagarika ballistic missile, and the Light Combat Aircraft have faced chronic delays. An audit mechanism will serve to identify potential weaknesses in the current development cycles. According to an audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of important DRDO projects for the period till 1998, the Light Combat Aircraft project incurred a whopping Rs 20 billion expenditure without any significant progress towards completion. Please read: Chinks in the Armour Third, such an audit will provide an effective system of checks and balances to prevent the hijacking of decisions concerning strategic projects by a particular entity. Despite the absence of an extensive US style military industrial complex, the history of India's indigenous defence projects reveals the influence of special interest groups in the decision-making process. A periodic audit of the strategic sector will prevent the manipulation of policies by any special interest groups and will provide an effective oversight to curb such activities. Fourth, constituting an audit mechanism will ensure greater transparency regarding government policies and will instill confidence among the public on the proper use of funds. India prides itself in being the world's largest democracy and it behooves the nation to act in a manner that justifies the label. In the past, critics of India's defence policies have pointed to several shortcomings in the policy making process. The non-involvement of the military in policy planning, the lack of institutional processes, and ad hoc and personalised style of management are some of the weaknesses pointed out by critics. The defence reforms initiated in the late 1990s have begun to address some of the shortcomings. The military is getting involved in the decision making process, strategic threats are being analysed in a systematic manner, and the management of defence policies is becoming more institutionalised. Oversight of the strategic sector is an issue that has not received the attention it deserves. Instituting an audit mechanism for the strategic sector should not be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the efforts of the strategic sector. Rather, it is an attempt to identify potential weaknesses and rectify them. Auditing of costs will check runaway expenses and keep the costs from spinning out of control. A technical audit will ensure that the projects meet the Quality Requirements of the end user, i e, the Indian armed forces. It is highly unlikely that India will meet the target of Plan 2005, a ten year plan initiated by A P J Abdul Kalam to strengthen India's military industrial base. However, adopting the right set of steps like instituting a strategic audit will help to strengthen India's defence production capability at least by 2015. Sundara Vadlamudi works at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, California
Methinks there is too much paranoia about this guy in the other forum. All he is saying is that there should be an audit process. It is of course possible that there is an audit process constantly underway and he is unaware of it. After all he is just a Graduate student. I say let us cut him some slack. There is nothing wrong with anything he has said in the article and to say that there should be an audit is not such a crime. Something similar has been said by reputable strategic analysts such as Bharat Karnad in his book on strategic security. The US has long ago separated the advocacy part of the AEC from the regulatory aspects (NRC). India should do something similar and the task of auditing strategic programs should be entrusted to an independent body such as a panel of academics from the high tech institutions. The present setup where the auditors/regulators and the scientists are one and the same is not satisfactory and is tantamount to lack of accountability.
http://headlines.sify.com/2872news1.html?headline=Nuke~bunkers~give~military~edge~to~India Washington: India's proposal to build "nuclear fallout shelters" along its border with Pakistan is more than a defensive maneuver, according to US geopolitical analysts. With Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons, the move would seem a logical defensive mechanism but the size and the scope of the bunkers "indicate their possible use in conventional warfare," analysts at Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor) said. The Indian military has attempted over the last six months to significantly widen its technological advantages over the Pakistani military, Stratfor said, and the proposed shelter construction is another step in that direction. Although as shelters they do not offer a significant tactical advantage, it was likely that the bunkers would be used for a "purposes not entirely related to protection from nuclear fallout". Indian Defence Ministry officials have alluded to using underground border facilities to protect command centers and other key facilities. Representatives of Dass Hitachi -- the construction company for the shelters -- outlined plans for large bunkers that would contain decontamination facilities separate from areas that could house and sustain approximately 30 personnel. "This description -- with separate decontamination, housing and communications facilities -- not only gives an idea of a bunker's size, but also makes it seem like something more than a fallout shelter," Stratfor said. Using underground bunkers to stage troops and equipment is a relatively widespread military tactic, Stratfor said. North Korea is believed to have hundreds of such bunkers peppered across the country. The bunkers are perfect for positioning command and control (C2) centers as well as key artillery and missile systems. Fixed underground C2 facilities grant two key advantages to India, the analysts said. First, a static location near the likely front means communications along this line can be interconnected through high-speed phone and data lines. Second, an underground location means that bunkers and their communications links become essentially invulnerable to enemy attack. "Constant, reliable communication is vital to the success of any modern military; a network of fixed underground facilities easily achieves that goal." "The construction of underground bunkers coupled with India's long-term military buildup and modernization reveals a widening rift in military capability between Pakistan and India."
http://us.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/29iaf.htm A K Dhar in New Delhi | February 29, 2004 18:57 IST The Indian Air Force is in hectic negotiations with French, Russian and US bidders to purchase 125 frontline multi-role fighters to partially replace about 300 MiG-21 aircraft, which are on the verge of being phased out. The IAF had projected an immediate need for about 125 new fighter planes with the selection to be completed in a few months. Some of the newly-purchased aircraft are likely to be given to the newly-raised Strategic Forces Command. The new fighters would seek to partially replace 300 MiG 21 FL/M interceptors and 100 MiG 23BN ground attack fighters, which are on the verge of being phased out. India, officials said, was expected to go in for direct purchase of the fighters in a bid to allow the Aircraft Development Agency (ADA) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited more time to make progress on the Tejas, country's Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which may be inducted only in 2009. With the delay in the LCA programme, the IAF is in danger of entering a critical phase as it faces reduction in its fighter fleet from the current 39 squadrons to 32 by 2006. The French-built Mirages, with their proven capability during the Kargil war and in Operation Parakram, are emerging as frontrunners. Dassault, while offering the upgraded Mirage 2000-5, is also ready for technology transfer arrangement to HAL. A high-level team from the company was recently in Delhi for protracted negotiations with the Defence Ministry and Indian Air Force officials. The two major Russian fighter companies Mikoyan, makers of the MiG range of fighters, and Robensoexport, makers of Sukhoi aircraft, have formed a consortium to jointly bid for the Indian contract, according to Defence Ministry sources in Delhi. The joint bid stems from India eliminating the Sukhoi OKB and NPK Irkut's offer of lighter versions of the still-to-be-developed SU-35 and SU-30 fighters. The IAF wants a fighter with a maximum take off weight of 25,000 kg, forcing the Sukhoi company to join hands with Mikoyan to back the upgraded MiG-29MI/M2 for the contract. However, the Russian proposal seems to be a non-starter as Mikoyan cannot meet the Indian time schedule because it will be heavily engaged in the manufacture of the MiG 29K for the Admiral Gorshkov, which India has contracted to purchase. Another contender is US company Lockheed-Martin, which is offering technology transfer of its runway bestseller F-16 Fighting Falcon.
amit21mech change you username to meet forum guidelines -moderator
Belatedly i am responding to Viren after several months to repost this in IF and link it in the library and bookmarks section Overt assistance from Pakistan may bring dire consequences Two analyses are presented here from Janes' Security; one is dated 20 Sept. 2001 and another was presented in October 2000, well before the acts of war on Sept. 11, 2001; the latter analysis relates to the growing threat from "asymmetric warfare" - usually involving smaller numbers of protagonists than traditional war, and using unconventional tactics that often have high political or material impact relative to the force involved. USA seeking an alliance with Pakistan is a good example of asymmetric alliance; the consequences for the alliance partner possessing greater force can be devastating. How can this asymmetric war be waged to victory? The war has to be fought premised on a high moral ground and focussed on the root causes of terror. The 'heavy' targets may last for a few seconds of CNN coverage of pyrotechnics or for a few days; the war against fundamental entities can be won only by eliminating the rationale for such entities. Intelligence Digest, 20 September 2001 Overt assistance from Pakistan may bring dire consequences As the United States plans its military response to last week's terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the role of Pakistan — and the position of the country's unelected military leader, General Pervez Musharraf — have become key questions. JID investigates and warns that, should the general fall as a result of offering overt support to the USA in its campaign against the Taliban, the consequences – both for the US-led alliance and the entire region – could be potentially catastrophic. There are many reasons why the present crisis will prove deeply troubling for Pakistan's self-appointed president. Having started the year with the prospect of building a new and more positive relationship with the incoming administration of US President George W. Bush, pressure is now mounting on Musharraf as embarrassing evidence of Islamabad's active support for the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan comes under intense scrutiny. One of the more difficult issues which the general may have to explain is the close links between two Islamic militant groups involved in the Kashmir region and the world's most wanted terrorist, Osama Bin Laden. The two groups in question, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e Tayyiba, were specifically singled-out in the US State Department's Report on the Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2000. Although, the Pakistani government has repeated denied that it has any involvement with these two groups, credible intelligence community sources point to close ties between senior members of Pakistan's military and security services and both organisations. Other awkward questions will focus on allegations that Pakistan has hosted training camps for militant Islamic groups and provided them with financial assistance — charges which Musharraf's officials have repeatedly denied — and that Pakistan has been used as the regular transit route via which Bin Laden's Al-Qa'eda group has travelled. In particular, there are serious allegations that Pakistan's Inter- Service Intelligence organisation has active links with both the Taliban regime's intelligence service and Bin Laden himself. According to local intelligence sources, the Pakistani authorities have provided medical facilities for the ailing Bin Laden, including renal dialysis, at a military hospital in Peshawar. None of this will be unfamiliar to US intelligence operatives who have been compiling extensive reports on these alleged activities. However, it is becoming clear that both the Taliban and Al-Qa'eda would have found it difficult to have continued functioning — including the latter group's terrorist activities — without substantial aid and support from Islamabad. This would, logically, place Pakistan in the category of "states which support terrorism", according to the US government's definition. President Bush's pointed warnings to Bin Laden's backers will have put Musharraf on the spot. The key question is not whether Pakistan will support the US anti- Taliban coalition, but only how far the general will dare to go in his desperate efforts to make amends for past activities that have been very well documented by US intelligence. Above all, Musharraf will realise that having come to power in 1999 by means of a military coup d'etat, he will have to rely on the continued support of Pakistan's army and security services — both of which are alleged to have close links with the US's principal targets. In broad terms, the US administration has three main options for military action against the Taliban and its notorious `guest': 1. Launch a general air-campaign against Taliban targets (government offices, strategic facilities, military forces etc) 2. Undertake selective targeting of Bin Laden's bases and associated locations 3. Attempt a very specific `smash and grab' raid, probably by helicopter and involving special forces, to seize or kill Bin Laden. Having launched an ill-fated Cruise missile strike against Bin Laden in 1998, the US cannot risk a repeat mission that fails to hit its main target yet again. Therefore, highly detailed information about his movements will be essential and Pakistan's intelligence service is very well placed to provide this, not least because of its alleged links to the man and his Al-Qa'eda organisation. For Musharraf, the risks are enormous whichever course he ultimately adopts. Failure to co-operate fully with the US will leave Pakistan isolated and perhaps lead to even tighter and more damaging international sanctions. On the other hand, he is under intense domestic pressure, not least from within his own armed forces. There is also the issue of the militant Islamic groups in Kashmir to consider. What makes the situation even more critical is that Pakistan is one of the world's nuclear powers. Although as JID has previously pointed out, there are serious limitations on the country's nuclear delivery systems, Islamabad may have around 25 nuclear missiles at its immediate disposal (see JID 9 June 2000). While it is highly unlikely that the present Pakistani government would actually resort to the use of such weapons unless in response to an overwhelming military attack, there is no guarantee that a pro-Taliban regime in Islamabad would act with similar restraint. General Musharraf came to power with the support of Pakistan's military. He is extremely vulnerable if the army, or at least a significant element of it, turns against him. If he were to be ousted during an anti-Western, pro-Taliban uprising organised by an alliance between Kashmiri militants and nationalist military officers, then the prospect of a full-scale regional conflagration might become very real. 869 of 3075 words Other features in this week's JID cover the following: · The dilemma faced by the Palestinians; · Potential assistance from Russia regarding bases in the former Soviet Central Asian republics; · The threat facing the Saudi leadership from Bin Laden and his supporters. http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jid/jid01092 0_1_n.shtml Jane Intelligence Review,12 October 2000 Intelligence gathering asymmetric threats - PART ONE Kevin O'Brien is Deputy Director of the International Centre for Security Analysis (ICSA). Joseph Nusbaum is a Researcher at ICSA, working on cyber threats presented by sub-state actors. Visit: www.icsa.ac.uk Much has been made of the changing security agenda and the emergence of new threats since the end of the Cold War. Most of these threats to national and international security are 'mutations' of existing threats. Kevin O'Brien and Joseph Nusbaum examine the challenge to intelligence communities from asymmetric warfare. The much-vaunted globalisation, new liberalisations in formerly autocratic states, increasing privatisation of state functions and, most importantly, the revolution in computing, telecommunications and data-transference capacities (commonly referred to as the Information Revolution - IR), have all impacted strongly on the international security agenda and on the nature of the threat actors in today's world. These factors have also had a significant impact on the intelligence process, requirements and use, as societies become more open, and as information and knowledge are passed around the world 'at the click of a mouse'. This has given rise to the introduction of the term 'asymmetric threat'. This refers to those threats that have gained prevalence since 1990 and present non-traditional - one heavily equipped military facing down another - threat postures to Western governments, and their defence and national security communities. These threats do not present the danger of a major conventional war to Developed World powers but do present equal (sometimes greater) dangers to the populations and governments of these states. In this new threat environment the world is faced with an increase in low-intensity conflicts (LICs). These include chemical-, biological- and radiological-capable actors, including an ever-increasing number of extremist groups. This has led to a rise in the number of less discriminate attacks perpetrated across the globe daily. To fully anticipate, analyse and investigate these threats, a much wider understanding and appreciation of the circumstances under which an asymmetric attack can develop must be prevalent in any intelligence community. Part one of this study focuses on the nature of asymmetric threats as they have evolved over the last decade from the more traditional perception of these being 'unconventional threats', how they impact (and will impact in the future) on Developed World security concerns, both domestically and internationally, and the concern that they raise for the national security and defence communities of the Developed World. [Part Two of this report, which appeared in the November 2000 edition of Jane's Intelligence Review, focuses on the intelligence requirements needed to respond to asymmetric threats – looking closely at information operations (IOs) and cyber-threats – and the potential for increased intelligence capabilities to deal with them.] Tools for asymmetric warfare In the future, opponents will be faced with a number of options for attempting to deter, disrupt, degrade or defeat Western military power. The approaches that an asymmetric actor can take can generally be divided into three 'families of threats', as the Canadian government calls them, outlining broad categories that potential asymmetric actors might use against Developed World forces. First, the acquisition of WMD, or long-range ballistic or cruise missiles. Future regional opponents could threaten Western forces with military escalation. Even without operational use, the mere presence of such a capability could overshadow regional security concerns and weaken the commitment of key allies to respond militarily to regional aggression. Second, the use of cyber or cyber-based warfare and the acquisition of selected high-tech sensors, communications and weapon systems. This could be called the 'strategy of the niche player', where cyber weapons and tools would be used to disrupt the information technology (IT) capability of military and civilian systems, as well as launch attacks on NII and CNI to disrupt and destroy the information-based economies and infrastructures of Western states. Third, choosing a conflict environment, such as large cities or jungles, not conducive to conventional forces, would degrade the Western military's capacity to find and attack militarily significant targets. These categories, summarised as WMD, IO and non-conventional operations (NCO), have existed in one form or another historically. In the last decade, however, they have become much more significant threats. Less sophisticated means to conduct asymmetric warfare are just as effective, especially at the tactical level. Obscurants to defeat laser-guided weapons; limited communications to thwart electronic sensors; human (non-combatant) shields to protect combatants; heat generators to confuse infrared sensors; and fighting in urban areas where heavy forces are impractical are key examples of non technological means available to asymmetric actors. Determining the types and levels of response to defend the interests and security of the Developed World has become a central aim of these defence and intelligence communities as mass conventional war threats fade into the background over the next decade. Methods and means In the 'families' listed above, a number of common factors exist. The first is that every threat has several acceptable delivery methods. The range, speed and accuracy of delivery continues to evolve rapidly and generally to the advantage of the attacker. While 'traditional' delivery platforms include military aircraft, missiles, rocket systems and special forces, alternative delivery means for asymmetric warfare include suitcases, commercial vehicles or couriers, public transportation systems, and private vehicles in the air, at sea and on land. It is worth noting that the most devastating asymmetric attacks on civilians in North America, Europe and Japan to date have not relied on military platforms for delivery. Similarly, the threat is compounded by the acquisition of high-tech sensors, communications and weapons systems by 'rogue' states and non- state actors, such as transnational organised crime (TOC) syndicates. The exploitation of civilian sources, such as the Internet and commercial satellite imagery, as well as the proliferation of advanced weapons, allow better operational planning, more accurate targeting and greater damage by the asymmetric actor. Finally, and ironically, the Developed World is making the asymmetric actor's job much easier through its over-reliance on large volumes of information provided by a largely unregulated Internet. In most instances, the populations and governments of Western countries rely almost entirely on national critical information infrastructures (NCII), consisting of government and corporate computer servers, telecommunications facilities and Internet Service Providers. All of these present ready targets for an asymmetric attack. Responding to a potentially devastating cyber or cyber-based attack has become one of the key priorities of most Developed World governments today. Non-conventional operations Conventional organised warfare - at least in the Developed World - between conventional powers is rapidly being superseded by LICs. Nuclear weaponry has almost eliminated the possibility of conflict between the major powers due to fears over escalation, and the advances in conventional firepower of Developed World states against Developing World ones (as was seen in the 1998 Gulf War) leaves little room for the more traditional conception of organised warfare between states. As LIC becomes the dominant nature of warfare in the 21st century, the nature of war fighting is also changing. Western powers are being forced to confront this new threat to regional stability. The interactions and ties between such conflicts and the transnational trade in narcotics, weapons, nuclear materials, people and terrorism are becoming indistinguishable. All of these crimes are in evidence in contemporary conflicts throughout Africa and Latin America (for example, the Revolutionary United Front [RUF] in Sierra Leone, the Lord's Resistance Army [LRA] in Uganda, and the drug-lords of Colombia and Mexico), as well as parts of the Balkans, the former Soviet Union (for example, over 40,000 Islamic 'mercenaries', or mujahideen, fought in the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia, compared with 15,000 in Chechnya) and Asia. Attacks such as Pan Am 103 and the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway are examples of asymmetric terrorist attacks. Terrorism is, by its very nature, asymmetric, achieving military-like results against a superior force relatively cheaply and with little friendly bloodshed. Actors can also use terrorism strategically and tactically. The World Trade Center bombing was a strategic act aimed at a symbolic target in the USA; the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia was a tactical attack on Allied troops in the field. Both show the vulnerability of modern societies to such forms of asymmetric attack. NCOs can involve the use of complex terrain, novel tactics and technology (hit-and-run tactics, fighting in large urban areas where the identification of attackers is hampered by large numbers of civilian bystanders and where counter attacks carry the risk of further civilian casualties, and enhanced blast munitions that can facilitate direct attacks on Western forces maximise the physical and psychological impact of an attack, and hinder military and police responses). Economic disruption is another tactic (including attacks on the means of production, the produce itself and on commercial infrastructure. This can lower national productivity, which can lead to critical shortages and directly affect the civilian population). Civil disobedience is also exploited (the use of demonstrations, illegal occupations of facilities, boycotts, strikes and riots to destabilise or discredit the government or its security forces. Terror is also a prime tool of asymmetric warfare (the targeting of non-combatants in locations where attacks were never previously considered, or the hijacking or taking of hostages, causes terror among the population out of proportion to the risks or cost to the attacker). All these offset the advantages enjoyed by Western military and security forces. Lethal agents employed in such operations range from a knife or a home-made bomb to a wide range of military weapons and munitions. Examples include the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Weapons of mass destruction WMD, their proliferation and means of deployment are a dangerous asymmetric threat. They inflict mass casualties, they cause terror and they degrade morale. It is also possible for some of these weapons to be produced by individuals, a factor that increases the scope of the potential threat. Rather than being weapons of deterrence, as they were during the Cold War, they are increasingly becoming the weapons of choice for 'second-rate' military powers and non-state groups. Acquisition of WMD by a potential opponent, with or without long-range delivery mechanisms such as ballistic or cruise missiles, would threaten Western states or deployed Allied forces with a dramatic form of military escalation. The availability and presence of these weapon systems are also significant factors because a threat alone, without the operational deployment of such a capability, could act as a deterrent to military deployment and operations, and even peacekeeping activities. The threatened use of WMD can produce strategic and political effects that may overshadow their military utility. Chemical and biological weapons can be inexpensive, easy to develop and are readily available. Their proliferation is largely due to this. Information to build them is available on the Internet, production technology is often dual use (commercial and military), and the materials to make chemical weapons are available anywhere. Biological agents based on the use of pathogens or toxins are easier and less expensive to produce than either nuclear or chemical weapons. Biological agents can cause casualties on a scale similar to that of nuclear weapons, or threaten the food supply. Their relatively low cost of production is within the capabilities of basic civil biotechnologists. In the short- to medium-term, biological agents must be considered very attractive to potential adversaries. In comparison with biological agents, more is known about chemical warfare agents, and defences against such agents are better developed. Potential threat countries, 'rogue' states and non-state actors are likely to continue chemical weapons programmes. A significant new factor in the chemical threat is that, while rogue states may not have the chemical stockpiles necessary to sustain attacks envisaged during the Cold War, they may have sufficient quantities to support terrorist activity. The threat from non- traditional chemical agents, such as toxic industrial materials, may grow in the short to medium term. Finally, they are easy to weaponise, deploy and hide. Nuclear weapons are perhaps the asymmetric weapon of choice, overmatching any conventional capability and providing a psychological edge. There are seven declared nuclear states, but others will probably have nuclear capabilities in the future, giving them a quantum leap in their warfighting capability. The proliferation of nuclear weapons will continue. In the near term Western states are not likely to face nuclear attack. However, because the effects of nuclear attack are so drastic, this possibility cannot be overlooked, especially where Allied forces deployed overseas could experience the effects of nuclear weapons resulting from a nuclear exchange between proliferating nations. Deriving partly from nuclear developments, devices based on radioactive materials are relatively easy and inexpensive to produce. Many countries, including some that are unstable, have civil nuclear technology. This presents the threat that radioactive materials or radiation-producing devices may be used to cause casualties, or restrict the use of terrain or facilities, both within Western states and in deployed missions. Threats also include exposure to radioactive materials, radiation from damaged civil radiological sources or terrorist attack with crude radiological devices. In the context of future regional conflicts, deterrence through the threat of retaliation could prove less effective prior to and after the use of WMD weapons. It is possible to imagine that a future opponent might brandish WMD weapons to intimidate one or more Western or regional ally. WMD could also be used as weapons of mass 'disruption'. For example, nuclear weapons could be used in a less-than-lethal IW mode through the generation of wide-area electromagnetic pulse effects during a critical phase of a military operation to damage a wide array of allied command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets. http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/usscole/jir0 01012_1_n.shtml
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-5-2004_pg7_7 ISLAMABAD: India has successfully developed a low yield nuclear bomb capable of use in the battlefield, a German newspaper reported on Saturday, quoting diplomatic sources in New Delhi. The daily Berliner Zeitung said Indian nuclear scientists tested a series of mini-atomic bombs in Rajasthan. The addition of mini-nuclear bombs to Indian defence inventory will radically alter the military balance with nuclear rival Pakistan, the report said. The report come just a day after New Delhi agreed to Islamabad’s proposal for talks on nuclear confidence building measures. In May 1998, India stunned the world by conducting five underground nuclear tests in Pokharan. Pakistan responded with three similar tests in Chagi on May 28.The 1998 tests had a capacity of a 43-kilotonne thermonuclear device, a 12 kilotonne bomb, and three miniature bombs of less than one kilotonne, while the mini nuclear bomb will have a yield of less than one kilotonne. The manufacture, maintenance and command and control of mini-nuclear bombs, sometimes known as “boutique bombs” is extremely complex. The daily said that India might be encouraged to test mini-nuclear bombs following a decision by US President George Bush to develop such bombs. In 1993, the United States banned the development of low-yield atomic weapons but Mr Bush lifted it last year. online
An interesting sidebar to the story of the development of the Nuclear Bomb by the Americans during WW II, has been the interest Robert Oppenheimer (the director of the program)had in the Bhagavad Gita. He is supposed to have quoted a verse from the Gita as he watched the explosion. It turns outhe was a sophisticated connoiseur of the BG and of Vedanta and was very attracted to the whole notion of nishkaama karma (action without consideration of reward). THe following is an interesting essay on the topic. This was orinally posted by pulikeshi in the other forum. http://www.aps-pub.com/proceedings/jun00/Hijiya.pdf
I still don't understand, what is the objective behind? What we will achieve? Natwar moots common n-doctrine for India, Pak, China New Delhi, June 1. (PTI): Outlining the broad contours of the new government's foreign policy, External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh today mooted a common nuclear doctrine for India, Pakistan and China, announced that Foreign Secretary-level talks with Islamabad will be held on June 27 and 28 and promised to pursue "constructive" engagement with the US. Declaring that the Congress-led coalition was keen on pursuing the dialogue process with Islamabad, he said that expert-level talks on Nuclear Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan will be held on June 19 and 20. Singh said he was not making any formal proposal for the common doctrine as this has to be discussed at the "highest level". "It is absolutely essential for us (the three countries) to speak the same language" to ensure that all inherent dangers disappear, Singh said at his first press conference after assuming office. Singh fielded an array of questions on Indo-Pak relations, strategic ties with US and China as also New Delhi's approach towards its immediate and near neighbours.
Originally posted by ramana in the other forum, Ashok Mehta in Pioneer....One of the nuggets in this is theadverse effects o f the 'reforms' instituted by MMS during his tenure as FM. I trust he will not repeat that aspect of his 'reforms'.
http://newsinsight.net/archivedebates/nat2.asp?recno=902 C O M M E N T A R Y By proposing a new nuclear doctrine, Natwar Singh is destroying the established strategic calculus. 3 June 2004: There are some things countries never change, unless there is a dramatic reversal of circumstances, as tectonic as, say, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 9/ 11, and so on, and one of those immutable things is a state’s nuclear doctrine, should it possess nuclear weapons. A nuclear doctrine is established after considerable strategic calculations, taking into account scores of factors, including, obviously, the nature and military strength of external enmities, a state’s own offensive and defensive powers, scope for firewalls and verification, scope for CBMs to hold up, etc, but once set, the doctrine stays set, because even in the madness of nuclear deterrence, some constants are necessary. Throughout the Cold War, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union changed their nuclear doctrines, not the broad brushstrokes certainly. The US and its other NATO allies opted for a nuclear first-strike doctrine, because of the overwhelming conventional-weapons superiority of the USSR and Warsaw-Pact countries in Europe. To preserve nuclear peace, the Soviet Union had to accept this position, plus the ABM Treaty, which prevented deployment of more than a minimum number of anti-ballistic missile systems, although in the initial years of the Cold War, the Soviets were far ahead in ABM technology. Whatever the give and take, it established a degree of confidence on both sides that a nuclear war would not commence accidentally. Intermeshed, the US and Soviet nuclear doctrines established a pattern of conduct with built-in reprisals. If the Soviets and their allies were to start a conventional war in Europe, and the US and NATO assessed they would lose it beyond a point, then it cleared the first use of nuclear weapons, but with a clear and present danger of an annihilating Soviet second strike. Of necessity, in the play of these competing doctrines, the Soviet Union had to own up to its role of aggressor, not so much aggressor as a ideological bloc on the roll, triumphal, which had pretty much been established at the Yalta Conference when Europe was divided into spheres of influence, and Stalin got the better of an ailing Franklin D.Roosevelt and a self-satisfied Churchill. Whatever be the powerplay, and there are a million interpretations, what held fast were the two complementary Cold-War nuclear doctrines. As the real possibility of nuclear war between the US and USSR receded, so verification mechanisms became stronger, and it lead to such confidence that it became possible to first begin strategic arms-limitation and then arms-reduction talks leading to treaties, which were by and large respected. China was a late entrant in the nuclear race, exploding its first bomb made with Soviet assistance in 1964, before the two Communist powers fell apart. While there are various theories about why the Soviets assisted the Chinese to go nuclear, the most convincing one is that they wanted a second nuclear front to be opened against the US. The Chinese, for their part, played it sensibly, quickly declaring a no-first-use doctrine, so that throughout the Cold War, it remained essentially the Soviet nuclear force against the US one. With China going nuclear, Nehru wanted US nuclear cover, which was refused, and so started, in earnest, India’s own nuclear programme. When Indira Gandhi imploded India’s first atomic weapon in 1974, she chose not to tie it to any doctrine, instead preferring to call it a "peaceful nuclear explosion". The explosion was meant to send a clear message to China and Pakistan which by then had fought, between them, four wars with India, but not so clear a message that needed to be spelt out with a nuclear doctrine. Apartheid South Africa and Israel had perfected a concept called bomb-in-the-basement, and this was the route Mrs Gandhi chose. Mrs Gandhi’s message, in some sense, boomeranged, as American strategists had warned. China, instead of turning bristly against India, quietly transferred bomb technology to Pakistan, whose Z.A.Bhutto had vowed to eat grass to reach atomic parity with India. The rest, as they say, is history. In 1987, Pakistan went covertly-overtly atomic, or acquired recessed deterrence, and either earlier (because government intelligence on these matters is very timely and accurate) or very shortly thereafter, India readied its own minimum deterrent. The phase of recessed deterrence ended when the Vajpayee government ordered the second Pokhran explosions in 1998, and India declared itself a nuclear weapons power. It is debatable what prompted the second explosions and the declaration as a weapons state. Some say the weapons designers were putting pressure, others that India wanted to test its weapons before President Clinton’s Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty came into force worldwide. It was also the NDA policy to go overtly nuclear, and influential strategic experts like K.Subhramanyam wanted too to call Pakistan’s bluff about possessing serviceable weapons. In case Pakistan did test successfully, the US would come down heavily on it, and India need not necessarily worry. Such was at least the thinking, flawed though it was. In the event, Pakistan did test successfully, six bombs to India’s five, as if it was a Diwali competition between two upstart rival neighbouring families. Frankly, that Pakistan would follow suit was never in doubt, although the US was promising it lavish presents of conventional weapons, which its army chief, General Jehangir Karamat, was wont to accept, but not prime minister Nawaz Sharief, for who the Indian testing had come as a slap in the face. But the Pakistani testing within the month in the Chagai Hills of Baluchistan still did come as a shock to the NDA establishment, which deadened all the BJP celebrations of nuclear Hindutva. That was the great mistake of the NDA government, taking pride in the possession of nuclear weapons, and flaunting all the decades of researching and developing them as its own achievement, ignoring the pioneering contribution of Congress governments since Independence. The second mistake, nay blunder, was to pinpoint the reason for the test explosions. Citing the past wars with China and Pakistan, A.B.Vajpayee, presumably at the prompting of his principal secretary, Brajesh Mishra, put the reason in his letter to Clinton and other G-8 leaders, which was promptly leaked to The New York Times. After this, China and Pakistan became India’s certified nuclear rivals, and for the first time in decades, according to intelligence reports, China turned its IRBMs in Tibet and elsewhere against India. But for the two blunders, there was one welcome development. Saner elements prevailed in determining India’s nuclear doctrine, and India adopted a no-first-use policy. India had a choice to go for first use, but it would have put it in direct confrontation with Pakistan, which had itself adopted it, because of India’s 1.5:1 conventional weapons’ superiority over Pakistan. No-first use was also mildly or remotely Gandhian, inasmuch as possession of nuclear weapons can be Gandhian at all, although the Mahatma was in favour of them for self-defence. But no-first use did not go a long way with China, which was superior to India both in conventional and nuclear weapons. But a country cannot have two doctrines, one for each enemy neighbour. Besides, India was – and is still today – in no position to enforce its nuclear threat against China. It neither has long-range nuclear missiles which can hit China’s political nerve-centres, nor strategic bombers that can carry payloads that far afield from the most forward Indian bases in the Eastern Sector. So, with China, no-first use was making a virtue of a necessity, while with Pakistan, it was the only way to bring nuclear sanity. In the six years since the second Pokhran explosions, India’s nuclear doctrine has held good, and all the nuclear CBMs with Pakistan at least are beginning to bear fruit on that principle. Now, Natwar Singh, the new UPA foreign minister, wants India, China and Pakistan to have a common nuclear doctrine, presumably a no-first-use doctrine. Jaswant Singh, who was both defence and foreign minister at various times in the NDA government, has roundly criticised Natwar. "While India subscribes to minimum deterrent and to no-first use, Pakistan does not have a no-first-use policy and China subscribes to a very different no-first use," Jaswant said yesterday. "It is important that the government verifies its thinking and not be given to fanciful individual notions." Fanciful or not, it is incredible that Natwar should toy with the idea of a new nuclear doctrine, when the existing one is found in order, and there is no chance of Pakistan going back on its fist-use policy. Why should anyone submit to India’s order of things, particularly a great power like China? While Natwar’s wooly-headed schemes will get nowhere with Pakistan, it reinforces the impression that India is back to its hegemonistic power-play in the sub-continent. A war of words has already commenced with Pakistan for a new front to be opened on the nuclear doctrine. It is best prime minister Manmohan Singh takes the microphone away from Natwar Singh.
Natwar Singh is not a deep thinker and has a habit of shooting from the hip. A deep thinker like his analogue in chess is one who is capable of thinking 4 or 5 moves or more ahead. India should develop a non partisan foreign policy. There is no such thing as 'secular security ' or 'saffron security. Believe me when that weapon hits it will not stop to ask whether you are secular or saffron. As a matter of fact neither Pakistan nor China gives a hoot whether india is secular or not. I wonder who wrote that column. Has the imprint of an experienced man like KS.
Boss, I know this is fiction but still you gotta read it.. http://www.sulekha.com/expressions/articledesc.asp?cid=307272
Rajesh, That's a good read. Maybe someone from IF can right a real good one. Anyway, anther guy named Sankalp Waingankar (anyone know him?) had written another fiction stuff: Part 1: http://www.sulekha.com/articledesc.asp?cid=306505 Part 2: http://www.sulekha.com/articledesc.asp?cid=306507
Leave India's security in Commies and Cong hands and forget about indiahttp://www.hindu.com/2004/06/19/stories/2004061901471000.htm
Some cold start discussion is going on on BRF. I have uploaded two files(documents as captured images) related with cold start warfare method. Now,my id has been banned due to some undisclosed reasons. so i m posting links here : or http://www.geocities.com/yindooenemy/ or http://www.geocities.com/yindooenemy/f_stryker.jpg http://www.geocities.com/yindooenemy/f_futureofwar.jpg will some1 can post these two links on BR then....Thanks.
I have a rather simple question , what do they mean when they say "the reactor went critical on such and such date" ????
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040715-045140-7667r.htm Outside View: Washington clueless on Pakistan By Kaushik Kapisthalam A UPI Ouside View Atlanta, GA, Jul. 16 (UPI) -- The July 14 hearing at the Senate Foreign Relations committee on U.S. policy toward Pakistan presented a stark picture for policy watchers. While the ranking Democrat on the committee, Sen. Joe Biden, D-Del., excoriated the Bush administration's Pakistan policy in his submitted opening statement, it was surprising to note that even the Republicans in the panel, led by Chairman Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., expressed a sense of helplessness with what to do with Pakistan. Biden's recounting of conversations with Bush administration officials conveyed the executive branch's unwillingness to do anything different with Pakistan simply because it saw no alternatives to the current course. How did Washington get to this state? U.S. interests in Pakistan are widely agreed to fall under three broad areas -- counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation and regional relationships. With counter-terrorism, American goals have been to arrest or eliminate al-Qaida leadership and the dregs that may have leaked into Pakistan from Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and thwart Pakistani jihadi groups and madrassas that provide the manpower for the next generation of terrorists. On nuclear proliferation, the U.S. would like to roll up the Pakistan-based A.Q. Khan nuclear E-bay and strive to prevent Pakistan's own nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. In terms of regional issues, America would like to see Pakistan avoid meddling in Afghanistan using the Taliban remnants, and, more important, maintain a durable peace with India and to avoid nuclear saber rattling with India over the Kashmir issue. Tied to all these goals is the strategic objective of "stabilizing" Pakistan by building its institutions and foster democracy. The panel included three old South Asia hands -- Ambassador Teresita Schaffer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dr. Vali Nasr of the Naval Postgraduate School, and Dr. Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute. The witnesses' testimony read like a litany of failures of the current U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Ambassador Schaffer, in her own diplomatic way, chastised the Bush administration for creating and making false choices between counter-terrorism and other goals like nuclear proliferation and democracy. She also faulted the current policy for over-relying on one individual, President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. She advised against any major military equipment transfer to Pakistan since it has historically emboldened Pakistan to undertake risky military adventures. Nasr focused on Pakistan's counter-terror efforts. He contended that far from making a clean break with Islamist terror groups, Musharraf had only put them on ice, hoping to use them at a future date of his choosing. Sure enough, said Nasr, Pakistan has arrested 500 or more al-Qaida suspects, but such arrests have been carefully orchestrated to pick up the mainly Arab al-Qaida elements while seeking to avoid harming the Pashtun Taliban and the local jihadi groups that do Pakistan's dirty work in Kashmir. Nasr also noted that Musharraf has done little to reduce the power and influence of madrassas, which continue to produce jihadi fighters at an alarming rate, despite an explicit promise by Musharraf on this front. Weinbaum looked at the role of Musharraf, whom he called a "marginal satisfier." According to Weinbaum, Musharraf has so far shown that he only seeks to do the bare minimum required by the various interests that compete for his time. Given this, Weinbaum contended that Musharraf is unlikely to fully commit to supporting U.S. policies and in fact seeks to keep the various problems alive in order to maximize his value. Weinbaum also noted that at a strategic level, Musharraf has sought to marginalize the mainstream secular political parties within Pakistan, while unapologetically cutting deals with obscurantist parties and jailing or silencing those who disagree with him. He flailed the U.S. policy of lavishly praising Musharraf publicly and said that it emboldens the general to act contrary to U.S. interests with a feeling of impunity. The comments and questions by the senators in response to the testimony indicated an unwillingness to question the assumptions that form the basis of the current and past U.S. policy toward Pakistan. There was a palpable evidence of Groupthink -- the same malaise that the Senate claimed that the U.S. intelligence community was afflicted with in its recent report on Iraq. Social psychologist Irving Janis defined Groupthink as "a mode of thinking ... when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action." Groupthink in the Pakistan policy context is manifested by the ease with which U.S. policy framers accept certain ideas on Pakistan as axioms. The first one is the notion that current Pakistani dictator, Musharraf is striving to be a "moderate" Islamic leader and seeks to wean his country away from jihad-friendly policies. In fact, had the senators heard the panel testimony with an open mind, they would have come to the conclusion that Musharraf's actions since 9/11 have displayed that he has only two goals. The first one is to keep himself in power, and the second one is to zealously guard Pakistan army's corporate interests. The main reason for Musharraf's U-turn after 9/11 was a desire to avoid his army from being targeted by an angry and hurt United States. Since then, he has sought to finesse his counter-terror actions with an aim of keeping his army's interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir unharmed. Had the United States looked at Pakistan as a tactical ally in its quest to take out the 9/11 culprits, it would have made sense. Instead, America tried to turn Musharraf into what Kemal Ataturk was for Turkey and as a consequence is disappointed when that came to naught. The second Groupthink assumption is that the U.S. alliance with Pakistan would collapse were Musharraf to be killed or replaced. This is sheer nonsense. The doomsday scenario of a Taliban-like regime in Pakistan controlling nuclear weapons is unlikely. The main reason Musharraf might get replaced is because his junior commanders' feeling that without a new chief, they cannot get promoted. In such a scenario, the successor to Musharraf is likely to be another general who would seek to do the same things as Musharraf -- keep himself in power and protect the army's pot of gold. A Pakistan sans Musharraf is likely to be no better or worse than the one with Musharraf. Therefore, the idea that "we cannot push Musharraf too far" is just an alibi for paralysis. The biggest Groupthink assumption is the U.S. acceptance that the Pakistan military's interests coincide with the country's interests. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Pakistani military itself suffers from Groupthink when it seeks to obtain a military victory over India in Kashmir and its belief that its superior Islamic warriors have only been kept from a victory over the "weak and cowardly Hindu nation" through a series of international conspiracies and American betrayals. Even a casual reading of writings by retired Pakistani generals would reveal a mindset filled with paranoia and strong belief that only U.S.-Jewish-Indian conspiracies have "kept Pakistan down." The Pakistan army's goals are absolutely in dissonance with what U.S. strategic objectives of regional peace, Islamic moderation and nuclear non-proliferation. The United States can therefore understand why Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, but it cannot tolerate Pakistani army -- the supposed nuclear gatekeeper -- bartering nukes with rogue regimes irrespective of its perceived insecurities and strategic needs. Pakistani generals ought not to be allowed to play the "Give me fighter jets, or I'll be forced to sell nukes" game. While the United States can sympathize with Pakistan's genuine military requirements, it cannot afford to be seen as subsidizing a military that spends millions on golf courses while poor Pakistanis are dying due to drinking contaminated water. Instead of worrying about how to provide the Pakistan army with sops so that "it doesn't have to embark on dangerous adventurism to the east and to the west," as Biden stated, the United States must make it clear that it will not underwrite or encourage irrational Pakistani military adventures seeking revenge for past defeats by India or "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. For a Pakistan policy to succeed, Musharraf needs to be explicitly reminded of U.S. red lines -- no nuclear trade, no adventures on either border and no victimization of secular political parties while enjoying unstinting U.S. support. Every time he reneges on promises, instead of privately nudging him, the United States needs to make its reminders public. Pakistan's generals are not suicidal maniacs like al-Qaida. They might cry wolf, but are likely to fall in line rather than lose face internationally. U.S. policymakers should also cease their public comments that tend to portray Musharraf as indispensable and instead focus aid toward institution building in Pakistan. The Pakistan policy situation is a quagmire only because of America's own faulty assumptions. Sans those assumptions, it is not that hard to frame a meaningful and effective Pakistan policy. -0- (Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance commentator on U.S. policy on South Asia and its effects on the war on terror and non-proliferation.) -0- (United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
This is a book promotion media blitz. What Clinton did by his visit to Bharat and Paki was to reinforce American foreign policy which continues to equate Paki-s and Bharat and turns a blind eye to the danger of the islamic nuke in Pakistan, since, it is, like Taliban a CIA creation, with full connivance of Uncle Sam and China acting in league. The recent admission of China in the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group is in line with this geopolitick of the US State department. Success of Bharatiya diplomacy will lie in promoting a change in this mindset of Uncle Sam and Brookings Institution type of think tanks, focussing on the dangers that the islamic nuke and China pose to the only supercop of the world in a unipolar world (and the dhimmi-s of Europe on the sideline). Kalyanaraman Engaging India Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb Strobe Talbott Brookings Institution Press 2004 c. 250pp. DESCRIPTION On May 11, 1998, three nuclear devices detonated under the Thar Desert in India shook the surrounding villages—and the rest of the world. The immediate effect was to plunge U.S.-India relations, already vexed by decades of tension and estrangement, into a new crisis. The situation deteriorated further when Pakistan responded in kind two weeks later, testing a nuclear weapon for the first time. Engaging India is the firsthand story of the diplomacy conducted between the United States and the two South Asian neighbors after the nuclear tests. In this book, the American point man for the dialogue takes us behind the scenes of one of the most suspenseful and consequential diplomatic dramas of our time, reconstructing what happened—and why—with narrative verve, rich human detail, and penetrating analysis. From June 1998 to September 2000, in what was the most extensive dialogue ever between the United States and India, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh met fourteen times in seven countries on three continents. They discussed both the immediate items on the security and nonproliferation agenda, as well as their wider visions for the U.S.-India relationship and the potential for economic and strategic cooperation between the two countries. As the relationship improved over the course of the talks, the United States was to able play a role in averting the possibility of nuclear war over the contested territory of Kashmir in the summer of 1999—the specifics of which are included for the first time in this book, told in way only a protagonist can. The Talbott-Singh diplomacy laid the groundwork for the transformational visit of President Bill Clinton to India in March 2000 and helped end fifty years of estrangement between the world’s two largest democracies. As pursuit of Islamic militants continues across South Asia, the increased cooperation established by Talbott and Singh will be an invaluable asset for current and future leaders of both countries. This book provides, for the first time, an insider’s perspective on the ground-breaking efforts to build a cordial relationship between the United States and India. The general reader will find it accessible, and more important, an indispensable tool for understanding America’s current role in South Asia, and the prospects for improved relations. Strobe Talbott is president of the Brookings Institution. He served as deputy secretary of state from 1994 to 2001. Prior to his service in government, he worked at Time magazine for twenty-one years. He has written nine books, including The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (Random House, 2002), a personal account of U.S. diplomacy toward Russia during the Clinton administration. http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/engagingindia.htm India's nuclear tests angered Clinton Press Trust of India Washington, July 11 India's nuclear tests in 1998 had angered then US President Bill Clinton leading him to personally suggest to his Russian counterpart Boris Yelstin that the two of them and China should jointly pressure India on the nuclear issue. However, both leaders were dissuaded by advisers from carrying out the proposal, who pointed out that China might regard it as a "harebrained idea," former US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott says in his forthcoming book "Engaging India--Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb". Talbott also disclosed that a Security Council resolution drafted by the Chinese was so anti-Indian that the Americans wanted it changed but it was too late as the Americans had been negligent at the drafting stage. Giving details on Clinton's proposal to Yeltsin to control India on the nuclear issue, Talbott described that the American President told his Russian counterpart that "I think India has made a terrible mistake". "But I also think India should get credit for fifty years of democracy. We need to help them see that they should not define greatness in a way that gives everyone else headaches. The ruling party there seems particularly to feel that earning the full respect of the world depends on India being a nuclear power." Clinton then suggested that he and Yeltsin coordinate their approaches, since both were planning trips to New Delhi in the fall. Yeltsin, who always welcomed demonstrations that the United States and Russia were joining forces to solve the world's most daunting problems, eagerly assented. Moreover, in order to dissuade Pakistan from matching India's 1998 nuclear test, former US President Bill Clinton had offered then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif massive economic and military aid, including F-16s. Former US Deputy Secretary of Stage Strobe Talbott says in his forthcoming book that Clinton told Sharif that if he would desist from testing nuclear weapons, the F-16s would be released besides huge amounts of financial aid and a prize certain to appeal to Sharif--an invitation for him to make an official visit to Washington." But, says Talbott ruefully in his book "Engaging India--Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb" that "Sharif was not swayed." Sharif told Talbott that if he listened to American advice and desisted from testing nuclear weapons in response to Indian tests, "the next time I (Talbott) came to Islamabad, I would find myself dealing not with a clean-shaven moderate like himself but with an Islamic fundamentalist 'who has a long beared." "At issue, he said, was his own political survival." Sharif told Talbott that he did not want to follow the example of Indian leaders but pressure was 'mounting by the hour' from all sides, including from the opposition led by his prodecessor, Benazir Bhutto. 'I am an elected official, and I cannot ignore people's sentiment." Clinton had told Talbott that he would use Sharif's visit to Washington and a Clinton visit to Pakistan in the fall to "dramatize" the world's gratitude if Sharif would just refrain from testing. http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_879750,00050001.htm
So the recent indian Agni-1 test on 4 July (Happy I-day `America ), was tested with a new RV at longer range the earlier maal. It is clear to me that the new 12 meter long missile confign, had 2 meter conical RV with 1 meter base, designed for 1,300 Km range (no photos yet to positively confirm). Clearly A-1 makes sense to be strategic weapon, but given limited range of Indian tacticle missiles (i.e. Prithvi) there is need for conventinally armed SRBM for SEAD and bunker bursting beyond 500Km range. Thus declaring Agni-1 to be purely strategic will be mistake; no need to tie our hand when we go to war. The new RV will not only be lower cost but may also limit the maximum conventional payload. OR maybe India will have 2 types of RV for A-1 to keep options open.
Welcome Arun. Your knowledge and wisdom will be deeply appreciated in this forum. I trust you will find time to take part in the discussions especially on starategic isssues. You will find many old friends also present here.
Thank you Kaushal. I know I am among friends. Cheers
http://newsinsight.net/nati2.asp?recno=2856&ctg=Defence 22 July 2004: For at least the past three months, Pakistan and Israel have been talking secretly, but Pakistan has not been able to convince Israel that A.Q.Khan’s proliferation activities are at an end, and that any Pakistani nuclear materials will not fall into the hands of terrorist groups, rogue states, or Iran. Western diplomats privy to the Pakistan-Israel talks while refusing to give details strongly suggest that Israel has threatened preemptive action against Pakistan’s nuclear installations, forcing the US to intervene and suggest safe-keeping of or taking custody of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals. Two days ago, we reported that the US was moving towards convincing Pakistan to allow its nuclear weapons to be taken into full or partial custody under a maintainability agreement (Intelligence, “Pakistan asks US for nuclear submarines”), and yesterday, Reuters said Pakistani and US officials had met for three days to discuss the safety of Pakistan’s civilian nuclear programme. Israeli intelligence suggests that Khan’s nuclear blackmarket is alive, that Pakistani proliferation continues apace despite Pakistani denials, and that, pushed to the wall, the Pakistani leadership would pass on nuclear technology to Iran, which has had blow-hot-blow-cold relations with the Jewish state since its inception. In their talks, diplomats said, Israel had warned Pakistan of preemptive action, refusing to accept Pakistani assertions that their weapons were secure, and fearing air attacks like the Osirak reactor bombing or sabotage by Israeli intelligence, Pakistan has opted to sue for US help. While Israel and Pakistan have no direct conflict, the fear of Pakistani proliferation has alerted and angered Israel, and diplomats said Israel is acting on definite intelligence that Pakistan’s arsenals may be secretly transferred to Iran, whose late Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa for the destruction of the Jewish state.
For those who may recall most of my earlier missile range projection at BRF was based on propulsion capability only. The useful range however also depends on the RV surviving the thermal and mechanical strain of re-entry without destroying the payload. At this momemt it is interesting to note that TSP GhauriI/II though could be capable of medium range, but the shape of the RV clearly indicate thet it will not survive re-entry at range greater than 500 Km. Thought a well engineered missile of its size can easily reach 800Km and as much as 1,400 Km. So much to speak of TSP missile capability. Indian Missiles however are not limited by RV capability for stated range. The A-II RV will work OK till perhaps 4000Km. JMT.
rajesh_g: The US believes in taking on potential challenger before it becomes a real threat. NoKo Ding-Dong has the necessary propulsion to get to US, thus is a threat, US response doesn't wait for matching RV development before recognizing/calling it a threat. Very contrasting approch to national security compared to India. What does it take for India to learn from Isreal? SELF-WORTH & BALLS ! The new generation 20 somthing has both, just wait, the moment is arriving soon.
Arun_S Could it also be that the new RV would be able to send bunches of boutiques ?
Curreently we do not have a civilian nuclear technology thread. we can spin off one if we need to. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/888278.cms My analogy of keeping Iindia chained to an energyless future (prometheus chained to a rock by Zeus) is still valid
New Context for India's Struggle against Nukes By J. Sri Raman t r u t h o u t | Perspective Friday 03 December 2004 Rajasthan is a colorful State of India - colorful in its turbans, saris and history. It is known for its desert landscape and its many tourist attractions, including medieval fortresses and palaces. Today, it is also known for Pokharan, a rural area turned into a nuclear test site. The sandy site witnessed Pokharan I or the PNE ('peaceful nuclear explosion') in 1974 and, more infamously, Pokharan II, the five tests that shook South Asia in May 1998 and led to the proclamation of India as a nuclear-weapon state. The tests also led, within days, to the Chagai tests in neighboring Pakistan and its identical proclamation. Jaipur, capital of Rajasthan and not far from Pokharan, thus made a fitting venue for the second national convention of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), an informal apex for India's peace movement. Hundreds of peace organizations and activists (including this writer) came together in the hugely successful convention of November 26-28. Notably, they did so in a new context for the country's struggle against nuclear weapons and for peace, particularly in South Asia. The issues remain the same but the political context has changed. And the change has brought a new challenge. The convention left activists and organizations, free from official links and lobbies, in no doubt about the challenge. Before proceeding to this challenge, a word about the specific issue of Pokharan, of special concern and symbolic importance to every Indian peace activist. Village Khetaloi, close to the site, has been a victim of the tests. Many villagers have been suffering from throat cancer and some strange disorders since the tests. A study of the matter was officially ordered, but the conclusions remain a closely guarded secret. The CNDP, along with the local activists, has demanded not only a better deal for the victims, but also a permanent closure of the test site. Asked about the villagers' sufferings, former Prime Minister (and father of Pokharan II) Atal Bihari Vajpayee famously observed: "Some people have to make sacrifices." They had to do so, presumably, for the patriotic cause. Identification of nuclear militarism with nationalism, indeed, was a prominent part of the ideology that Vajpayee and his regime in New Delhi proudly represented. Ever since its founding in its first national convention in New Delhi in November 2000, the CNDP has combated this ideology combined with religious 'fundamentalism' and revanchism. It was this ideology that inspired Pokharan II, which in turn provided the excuse for Pakistan's Chagai. It was this ideology, along with 'jihadi' extremism in Pakistan, that took South Asia to the brink of a nuclear war in 2002. The coexistence of the two countries in the US-headed alliance for 'global war against terror' made the confrontation even more deadly and dangerous. The wise Indian voter firmly rejected the ideology and politics of the far right earlier this year. A United Progressive Alliance (UPA), headed by the Congress party and backed by the left, came to power under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The new rulers were officially opposed to the ultra-nationalism of the Vajpayee camp. Did the change end or enfeeble the challenge before the peace movement? Did the new context spell new hope for the anti-nuclear weapon activists? Certainly not, as developments since the change in New Delhi in May 2004 have demonstrated. The feebleness of the centrist Congress opposition helped the far right, more than anything else, over the past few years. The Congress in power has not shed any of its political shyness about espousing the cause of South Asian peace explicitly. Not without reason does the Jaipur Declaration adopted at the convention call upon India and Pakistan to "seriously and sincerely engage in a dialogue." The call represents the consensus in the movement on the India-Pakistan "peace moves." The consensus includes the concern in a significant section about the prospects of the moves. The concern stems from the main motive force of the "peace initiatives": the pressure from the USA, keen to keep within controllable limits the contradiction and conflict within the South Asian segment of the "anti-terror alliance." The "peace moves" are even less promising on the nuclear front. The mountain of pretended official labor on the issue (in the form of a series of talks) has produced only a mouse (in the shape of a decision to set up a 'hotline' between the military commands of the two countries). New Delhi has dismissed with contempt the CNDP demand for the closure of the Pokharan site and, along with Islamabad, for de-deployment of nuclear-capable missiles. Worse, as Pakistani peace campaigner Karamat Ali pointed out at the convention and as many Indian activists would agree, the rulers of the two countries are using these talks actually to "legitimize" the nuclear weapons of each other. Not to recognize this objective of the talks on "confidence-building measures" would be to welcome nuclear militarism in a new form. The worst outcome of the talks was a resolve by official India and Pakistan to seek "parity" with "nuclear powers" (P5) and "consultations" with them on "issues of common concern" as well as to attempt working out "a common nuclear doctrine." This was nothing but a loud and clear knock by both India and Pakistan on the door of the 'nuclear club.' Strangely and very sadly, an even more unacceptable version of the same proposal, calling upon India to convene a meeting of all "nuclear-capable" states (P5 plus Ariel Sharon's Israel and North Korea) for the same objectives, found its way into the convention. The political change in New Delhi does not give such proposals any pro-peace legitimacy. The peace movement cannot let such proposals be peddled as initiatives for nuclear sanity in South Asia. The movement must prepare to meet the new challenge posed by the new political situation. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A freelance journalist and a peace activist of India, J. Sri Raman is the author of Flashpoint (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a regular contributor to t r u t h o u t.-------
For those who want to know nuts and bolts of Nuclear weapons (Fission, Boosted Fission, Fission-Fusion, Fission-Fusion,Fission varients) may start at : http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq0.html by Carey Sublette (it is a another issues that this is same guy who lead Psy-Op against Indian nuclear test) Depending on your interest and how deep you would like to dvelve it may streach from few hours to a few days of reading. But one comes out physics refreshed
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=60921&headline=Singh~regrets~India%E2%80%99s~N-status Has this guy gone insane ????
http://www.indiareacts.com/archivedebates/nat2.asp?recno=1037 newsinsight.net take on nutwar's stupid statement. i still cannot believe he said that. i have to ask again -> is this guy insane ?
Stupid response from puppet PM. The man cant reign in his foreign minister and now he lectures people to stay above party politics ? Whats more this new paradigm called answer-to-journalistic-queries is not equal to GOI-policy was conveniently coined. Just ask the senile idiot to resign for god's sake..
Pioneer edit on the issue.. Even they think he might have been misquoted. Although I doubt this. I think this guy is senile and in a rare admission of senility he bumbled these things. Or worse, the jerk is floating a baloon only to be picked up by idiots like desouza/patwardhan on how bad nukes are.. Such a sorry lot..
rajesh_g, The Hindu correspondent in Singapore (P. S. Suryanarayana) interviewed Natwar Singh and its quite plain that he was not quoted in context. He is not to be blamed. BTW, PS was the Hindu reporter in TSP early on. Howeve this report has caused a slugfest with people who oppose the tests coming out of woodwork. It also unmasked those who want to get rid of Natwar Singh.
Thanks Ramana Garu.. I lost my bearing for a while. Sincere apologies due to Natwar Singh. I wish he had worded the "no question of regret" more appropriately. I didnt get the "out of tube" thing at all. Although I have to admit the question was loaded to begin with. Hopefully after this FM will be more prepared for these types of questions. Will keep this Shishir Gupta in mind. Wonder what his agenda is..
http://www.indiareacts.com/archivedebates/nat2.asp?recno=1039 What the heck is going on ???
Yesterday I watched a Korean movie called "The Phantom Submarine". Its a ripoff of "hunting for red october" and that other hackman-washington movie (forgot the name). Basically they show that the SOUTH korean navy has a super-secret project of a secret nuke submarine with nuke missiles. None of the crew members are addressed with names (only numbers eg. 202, 413 etc). Anyway they have been noticed by US and Japan. Yet they go out on a trip and then the deputy gets rid of the captain of the sub, takes charge and decides to nuke Japan (not north korea). In general its just a movie with many scenes copied from hollywood movies but the dialogues, Japan as the bad-boy to go after, etc were really interesting. We have always known that the koreans would love to go nuclear but to actually see koreans (even if its just in a movie) say that a nation's sovereinty is guaranteed with the nukes, having nukes will prevent any humiliation of the 5000 yr old civilisation, etc is just something else. Suffice to say, that once NoKo and SoKo unite, they will be a big pain in the a$$ for Japan, China and US. These 3 will do their best to keep them separate. Enjoyed the movie.
Ramana garu posted this on BR
Thanks rajesh was going to post here too. I think if this true it puts Rao way above all other politicians. He could easily have been re-elected but India would be only a half power. Also if you think about it all the stories about Israeli collobaration are humbug for India was ready even in mid 1996. So why did they offer Green Pine and Arrow system?
The last post is about power reactor training and gives incorrect impression vis s vis the thread title.
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/index.html by Joyce Battle http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/ipn17_1.htm
Have been busy writing a major piece on Indian Strategic Missiles. Finally it was published on Indian Defense Review (Lancer Publishing) in Feb-2005 and ~1500 copies were destributed at Aero India 05 in Feb. A more expanded artical has finally been http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Agni.html in last 3 weeks at BR. This is I belive the most comprehensive open source writing on Agni missiles (Agni-1, Agni-2, Agni-2AT, Agni-3 and Agni-4), as well as strategic weapons. This is not to blow own trumpet but I belive this will be of interest to many on this forum, and others as an education to evolving Indian capability & position. Indian citizenary and politicians need to be more informed on this aspect. Any questions or comments are welcome.
Keep up the good work Arun. You are definitely the right person to write such an article.
May 11 is the anniversary of the POK II tests.
ramana, These Congressi morons have decided not to celebrate India's power.
Many nations which publicly condemned India's nuclear tests are among those who are now actively assisting India in completing its nuclear nation status. The same nations made sure that between 1980 to 2000 China was perceived as a large upcoming power
Mudy look at it this way: WHO HATES THIS AGREEMENT? FOIL. Therefore, it has to be good. Q.E.D. I am very interested to read Reggie's account of the big-power plays in DupleeCity. All I can say is that I have WALKED PAST Blair House and peered into the Gora Ghar from outside the iron-spiked fence - and seen the telescopic rifles peering back at me. BUT .. those were in the context some other stuff that leads me to see a lot more in this agreement than what the experts have written so far. Kanchan Gupta's "Kaun Jeeta / Kaun Hara" list is OK, but incomplete. I believe that one must add: Kaun Jeeta: 1. American nuclear power industry 2. Indian infrastructure industry (cement plants, metal, electric cables, construction industry in general) 3. Indian plumbing/ sensors/ chemical industry (side benefits of huge increase in market size for such things, and relaxed import controls for latest stuff) 4. Indian environmentalists (tough controls and close watch on all Indian industries - swarms of Green types running around, Geiger counters and snooty noses deployed) 5. Indian Space industry - Bush is a huge fan of nuclear power for space propulsion. Till now, he has had a tough time finding other nations willing to go down that road. 6. NON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. (see below) 7. Russia (see below). Kaun Hara: 1. Nonprollotullahs: All the noise from the nonprollotullahs is just noise - they are screeching because their monopoly is about to be knocked loose. They have no solutions, just a lot. 2. Chicoms. 3. Pakis. Noooooo P-7 unless it is to include Israel, which will probably be included. 4. Present NPT. The surprise news I have is that the India-US acccord broke through the #1 Mental Block that has been stopping REAL Nuclear Non-Proliferation. NPT was essentially about to expire (or is practically dead). BUsh would like to walk out of it entirely - so as recently as 3 months ago, the mood in the bottom of Foggy Bottom was utter depression - no hope in sight for any new NonProl Initiative. I happen to know a lot of people who have been trying very hard to see what a "New NPT" would look like. This week I think they have reason to perk up, though in the short term they will do some breat-beating about "Oh! What a blow to the NPT!" They have known for a long time that there is no hope of a real NPT without India on board. Well .. Bush just signed on to REAL Non-Prol. Bring India on board, and develop a new non-prol with a firm commitment to disarmament. The stumbling block right now is that Russia claims it needs thousands of nuclear artillery shells (tactical nukes) to counter Red Chinese invasion of Siberia. If this issue can be sorted out, then with some fine Indian negotiating skills, Russia can agree to cut down tactical nukes (the most dangerous weapon w.r.t. being stolen by Abdul) and then US can reduce, and both can reduce to near level of China, then force Chinese reduction (how is another issue). 5. Kofi Anan and UN mafia The other side is that Bush has neatly eliminated Indian opposition to what Bush wants to do to the UN. The G-4 initiative was floundering in that India had already lost hope of Veto. Now who cares? P-6 membership IS the Veto, UN or no UN. And now India and US and Russia are on same side, France is OK, Poodles are barking, but China has been basically isolated, and will hence scamper to pretend to be on same side. US (read John Bolton) can "reform" UN as Bush wants it reformed. Reconstituted UN may be very different. **************************** "Kyon yeh karna tha dubya ko?" But why did Bush see this as a good idea? He's Prez of the US. This agreement means that the severely-depressed US nuke power industry is about to bloom. Right now, from nuclear Arms Reduction, the US is BUYING most of the Russian / FSU enriched uranium fuel, bringing it to US, and using it to run US nuclear power. They tell us that half the bulbs in our homes in US today are burning Russian nuclear weapons. So - the US has a huuuge surfeit of nuclear fuel, and this is ruining the domestic nuclear fuel industry. Now - a huge market for nuclear fuel, close to Russia. The US will do the brokering and collect a nice fee. Price of nuke fuel will rise again in US, American industry happy. Also, tons of money from India pouring back into US. That's not bad for India - much of the money will be spent inside India, and it will be spent on building power plants, the engines that run industry and generate new wealth. Hundreds of thousands of jobs, a fundamental revolution in Indian construction industry and infrastructure. Better roads to carry the reactor vessels. Think about it - right now, nuclear power is 3% of India's meager electric power generation. India wants to multiply the total by some huge factor - AND - nukes are then going to be 25% of the total. Probably, Congress will sign some severe conditions into the laws permitting all these - like - US will use 10% of the revenue from all this to do alternative energy research on fuel cells and hydrogen,a nd 10% for continued arms reduction efforts (i.e., money to Russia). So, in 20 years, with India sinking all money into nuke power, US will coolly announce that it is switching to alternative energy. With Indian money. No point in feeling bad about it - India should use the research and develop alternative energy piggyback, since we clearly have not shown the motivation or organization to do it ourselves instead of going broke buying oil from the Arabs all these years. Win-Win. Most of the whining about "intrusive inspections" is just that - except that the Fast Breeders will have to be removed from civilian program, probably. The P-6 have no intrusive inspections of their MILITARY facilities. Total privacy to do the good stuff. (which is actually what worries me. Do you remember that most of the advanced machine-guns carried by the Chambal Dacoits were straight from Indian MILITARY factories and armories?) Unphortunately, the good parts of this cannot be published under ophishiyal naam onlee. Reggie, if u want the scoop for good causes, pls email u-no-me.
Yes, after reading FOIL concern I also feel there is something good which is causing heart burn to FOILies and there masters. My concerns are: Till today Narora is never been fully utilized because of fuel and other issues. Sanctions are US pet goody, relying on uncle for fuel is not a good idea. India needs technology to reuse waste and nuke waste handling. No or miniscule programme to safeguard citizens incase of accident. Very small initiative on research work for alternate energy. They are still in Gobar gas plant era. No major initiative to protect theft from N-plants which are still common. After having separate complex it will be well targeted theft and regular terrorist target. Inspection or not, these babus knows how to deal with papers. They can create factory in sea and destroy in accident and can claim insurance. They can handle anyone everyone.
http://www.asianage.com/main.asp?layout=2&cat1=1&cat2=153&newsid=170803&RF=DefaultMain -By Strobe Talbott
Visas? Part of the deal is that they get 5-year multiple-entry visas, no questions asked. 24-hour notification for visits, if that. Nothing new there - at present, all signatories of the Chemical WMD elimination treaty get visits like that. I have a friend in the UN who goes all over the world (incl. parts of the US that you or I will never see, like remote islands in the Pacific) on monitoring visits. If they have reason to suspect some hanky-panky, they are ordered to get on the next plane and land up, and demand access where they need it. They get escorted by military types who may or many not be friendly, but they have to be allowed to visit. But they don't even trust that for the nuke monitoring, say for the Strategic Arms Reduction exercise. They simply put a couple of (advertised) people on site, and probably quite a few unadvertised. Then they set up a "collaborative" regime - in other words, their tactic is a bear-hug, to stay close. Lots of visits back and forth, very pally-pally, but also very tough. They send data back all the time to Oak Ridge or Geneva or wherever. Every bend in the pipe through which the hot stuff goes, has sensors upstream and downstream, counting neutrons or gamma rays or whatever. Note that the concentrations are extremely small - but they use single-particle detectors. Every door has sensors, etc. etc. etc. They simply satisfy Conservation of Mass, Conservation of Charge and maybe even Conservation of Atoms of the hot stuff. If stuff goes missing, they scream. Their aim is to track fissile material from the soil that is dug up, all the way to the spent fuel buried in concrete-sealed containers under the ground. This is going to put a bad dent in the baksheesh regime at desi facilities, for sure, because all these guys willl also have to be cut in, for anything. One may cheat N of the detection systems, but one cannot say what the total number M is, and how many cross-checks there are between the N. *********************** Mudy, I read Strobe Talbott's article with interest. He is Head Honcho of Brookings Institution. I note that he didn't really attack India - what he has done is equivalent of Rajesh Khanna talking down riotous mob of gau-wale ready to go on rampage. So one listens with all antennae out for the noises coming between the lines - i.e., what do they want $$ for? The noise I hear is:
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I am for the most part in the camp of those who believe that the current US India rapprochement on nuclear matters is generally a win win situation. India badly needs technology to accelerate her nuclear program.The progress in the Indian nuclear power program has been painfully slow and india may be superceded by developments in this area. This is not to take away from indian scientists who have done a yoeman job in keeping the program afloat over the decades, despite a plethora of boycotts, emanating especially from our friends the americans. But the fact remains that we lack as of now the manufacturing prowess that a first class nuclear program demands. Absent such a manufacturing base it has been a miracle that we have been able to build even the seven plants that we have. To admit to such a lacuna in our manufacturing capabilities does not take away from our manhood as a nation. So the agreement if in fact it loosens the stranglehoid that america has imposed on india is on balance a good thing. The division into defense and civilian sectors of the AEC is also a good thing and will force india to devote production reactors solely committed to producing fuel for weapons. All thisa will add to the cost of the program, but it will be a small prce to pay if the civilian program is to accelerate, as it must. PS The fact that strobe talbott does not like the accord is another plus for the same. !
India's raw deal with the United States By Brahma Chellaney International Herald Tribune MONDAY, AUGUST 8, 2005 NEW DELHI When President George W. Bush last month announced his support for a deal allowing civilian nuclear technology sales to India, a storm of protests arose. Nonproliferation advocates around the globe were angered that Bush had implicitly legitimized New Delhi's nuclear arsenal, but what has been less noted is that Indian voices were raised also. Why? Because the technology deal involves an unequal bargain in which India gains few benefits even as it agrees to many restrictions - including a limit on its ability to deter its nuclear-armed neighbor China. India claims that under the deal it will assume the same duties and rights as the other nuclear powers, "no more and no less." The truth, however, is different. Indeed, China's welcome and Pakistan's lack of protest indicate their glee over a deal that employs the lure of commercial nuclear power assistance to help constrain the growth of India's nuclear military capacity. The deal has advantages for America. If approved by the U.S. Congress and the other nuclear powers, it would lift a sales ban that dates back to the first Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. The ban has been a major stumbling block to the forging of a true U.S.-Indian strategic partnership. Another advantage for Washington is that the deal opens the way to tens of billions of dollars worth of contracts for U.S. technology. What India gets out of it is less clear. One benefit is that the deal would allow the country to import nuclear reactors and fuel for generating electricity. But the protesters in India are focusing on the deal's implications for the country's nascent nuclear military program. China has always been the primary focus of its nuclear drive; India still lacks missiles that can strike deep into the Chinese heartland. And while Bush has made only a promise that he may not be able to fulfill, the deal lists a lot of requirements for India. This includes bringing civil nuclear plants and materials under international monitoring, allowing foreign inspectors unhindered access, and refraining from further testing. By agreeing to separate its civilian and military nuclear programs, India will raise the costs of its declared policy to build a "credible minimum deterrent." The deal strikes the weak spot of India's nuclear military capacity - its umbilical ties with the civilian program. India's weapons program flows out of the civilian nuclear program. Bush, meanwhile, rejected New Delhi's request that the deal classify India as a nuclear-weapons state. India, however, has agreed to take on obligations that the recognized nuclear powers have not accepted. First, India is to begin "identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner" and then declare the civilian part in full to the International Atomic Energy Agency. (In contrast, China will remain free from any obligation to carry out civil-military segregation.) Second, India has agreed to "voluntarily" allow all its civil nuclear sites to be inspected by the energy agency. The other nuclear powers have not done that in practice, because in a majority of cases there is not even the pretense of civil-military separation. The five recognized nuclear powers, under voluntary accords, offer nuclear materials and plants for agency inspections in name only. The agency, in return, carries out token inspections or, often, no inspections. India, however, will have to accept, on its civilian program, rigorous inspections. The atomic energy agency will treat it like a non-nuclear state. Third, India has pledged "adherence," to the rules of the very nuclear technology cartels that continue to exclude it - the American-led Nuclear Suppliers' Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. For Bush, the deal is an astute move that can result in lucrative business contracts, secure a firm U.S. strategic foothold in India, and bring a large part of the Indian nuclear program under international monitoring. However, is it in the United States's interest to limit India's ability to deter China? Bush faces an uphill task persuading both Congress and America's partners in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (including China) to exempt India from export controls. New Delhi should wait until Bush has delivered his part of the bargain and then meet its obligations to the extent honored by the other nuclear powers, and with the same rights as them - "no more and no less." (Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. ) http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/08/07/opinion/edchell.php
Satish Chandra is the brother(IIRC) of former ambassador to the US Naresh Chandra(Saxena). Both very astute individuals. Doesnt mean they were always right.
Book Review in The Telegraph, 9 Sept., 2005
"The very possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of small and medium powers would prevent the outbreak of conventional war." 'A bomb in the back yard and an ICBM in the front yard of every country will lead to worl peace and understanding' Spinster 1998
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/10/politics/10iran.html?th&emc=th Wider U.S. Net Seeks Allies Against Iran's Nuclear Plan By STEVEN R. WEISMAN Published: September 10, 2005
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/ctbt/NGOstatement2005.html NGO Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the Fourth Article XIV Conference on Accelerating Entry-Into-Force To be delivered 22 September 2005
[color=blue][i][b]The West does not consider India as a threat; its pro Pakistan stance was based on other factors. The first was that USA felt that a strong Pakistan was necessary to contain the USSR if it tries to expand to the East. One should remember that this was not a new policy of the West which suddenly came into existence after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. This policy had been there since early 1800 when the British decided to back Afghanistan so that Imperial Russia could not expand to the East. The second reason for the pro Pakistan and somewhat anti-Indian stand by the West originated from India’s desire to have an independent foreign policy of its own. India fist got this idea when it realised in the early 1950s that the West is not ready to part with modern technology which was needed at that time for the rapid industrialization of the nation. In fact, the West wanted India to be the main supplier of raw material for their industries, so that the finished goods from the West can still have the large captive Indian market. Now the situation has changed.There is no USSr and India has become sufficiently industrialised to challange the industrailised nations of the West, in the markets of Asia and Africa.It has also developed Human Resources to a level where it can be of help to many of the industries in the4 West to survive in today's world.Therefore, we see the gradual change in attitude of the Western nations towards India.
http://www.timesleader.com/mld/timesleader/news/politics/13485696.htmBY JIM LANDERSThe Dallas Morning News
Ramanujan, Welcome and now that your are here please go to this thread and post your insights. Thanks, ramana http://www.india-forum.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=1146
The Nuclear poison pill - By Bharat Karnad Op-Ed : Asian Age, Jan 27, 2006 (Bharat Karnad is Professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and author of Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, second edition) The advocates of the proposed nuclear deal with the United States are getting shrill as they see its prospects dimming, a denouement not anticipated by its promoters within the Indian government and the media. To try and sell a patently bad agreement with the capacity seriously to injure national security and India’s strategic interests on the basis that it will enhance relations with America, procure needed civilian nuclear technology from abroad, and gain Indian entry into the big power ranks as "international balancer," is at best to misread the fundamentals of international power politics and, at worst, cynically to engage in trepidation-mongering — fall in line or miss out on the main chance. But history suggests only the strong become decisive players in the international arena. And genuine strategic military power — in the present age, this means high-yield thermonuclear forces with reach provided by intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered submarines — is the key. It requires visioning based on historical constants, rather than on nonsensical notions of Indian "exceptionalism" that translate into riding piggyback on the US, and on expediting policies to acquire the necessary strategic wherewithal. The complementary attribute of a high economic growth rate, on the other hand, would benefit from plugging into the competitive global trade and commercial environment and, at home, from dismantling Socialism-inspired public sector and facilitating private sector efficiency. One of the main reasons why the nuclear deal is hitting road-blocks is because its champions here are incoherent on the technical aspects. How else to explain the charge that rejecting this deal will result in "technology thralldom"? Come again! If ignorance of laws is no excuse for violating them, unfamiliarity with the science and technology involved cannot reasonably be the vehicle for nuclear policy propagation. Importing nuclear technology or nuclear fuel, rather than self-reliant development, surely, will result in dependence, slavery, and "thralldom" (to use a string of synonyms to emphasise the point). This is so obvious a fact, one would have thought it needed no iteration. Further, how many of the indigenously developed power plants and what other nuclear facilities to put under international safeguards is not, as per the July 18 Joint Statement, a matter of negotiation but, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared in Parliament July 29, solely for India to decide and, like in the matter of the four other NPT-recognised nuclear weapon states, for the US to accept. That New Delhi has to produce a "credible, defensible" separation plan which will pass muster with the US Congress is a later construction of American officialdom. Unless Dr Singh was not being candid in Parliament, it is not the Indian government’s responsibility to inflict hurtful measures on the country just so it enables their American counterpart to push this deal on the Capitol Hill. The more the Manmohan Singh regime bends backwards to accommodate the George W. Bush administration, the more dubious the deal becomes in the eyes of the Indian people. India has to do what other major powers have done — surrender no options, give as little ground as possible where its nuclear programme is concerned and restrict international monitoring to the barest minimum. If this is not possible, then to junk the deal and get on with life. The larger issue involved is adherence to a principle of conduct established long ago by Dr Homi J. Bhabha, the great visionary and architect of the country’s nuclear programme, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the most strategic-minded of India’s Prime Ministers. They decided early that international safeguards were acceptable only for installations built with foreign help and material assistance. The reason they adduced was simple: international safeguards hampered and hindered technological innovation and the development of indigenous technology. And they stuck by it at a time when India was vulnerable. Brazil, for example, which had no such far-sighted leaders, is now discovering that for advances to be made in locally produced technologies, like the centrifuge cascades, mindlessly put under safeguards, require prior approval by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. It is the frustration with its loss of freedom and with international red-tape which has led Brazil to not permit IAEA inspection of its newest centrifuge units. Its plea is that technological innovations are protected by Intellectual Property Rights and cannot be disclosed. The irony is that even as India is getting out from under the economic jackboot of a "licence and permit raj," New Delhi is seeking to subject its most valuable technology enclave — the Indian nuclear programme — to an international "licence and permit raj" run by IAEA. There is also plain ignorance about the breeder programme in the pro-deal camp. Few countries other than India are pursuing the fast-breeder route primarily because they have alternatives. President Jimmy Carter closed down the American breeder project in the late Seventies and France shut down its Super Phoenix reactor because, in both instances, this technology was deemed redundant to their needs. The French breeder is run on spent uranium fuel from power plants of which there is aplenty. This is unlike the Indian breeder reactor designed directly to utilise thorium in which India is super-rich, having in excess of 70 per cent of the estimated world reserves. So it is hard to see just how and where foreign technology can help this programme. Moreover, the Indian breeder reactor has definite military uses. A breeder reactor being essentially a "refinery" for bomb-grade fissile material, one 500 MW breeder — like the prototype coming up in Chennai — will produce more weapons-useable plutonium than as many as five power plants operating at low burn-up rates. This is the main reason why the United States desperately wants the Indian breeder programme under safeguards and included as part of the IAEA-monitored, permanently civilianised, nuclear sector in the separation plan, and why New Delhi should zealously protect it. It is significant that other than Dr Anil Kakodkar, the current chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who, perhaps, feels compelled to toe the government line, no eminent nuclear scientist or engineer has expressed support for it. Indeed, stalwart nuclear scientists and engineers, including Dr A.N. Prasad, retired director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, and Dr A. Gopalakrishnan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, have publicly slammed the separation plan as detrimental to sovereignty, national security, and the integrity of the nuclear programme, and have advised a minimalist principle for separation, which paraphrased reads: "When in doubt, keep it out (of the safeguards net)." This conforms better with the Nehru-Bhabha principle than buying into the expansive American non-proliferation line swallowed whole in official quarters who, to invert the adage, are missing the trees for the forest. Strategy conceptualised with an eye to the sky is in danger of stumbling on the shrubs. When you scrape away the questionable premises, what remains in the case made by the pro-dealwallahs is their fear that better relations with the US hinge on this agreement, when actually they do not. Some 12 years back in a book — Future Imperilled: India’s Security in the 1990s and Beyond — this writer had fleshed out a security architecture ("an Indian Monroe Doctrine" — an India-centric concept derived from Nehru’s impracticable "Asian Monroe Doctrine" of the late Forties) and a mutually beneficial strategic tie-up with the US based on the limits of America’s interventionary capability and India’s emerging clout, under its own steam, as a credible military and economic counterweight to China in Asia. This analysis was published at a time when most of the analysts now incessantly cawing about an India-US partnership, had quite different views. The bedrock of strong strategic ties is the "defence cooperation framework agreement" worked out between defence minister Pranab Mukherjee and US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld last summer. The nuclear deal owing to its skewed nature is, as I have detailed in these columns, a "poison pill" that is likely to embitter relations in the future and stop the promise of full-scope defence cooperation from being realised. This argument, incidentally, is echoing in Washington where people like Leonard Spector — one of the principal authors of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center, are pleading that there are too many positive factors animating the India-US relationship for it to run aground because of a failed nuclear deal. Spector, in fact, mentions that India and Israel are in like situation vis-à-vis the US. Tel Aviv has emphatically resisted the imposition by the US of IAEA safeguards on any part of its nuclear programme and has otherwise rejected truncating its nuclear options in any manner for any reason and under any guise. This has not impacted adversely on Israel’s bilateral relations with the US because Washington needs a strong Israel in West Asia. A strategically-oriented India standing up for its nuclear interests will only draw US’ respect and consideration, because a comprehensively powerful India is more beneficial to long term American national interests than the meagre non-proliferation returns from a punitive-minded nuclear deal at the present time. http://www.sulekha.com/news/nhc.aspx?cid=443186, http://www.asianage.com/
On Saturday 4th Feb 06 India voted with the EU, USA and 25 other nations at the IAEA meeting in Vienna on a resolution against Iran. It is a decision which had generated considerable amount of debate within the Indian domestic political scene as well as in teh Indian media. However, as the developments leading to today's voting in Vienna gathered momentum, the Indian Left parties who were opposing any Indian move against Iran, fell in line after Russia and China agreed to go with the EU and USA . It's fall out may lead to the suspension of the talks on India-Iran gas pipeline through Pakistan. There may be other issues on which particularly in the energy front, where Iran may not be as forthcoming or as cooperative as in the past towards India.We as a nation as to face the situation with courage , determination and fortitude. Jai Hind
As India twiddles thumbs, US, Russia unveil nuclear deal http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=87385
Even today Indian commie's reaction/action are based on their master sitting in Russia and China. Indian Tax money are feeding these traitors everyday.
http://ia.rediff.com/news/2006/feb/06al1.htm?q=np&file=.htm In the national interest, Dr Singh? (Lavakre)
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=87398 This Rajamohan is getting more weird by the day. I can almost expect the commies now coming out in full force to support the deal. The day that happens one can almost deduce that the yanks have figured out the political scenario in India. It was in full display during Modi Visa episode and its almost there now.. Lets see what happens.. :unsure
Yanks knows how to buy journalist and so-called analyst.
Solid interview by Shri Kakodkar.. http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=87466&spf=true
If there is a rush to sign up with the US demands, Mulayam is the key. See efforts to muffle him before any sign ups.
I look at this from a basic deal-making perspective. When deals are done one goes with an understanding of what one can offer to the other side that the other side might value as equivalent or more to what the other side is offering. I would like to see a list of things that India can offer to the US when this deal is brokered. It is definitely nice to have all these power plants and tech from the US but what is India offering that US finds sooo compelling that it is ready to make this deal ? We need to understand this.
The Hindustan Times of date reports the difficulties ahead for a deal with the United States. Quote DESPITE US President George Bush’s visit being just round the corner, the Indo-US nuclear agreement looks like a non-starter. Talks are deadlocked on separating India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities. Standing in the way are not just Indian fears that its nuclear deterrent would be compromised, but also the Bush administration’s compulsions in making a onetime waiver of nuke prohibitions for India. Both governments had always known the deal would lead them into “uncharted territories”. But the extent of the “difficulty” became apparent after the joint working group, headed by Under Secretary Nicholas Burns and Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, began talks. The JWG is likely to meet before the Bush visit, though the US is yet to decide if this is the right time to send Burns to New Delhi again. Sources say that the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership was “offered as a sop” to India as the main civil nuclear deal “might not work out.” Moreover, US Ambassador David C Mulford’s recent warning of “devastating” consequences if India did not vote against Iran at the IAEA was “clear indication” of the difficulty in pushing the deal forward. Sources said Mulford’s warning came only after Washington’s ‘go-ahead’. Again, Atomic Energy chief Anil Kakodkar’s recent criticism of the US’s “shifting goal posts,” was, sources said, a response to criticism within the US nuclear establishment to the deal. It was also intended to ensure that India would “not go beyond or expand on the letter of the text” of the July 18 agreement. Since the Bush visit is not being pegged on a single agenda, as part of other initiatives, Commerce Secretary S.N. Menon will visit Washington next week for talks to remove barriers to bilateral trade — particularly Indian exports. Why no deal ¦ India fears its N-deterrent would be compromised ¦ A ‘yes’ vote in the US Senate is diffi cult with at least three-fourths of India’s reactors needing to be safeguarded ¦ With the deal not working out, both sides are working on other initia tives, including removing barriers on Indian DESPITE US President George Bush’s visit be- ing just round the corner, the Indo-US nuclear agreement looks like a non-starter. Talks are deadlocked on separating India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities. Standing in the way are not just Indian fears that its nuclear deter- rent would be compromised, but also the Bush administration’s compulsions in making a one- time waiver of nuke prohibitions for India. Both governments had always known the deal would lead them into “uncharted territo- ries”. But the extent of the “difficulty” became apparent after the joint working group, headed by Under Secretary Nicholas Burns and For- eign Secretary Shyam Saran, began talks. The JWG is likely to meet before the Bush visit, though the US is yet to decide if this is the right time to send Burns to New Delhi again. Sources say that the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership was “offered as a sop” to India as the main civil nuclear deal “might not work out.” Moreover, US Ambassador David C Mulford’s re- cent warning of “devastating” consequences if India did not vote against Iran at the IAEA was “clear indication” of the difficulty in pushing the deal forward. Sources said Mulford’s warn- ing came only after Washington’s ‘go-ahead’. Again, Atomic Energy chief Anil Kakodkar’s recent criticism of the US’s “shifting goal posts,” was, sources said, a response to criti- cism within the US nuclear establishment to the deal. It was also intended to ensure that India would “not go beyond or expand on the letter of the text” of the July 18 agreement. Since the Bush visit is not being pegged on a single agenda, as part of other initiatives, Com- merce Secretary S.N. Menon will visit Washing- ton next week for talks to remove barriers to bi- lateral trade — particularly Indian exports. Why no deal ¦ India fears its N-deterrent would be compromised ¦ A ‘yes’ vote in the US Senate is diffi- cult with at least three-fourths of India’s reactors needing to be safeguarded ¦ With the deal not working out, both sides are working on other initia- tives, including removing barriers on Indian exports to the United States. Unquote It gives some insight to the very difficult path that both sides have to cover before any workable and useful agreement could be reached on the issue. TOP
One thing is sure. This talks have smoked out the Indian position on the MND. They have unveiled the nature of the sub-Kt tests, the FBR and the number of PHWRs needed for MND, the complexes where strategic activities are expected to be happening. Can expect these to become targets. On an aside. The fact that there is a lot of reactor grade Pu(~9T) that can be used for conversion to weapon grade sub-kt stuff means that the Indian forces will have a measured esclatory ladder but also means they are for a regional emphasis and should not impact golbal strategic balance. In other words they are defensive and not offensive weapons if such a thing can exist and will not effect the strategi arms balance. So US need not worry about China increasing its inventory due to India. If China is increasing it is due its own threat perception from the P-5. On the US side they revealed the true agenda of the US elites- NPA( chatterati and Congress) and SD types. The former want severe limits on Indian even if there are other unnamed as yet benefits from the deal. The latter want India to support the US in its global hegemony as a junior partner. The neo-con political types even after tall talk did not invoke strategic interests clause shows that it was tall talk only. One significant aspect not commented on is the deep US-China tango which has driven the US Congress types to scuttle the deal. Amb T.K. Sreenivasan's talk at CIEP shows lack of understanding of this fact. I would like to see an analysis of the stated reasons of the US for pursing theJuly 18 agreement. Also in India it has revealed the lifafa opinion makers in the media. In the official circles the MEA can always wiggle out as it was operating under PMO guidelines. Anyway only Shyam Saran is tainted , but he has redeemed himslef by reading the riot act to Mulford. What is not unmasked is the PMO cretins who carried on a campaign against the DAE and BARC officialdom. The eight retired diplomats in Bangalore redeemed themselves by coming out first against the shifted goals deal.
The commie reaction to this whole business needs to be collected. Even if its absence of opinion it needs to be noted. This deal-making has also showed the US understanding of the Indian political situation. More and more I think the commies are being coopted by the US establishment to work within the US set framework, no matter what the outward show is. PS : Channels used in Modi visa episode and in this episode needs to be studied.
Not related to the nukes, but the article from Jakob has some interesting insight into how the US coopts and guides the seemingly hostile factions to work within the framework.. http://www.india-forum.com/articles/70/1/TOWARDS-A-POSITIVE-PORTRAYAL-OF-THE-HINDU-TRADITIONS%3F where Jakob writes..
Has this been posted before ? Real sensible piece. http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1628699,00120001.htm Aim before you shoot : Brahma Chellaney
The Indian Ambassador to the USA has made several important observations in his address to the National Press Club which are worth noting.Quote Wednesday February 22, 03:51 AM U.S. nuclear deal would not expand Indian arsenal - envoy By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent WASHINGTON (Reuters) - India's ambassador to Washington on Tuesday dismissed fears that a controversial civilian nuclear energy deal with the United States would help New Delhi expand its atomic weapons production. Speaking ahead of President George W. Bush's first visit to India, Ronen Sen said debate over the troubled accord had been "hijacked" by non-proliferation "theologians" in the United States and advocates of Indian self-reliance in his country. Prominent U.S. non-proliferation experts, in analyses made public last week, said the nuclear deal would allow the rapid expansion of India's nuclear arsenal and encourage Pakistan and China to respond. But Sen, speaking at the National Press Club, said this criticism "doesn't hold water ... because ... we don't require any outside assistance with this (nuclear weapons) program. ... So that program is going to continue irrespective of whether you have this agreement or you don't have this agreement." Bush will visit New Delhi next week to further advance a rapidly growing U.S.-India relationship that has the nuclear deal as its centerpiece. Agreed in principle last July, the deal would give India access to long-denied U.S. civilian nuclear technology, including fuel and reactors. Failure to resolve key practical differences would mar Bush's trip, which also includes a stop in Pakistan, officials and experts say. The two governments are at odds over the issue of separating India's civilian and military facilities and subjecting the civilian sites to international inspections while military sites remain off-limits. Americans insist India must put more facilities under international supervision. India's powerful nuclear establishment has complained this would shackle its scientists and leave the country dependent on imported uranium. Although some U.S. experts say the deal is falling apart, U.S. businessmen with interests in India are more upbeat. TALKS IN DELHI Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns will hold talks in New Delhi later this week and U.S. officials said he would not be going if he did not believe there was a basis for resolving the dispute. Sen insisted the agreement was strictly about energy and said: "The debate, I think, has been hijacked over here by nonproliferation theologians and in India by those rallying under the banner of self-reliance, even though it might not be conducive to our overall self-interests." If India were unable to expand its nuclear power industry with the help of U.S. and other imported fuel and technology, the country would have no choice but to burn its own stocks of "dirty coal ... at the cost of our health and health of this planet," Sen told a National Press Club briefing. Sen said India now imported 70 percent of its oil and to sustain the rapidly growing economy, New Delhi had to pursue nuclear energy as an alternative to oil. If that were not possible, he said, "we are going to burn that coal." He refused to discuss specifics of the nuclear dispute but predicted Bush's visit would be "a very successful visit ... a milestone in our relationship." U.S. officials and experts have said that if they could not nail down the nuclear deal, the two governments would shift the focus of Bush's visit to other, less contentious initiatives. U.S. business leaders say the nuclear deal could open the door to billions of dollars in contracts, while U.S. officials say it commits India to play a key role in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. For 30 years, the United States led an effort to deny India nuclear technology because it tested and developed nuclear weapons. Neither India nor neighbor and nuclear-armed rival Pakistan have signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Bush now views India, a rising democratic and economic power on China's border, as an evolving U.S. ally and the new nuclear deal is central to that vision. Unquote He has made it very clear that whether the USA goes ahead with the nuclear deal or not , it will have no effect on India's ability to increase its nuclear weapons, if it so wishes.This should clear the misconceptions in the mind of the opponents of the deal both in the United States and in India.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114057601361479756.html THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
This headline is funny, deserve to be in Humor thread. http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1632850,001301790001.htm
I found the headline above the last one even more funnier.. Whats with "deserves" ? As long as India negotiates from this sorry condition it cant negotiate a good deal. Sorry to see people like KS come up with such stupid stuff..
One point to be kept in mind is that MMS daughter was protesting as an ACLU lawyer and not as MMS daughter. So this MMS picture in the WSJ is creationsim at its best.
[The following is the text of the statement made today by the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India in the lower house of the Indian Parliament :- Quote Suo-motu Statement by the PM on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States February 27, 2006 New Delhi Mr Speaker Sir, I rise to inform this august House of the status of discussions with the United States on civil nuclear energy co-operation. Substantive aspects of this are reflected in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 that US President Bush and I agreed upon during my visit to Washington DC last year. I would like to use this occasion to outline the context and core elements of the Joint Statement, before detailing the status of the ongoing negotiations. Hon’ble Members are aware that our effort to reach an understanding with the United States to enable civil nuclear energy cooperation was based on our need to overcome the growing energy deficit that confronts us. As India strives to raise its annual GDP growth rate from the present 7-8% to over 10%, the energy deficit will only worsen. This may not only retard growth, it could also impose an additional burden in terms of the increased cost of importing oil and natural gas, in a scenario of sharply rising hydrocarbon prices. While we have substantial reserves of coal, excessive dependence on coal-based energy has its own implications for our environment. Nuclear technology provides a plentiful and non-polluting source of power to meet our energy needs. However, to increase the share of nuclear power in our energy mix, we need to break out of the confines imposed by inadequate reserves of natural uranium, and by international embargos that have constrained our nuclear programme for over three decades. Established through the vision of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and sustained by the commitment of scientists like Dr. Homi Bhabha, our nuclear programme is truly unique. Its uniqueness lies in the breadth of its overarching vision: of India mastering a three-stage nuclear programme using our vast thorium resources, and mastering more complex processes of the full nuclear fuel cycle. Consequently, our civilian and strategic programmes are deeply intertwined across the expanse of the nuclear fuel cycle. There are hardly any other countries in a similar situation. Over the years, the maturation of our nuclear programme, including the development of world-class thermal power reactors, has made it possible to contemplate some changes. These are worth considering if benefits include gaining unhindered access to nuclear material, equipment, technology and fuel from international sources. However, international trade in nuclear material, equipment and technologies is largely determined by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG)—an informal group of 45 countries. Members include the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom. India has been kept out of this informal arrangement and therefore denied access to trade in nuclear materials, equipment and various kinds of technologies. It was with this perspective that we approached negotiations with the United States on enabling full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. The essence of what was agreed in Washington last July was a shared understanding of our growing energy needs. In recognition of our improved ties, the United States committed itself to a series of steps to enable bilateral and international cooperation in nuclear energy. These include adjusting domestic policies, and working with allies to adjust relevant international regimes. There was also a positive mention of possible fuel supply to the first two nuclear power reactors at Tarapur. US support was also indicated for India’s inclusion as a full partner in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Research Project and the Generation IV International Forum. But more importantly, in the Joint Statement, the United States implicitly acknowledged the existence of our nuclear weapons programme. There was also public recognition that as a responsible State with advanced nuclear technologies, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other States which have advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. The Joint Statement offered the possibility of decades-old restrictions being set aside to create space for India’s emergence as a full member of a new nuclear world order. On our part, as Hon’ble Members may recall from my suo motu statement on July 29 last year, we committed ourselves to separating the civilian and strategic programme. However this was to be conditional upon, and reciprocal to, the United States fulfilling its side of the understanding. I had stressed that reciprocity was the key and we expected that the steps to be taken by India would be conditional upon and contingent on action taken by the United States. I had emphasized then—and I reiterate today—that no part of this process would affect or compromise our strategic programme. I now come to the negotiations that have taken place in the past few months. While these have been principally with the US, there have been discussions with other countries like Russia, UK and France as well. At the political level, I have maintained contact with President Chirac of France, President Putin of Russia, Prime Minister Blair of the UK. I have also raised this subject with the Heads of State/Government of Norway, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Czech Republic and Ireland - all members of the NSG. I also met President Bush in New York last September and discussed implementation of the July 18 statement. In the same period, several American Congressional leaders and policy-makers have visited India in the past few months, many of whom met me. We have amply clarified our objective in pursuing full civil nuclear energy cooperation for our energy security and to reassure them of India’s impeccable non-proliferation credentials. At the official level, we have constituted two groups comprising key functionaries concerned with strategic and nuclear matters. They included the Department of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Armed Forces and my Office. These two groups were respectively mandated to draw up an acceptable separation plan, and to negotiate on this basis. The directive given to both groups was to ensure that our strategic nuclear programme is not compromised in any way, while striving to enlarge avenues for full civil nuclear energy cooperation with the international community. The negotiations by our officials have been extensive and prolonged. These have focused on four critical elements: the broad contours of a Separation Plan; the list of facilities being classified civilian; the nature of safeguards applied to facilities listed in the civilian domain; and the nature and scope of changes expected in US domestic laws and NSG guidelines to enable full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. Hon’ble Members may be assured that in deciding the contours of a separation plan, we have taken into account our current and future strategic needs and programmes after careful deliberation of all relevant factors, consistent with our Nuclear Doctrine. We are among very few countries to adhere to the doctrine of ‘No first Use’. Our doctrine envisions a credible minimum nuclear deterrent to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary indulging in a nuclear first strike. The facilities for this, and the required level of comfort in terms of our strategic resilience have thus been our criterion in drawing up a separation plan. Ours is a sacred trust to protect succeeding generations from a nuclear threat and we shall uphold this trust. Hon Members may therefore be assured that in preparing a Separation Plan, there has been no erosion of the integrity of our Nuclear Doctrine, either in terms of current or future capabilities. The Separation Plan that is being outlined is not only consistent with the imperatives of national security, it also protects our vital research and development interests. We have ensured that our three-stage nuclear programme will not be undermined or hindered by external interference. We will offer to place under safeguards only those facilities that can be identified as civilian without damaging our deterrence potential or restricting our R&D effort, or in any way compromising our autonomy of developing our three stage nuclear programme. In this process, the Department of Atomic Energy has been involved at every stage, and the separation plan has been drawn up with their inputs. Therefore our proposed Separation Plan entails identifying in phases, a number of our thermal nuclear reactors as civilian facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, amounting to roughly 65% of the total installed thermal nuclear power capacity, by the end of the separation plan. A list of some other DAE facilities may be added to the list of facilities within the civilian domain. The Separation Plan will create a clearly defined civilian domain, where IAEA safeguards apply. On our part, we are committed not to divert any nuclear material intended for the civilian domain from designated civilian use or for export to third countries without safeguards. Mr Speaker Sir, Negotiations are currently at a delicate stage. In our dialogue with our interlocutors, we have judged every proposal made by the US side on merits, but we remain firm in that the decision of what facilities may be identified as civilian will be made by India alone, and not by anyone else. At the same time, we are not underestimating the difficulties that exist in these negotiations. There are complex issues involved. Several aspects of the nuclear programme lend themselves in the public discussions to differing interpretations, such as the Fast Breeder Programme or our fuel-cycle capabilities such as re-processing and enrichment requirements. The nature and range of strategic facilities that we consider necessarily outside safeguards constitute yet another example. We have however conveyed to our interlocutors that while discussing the Separation Plan, there are details of the nature and content of our strategic requirements that we cannot share. We will not permit information of national security significance to be compromised in the process of negotiation. It is essential to recall that the July 18 Statement was not about our strategic programme. It was intended to be the means to expand our civilian nuclear energy capacities and thereby to help pave the way for faster economic progress. In seeking to achieve this objective, we appreciate the need for patience to remove misperceptions that abound. I reiterate that India has an exemplary record on non-proliferation and this will continue to be so. All in all, one major achievement so far is that a change is now discernible in the international system. We believe that when implemented, the understandings reflected in the Joint Statement will give India its due place in the global nuclear order. The existence of our strategic programme is being acknowledged even while we are being invited to become a full partner in international civil nuclear energy cooperation. Mr Speaker Sir, I must emphasize that the nation is justly proud of the tremendous work of our nuclear scientists and the Department of Atomic Energy in mastering all the key aspects of the full nuclear fuel cycle, often under difficult circumstances. The tremendous achievements of our scientists in mastering the complete nuclear fuel cycle - the product of their genius and perseverance – will not be frittered away. We will ensure that no impediments are put in the way of our research and development activities. We have made it clear that we cannot accept safeguards on our indigenous Fast Breeder Programme. Our scientists are confident that this technology will mature and that the programme will stabilize and become more robust through the creation of additional capability. This will create greater opportunities for international cooperation in this area as well. An important reason why the US and other countries with advanced nuclear technologies are engaging with India as a valued partner is precisely because of the high respect and admiration our scientists enjoy internationally, and the range and quality of the sophisticated nuclear programme they have managed to create under the most difficult odds. This gives us confidence to engage in these negotiations as an equal partner. As I said, many aspects of the proposed separation plan are currently under negotiation. It is true that certain assurances in the July 18 Statement remain to be fulfilled – the supply of imported fuel for Tarapur I and II, for one. Some elements, such as US support for India’s participation in the ITER programme, have materialized. The issue of the nature of safeguards to be applied to facilities designated civilian also remains pending resolution. I seek the indulgence of this House not to divulge every single detail of the negotiations at this time. However, this august House can be assured that the limits are determined by our overarching commitment to national security and the related issue of the autonomy of our nuclear programme. Our Government will take no step that could circumscribe or cast a shadow over either. I am aware that concerns have been raised over information being shared with outsiders, but not with our own citizens. Members may be assured that nothing that could compromise our nuclear deterrent has been shared with anyone. On this aspect there is no reason for concern or doubt. Mr Speaker Sir, As I said at the outset, our approach is defined by the need to utilize the window of opportunity before us, to find a solution to our energy deficit. We have also been guided by the need to dismantle international restrictions, which, when achieved, could unleash our scientific talent and increase commercial potential in the nuclear and related sectors. The nation will be kept informed, through this august House. Thank you. Unquote
Good Nukes, Bad Nukes By David Ignatius Wednesday, March 1, 2006; Page A17 Juxtaposed this week are the two poles of the emerging world: India and Iran. They are alpha and omega, the dream and the nightmare. One symbolizes the promise of globalization, the other the threat of global disorder. What they share, unfortunately, is a passion to be members of the nuclear club. India has nuclear weapons; Iran wants them. Between them stands the United States, trying to set rules that will apply to both -- rewarding the good boy while maintaining an ability to punish the bad one. F. Scott Fitzgerald famously observed that intelligence "is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time." That has always seemed to me like an argument for enlightened hypocrisy. And maybe it's the best explanation for why we should say yes to India's nukes and no to Iran's. The two cases are different because -- they're different. The same rules don't apply to both; one has shown that it is benign and the other behaves like a global outlaw. President Bush's trip to India this week sets the nuclear issue in all its hypocritical glory. The centerpiece of the visit, it is hoped, will be an agreement that, in effect, validates India's accession as a nuclear weapons state in exchange for its acceptance of new safeguards on its civilian nuclear program. An Iranian observing Bush's visit might conclude that the lesson is that if you can somehow manage to build a nuclear bomb despite the West's antiproliferation efforts, you will eventually get away with it. Iran would be dangerously mistaken if it made that assumption. The real lesson may be that rules are sometimes less important than behavior. The world is ready to accept India as a nuclear power because its actions have given other nations confidence that it seeks to play a stabilizing role. A world where behavior matters gets the incentives right: It forces Iran to demonstrate its reliability so that, over time, it can be seen in the same league as India and Pakistan. One common thread in U.S. policy toward India and Iran is the insistence that enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel be under some form of international supervision. The agreement Bush is seeking during his trip -- to separate India's civilian and military nuclear programs -- embodies that idea. So does Russia's proposal to provide enrichment for Iran's nuclear program. Iran suggested last weekend that it might accept this plan. Most observers remain dubious, but if Iran is really willing to outsource its civilian nuclear fuel, that might be a breakthrough. The Bush administration is weighing a more ambitious idea that all nuclear enrichment and reprocessing should be capped -- so that no new country can join the club. Sen. Richard Lugar has submitted such a proposal, based on suggestions from Ashton B. Carter, a Harvard University expert in nuclear policy. Under the Lugar plan, countries that forgo their enrichment and reprocessing programs would have guaranteed access to nuclear fuel at reasonable prices. Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, proposes to take internationalization of fuel supplies a step further -- so that all enrichment and reprocessing would be under the IAEA's control. How can the world foster civilian nuclear power without further proliferation of weapons? That conundrum was the starting point for the drafters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the 1960s, and it has become more urgent today. There's an emerging consensus that nuclear power is the best way for China and India to modernize without adding disastrously to global warming. John Ritch, head of the World Nuclear Association in London, argues that the world will need 10,000 civilian nuclear reactors by the end of the century, compared with 440 today. How can we manage this explosion of nuclear power while avoiding a mushroom cloud? That's the backdrop to our debate about India and Iran. Harvard's Graham Allison tells his students that the Iranian nuclear issue is a "slow-motion Cuban missile crisis." By that, he means that miscalculation on either side could have catastrophic consequences for the world. Allison's famous study of the missile crisis, "Essence of Decision," explained how both firmness and flexibility allowed President Kennedy to avoid war. One of Kennedy's secrets, it could be argued, was a policy of strategic hypocrisy -- responding to a constructive Soviet message that could resolve the crisis and ignoring a subsequent belligerent one. The West is still waiting for the constructive message from Tehran. In the meantime, we should all learn to live with a policy that says yes to India and no to Iran. firstname.lastname@example.org
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=1677864 U.S., India Reach Agreement on Nuke Deal U.S., India Reach Agreement on Landmark Civil Nuclear Deal During Bush Visit .................. Under the accord, the United States would share American nuclear know-how and fuel with India to help power its fast-growing economy, even though India won't sign the international nonproliferation treaty. It would represent a major shift in policy for the United States, which imposed temporary sanctions on India in 1998 after it conducted nuclear tests. ...................
Propensity of Indian politician to fall for flattery and crawl when asked to bend is there for all to see. So such expectation (NPT signing ) may not be misplaced. Now what we have to wait for is the details of agreement ... as an Indian I have my own cynical views abt US. Hope that is okay. The way KS and ppl like Shekhar Gupta / certain NSAB member were rooting for US who have in past have not hidden their love for China all raised certain question. Remember protestations of Mr Kakodkar .. So if not signing it directly but indirectly agreeing to various stiffling agreement may amount to same , isn't it ? I am not celebrating yet . PS : BR hacked ?
China's tushy has started quivering. I find it delectable - at the same time worthy of quiet anger. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1435620.cms The eternal Chinese persistence and diplomatese is all over it. http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/02bush50.htm
BR is down again. Could be too many requests also. Will find out soon. Meantime, Manne, now that an accord has been reached post your 'golden nuggets' in this and the BR thread once it opens. In my view Indian diplomacy has ensured that it is medium threat situation that I described in BRM article "What Next?" The next step is mutual detargetting agreement as a follow-up once the US Congress ratifies the this accord. Here is a newkerala.com report
Today’s Kate Couric (NBC) asked Thomas Friedman - Don't you think there is double standard, we are helping India who is not a signatory of NPT and not allowing Iran or North Korea. His answer was- Yes, it is a double standard but we are telling world that India is a democracy and you are not. Basically US is trying to sell US citizens that Indian is becoming richer and more people are buying cars, they will consume more oil for development, it will make Gas in US expensive. So let us help India to build nuclear plants which will give jobs to US citizens and less oil price for common US citizens.
Mudy, you know thats not right. NPT was brought into effect to contain the emergence of nuclear armed states in Europe. A whole lot of states considered going nuclear- Sweden, Germany, and Italy. They signed the NPT once they were given the US nuclear umbrella and access to weapons in case of war with Soviet Union. Ditto with Japan and South Korea. India was collateral damage. Halbright was still in school when it was first discussed in early 1960s. Being an Admin you cant make glib statements like that. Responsibility comes with power.
Ramana, My understanding regarding any deal with India on Nuclear issue, Clinton Admin was using sign CTBT first and NPT is for some exclusive club. But with Bush, CTBT is gone but before signing this deal there is no binding. NPT, which means they still beileve India not a "nuclear weapon state" or not part of "exclusive club".
Nuclear Deal With India a Victory for Bush By DEB RIECHMANN, Associated Press Writer 2 hours, 13 minutes ago NEW DELHI - President Bush got a victory Thursday on his first visit to India, securing a landmark nuclear energy agreement that he says could help ease energy prices in the United States. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the deal, which will open most Indian reactors to international inspections and provide the growing nation with U.S. nuclear technology, during a joint news conference after meeting privately to hammer out details. "We made history," Singh said of the deal that will aid India's quest for more global influence. Under the accord, the United States will share its nuclear know-how and fuel with India to help power its fast-growing economy. It represents a major shift in policy for the United States, which imposed temporary sanctions on India in 1998 after it conducted nuclear tests. "We concluded an historic agreement today on nuclear power," Bush said. "It's not an easy job for the prime minister to achieve this agreement, I understand. It's not easy for the American president to achieve this agreement, but it's a necessary agreement. It's one that will help both our peoples." Critics said the deal undermines the Nuclear Nonproliferation Agreement, which India won't sign. And they say it sends the wrong signal to leaders of North Korea and Iran, who have snubbed their noses at international calls to halt their nuclear weapons programs. The agreement will require U.S. congressional approval. Bush immediately acknowledged that will be difficult to win. Bush said he will tell lawmakers that the U.S.-India relationship is changing for the better and that it is in the United States' interest to cooperate with India on its nuclear programs. He also said the deal could be a boon for U.S. consumers. "Proliferation is certainly a concern and a part of our discussions, and we've got a good faith gesture by the Indian government that I'll be able to take to the Congress," Bush said. "But the other thing that our Congress has got to understand — that it's in our economic interests that India have a civilian nuclear power industry to help take the pressure off of the global demand for energy. ... To the extent that we can reduce demand for fossil fuels, it will help the American consumer." Singh's leftist allies also criticized the pact, saying it paves the way for U.S. meddling in Indian affairs. "Today is one of the most shameful days in the history of independent India," said Shambhu Shrivastava, spokesman for the socialist Samata Party. A top official of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party said the agreement sounded good, but must not compromise national security. India argues that it has been a good steward of nuclear material for five decades, and that there has not been one instance of nuclear proliferation coming from India. Singh repeatedly thanked Bush for shepherding the deal. "But for his leadership, this day would probably have not come so soon," Singh said. Not everyone in India was pleased about Bush's involvement in its affairs. Demonstrators gathered across the country, including an estimated 10,000 people who chanted "Bush go back!" and "Down with Bush!" a few blocks from where the two leaders met. Many carried the red flags of India's leftist political parties or wore white skullcaps indicating they were Muslim. India has the world's second-largest Muslim population, behind Indonesia. Bush and Singh signed an agreement in July to provide India with nuclear fuel for its booming but energy-starved economy. But the deal hinged upon determining how to segregate India's nuclear weapons work from its commercial nuclear program, and place the latter under international inspection, in a way that satisfied both sides. U.S. Undersecretary of State Nick Burns said India agreed to open a majority of its nuclear power plants to international safeguards. A senior administration official said India classified 14 of its 22 reactors as civilian, which would open them to international inspection. Eight were deemed military reactors, making them exempt from inspection. Bush began more than 12 hours of events and meetings on Thursday with a striking arrival ceremony in a sun-drenched plaza at Rashtrapati Bhavan, the president's palace. He reviewed troops of the Indian armed services outfitted in orange turbans and brown dress uniforms with colorful sashes and marveled at a cavalry unit on horseback that earlier had flanked his limousine. "I have been received in many capitals around the world but I have never seen a reception as well-organized or as grand," Bush said. Bush and his wife, Laura, then visited a memorial to India's independence leader, M.K. Gandhi, standing in stocking feet for a moment of silence and wreath-laying at the site of his cremation in 1948. Following tradition, the Bushes tossed flower petals on the cremation platform — a gesture repeated for news photographers. After meeting with U.S. and Indian CEOs and answering questions from the media, Bush and Singh had a lunch of smoked salmon, mutton and vegetables. Singh spoke of how another American-Indian duo — Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi — pushed for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The day was to end with an elaborate State Dinner. After India, Bush was headed to Pakistan where on Thursday at least one bomb ripped through the parking lot of the Marriott Hotel in Karachi, exploding windows in the nearby U.S. consulate. Bush said he had been briefed on the bombing and had been told the victims included at least one U.S. citizen, a foreign service officer he did not identify by name. The attack occurred hundreds of miles from Islamabad, where Bush's events were to take place, but underscored the need for the extraordinary security planned for his visit. "Terrorists and killers are not going to prevent me from going to Pakistan," he said.
From newkerla.com report:
Mudy, The NPT was waved against India from Johnson's adminsitration. It was not some exclusive thing that the Clinton Admn waved at India in particlular. Lets get to basics. In 1954 Jawahar Lal Nehru proposed the Test Ban treaty after the British tested in 1953. The logic was that testing was a precondtion to becoming a nuclear power and limiting the powers that had nukes was a good thing for world peace especially when India did not have access to such weapons. However the West and Soviet Union rejected the suggestion for they new the club was incomplete. In 1955 Mao told JLN that PRC was pursuing nukes and would not be bound by any treaty. So in 1955 the Second Five year plan was totally changed empahsis from Agriculture to Science and Technology focus and AEC established. India continued pursuing atomic knowledge while advocating world disarmament for it was willing to be a party ot world disarmament of such WMD.(In effect he was pursuing Power Law 48 from above) Before the PRC test in 1964, Dean Rusk of US suggested giving nukes to India as counter. Johnson appointed the Gilpatric Commission to examine the issues. The Gilpatric Commission came back and said that the spread of nuclear weapons was not in the US national interests and a treaty to limit the powers should be negotiated. Since then the US has pursued the idea of NPT whicc India had come up with first but in a radically altered manner that gives permanent prominence or primacy to those states that tested before 1968. India objected to this as a discriminatory clause for it would create permamnent power imbalances and by then the 1962 agression had happened. The NPT clause of peaceful explosions was used by India in 1974 to show its capabilites but it did not violate the letter of the law of the treaty. Since then as the security conditons worsened withthe introduction of nukes in TSP, the GOI took the decsion to waeponize in 1989. All this is old hat in Chengappa's WOP. The objective of every US Admin since the Johnson era was to foreclose Indian capabilities as a part of the Gilpatric Commission report. So it was not just a Clinton Admin thing. If you really followed the debate in the 2005 elections in India, ABV said Richardson offered India weapons so that it would not have to test in 1998. Everyone phoophooed the information. So everything is not black and white.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1640283,001301790000.htm ramana, Thanks Ramana, very informative. Do you think US Congress will ask India to sign NPT?
February 28, 2006 http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/slot3_022806.html?ei=5070&en=cd169a39e46168be&ex=1141880400&emc=eta1&pagewanted=print Q&A: U.S. and India By BERNARD GWERTZMAN From the Council on Foreign Relations, February 28, 2006 Bernard Gwertzman is consulting editor for the Council on Foreign Relations website, cfr.org. George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a leading expert on India's nuclear program, applauds the U.S. goal of trying to reach an accommodation with India over its nuclear program. But he says the details in the draft accord, now being worked on in advance of President Bush's arrival in India next week, were "very under-cooked and not well-considered." "The idea of changing the rules to make some accommodation with India was correct," says Perkovich. "But this particular approach was ill-considered, in essence giving India, or attempting to give India, everything, and to throw out in essence all the rules in return for too little from India. And the reason that you want more from India is to be able to send a signal to the rest of the world that 'Yes, nonproliferation matters also, and we're not throwing out the distinctions that have been made between countries that have nuclear weapons and countries that don't.'" President Bush heads to India and Pakistan next week. In India, which will be the centerpiece of the trip, he's hoping to sign an agreement on nuclear sharing, which will require congressional approval. Do you think this agreement will actually come into being this soon? Certainly the administration and the Indian government in July when they announced the basic outlines hoped and anticipated that by now, yes, they would have been able to clear away the legal issues and actually have something formalized. The proposal ran into a lot more difficulty than either government anticipated, in both countries, interestingly. It ran into considerable opposition in India and a lot of scrutiny in the United States. What were the problems? The original proposal was unusually vague, and it left open some really fundamental questions. For example, the administration in July 2005 said that this deal would augment our nuclear nonproliferation objectives. It said the main way this would happen is that for the first time India would designate certain nuclear facilities as civilian, and put those under safeguards by the [UN nuclear watchdog, the] International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Many of those facilities aren't under such safeguards now. What the administration didn't nail down was how long would the safeguards be accepted or agreed to by India. In other words, all of the world, except for the five recognized nuclear weapon states, have safeguards forever on a facility. You build a facility, you put it under safeguard, safeguards are there eternally, and safeguards on the fuel and the nuclear material are for eternity. People asked, "Is this what India's going to do, when it designates a facility as civilian and puts it under safeguards, is it for eternity?" [Bush] administration leaders kind of shrugged their shoulders. They hadn't thought of it. The Indians, when first asked, said, "No way, because what we've agreed to, and what President Bush has said, was that India now will be treated like all the other advanced nuclear countries, meaning the five recognized with nuclear weapons." And the dirty little secret is that we five--the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, and France--do not accept safeguards forever. We have voluntary safeguards which say, "Yes, you can come look and inspect it today, but if tomorrow I change my mind, I kick the inspectors out, I take the fuel, and do what I want with it." And so Congress and others asked the administration, "Well which is it, is it safeguards forever, in which case, OK; if it's not safeguards forever, you didn't get anything." And the administration scratched its collective head and said, "We're going to have go talk to the Indians about it." So what's happened when we talked to the Indians? The Indians came up with a formula that was very clever. They said, "Well, we don't like it, but we're prepared to accept safeguards on facilities and on fuel as long as you're prepared to continue providing the fuel. So if you say safeguards forever, that means you have to promise fuel forever." The United States will never agree to that. Why is that? I've had this discussion with administration officials. They say, "We will never give up our sovereign right to deny exports to anyone." This comes up in regard to Iran. In many ways, the key to solving the Iran nuclear problem will be to guarantee Iran sources of fuel from outside of Iranto persuade Iran not to make the fuel themselves. And the Iranians say, "We can't do that if we're not going to be guaranteed that fuel supply forever." And the United States says it will never make that guarantee forever because it may want to impose sanctions if Iran takes hostages again, or what have you. The United States will never give up its right to deny export licenses. And so that same principle would have to hold for India. This is one of those issues that's still, I think, being hammered out as we speak. And of course, in India, I gather, there's a strong nuclear lobby? In India, you have a strong nuclear establishment, which is a little different from a lobby. In other words, it's the Department of Atomic Energy, the Atomic Energy Commission, the people who actually wear the white coats and design and build things and get budgets to do that. It's always been a state within a state. It's been highly unaccountable. It's never been subjected to international scrutiny or competition. They were seen as the avatars of modernity and brilliance, the real symbols of great technological prowess, and so they have been powerful over the years, and also, immune from economic accountability and pressure. It's a paradox. On one hand, the nuclear experts realize that, finally, all of the promises they've made about providing nuclear energy for decades always come up woefully short; that they're never going to meet the country's energy needs without significant international cooperation. You mean they don't have enough sources of uranium? They don't have enough sources of uranium to fuel the kind of first-generation nuclear reactors they would need to meet energy requirements for the short term or even the next two decades. So there's a physical limit because of the fuel. There's a technological limit because their programs always kind of run behind in terms of the size of its reactors and its general capability. Now, they're improving that a lot, but they can't build enough reactors soon enough to meet the country's energy targets. So where that leads is that, for a combination of both fuel needs and reactor needs, they're going to have to turn to international cooperation. Now they have a grand plan that they've had since the 1940s, which is to be the only country which relies on a totally different kind of fuel, which is a thorium-based fuel, because India has an abundance of thorium in its sand, in its soil. The problem is that the thorium fuel cycle is always fifty years away. So did the Indians come to the United States first? They have been coming to us for many, many years, saying, "You want better relations, the No. 1 issue has been to open up for nuclear cooperation, end the different kinds of sanctions." So they've been hammering on this for decades. Yes, they came to us saying we want fully open nuclear cooperation. Modestly, they would have settled for fuel right now, but they wanted everything. And then this administration, unlike others, for a variety of reasons said, "Let's give them everything." If we reached an agreement, this would allow American companies like GE [General Electric] or Westinghouse to build reactors for them? Yes, that's right. [It would be an agreement] to build reactors, to supply nuclear fuel, to engage in full-scale civilian cooperation in facilities under IAEA safeguards. And this is what requires a change inU.S.law. Also, if the United States were to be faithful to the international rules that it helped establish, we would have to persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which is a cartel of nuclear technology suppliers, to change their rules, which also bar this kind of full cooperation with countries that don't have all of their facilities under IAEA safeguards. And so the president promised that in addition to changing our laws, he would try to change the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines, to make what we want to do consistent with the rules. That would open up the Indian sector to cooperation from France, Japan, and anybody else with which India would want to do business. The question to me is why did India ever set off those bombs in 1998 that led to its problems? From their point of view, it was: "We're going to set off these bombs because, like the United States and China and other great powers we need nuclear weapons, and we face a rising China that's been noted by the United States as a potential major power with which we have a border dispute. They have nuclear weapons targeted at us; we're going to need demonstrable nuclear weapon capability. Pakistan has nuclear weapons and is engaged in violence with us." But at least as important as that was the view: "Look, the countries with nuclear weapons get treated like great powers in this world and the countries that talk about morality and disarmament, as India has for forty years, get dismissed, they get laughed at. And so we are going to speak the language that the United States and China and others respect, which is the language of assertiveness, of military strength and defiance, and so we're going to defy these rules, and we're going to blast the tests and you'll want to sanction us, you'll do it for a while, but eventually, you're going to have to accept us as a great power." That's why they did it. And they're turning out more or less right, aren't they? That's why this is controversial for a lot of people. The administration's view is, in essence, "Yes, we should admit they were right, and the world has changed, and we all are in a contest with China, and India sits in an interesting place on the map. So let's change these rules and recognize thatIndiais a great power and treat it as such." You've written a book about India's nuclear program. What do you think about this pending U.S.-Indian agreement? Is it a good one, or is it not? I think this particular agreement was very under-cooked and not well-considered; very important details were omitted, but the idea of changing the rules to make some accommodation with India was correct. But this particular approach was ill-considered, in essence giving India, or attempting to giveIndia, everything, and to throw out in essence all the rules in return for too little fromIndia. What do we need from India? The safeguards that India puts on facilities it designates as civilian should be permanent. That's key. The number of facilities that India designates civilian as opposed to military should be very high. In other words, they could turn around and say, "You know, half the program is civilian, you can put safeguards on it, but the other half we're calling military and no one's ever going to go near it." And that would be kind of a travesty in terms of diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in the world. So there's that issue. But the biggest issue, and where the administration neglected things, was the world already has much too much raw material, highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. And the United States, France, Great Britain, and Russia have stopped producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. We believe that China has also stopped producing but they've never announced it or formalized it. And it is a high priority of much of the world to have everybody in the world stop making additional materials for nuclear bombs. Now the Indians claim they need to be able to produce fissile material because they only have a minimum stockpile, right? Well, they say several things. They started late, comparatively, and they have a small stockpile, but all they ever want is a minimum credible deterrent, they say, but they never define it. And I think the administration, and much of the criticism the administration faces, is that in essence, this deal not only blesses that India has nuclear weapons--and that's something I think is natural and unavoidable and we should just go ahead and accept--but they've blessed the idea that India has nuclear weapons and is going to continue to make more of them, and that's the part that I think is objectionable, and I think at this time our position should be nobody should be making any more nuclear weapons, period. Now if Bush gets to Indiaand there is no agreement to sign, is that a terrible disaster in the relations? No, I don't think so. I don't think it should be a medium or long-term disaster if it isn't signed, but secondly, if it were, then it proves all the claims about the relationship are a lie anyway. In other words, champions of the deal, in many ways say we should make this deal to demonstrate that the U.S.-India relationship is so strategically important, that we have so much in common, we share such values, we're such natural allies, that we want to reflect that in this deal. Now, if you turn around and then say, "But if you don't do this deal somehow we're going to be adversaries or there's going to be no relationship," then you were lying about the relationship that you say the deal was reflecting. So how could a nuclear cooperation deal carry that much freight? Is Pakistan going to try to get the same thing, or is that just out of the question? They're going to try to get the same thing and it should be out of the question.
ramana, Will do if I get the time. AG's writings really had a few things that others did not write about. Also, we need to know the details clearly. No clear report so far....bits here and bits there. Meanwhile, http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=63730
GeorgeP is another snake. Here is what he says about our nuclear establishment.
I think the Selig Harrison articleis more insightful and should be psoted in full here.
BR is back again. Will just x-post quickly... Australia - will change position eventually. China is troubled as I said.....watch their statements and actions hereafter. Read Japan's statement - very important and interesting if you remember history. Finally, watch CEO forum moves. I said second Tango was about to begin. I was wrong. The quick-step has started.
ramana, True but they are also "aryan"s - even now. Anyway, India has multiple layers of leverage. Now, these may not be sufficient by themselves but throw US, France, Russia and UK in the couldron and the biryani starts looking delicious. So, Germany will not be a problem I think. China will be an issue and they will try to use their leverage with the likes of Germany and Australia...basically countries that are still on the fence.....to the fullest extent possible. There are counterpoints to these like the recipe I mentioned above. Then there is the growing economy with a much better banking system and fiscal picture. I dunno much but Norway may be bigger problem than Germany (relatively).
Whatever they do, they have no choice left. They can't ignore or bully India anymore. Finally, elephant is moving and moving pretty darn good. China did provided India Nuclear fuel 5-6 years back. Why Oz are crying?
Somebody tell Perkovich that Santa's got a brand new bag. And that bag is full of dollars from India.
I told you - Democrat Strategist James Carvile (Spelling - Bald guy) He is saying if India need help in nuclear technology in return they should send thousands of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. What we will get out US-India nuke deal ?
Mudy, To be honest, it is not as if they will not have a choice. They will. Always. It is just that they will find themselves wanting to be part of the band of brothers. Germany's involvement with India has been steady and strong in engineering areas. Moreover, important German companies like Siemens are building on India. That gives the govt. better outlook for India. Our problems lie elsewhere. With a little help from our friends - inshallah - we shall overcome.
Here is a key part of the deal: http://www.samachar.com/showurl.htm?rurl=http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060304/asp/nation/story_5925000.asp?headline=Nuclear~deal~rescued~from~brink~of~collapse
Deal looks good, but main hurdle is now.
Mudy that is an important question. Permit me to reuse my response, as to why FBR dependence for strategic use is for relatively short term:
BUSH AND THE IDEA OF INDIA Restoring Balance President George W Bush should be evaluated in India not by what he did in Iraq but what his policies are doing for India in rectifying the regional imbalance of power, says K. SUBRAHMANYAM A FEW days after the Chinese nuclear test of 16 October, 1964, as a deputy secretary in the Ministry of Defence, I wrote a note on the implications of the test for India and urged that India should initiate action to counter the Chinese nuclear capability. I suggested immediate formation of a committee under Dr Homi Jehangir Bhabha to consider steps to be taken by India. Totally independent of my move, K.R. Narayanan, then director, China, in the Ministry of External Affairs, had forwarded a similar note to the foreign secretary. Though the committee under Dr Bhabha was constituted, both of us were not in the loop as we were too junior in the official hierarchy. From what Dr Raja Ramanna told me, I gathered that the Department of Atomic Energy got the go-ahead for an underground nuclear test from Indira Gandhi only in October 1972. At that time the government of India was not aware of the decision already taken by Z.A. Bhutto in January 1972 to develop the Pakistani nuclear weapon and the ongoing negotiations between Beijing and Islamabad on the former proliferating to the latter. At that stage China was peddling the Maoist line that all peace-loving countries had a right to have nuclear weapons. The 1974 nuclear test and its aftermath are now history. While in 1961, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk recommended, unsuccessfully, helping India to become a nuclear weapon state ahead of China in 1970s, the US attitude towards India in the aftermath of the Henry Kissinger visit to Beijing was hostile, especially after the Pokhran test. During his visit to Beijing in November 1974, Dr Kissinger even discussed jokingly with Deng Xiao Peng arming Pakistan with nuclear weapons to check Indian hegemonism. It was therefore no surprise that the Chinese concluded an agreement with Bhutto in June, 1976, to proliferate to Pakistan. Bush realised that a nuclear China, on the way tobecoming the second largest market, upset the balance of power in Asia unless the Indian nuclear weapon capability was legitimised. He also realized that India, with a billion people, growing at 8 per cent, would make enormous demands on world oil and gas and exacerbate the problem of emission of green house gases At that stage, China had not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Against this background the US passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and warned Pakistan against nuclear proliferation with the clandestine acquisition of equipment from Europe for Plutonium separation. In April 1979, President Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its persisting with proliferation. However, by 1982, the US agreed to turn a blind eye on Pakistan-China proliferation as a quid pro quo for Pakistani help to provide infrastructural support for Afghan Mujahideen campaign against the Soviet forces. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons in 1987 with active Chinese support and the US looking away. Faced with a Pakistani bomb produced with Chinese proliferation help and US looking away, Rajiv Gandhi decided to assemble the nuclear weapon in 1989. In the early 90’s, the US applied a lot of pressure on India to cap, halt and eliminate Indian nuclear weapon production even as it continued to turn a blind eye on China-Pakistan proliferation not only in respect of nuclear weapons but also in missiles. The recent disclosures of former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers reveal that CIA was having close contacts with Dr A.Q. Khan. There are valid reasons to believe the US also turned a blind eye to Pakistani proliferation to Iran and North Korea at that stage. Though China joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, it continued its proliferation to Pakistan. The US brought out into the open the supply of 5000 ring magnets by China to Pakistan but chose to accept the Chinese explanation of its being a deal without central government approval. The US also shielded Chinese supply of missiles to Pakistan till just a few months before President Clinton demitted office. When India carried out its nuclear tests in 1998, President Bill Clinton joined China in condemning the Indian nuclear tests but also talked of China’s legitimate interests in South Asia. China’s hostility towards India was exhibited not only through its nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan, but in the stand it took against India on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and in the formulation of the Security Council Resolution in the wake of Indian nuclear tests. The arch proliferator, China is now talking of India’s exceptionalisation from the NPT should be within its framework. Ever since US made up with China in 1971, the US had been applying pressure on India to cap, halt and roll back Indian nuclear capability. This policy was consistently pursued from 1967, when US would not extend a nuclear security guarantee to India till the Bush administration took office in 2001. For the nuclear non-proliferation ayatollahs in the US, proliferation by China to Pakistan was acceptable but not legitimate acquisition of nuclear weapons by India. It is to the credit of President George W Bush that he realised that a nuclear China, also the third largest market, on the way to becoming the second, upset the balance of power in Asia unless the Indian nuclear weapon capability was recognised and legitimised. Secondly, he realized that India, with a billion people, growing at 8 per cent, would make enormous demands on world oil and gas and exacerbate the problem of emission of green house gases. Therefore, in the interest of global environment, lessening of pressure of demand on oil and, at the same time, ensuring the fast economic growth of India, necessary as the engine of growth in the industrialised world, India should be exceptionalised from the Non-Proliferation Treaty to enable it to have access to civil nuclear energy. In terms of norms of Non-proliferation Treaty India’s acquisition of weapon was more indigenous than that of China and its proliferation record spotless compared to China’s. Unless there is an understanding of the radical change in US policy towards nuclear India under George Bush, there is bound to be misunderstanding about what the new US strategy towards India is. There can be no doubt that the new policy is intended to further US national interests. Even so, it happens to be more friendly to a nuclear India than that of any other President since John F Kennedy. Secondly, it has a strong component of collective energy security for the world. Since both these are new concepts both for traditional US thinking (including those of the ayatollahs) and the Indian thinking conditioned by six decades of Cold War, there are problems of adjustment to Bush’s views. People also find it difficult to reconcile to the reality that a President whose views may be unacceptable in some respects may come out with policies in other areas beneficial to the Indians. Winston Churchill’s reactionary views on India need not detract from his merit as a great war-leader. Roosevelt was a great liberal in many respects but did little by way of extension of civil liberties for the Blacks. Similarly, George Bush should be evaluated in India not by what he did in Iraq but what his policies are doing for India in rectifying the imbalance in this part of the world. This rectification of imbalance is not unfriendly to China. India did not take a hostile attitude towards China’s rise to power. In a larger sense, such a restoration of balance of power is good for China too and help in its progress towards democracy, which is inevitable. The author is Chairman, national task force on Global Strategic Developments
Washington's Dangerous Nuclear Horse Trading EDITORIAL Translated By Jan de Nijs March 3, 2006 NRC Handelsblad - The Netherlands - Home Page (Dutch) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Yesterday's accord between the United States and India on nuclear cooperation makes it crystal clear that Washington holds an ambivalent attitude when it comes to nuclear horse trading. Friendly nations with nuclear ambitions are held to different standards than unfriendly ones. Arbitrariness occurs when it comes to foreign relations, but the timing of this accord and its blatant overtones are remarkable. While in the middle of difficult negotiations with Iran about Teheran's nuclear program, Delhi is recognized and rewarded for its economic achievements using nuclear technology. Of course, limited to civil purposes, but on the other hand, this appeaser for critics fails to address the fact that India has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyRealVideo]. Nuclear cooperation with India may well intensify the nuclear arms race in the region. This accord also undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Because of this American disingenuousness, it opens the door for Iran to ignore further warnings and any eventual ultimatums. Contrary to India and the other nuclear powers, Iran has actually cooperated with nuclear inspectors. It is a member of the Non Proliferation Treaty. It is clear that Iran doesn't need nuclear weapons. But it can rightfully claim the right to use nuclear power for civil applications. Why is Iran not allowed to pursue what India and America are allowed to? Talks between Tehran and the three European Union members [Britain, France and Germany] were difficult enough. Now they look like an exercise in futility. For nuclear powers Israel and Pakistan, the Americans looked the other way. Now it's India's turn to become involved in the horse trading. In Bush's parlance, this is a "strategic partnership." These were words he used yesterday in a short speech with India's Prime Minister Singh RealVideo. This will have far-reaching consequences, specifically, when the U.N. Security Council has to address the issue of sanctions against Iran, due to its alleged nuclear disobedience. Right now, there is hardly any judicial or moral ground to implement sanctions against Iran. Which doesn't mean that Iran can now embark on an unbridled nuclear development program. It has to make clear what its goals are. And it must abide by the rules, even if it is told to shut its program down. The boundaries between civilian and military use of nuclear technology are vague. More and more countries are pushing toward nuclear energy, which is their complete right. But at the same time, more and more countries have the ambition to own nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Accord is supposed to prevent this from happening, but if the most important nuclear powers show no willingness to disarm, or if they forge deals like the one between United States and India - what is left of this accord? On paper, in any event, not a lot. The E.U. member states that are negotiating with Iran are well advised to follow their own course. Which means: stay well clear of what Washington is doing.
Somehow there is shortage of what was offered to the US in return of this deal. This containing china or some vague benefit way out in the future doesnt make any sense to me. GWB has to sell this to local audience and what is he going to use ? We didnt get it for free, I am sure. So what was the price ?
Ramana on BR..
http://www.guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,,1723276,00.html Nuclear proliferation -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bush and the bomb Leader Saturday March 4, 2006 The Guardian
Arun_S, There are other reasons why we might want to lay out clearly what the yanks got out of this.. 1. Better portrayal of the case so it passes thru congress. 2. Not hear "US *gave* India nuke tech" rather then "US made a deal with India" for the rest of our lives. 3. As a corollary, if there are things to be done in the future as QPQ then the aam-junta has to know how far we have to go. Possibly others. The rosy DDM articles dont give a good picture.
Rajesh G: Absolutely the lessons of California SBE episode is fresh in my mind. We must not fall into the trap laid, to goad and have 2 minutes of glory, so that the opposition can hang us by the rope we give them. No country (not even stupid Indians in early 70's) has given up anything in negotiations except to get a good deal for national self interest. US is the most apt and hard negotiators to preserve their upper hand in world. It will be naive and stupid for India to think otherwise at its own peril. And this is when the deal still not signed till it passes US Congress. As I mentioned in other forum, what GW Bush purchased from India are: 1. A set of very high value Insurance Policies to protect strategic interest of USA. For petty shopkeepers spending money for Insurance is an alien concept and may consider it strange, stupid; and treat it with scorn expected from the un-informed. So one has to look at what Insurance Policy Bush bought and how to value it and convey that to the media and ordinary American and their Congress reps. As some Congressmen said couple of weeks ago, its better to co-opt India (read buy the Insurance that only India can offer) now at a lower price rather than later when they are going to be very expensive. 2. For another aspect of the deal that is more tangible for lay mind, let me use excerpt from the other forum:
Arun, I agree with you. Interesting is to watch good cop n bad cop played by US and Oz. whic make me think, US is still keeping some area for twisting.
Bush May Face Fight in Congress Over Nuclear Accord With India http://tinyurl.com/lo5xm
Nothing to gloat over By M.J. Akbar TROUBLE is, ma-in-law ain't approved of history yet. Arms-wide-open George Bush and simple-but-hardly-simplistic Manmohan Singh summoned history to witness their alliance. "We have made history today, and I thank you," Dr Singh told his guest in Delhi. Very coy, very nice. But it isn't legal yet. Marriage awaits mother-in-law's approval. Mother-in-law is the Congress of the United States. She is particularly watchful about errant sons who declare victory before she has checked the fine print. Once upon a time, long long ago, a president of the United States of America offered the president of Pakistan a whole bunch of F-16s, and even collected cash on the deal. Pakistan is still waiting to put those fighters to some historic use. I don't want to be a party-pooper at a particularly cosy love-fest, but here are a couple of quotes printed in the March 3 edition of ma-in-law's favourite newspaper, The Washington Post. Republican Ed Royce, chair of the international relations subcommittee on international terrorism and proliferation, thought the Delhi deal had "implications beyond US-India relations" and that the "goal of curbing nuclear proliferation should be paramount." Democrat Edward Markey, co-chair of the bipartisan task force on non-proliferation, called the agreement "a historic failure of this president to tackle the real nuclear threats we face." When ma-in-law talks from the side of her face she can be a tough old bird. If history is made, then it will be certainly made in one respect: it will be the first time that India will sign an international protocol that has implications for its nuclear programme and nuclear military assets. A series of prime ministers, cutting across party lines, has resisted the most serious pressure to sign on any dotted line. The potential to build a nuclear weapon was created by Jawaharlal Nehru; the ability to build it was confirmed by Indira Gandhi; the decision to go public was made by Atal Behari Vajpayee. The one thing they, and others in between, knew was that any signature became a commitment that might fetch flexibility in the present but could become a prison in the future. Since this is the first agreement that India might have to sign, unless the American legislatures sabotage it or the present government in Delhi makes way for a more sceptical successor, I hope those who have drafted it have read every line, checked the top line, bottom line, underline and then checked the little comma hidden in the fine print that discusses the separation of 14 civilian nuclear plants from eight military ones. This is a marriage built on separation, in more senses than one. The two constituencies, Delhi and Washington, are offering distinctively separate narratives. Here, in sum, is what the spokesmen of Dr Manmohan Singh will be telling us as they take their message to the country: — This agreement will permit India to produce fissile materials for its nuclear military needs, despite the fact that the recognised nuclear powers have halted, voluntarily, such production. — The fast-breeder reactors, which can make super-grade plutonium when fully operational, will not be under international inspection or safeguards. — India can now hope to make up to 50 nuclear weapons a year, for the availability of imported uranium frees local supplies for use in military reactors. — India gets the latest technology long denied to its scientists. Listen to the narrative on the American side, some of which has already begun to be articulated, even by the extremely sophisticated and persuasive American negotiator, Nicholas Burns: — India enters the inspection regime, a far better situation than the zero-influence that existed so far. (It needs to be pointed out, of course, that India rose from drawing board to major nuclear power, without indulging in theft, only because of this zero-influence, a status that the Manmohan Singh government is in the process of bartering away.) — The fast-breeder reactors that India possesses will be isolated, and unable to get new technology, thanks to the inspections regime, ensuring, over time, stagnation or decline. Implication: India has been sold a lemon thanks to a gullible government. — The deal brings India into the American zone of influence, and turns it into a virtual ally with a potential for assistance in American strategic interests (that is code word for American intervention). India's conventional arms programme now shifts dramatically into the supply chain of the American industrial-military complex. If the Indo-Soviet treaty kept India within the Soviet camp till the Soviet Union collapsed, then this agreement will keep India in the American parlour for the foreseeable future. — There is a great bonanza to American industry of arms sales (this will be the most persuasive argument in the Senate, because the one thing a legislator does not want to be accused of is preventing jobs). The starting figure, according to Pentagon officials who admittedly have not dealt with Indian bureaucrats so far, is nine billion dollars. That is a lot of dollars. Keep counting, Senator! — There is no political quid pro quo. The Soviet Union intervened when necessary to protect India's position on issues like Jammu and Kashmir with a veto in the Security Council. America has given no such commitment. Indeed, Delhi's leverage with Moscow is reduced with the shift in arms purchases. China will never support India over Pakistan in the Security Council and the West will have the pleasure of balancing Pakistan's interests with India's on issues like Kashmir. With time, the narrative in Washington will doubtless take on other hues, since emerging questions will demand creative answers if the agreement is to be pushed through the Congress. Senator John Kerry publicly worried about fissile material during a visit to Delhi. Others are wondering whether such a reward for a nation that has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not a signal for others to risk going nuclear. And then of course there is the weight of Pakistan's pressure to which there may not be any immediate give, but which will make its play in the coming months. Pakistan remains a frontline state in Bush's war on terror. Such voices may not be consistent, or even necessarily logical, but they will demand to be heard. Some will pick up claims made in Delhi and ask the Bush administration for clarifications, as for instance on the delicate matter of how many nuclear weapons India is capable of making. If Pakistan is truly lucky, it will have the extraordinary good fortune of escaping the Bush embrace. The indications are that Bush will not offer the terms of the deal with India to Pakistan. What does this mean? It means, first, that while India will sign a limiting commitment on its nuclear programme, Pakistan will sign nothing. Pakistan can, therefore, be held down to nothing. Bush is going to be in power for only another two years, and that as a terribly lame duck. His approval ratings are below freezing point, and his own party is distancing itself from him, raising the question as to whether he has the political capital to push anything through Congress. What are Pakistan's options? Pakistan's nuclear programme has been created with China's help. China may not have technology as good as America's, but it isn't a junkyard either. As a friend, China will be much more reliable than America. This is not because of any character defect. America is a democracy, and therefore always vulnerable to democratic discourse. China is a dictatorship. China, most crucially, will not be propelled by mere goodwill or friendship; its policy will hinge on self-interest. Since a critical rationale for the Bush shift is to help India become a counterweight to China, Beijing will respond by playing the Pakistan card against India. China has already assured Pakistan three more nuclear reactors, and you never hear of any fuel shortage problems in Islamabad. President Pervez Musharraf has gone on record to say that Pakistan has its options. Is this what he meant? We may never know what the complete truth is. But keep your ears open when the mother-in-law starts asking questions on Capitol Hill in Washington. The writer is editor-in-chief of Asian Age, based in New Delhi. http://www.dawn.com/2006/03/05/ed.htm
MJ Akbar takes simplistic view of the issue. China has already played the Pakistan card. Chinese are smart and most probably know that Pakistan is the weakest link. The Indian option and capaicity to make 2000 bombs can put fear of God in any adversary ..even Communits PRC. Let India play to its strengths to serve its interests. India should not be looking for politcial patrogane in this age and time.We aint poodle or Paki-satan.We are indepenedent, sovereign, separate civilizational entity.
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=88925 NATIONAL INTEREST New pitch, front foot forward India’s lower middle order slot in the global batting order has changed. Now is the time to settle with Pakistan, China SHEKHAR GUPTA
Thankyou Arun_S. It would be fantastic to have a BR/IF article on this. The article has to be for dummies like me, laying it out in as simple terms as possible. Even a small article that puts out the $ amount for point #2 would be a good start. ----------------------------------------- On a different note, in my limited understanding I would have preferred it if we had a genuine thing to offer to the yanks. For example, in the current situation, can we offer a couple of divisions to Afghanistan ? It should relive unkle from atleast one front. And it gives us a lot of leverage in pushing this deal along with others thru congress.
Rajesh_G: IMHO need of hour is to produce well reseacherd and anlayzed material for US Congress (not much to gain by preaching to the coir), and I am spending much time to that end. All of us can help by channeling in their own way, but I think doing it via www.USINPAC.org is a good and efficient way. As for tangibles for Yanks, that is GW BUsh and Condi's problem, let them expend the political capital to carry their part of the burden. Their arses should be on fire not Indian. Let them convey their new found faith/vision to US Congress. These kafirs did enough with fart of US embassodor in Delhi to pressure Indian Goverment to move the gaol post, change the terms of July 18 agreement; whose cardinality centered around reciprocity and equality. They spent no effort reignin or respond to NP Ayothullahs that were let loose to preach the NPA faith in US Congress, expecting Indian Govt to spend the political capital by 1. agreeing to put forward Nuclear plant separation plan + 2. US dictated credible seperation plan (as against Indian soverign decision) + 3. a schedule that India will decide later after US Congress retifies the deal (Instead these SOB's tried to imposed their wish list of before hand determination) + 4. FBR controversy; all unequal terms and against the July 18 statement. So I relish the thought of Bush & Condi stewing in their own juice and save their chestnut from fire. Else any wish of strategtic partnership with India is sayonara, and let US be defeated by International Islamist in Iraq and elsewhere, and India will continue down its own path to sunrise and glory; hastening and making this a Asian Century, albiet making friends with who ever else that makes strategic sense to India. Conversly USA turns out to be the biggest loser, losing all its marbals. Hee heeee ... Who will be more happy savouring that outcome?.. . . That means more heat under the Bush seat; while India has all the time in the world with interesting options.
If you watched some of Bush's statements while in India he was very thankful to all of the CEOs. It is these CEOs that will help India in the Congressional hearings to push the deal through. At the same time the MRCA RFP will have cleared the CVC approval and will be out for bid. That will have a big impact on Congress's thinking. There should also be open discussions with GE and Westinghouse on getting reactors built and operational in seven years. By no means do I suggest remaining complacent, and helping USINPAC is very useful at the personal level.
I had a long conversation with USINPAC today. We are helping then provide Subject Matter Expert (SME) and they will connect us to Congressmen and hearing. They are doing a good job attending all session where new law is introduced. Educating congressmen on various aspects of US-India strategic tie up including Civil Nuclear tieup is going to expensive. If the admins allow me some latitude, I request one and all who are reading this to please donate with full heart and soul to USINPAC. We got to sustain Indian organization to protect Indo-American interests. Visit http://www.usinpac.com/ to know more and donate online. Please help them financially. (Do not forget to mention the India forum and/or other forum that motivated you to visit their site & donate. That increases the website influence)
For sure when I got up, the morning was different. The Sun seem to rise for South! : No I forgot job of media, analysists and think-tanks is to serve its national Interest ( atleast that is the way US is). Mar. 07, 2006 http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/opinion/14037116.htm
The following is the text of the statement made by the Prime Minister in Parliament today on the India-USA Nuclear Agreement.
ANALYSIS - U.S.-India ties play on Pakistani insecurities Tue Mar 7, 2006 3:39 PM IST16 By Simon Cameron-Moore ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Warming U.S. ties with India are playing on Pakistani insecurities at a time when President Pervez Musharraf is under fire for the conduct of a war on terrorism forced on him by the United States. Analysts say by the time U.S. President George W. Bush arrived home on Sunday at the end of a South Asia tour, Pakistan had little new to show for an alliance with Washington that has pitted its army against its own people on the Afghan border. To add to Pakistan's chagrin, before coming to Islamabad Bush struck an accord in New Delhi to provide arch rival India with American know-how for its civilian nuclear programme. "There was a sharp contrast between the treatment meted out to India and Pakistan," said Talat Masood, a retired general turned political commentator. Some analysts believe hardliners in the army could be growing impatient with both the conduct of the war on terrorism, and Musharraf's inability to get more support from the United States in dealings with India. Meeting Pakistani media on Monday, President Pervez Musharraf played down rivalry with India, saying Pakistan did not share its neighbour's "global and regional aspirations". "We are not in competition with India," he said, declaring Pakistan's priorities were defensive and the creation of jobs and reduction of poverty. But Masood said the U.S. aim to build up India as a regional counterweight to China would inevitably fuel Pakistani unease. "Whether the fears of Indian hegemony are real or imagined, it has heightened Pakistan's insecurities." INSECURITIES PLENTIFUL Pakistan has lurched in and out of military rule in the 59 years since it sprang into being from the partition of India. Both India and Afghanistan have regularly accused Pakistan of using militant groups to try to destabilise them. Since joining a U.S.-led war on terrorism in 2001 Musharraf has been the target of several assassination attempts, with several junior military men convicted of involvement in plots. Although Pakistan has caught or killed around 700 al Qaeda members, Osama bin Laden is widely believed to be hiding somewhere in the country and Pakistan's Islamist opposition sympathises with Taliban guerrillas fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Even while Bush was meeting Musharraf at the weekend, Pakistan's army and tribesmen clashed on the border. Pro-Taliban clerics issued a call to arms after Pakistani forces struck a compound killing 45 mostly Central Asian al Qaeda linked militants last Wednesday. And by Monday, after three days of fighting in North Waziristan tribal agency, some 120 people lay dead, including at least five troopers. Following the furore over Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, the bloodshed in tribal regions has given Islamists more ammunition against Musharraf with an election due next year. "The real agenda of Bush in Pakistan is to speed up military operations in the tribal areas," Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of the six-party Islamist opposition alliance, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, wrote in the News on Sunday. "The height of misfortune is that our armed forces are on the warpath with their own nation," wrote Ahmed, who had spent Bush's visit under house arrest to stop him leading protests. FLAWED DIPLOMACY Pakistan constantly seeks U.S. support to make up for its own lack of firepower against a bigger, stronger neighbour, but the United States resists, as Bush did during his visit, any attempt to drag it into the core dispute over Kashmir. Instead, analysts say, Washington pays for its influence with arms supplies and defence accords to please the Pakistan army. Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance. Washington has pledged $1.5 billion of military financing from 2005 to 2009, and last year said it would sell Pakistan the F-16 warplanes it has long wanted. Diplomacy conducted on such terms lacks long-term vision, according to Hussain Haqqani, a former adviser to three Pakistani prime ministers, and now teaching at Boston University. "Pakistan always looks on the (U.S.) relationship in quid pro quo terms, expecting something in return," said Haqqani. "India takes a longer view, building up relations at multi-dimensional levels and ends up getting more." Indeed, according to Haqqani, trying to keep up with the Indians has been Pakistan's preoccupation. "Pakistan never asked for civil nuclear agreement until India got one," he remarked. Bush gave Musharraf short shrift when he raised the possibility of getting a similar nuclear accord for Pakistan, even though it is just two years since its top scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, admitted selling nuclear components to, among others, Iran.
http://ia.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/08guest.htm?q=tp&file=.htm Who is this Shen fellow ? Interesting designation..
Thursday, March 09, 2006 VIEW: Nuclear pact launches India into uncharted waters — Pratap Bhanu Mehta If relations between the US and China worsen, India, by aligning with the US, risks becoming a frontline state in that confrontation. While the prospects of such a scenario should not be exaggerated, there is more immediate cause for worry The recently signed Indo-US nuclear deal welcoming India to the world of recognised nuclear powers has been termed historic, and for once that may not be usual media hyperbole. Though only the future will determine its true significance, undoubtedly the nuclear pact is an emphatic acknowledgment of India’s transformation from a regional to a global power, an important step in transforming the rules of the world order to accommodate the aspirations of a rising power. Beyond these obvious implications, the measure of the tectonic shift that the Indo-US entente implies will be revealed in its impact on both the world’s non-proliferation regime as well as India’s strategic posture, its economic development and foreign policy orientation. As the fallout from the nuclear deal becomes clear, India may be seen to have made an immediate strategic gain while underestimating the long-term political consequences. The deal was supposed to be a balancing act between India’s desire to maintain autonomy over its military nuclear programme and the rest of the world’s desire to cap it. While the details are not available, at this juncture it appears that the deal gives a distinct advantage to India at the expense of the global non-proliferation goal. While India has agreed to safeguards for its civilian reactors in perpetuity, it has artfully tied this to assurances on an uninterrupted fuel supply. India has retained the right to designate future nuclear plants as civilian or military, it can divert indigenous fuel entirely for military use, and the number of plants kept outside the purview of inspection seems large enough to allow a credible military programme. It will be difficult to argue that this deal significantly caps India’s nuclear capability. If the deal goes through, India will have managed to transform the rules of the international order without sacrificing its military autonomy. Will accommodating India weaken the non-proliferation regime, as many critics have claimed? It could be argued that states like Iran and North Korea will do whatever they wish, regardless of the choices made with respect to India. The choices of countries to go nuclear will be determined more by their perception of security threats and the compulsions of their domestic politics than choices made by third countries. India’s treatment as an exception is not arbitrary but principled. India satisfies the criteria of what is called a “responsible” nuclear power: a democratic country that does not engage in proliferation. Iran, Pakistan, North Korea or, for that matter, China do not meet this criteria. But while a principled case can be made for accepting India, this deal further legitimises the possession of nuclear weapons. If legitimising nuclear weapons as such poses a risk to the world order, this deal enhances those risks. On the economic front the interdependence of India’s economy with that of the US is only bound to increase. India now becomes an attractive market for nuclear and advanced technologies worth billions of dollars. Both sides justify the deal in economic terms. India’s ruling classes are convinced that nuclear power is necessary for its energy security. It is the only viable answer to India’s acute power shortages. The US also wants to re-legitimise the worldwide use of nuclear power as the only alternative to burning hydrocarbons. But will dependence on nuclear power really give India the energy security its needs? Although the terms of the deal safeguard the import of uranium, will it be wise for India to base its energy security on imported supplies of uranium? And are the economic arguments in favour of nuclear power over alternative sources so compelling that it becomes the cornerstone of India’s development strategy? While the desirability of India’s energy strategy can be debated in technical terms, the political consequences of this deal are far more uncertain than India acknowledges. The nuclear deal is simply one aspect of an Indo-US relationship that is acquiring unprecedented momentum. For the first time in its history, the fortunes of India’s elites are comprehensively and intimately tied with the fate of America. Can India be so materially and culturally bound with the US and yet resist seeing world geo-politics through American eyes? While formally India claims that it will not always align with the US, there are signs that India is subtly internalising the terms of discourse by which the US describes the world order. Take for instance, the war on terrorism. India and the US have emphatically reiterated their common interest in defeating terrorism. But it is still not clear that it makes sense for India to buy into the idea that there is a single kind of terrorism or a united war against it. India was a victim of terrorism that had its roots in the geo-politics of South Asia, not in the militant Islam that targets the West. Both are different entities that require different responses. India’s strategy of military self-restraint in the face of terrorism has also been politically prudent, while US military actions have, arguably, given terrorism more aid and succour. Is India now in the danger of being drawn into the confrontation between militant Islam and the West, a confrontation that is not of its making? Of the foreign policy dilemmas that the deal will produce, the most important one revolves around China. The US projects India as some sort of counterweight to Chinese power. It is odd not to help build India while the Chinese juggernaut roles on unabated. While not acknowledging it overtly, India is also preoccupied with containing Chinese influence. What effect will the deal have on India’s relations with China? The answer to this question depends on how US-China relations evolve in the future. If relations between the US and China worsen, India, by aligning with the US, risks becoming a frontline state in that confrontation. But while the prospects of such a scenario should not be exaggerated, there is more immediate cause for worry. The US has emphatically rejected equating India and Pakistan in any nuclear order, but will China do the same? Some argue that China will assist Pakistan, regardless of what India does. So does an increasing alignment with the US raise China’s stakes in the subcontinent? Will it be licensed to scale up its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan? China has also offered Bangladesh civilian nuclear cooperation. The prospect of Pakistan and Bangladesh possessing significant numbers of civilian nuclear reactors is not one that the world, at this juncture, should contemplate with equanimity. As the Iran crisis has demonstrated, the line between civilian and military nuclear use is, to put it mildly, a contentious one. In the chessboard of great power politics, the moves of every nation, knight or rook, are equally important. Coming months and years will show that the Indo-US deal is not just a bilateral pact; it will have consequences for the behaviour of other nations. Prudence requires that India acknowledge the unpredictability of those consequences and brace itself. Pratap Bhanu Mehta is president of the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, India. This article appeared in YaleGlobal Online (www.yaleglobal.yale.edu), a publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, and is reprinted by permission. Copyright © 2003 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization
It is an excellent analysis of the likely short term and long term effect of the India-USA Nuclear Agreement.
Friday, March 10, 2006 US-India nuclear deal under fire By Khalid Hasan WASHINGTON: The US-India nuclear deal remains under fire from leading experts in the area with one of them, Stephen Cohen of Brookings, arguing that even if the deal fails in Congress, it would still have enabled India to shop around the world to fulfil its nuclear requirements. Cohen told India Abroad that US President George W Bush decided that he would interrupt the negotiations going on in New Delhi between the two sides and accept the last offer made by India. “He wanted to have an agreement while he was in India, and that’s why my guess is that this is not going to help its chances in Congress.” He also pointed out that from an Indian perspective, “they don’t care because they got the deal” and there are plenty of other countries that are nuclear-capable in terms of providing India with uranium fuel. However, he insisted that India is not “serious” about being a major nuclear weapons state and those who believe that this opens the door for India to make a couple of thousand nuclear weapons “just don’t understand India”. Michael Krepon, founder president of the Stimson Centre, who has opposed the deal from the very beginning on proliferation grounds, said, “The Bush administration set three key tests for a worthwhile agreement. The separation plan (between civilian and military facilities) had to be credible and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint, and that it had to be transparent. The administration pledged to Congress that a credible and defensible deal would permit a big growth in India’s electricity but not big growth in India’s nuclear arsenal. This in turn meant that very few nuclear plants would be unsafeguarded, that the safeguards would be in perpetuity, and that India’s breeder programmes would be all safeguarded.” Krepon pointed out that all the early reports “indicate that the administration has not met its own standards for a credible and defensible agreement”. Walter Andersen of Johns Hopkins University’s School of International Studies said the deal “came as a bit of a surprise to even many veteran South Asia watchers who assumed it would take much longer to work out the kind of agreement that was signed in New Delhi”. He said he strongly believed “the strategic gains far outweigh the nonproliferation risks” and would serve US balance-of-power interests in South Asia. He found the apprehensions of the nonproliferation lobby “exaggerated”. He felt that the case for nonproliferation is advanced by bringing in the majority of India’s facilities under international inspection, most for the first time. Karl Inderfurth, head of South Asia at the State Department under Clinton, said “there is much more to commend about this agreement than condemn” and was of the view that once the details had been presented to Congress and the Indian parliament, as well as the international community, “all will be on board and the agreement will go through”. Robert Hathaway of the Woodrow Wilson Centre saw the deal as the “crown jewel” in the transformation that had occurred in US-India relations. However, few experts and commentators here share Inderfurth’s or Hathaway’s optimism or their upbeat assessments. They continue to maintain that the deal offers little to America that it could not have had from India without the nuclear deal, which amounts to a recognition of India as a de facto member of the nuclear club and without having had to pay any penalties either. Meanwhile, in Congress the first stone has already been cast with the impending introduction of a bill by Rep Edward Markey, Democrat member from Massachusetts - or others - who said on learning of the New Delhi deal, “The president appears to have given away the store for an agreement that provides the US with no real benefit. If other nuclear suppliers nations follow the example set in this deal, the entire nonproliferation regime will begin to collapse.” On the separation plan that Bush accepted in New Delhi, the congressman said, “The premise to me is an oxymoron. There cannot be a credible separation plan without full scope safeguards and the entire purpose of the IAEA safeguards is to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from a civilian reactor to military use. But in India we would be imposing safeguards on civilian plants when there would be a military nuclear infrastructure operating in parallel and that renders safeguards illusory. They may give some modicum of comfort that the reactors and our nuclear fuel aren’t directly assisting the Indian military programme freeing up India’s stockpile of fissile material for military rather than civilian use.”
Friday, March 10, 2006 Bush ‘made fatal error’ by signing N-deal with India WASHINGTON: A leading nuclear and security expert has said that the deal signed by President George Bush in New Delhi “endorses and assists India’s nuclear weapons programme”. “The president may have made a fatal error in putting nuclear weapons at the heart of improved US-India relations. Lawmakers want the latter, but not at the price of the former,” according to Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He points out in an analysis this week that buffeted by political turmoil at home, what Bush sought was a foreign affairs victory in India. “To clinch a nuclear weapons deal, the president had to give in to demands from the Indian nuclear lobby to exempt large portions of the country’s nuclear infrastructure from international inspection. With details of the deal still under wraps, it appears that at least one-third of current and planned Indian reactors would be exempt from IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspections and that the president gave into Indian demands for ‘Indian-specific’ inspections that would fall far short of the normal, full-scope inspections originally sought. Worse, Indian officials have made clear that India alone will decide which future reactors will be kept in the military category and exempt from any safeguards,” he writes. The deal, according to the expert, endorses and assists India’s nuclear weapons programme. US-supplied uranium fuel would free up India’s limited uranium reserves for fuel that would be burned in these reactors to make nuclear weapons. This would allow India to increase its production from the estimated six to 10 additional nuclear bombs per year to several dozen per year. India today has enough separated plutonium for 75 to 110 nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many it has actually produced. Cirincione is not surprised Indian leaders and press are “crowing about their victory over America”. He writes that Bush has done what Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Clinton and his own father had refused to do, namely, break US and international law to aid India’s nuclear weapons programme. Bush has now unilaterally shattered those guidelines and his action would violate the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) proscription against aiding another nation’s nuclear weapons programme. It would require the repeal or revision of several major US laws, including the US Nonproliferation Act. Bush has won no significant concessions from India, as it refuses to agree to end its production of nuclear weapons material, something the US, UK, France, Russia and China have already done. He predicts that Bush will run into trouble precisely here as both parties in Congress are deeply concerned about the deal and the way it was crafted. According to the writer, the deal was “cooked by a handful of senior officials (one of whom is now a lobbyist for the Indian government) and never reviewed by the Departments of State, Defence or Energy before it was announced with a champagne toast by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Congress was never consulted.” Cirincione believes that lawmakers here are concerned about the example the nuclear weapons deal sets for other nations. The lesson Iran is likely to draw is simple: if you hold out long enough, the Americans will cave in. “Pakistani officials have already said they expect Pakistan to receive a similar deal, and Israel is surely waiting in the wings. Other nations may decide that they can break the rules, too, to grant special deals to their friends. China is already rumoured to be seeking a deal to provide open nuclear assistance to Pakistan - a practice it stopped in the early 1990s after a successful diplomatic campaign by the United States to bring China into conformity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty restrictions. Will Russia decide that it can make an exception for Iran?” khalid hasan
Last time this guy was on NPR on talk of the nation, the only thing he was pushing on was about finding the "weak points" of other nations and then hang some carrots and so on.. This guy is a snake.
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,18416798%255E25377,00.html In our interests to support India's rise Greg Sheridan, Foreign editor
India, China, and the United States: A Delicate Balance Author: Esther Pan, Staff Writer February 27, 2006 * Introduction * What’s India’s current relationship with China? * What are the major elements of the relationship between India and China? * What’s India’s relationship with the United States? * What’s China’s role in the India-U.S. relationship? * How will improved U.S.-India ties affect the U.S. relationship with China? Introduction President George Bush travels to India March 1 for the first time in his presidency, highlighting the increasingly important role New Delhi is playing in world affairs. Many analysts see a stronger U.S. relationship with India as part of a longer-term effort to check China's influence in Asia. India's leaders have dismissed suggestions their country should be part of any U.S. containment strategy toward China and have cited the importance of booming economic ties with China. But officials in both New Delhi and Washington have stressed what they term is a "natural" partnership based on their traditions as large, multiethnic democracies. What’s India’s current relationship with China? Experts say both India and China are pursuing their foreign policy goals more assertively as each country tries to position itself as the major political and economic force in Asia. "It's the start of the realignment of the balance of power in Asia," says Anupam Srivastava, executive director of the South Asia program at the University of Georgia's Center for International Trade and Security. Others say New Delhi is not quite sure how to deal with Beijing. "The Indians don't know what they want with China," says Sumit Ganguly, the Rabindranath Tagore professor of Indian cultures and civilizations at the University of Indiana, Bloomington. "On one hand, they see China as a major strategic threat," while at the same time a growing economic relationship is bringing the two countries into increasingly closer contact, he says. That economic growth has kept the bilateral relationship, with its potential for conflict, generally positive thus far. "There's a sense right now that they're both rising, and it's not a zero-sum game yet," says Adam Segal, the Maurice R. Greenberg senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Right now it's still win-win." What are the major elements of the relationship between India and China? * Energy. India and China are two of the largest, fastest-growing energy consumers in the world. India imports some 75 percent of its oil needs, while China imports about 33 percent of its oil. Their combined demand has helped drive oil prices to record highs, prompting both nations to try to lock down sources of energy around the world. China's quest for energy has prompted it to strike deals with countries from Africa—it has agreements with Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, and other nations—to Myanmar, Tibet, and Russia. India is also seeking oil in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Sudan, among other nations. In January, China and India agreed to a landmark energy cooperation deal that would prevent them from bidding against each other for energy resources. "The two countries realized that by very aggressively bidding for the same resources, they were pushing prices up for both of them," Srivastava says. "It's a lot cheaper for them to divide resources and cooperate." Both countries are also exploring alternate energy sources, a factor behind the nuclear deal India is negotiating with the United States. * Trade. Bilateral trade between India and China has gone from $332 million in 1992 to $13.6 billion in 2005, according to a paper by Srivastava published in the fall 2005 issue of the Indian Journal of Economics and Business. Trade between the two nations has grown at over 30 percent per year since 1999. India accounts for nearly 80 percent of South Asian economic activity and is a critical gateway to the region's economy. The two countries are increasing their economic cooperation, particularly in areas like technology. "There's this idea that India does software and China does hardware, and the two of them together could make a new Asian market," Segal says. But some experts say India is worried it will be forced into the role of supplier of minerals and low value-added goods to China, unless it can leverage its expertise in services and higher value-added manufacturing into the bilateral trade relationship. * Borders. The two nations have a longstanding territorial dispute in the Himalayas that led to a border war in 1962. Negotiations over the 2,000-mile border are ongoing. Among the areas of contention, India says China is illegally occupying Indian territory in the disputed region of Kashmir. China has claimed the rights to land in the northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. * Security. At the time of India's 1998 nuclear test, Indian officials said they needed nuclear weapons to deter China, an assertion that raised hackles in Beijing. "There are suspicions on the military side, but both leaders have kept it in check," Segal says. India is wary of China's longstanding relationship with its rival Pakistan, including Chinese assistance for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and China's role in a project to upgrade a Pakistani deep-sea port at Gwadar. "The nuclear threat from China and Pakistan is combined, since China has built up Pakistan's nuclear and conventional capabilities," Ganguly says. China has also expanded its security ties with other nations around India, including Myanmar and Bangladesh. But "a direct military conflict doesn't serve either country's interest," Srivastava says, so Bejiing and New Delhi are compartmentalizing their differences so they can move forward on other issues. The two countries are now planning to conduct their first-ever joint naval exercises. What’s India’s relationship with the United States? President George Bush said in a February 22 speech that U.S. relations with India have "never been better," and praised India's commitment to secular government and religious pluralism, saying they made the nation "a natural partner for the United States." Many experts say the United States and India have worked for the last several years to build a close, cooperative alliance. Robert Blackwill, a former U.S. ambassador to India, said at a Council meeting February 23 that while there is not likely to be a formal U.S.-India alliance, the bilateral cooperation between the two nations will continue to increase. Srivastava agrees. "There's a very close partnership between the United States and India," he says, one that spans a range of issues, including counterterrorism, joint protection of critical sea lanes, and close cooperation on security investigations. What’s China’s role in the India-U.S. relationship? Some experts say India is seeking a closer relationship with the United States both to improve its regional standing and to bolster its security position against China and Pakistan. Ganguly says India suffers from "status anxiety" in relation to its northern neighbor, and is "constantly peering over the Himalayas at China, trying to catch up." China began its economic reforms nearly a decade before India did and its per capita income is now nearly three times India's, he says. Beijing also enjoys greater world standing—including UN Security Council membership and a prominent role as a political power broker in situations like the North Korean nuclear issue—which some in India covet, experts say. How will improved U.S.-India ties affect the U.S. relationship with China? While U.S.-China relations have also shown steady improvement, there is a strong awareness from the U.S. side of China as an emerging competitor for everything from international markets to energy resources to military primacy. Some experts suspect the United States is cultivating a closer relationship with India to contain China, a factor they suspect is behind the recent nuclear deal. But some say this would be a mistake. "There's no better way to empty a drawing room of Indian strategists in New Delhi than to start talking about this idea," Blackwill said. Indian officials have "no interest whatsoever in trying to contain China because they believe this could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, and their whole policy is to seek the best possible relationship with China and to try to shape their policy to that end," he says. "Neither India nor the United States is interested in any kind of containment of China," Srivastava agrees. Still, he says, Chinese officials still harbor suspicions about U.S.-Indian intentions.
Congressional hearing on India-US deal this month By Khalid Hasan WASHINGTON: The House of Representatives’ International Relations Committee announced on Monday that it would hold hearings on the India-US nuclear agreement later this month. “This is a complex agreement with profound implications for US and global interests. Congress will need to take a close look at its many provisions in order to come to an informed decision,” said Committee Chairman Henry J Hyde, Republican from Illinois. Last week, Hyde met Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to discuss the proposal. He and the committee’s ranking member, Tom Lantos, Democrat from California, agreed to introduce the agreement’s enabling legislation at the request of the Bush administration, but Hyde suggested that Congress may seek conditions for its approval. According to Lantos, “The issues involved are complicated and technical and it will take some time for Congress to absorb them as we move the agreement to fruition. I view the new strategic alliance between the world’s oldest and largest democracies as a breakthrough, but all members of Congress will undoubtedly wish to see the details of the agreement before deciding how to vote.” Legislation amending the Atomic Energy Act is necessary to authorise US-India nuclear cooperation because India has never adopted the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and therefore cannot meet the prerequisites set out in current US law.
NUKEWARS Outside View Emasculating Nuclear India Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. by M D Nalapat Outside View Commentator New Delhi (UPI) Mar 14, 2006 There is zero doubt that India and the U.S. are natural partners. Steady migration to the U.S., the ever-denser interlinking of the hi-tech industry in both countries, and common threats from religious fundamentalism and political authoritarianism mandate that Washington and New Delhi forge an alliance that is as close as that between the U.S. and the UK. However, the caveat to this is that such a partnership can only be on terms that are the same as what the U.S. accords to the U.K. In brief, the U.S. has first to accept India as a nuclear weapons state that deserves permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council. Unfortunately, almost all the formulae trotted out by the "South Asia" brigade in U.S. think tanks and other centers of influence such as the State Department implicitly or otherwise seek to "engage" India on terms that would, if accepted, result in an emasculation of the world's most populous democracy. The proposed Nuclear Deal falls squarely in this category, and will, if sought to be implemented, push official U.S.-India relations back to the frost of the Cold War period. Indians love flattery, and often surrender substance in exchange for a verbal pat on the head. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, by education as well as by his experience in international institutions, is predisposed to uncritical acceptance of the standard Western worldview, which implicitly sees India as a juvenile power needing mother-henning, and definitely not mature enough to be trusted with grown-up implements such as nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems. This mistrust of the country's maturity -- despite New Delhi's impeccable non-proliferation record to date -- infuses the terms of the deal that has been agreed to by the Sonia Gandhi-led coalition government, hungry as always for formal acknowledgment of its improving status. Were the agreement to be implemented, India would almost immediately lose its chance to switch to the thorium cycle, and within 12 years would find its tiny arsenal of nuclear weapons depleted to irrelevance. This would place India not in the category of Germany and Japan, both of whom have a muscular nuclear power capability, but that inhabited by the likes of Burundi and Laos, a supplicant state dependent on technology handouts from "advanced" states. That Manmohan Singh has in effect written his political epitaph by agreeing to this deal speaks for the capacity of the Bush team to bully and cajole enough to get their way, even when -- as in Iraq -- such immediate "victories" lay the seeds for future disaster. The Indian prime minister's obsessive eagerness to conclude a deal -- almost any deal -- with President Bush is not born out of circumstances. Granted, India faces a shortage of uranium, caused partly by the tardiness of successive governments in overcoming "environmentalist" resistance to the opening of new mines. However, India depends on nuclear power for less than 3 percent of its total electricity generation, and given the costs of nuclear power sourced from expensive Western reactors, it would be more prudent to (a) raise funds by selling India-developed technologies for nuclear power generation, to buyers in Southeast Asia and South America (b) use such funds and other grants for fast-tracking the indigenous nuclear energy program, especially the conversion to thorium in place of uranium as the feedstock, as India has ,at over 500,000 tons, more than half the world's proven reserves of this radioactive material and © intensify efforts to exploit India's own uranium reserves. In order to meet a temporary shortfall of uranium, the Sonia Gandhi-led coalition government at New Delhi has agreed to effectively destroy India's robust nuclear program. Now, the basics. India has at present only 15 operational reactors, of which 12 are in the list of 14 that has been offered to be placed under international safeguards. Thus, while Manmohan Singh has claimed that only 65 percent of India's nuclear capacity will enter the safeguards regime, in fact around 85 percent of present operational capacity would go under safeguards. The Bush administration has repeatedly made it explicit that India would not be treated as a Nuclear Weapons State as a consequence of the nuclear deal. This means that the safeguards applied on the "civilian" nuclear capability of India would be of the intrusive kind applied to non-nuclear weapons states. This goes against the Government of India's oft-stated stand that it would not accept any outcome that does not, de facto if not de jure, accept India as a Nuclear Weapons State Such a safeguards regime would effectively cripple India's indigenous nuclear program. The scientists of the Department of Atomic Energy would need IAEA permission even to shift lab equipment from one location to the other. Even more deadly, under "pursuit" clauses, IAEA inspectors can adopt the same harsh measures on entities that they subjectively believe have collaborated in any conceivable way with the "civilian" entities. An email from a scientist working in an unsafeguarded military facility to a friend working in a "civilian" location can be used as the basis for such inspections. Worryingly, any company that is, or is to the subjective satisfaction of the international inspectors, "guilty" of supplying services or products to both a civilian as well as a military facility would be open to inspections that could -- for the benefit of competitors located in countries such as the U.S., France and China, known to access privileged information from the IAEA -- leak to other entities, thus destroying the ability to compete in the marketplace. In effect, these restrictions would ensure that few Indian companies would take the risk of supplying services and materiel to the country's nuclear sector, thus ensuring dependence on outside sources as well as a drastic slowing-down of the military program. This program would already have been hit by the removal from production of the CIRUS reactor located at Mumbai, which has been estimated to produce 35 percent of the highly-enriched uranium and plutonium needed for the cores of India's nuclear weapons. This is on top of the removal of over 80 percent of capacity by the transfer of 14 reactors to the "civilian" list. Initial estimates are that India would need to spend US$ 16 billion over the next five years simply to compensate for this disruption in fuel supply for the military program. This figure would, at a conservative estimate, rise to US$ 40 billion over the next 10 years. Given the huge outlays that would be needed to purchase foreign reactors and fuel, as well as the billions of dollars that would need to be spent on U.S. armaments to keep friends of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney in good humor, this would mean that the Indian military program would get capped, rolled back and finally eliminated over the next 12 years, as the weapon cores degrade and fail to get replaced. Not coincidentally, Prime Minister Singh has stopped talking of a "Credible Minimum Deterrent." It is now a "Minimum Credible Deterrent." Unfortunately, the nuclear deal will ensure that this "minimum" soon ceases to be "credible." This is in a context where China would be free to continue its assistance to Pakistan, North Korea and now Bangladesh, so as to checkmate regional rivals India and Japan. Not merely has the "India-friendly" George W. Bush effectively capped the Indian military program, he has managed to get the Indians to agree to the unprecedented condition of safeguards in perpetuity. Thus, Manmohan Singh has bound all his successor regimes into accepting this emasculating nuclear deal, or facing the risk of sanctions. Under the deal, India would not have the right to move safeguarded entities from the civilian to the military sector even in the case of a military emergency such as a nuclear attack. Of course, the capping and rollback of India's supply of nuclear weapons would make such an attack more rather than less likely. Unlike those vociferous critics of Nuclear India, the Scandinavians, the world's most populous democracy has threats other than otters and seals to contend with. India abuts China, a country whose ruling structure is authoritarian and unpredictable. There are the failing states of Pakistan and Nepal on other borders, as well as the Wahabbizing nation of Bangladesh and the splintered island of Sri Lanka. Close by is Central Asia, where rival kleptocracies joust and a well-funded Wahabbi movement spreads its influence. Next door is Indonesia, not the most stable of republics, and a little away are Iran and the Middle East, not to mention the African coast. Clearly, those who say that India's 1.1 billion people do not need a nuclear umbrella have yet to look at an accurate map. Volleys of opinions generated by the well-funded international non-proliferation lobby (which since the 1970s has ignored China, North Korea and Pakistan in its obsession with India) have painted a picture of economic desolation were the nuclear deal not to be signed. The reality is that the worst-case scenario -- should the Nuclar Suppliers Group continue its blockade of India -- would be the shutdown of one of the Tarapur nuclear power plants in 18 months. For at least the same cost of buying reactors from France, the U.S. and other countries, and high-priced uranium from Australia, India's own thorium-based Fast Breeder Reactor program can be fast-tracked so as to become operational within eight to nine years, ie: the same length of time it would take to make operational imported reactors. Decades ago, India's scientists began work on a three-stage program of nuclear self-sufficiency. First would come the development of pressurized heavy water reactors. Next, the Fast Breeder reactors. Finally, thorium would replace uranium as reactor fuel. Scientists at atomic research establishments in India privately claim that the country is at the cusp of proceeding to Stage II of this three-stage program for generation of adequate volumes of nuclear power. The significance of this is that, once this milestone gets crossed, additional uranium will no longer be needed, as the new processes would "breed" more fuel than it takes in. According to a top scientist, "even at present, India has more than enough known deposits of natural uranium to meet the planned Stage I level of 10,000MW of nuclear power." He and other scientists smell not simply a rat but a giant bandicoot in the tearing hurry of the Bush administration to lock India into a regime of safeguards that would gut the indigenous program and make the country reliant on outside fuel and technology. In his recent Asia Society U.S. President Bush has made it clear that his administration classes India with the 130-plus countries that would be denied the indigenous capability of processing fuel. These would have to depend on "advanced nuclear powers such as "Germany and Japan" to meet their needs. Unlike India, neither of the two is a nuclear weapons power. Clearly, Bush would like to travel the road taken by South Africa and Brazil, who have folded up their indigenous capabilities in exchange for (largely unfulfilled) promises of technological assistance. It must be said to the credit of the Bush administration that they have been transparent about their intention to convert India into a non-nuclear power. It is Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who has repeatedly obscured the truth from his own people, by pretending that the twin elephants of perpetuity and intrusive inspections do not exist. And once India's nukes are dealt with, can there be any doubt that its rockets will follow? Already there are essays on how India's ICBM program "is targeted at the U.S.", something that has thus far remained a secret to the entire Indian military establishment, which is focusing on a Great Power much closer to home. Like the nuclear weapons program, which has piggybacked on the civilian nuclear energy program, the Indian missile program has been powered by the development of rockets designed to launch satellites into space. Although Bush began to make noises about participating in the Indian space program three years ago, as yet there has been zero contribution from the U.S. side. Once the anti-nuclear lobby has its way, can the anti-rocket enthusiasts be far behind? Manmohan Singh can be relied on to somberly inform Parliament that India "desperately needs foreign assistance" in launching an adequate number of satellites, and so he has decided to scrap the Indian program in favor of exclusive reliance on foreign-built launch vehicles. As a sop, perhaps an Indian national would join the team aboard a future space shuttle, taking a call from President Bush and Prime Minister Singh as he surveys the end of the Indian space program. If, despite the one-sided nature of the deal, the non-proliferation lobbies in the U.S., China and Europe are vociferating against the July 18, 2005 Singh-Bush nuclear agreement, the reason lies in their desire to force the Indians to publicly eat crow rather than, as now, pretend that the country's indigenous nuclear ( and subsequently missile) program has not been terminally affected Like China, India is a country with a high degree of immunity to international sanctions. Once the nuclear deal begins to be implemented, the effects it will have on India's nuclear establishment will generate a political firestorm that will kill the deal and -- almost certainly -- the political career of Manmohan Singh. Ties between India and the U.S. are multiplying exponentially, but this is despite rather than because of the two governments. People-to-people, business-to-business and university-to-university contact is growing at an accelerating clip. The nuclear deal, far from giving a boost to this process, has the potential for igniting within India the same suspicion of U.S. intentions that resulted in a mud wall being built within India against U.S. contacts during the 1970s and well into the 80s, a development that harmed the interests of both countries. By seeking to force through a nuclear deal that is scientifically and politically unimplementable on the Indian side, George W. Bush may do for U.S.-India official relations what Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in doing in 1971, when they ordered the nuke-armed USS Enterprise to enter the Bay of Bengal in an effort at blackmailing New Delhi from preventing the slaughter of Bengalis by the Pakistan army. As Iraq has shown, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Professor M D Nalapat is Director of the School of Geopolitics at the Manipal Academy of Higher education, India. United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited. Source: United Press International
Economy growing at 7-8 per cent: Manmohan New Delhi, March 14 (PTI): Prime Minister Manmohan Singh today asserted India was not surrendering its autonomy on decision-making while engaging with the US, and said foreign capital was central to pushing the economy which is now growing at 7-8 per cent. "In engaging with the US, we are not surrendering our automony in decision-making," he said replying to a debate in Rajya Sabha on the working of External Affairs Ministry. He said the inflow of foreign capital would add another one or two per cent to the GDP growth which would take the growth rate to double digit levels. Singh said "we have a saving rate of about 29 per cent and with another 2 or three per cent of GDP from abroad through foreign capital, we can step up the growth by 1 or 2 per cent per annum." While developing relations with the US, the Prime Minister said in the last two years of the UPA government in office, India's ties with Russia and China had grown overwhelmingly. Referring to relations with Britain, Singh said during the visit of his British counterpart, Tony Blair, last year, the two countries had given a vision and concrete shape to their strategic partnership. He told members that government should be judged from the totality of its work in various fields. Singh, who holds the External Affairs Ministry portfolio, said India was the only nuclear weapon state which believed in universal nuclear disarmament. "This is our objective and we remain committed to it," the Prime Minister said. Replying to foreign policy issues raised by CPI-M member Sitaram Yechury, he said India's independent foreign policy was rooted in the twin principles of civilisational heritage and enlightened national interests as followed by Jawahar Lal Nehru. He said changes had come in since then and these had been incorporated accordingly in the foreign policy of the UPA government. Singh, who holds the External Affairs Ministry portfolio, said India was the only nuclear weapon state which believed in universal nuclear disarmament. "This is our objective and we remain committed to it," the Prime Minister said.
Beware of pitfalls on N-deal: BJP March 14, 2006 21:20 IST Accusing the United Progressive Alliance government of pursuing a "crippling" foreign policy, main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party on Tuesday asked it to beware of pitfalls while taking follow up action on the nuclear deal with US. Initiating a discussion on the working of external affairs ministry in Rajya Sabha, Leader of the Opposition Jaswant Singh said India has to be very clear and will have to be clinically analytical while assessing where the current US policy is headed". "India is the only country in the world which still has unsettled borders. It is a crippling deficiency in the foreign policy," Singh, a former external affairs minister, said. Noting that the US wanted a deal with India because of its failure in its foreign policy on Iraq, Iran and the West Asia, Singh cautioned, "For each failure of the US in the region, the region has paid, India has paid and we will continue to pay." Accusing the US and other major nuclear powers of adopting double standards on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, he said India must consistently work towards universal nuclear disarmament as otherwise it would be accused of being a partner in double-standards especially after the Indo-US deal. Singh warned that if India worked in this "shadow of dishonesty", its image would get coloured and it might ultimately have to pay a heavy price. He also wanted India to stop raising the issue of cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir with the US. Singh, however, welcomed the Indo-US deal as it aimed at bringing about energy security, which was vital for economic security of the country. He said the government should share with political parties the detailed sketch of the ongoing Indo-Pak dialogue. Referring to the Afghan situation, he questioned the presence of NATO powers in the country and voiced concern over re-emergence of Talibans. Singh said India lay in a tri-junction of collapsed empires -- Ottaman, British and the Soviet Union. The impact of these collapsed empires was huge on India because of the geographical proximity.
One nuclear deal, two narratives Vidya Subrahmaniam That the Western media have savaged the Bush visit and the nuclear deal shows India acted in its national interest. Yet looked at another way, India is befriending a world leader seen to pursue an agenda against Muslim countries. CONSIDER THE paradox: The United Progressive Alliance Government signs a "historic" civilian nuclear deal with the United States, that, by most reckoning, is tilted in India's favour. Put simply, India's achievements are three-fold: It is now a de facto nuclear weapons power; it has demolished the technology denial regime in force since the first Pokhran tests of 1974, and it has fought and won its right not to subject its fast breeder programme to safeguards. Domestic reaction to the achievement ought to be euphoric. It is not. As the party that heads the Government, the Congress ought to feel elated. There is no evidence that it does. Something is Fishy - THey seem to have prior arrangement with Uncle to Bind India for CRE Consider another paradox: The Government and the Congress Party are thought to be in a rush to woo Muslims. The Bharatiya Janata Party makes the alleged "minority appeasement policy" of the United Progressive Alliance the centrepiece of its plan to revive itself in Uttar Pradesh. But Muslims are not "appeased"; they are so sullen and angry that the Congress fears it has lost whatever little chance it had in Uttar Pradesh, indeed that the community has reverted to Mulayam Singh. The two situations are related and flow from the same perception: Any deal with the U.S. cannot be to India's good. How did the Government manage to convey such an impression about an agreement that cold analysis reveals to be a huge success? Critics who feared the Indian side would barter away vital security interests, concede Manmohan Singh & Co played their cards well. The breast-beating in the Western press dispelled any remaining doubt about who got the better of whom. The New York Times savaged both President George Bush's tour of the subcontinent and the deal with India. The visit was "spectacularly misconceived," while the "disastrously ill-timed" deal threatened to "blast a bomb-sized loophole through the Nonproliferation treaty." In a cover story written on the eve of Mr. Bush's visit, The Economist bristled at the hard bargain India was driving, and argued that any compromise by the U.S. would be a "dangerous mistake." In a visceral follow-up edit, the magazine urged U.S. Congress to veto the nuclear deal with India: "Not only is nuclear-armed India being offered all of the civilian benefits available to countries that have accepted the NPT's anti-nuclear restrictions. It has also accepted few, if any, of the real obligations of the five official nuclear powers recognised by the treaty, America, Russia, China, Britain and France. All at least signed the treaty banning all nuclear tests; India declined. All have ended the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes (only China has yet to say so publicly); India flatly refused America's request to do likewise." The unprecedented bad press forced U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to set out the importance of the deal — as much to the U.S. and the world as to India — in a signed article in The Washington Post. It is accepted wisdom that when the Western media start hyperventilating about a country, that country can be presumed to have acted in its own national interest. Thus, far from compromising its independence, New Delhi clinched a good deal, perhaps a great deal, judging by The New York Times' killer last line: "Mr. Bush should have just stayed home." Yet contrast the outrage abroad with the less than enthusiastic domestic reaction. Is the continuing Indian public suspicion around the deal just nuclear illiteracy? The BJP is miffed because Dr. Singh pulled off what the more-than-eager Jaswant Singh could not through several rounds of negotiations with Strobe Talbott. If anything, the 1998-2000 talks centred on getting India to cap its nuclear programme — a point conceded ironically by Brajesh Misra, the National Democratic Alliance Government's National Security Adviser, in the course of a recent television discussion; the disclosure was intended as a warning that India could similarly be coerced on the civilian nuclear deal. All the more reason for the Congress to have rejoiced in the Government's spectacular breakthrough. Had the BJP swung the deal, it would have been unrestrainedly joyous. In the Congress, the unease is palpable; hushed conversations about the deal stop short of insinuating a "surrender"; the anxiety is less about the specifics of the deal than about its likely impact on domestic politics. The huge Muslim presence at rallies protesting the Bush visit, in Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata, was a warning the Congress could not ignore. The Government's case that the nuclear pact was foreign policy not subject to shifting voter concerns was technically sound. Yet which Congressperson dared convey the foreign policy logic to the surging crowds that screamed for Mr. Bush's head? The beaming visitor, who threw a friendly arm around the Prime Minister, who seemingly granted India's every wish, though refusing to yield an inch in neighbouring Pakistan, was South Block's dream come true. This flattery is suspicious Another take Yet looked at another way, India was befriending a world leader seen to pursue an agenda against Muslim countries — Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, with Syria shortlisted for future action. Distrust of Mr. Bush was strongest among Muslims but, as newspaper surveys revealed, even those welcoming the President felt he was bad for the world. The irony was difficult to miss: Diplomatic India, with a direct stake in world affairs, wanted to pursue a U.S. policy uncluttered by the superpower's unforgiving conduct in Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. Domestic India, which ought to have felt remote from America's conduct in Afghanistan, Iraq, etc., was aggrieved by it. President Bush's speech at the Purana Qila made Congresspersons cringe. If the deal was the Government's victory, the speech was the Congress' defeat. Mr. Bush invited India to partner him in the pursuit of freedom across the globe, "from North Korea to Burma to Syria to Zimbabwe to Cuba ..." The world, he said, "needs India's leadership in freedom's cause." Iran was singled out for denying basic freedoms, sponsoring terrorism, and pursuing nuclear weapons. The more the Government tried to keep the focus on the civilian nuclear deal, the more the visitors embarrassed it by speaking of a "deeper, longer" relationship with India not contingent on the success of the deal. En route to India, Ms. Rice sang the friendship tune: "This trip is not a civil nuclear power trip. This trip is about a very broad relationship that is deepening." On the same day that Mr. Bush painted a merry picture of India and the U.S. spreading democracy hand-in-hand, Government sources clarified that the nuclear deal was not to be construed as a "paradigm shift." The strategic thinking of India and the U.S. did not necessarily converge, and the deal did not amount to endorsing all of the U.S.' foreign policy initiatives. But the damage was done. On the one hand, there was much American flaunting of the "broadening, deepening" relationship between India and the U.S. On the other, there were stern, "or else" messages, such as the one on the Iran vote from Ambassador David Mulford. The signals converged to project a picture of Indian servility, of an India willing to partner the U.S. in all its crimes. More propaganda value came by way of other seemingly minor but nonetheless discomfiting details: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's decision to break protocol and receive the visiting Head of State, the housing of presidential sniffer dogs in five-star comfort, their objectionable presence at India's holiest of holy sites — the Mahatma's samadhi. The visit over, the Government tabled the nuclear separation plan in Parliament — again acknowledged by experts as being to India's advantage. Prime Minister Singh issued all the necessary clarifications — on the deal, on India's independent foreign policy, on its unwillingness to be a part of the U.S.' regime change plans. But as Congresspersons see it, the intervention came way too late. The Congress' immediate worry is Uttar Pradesh where it was hoping to make some advance in the coming Assembly election. A crucial part of its calculation was the Muslim vote, now substantially with Mulayam Singh. The Bush visit, the party fears, has driven the community back to the Samajwadi Party, which for its part has done everything to stoke minority insecurity. In recent days, the U.P. Chief Minister has happily played to the gallery, deliberately permitting intemperate elements like Yaqoob Quereshi to run away with the agenda. It does not help the Congress that the Muslim factor weighs equally with the Bahujan Samaj Party — and for a different reason with the BJP. Mayawati's party has registered phenomenal progress on the ground, and in the post-Bush situation, is the likely first choice of Muslims disillusioned with the Samajwadi Party. The BJP needs Muslims — but in order to gather Hindu votes. It is only by projecting the community as pampered and aggressive that it can achieve the objective. The loser in all this is quite evidently the Congress. On one side is the SP, determined to harness Muslim anger over the Bush visit. And, on the other, is the BJP, bent on raising the spectre of "Muslim appeasement". The villain in both schemes is the Congress. The party must hope and pray that the two opposing narratives neutralise each other.
ednesday, March 15, 2006 VIEW: The Bush visit in retrospect — Ijaz Hussain There was also a marked difference in style with President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000. President Clinton had lectured and hectored the entire Pakistani nation and was reluctant to be seen shaking hands with a military dictator. His successor, however, was comfortable hobnobbing with the man with two hats The image that captured the outcome of US President George Bush’s visit to Pakistan most succinctly was the one of his reception at the Islamabad airport. In terms of protocol Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, rather than President Pervez Musharraf, receiving the US president was absolutely correct. As President Musharraf explained in his press conference, the American president, too, had never received him at the airport whenever he went to Washington on an official visit. However, the image stood out because it contrasted sharply with the one that came out from New Delhi — showing Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ignoring protocol to welcome the American president at the airport. It also stood out because not long ago the US president had publicly called President Musharraf a “friend”. There was also a marked difference in style with President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000. President Clinton had lectured and hectored the entire Pakistani nation and was reluctant to be seen shaking hands with a military dictator. His successor, however, was comfortable hobnobbing with the man with two hats. Nor did he speak to the Pakistani nation like a headmaster. In substance, however, the treatment was no different. President Musharraf’s virulent public broadside against Afghan President Hamid Karzai was a sign that President Bush had done in private, what President Clinton had done in public. The difference in the styles of the two American presidents is best explained by the fact that unlike Mr Clinton Mr Bush was visiting after the 9/11 tragedy. While generally correct in his manners, President Bush could not help acting a bit like the boss at the joint press conference saying the purpose of his visit was to ascertain whether or not General Musharraf was still committed to the war on terror. He also lectured his host on the importance of democracy. The latter was left defending his commitment to both fighting terrorism and restoring democracy. He reiterated his unstinting resolve to fight terrorism and promised to hold fair and free elections come 2007. President Bush’s behaviour appeared to be less a reflection of the unequal relationship between the US and Pakistan and more of the perception that President Musharraf’s hold on power depends on US goodwill. US relations with Pakistan and India were ‘de-hyphenated’ sometime back. However, this appeared not to have sunk into the Pakistani consciousness. The Bush visit brought home this point. The Bush Administration had already indicated that it would not extend the civilian nuclear technology deal to Pakistan. However, swayed possibly by the irrational exuberance of the “Busharraf” phenomenon the Pakistani president perhaps hoped to convince his US counterpart to change his mind. The latter, however, sternly observed that “ Pakistan and India are two different countries with different needs and different histories”, and that the US strategy in the region would take into account “those well known differences”. This caused enormous disappointment in Pakistan. The US nuclear deal with India is a corollary of the American commitment to help the latter become a global player. The US is motivated by the desire to preserve its own preeminence by promoting India as a counterweight against a resurgent China. In other words, the Bush visit to India was meant to effect a balance of power — like the Nixon visit to China in the 1970s. An unintended consequence of the present visit, however, could be the creation of a regional imbalance in South Asia. The nuclear deal also has the potential to start a nuclear arms race in the region, principally because of the exemption of the fast breeder reactors from the IAEA purview. The China threat behind the nuclear deal has been compared to the Germany threat in the 19th century. But the comparison is misplaced because unlike the latter, which undertook a policy of “blood and iron” in pursuit of its national objectives, the former insists on harmony and peace. There is nothing to suggest that China is a territorially expansionist power. However, the US is so paranoid about the incubus of rising China that it has not flinched from undermining the NPT which forbids civilian nuclear cooperation with a non-member state. Nor has the fallout this would have in dealing with nuclear weapons ambition of Iran and North Korea deterred the US. According to some Western analysts the Bush visit to India may have laid the foundations of a cold war in Asia. The emerging political and military alignments in the Chinese neighbourhood seem to attest to it. The US has military alliances with many South East Asian countries and Japan. The latter has broadened it by according permission to the US to move the command headquarters of its Army’s First Corps from the US Pacific coast to Camp Zama near Yokohama. The US is also in the process of moving the command operations of its Pacific Air Force fleet from Guam to Tokyo. These developments are worrying for China because they heighten its threat perception. The nuclear and other cooperation with India may come to be viewed no differently. This could lead to Chinese opposition to the Indian quest for SC seat. Let us not forget that China already opposes the Japanese candidature. The Bush attitude towards Kashmir during the visit should disabuse Pakistan of any meaningful US “facilitation” in its settlement. The US president gave an encouraging statement on Kashmir in his Asia Society speech emphasising the need for a settlement acceptable to all parties. However, he did not follow it up during his visit to India. Irrespective of the rosy picture the Pakistan government may paint of behind the scenes US pressure on India, Kashmir was not mentioned in the joint statement issued at the end of the Bush visit to Islamabad. Bush did urge the two countries to intensify their efforts to resolve the issue but that does not mean much. Incidentally, this exhortation came in response to a question by a Pakistani journalist. Much more damaging than President Bush’s failure to pressure India on Kashmir is the conclusion of the nuclear deal for this rules out the possibility of India making any concessions. American and Indian think tanks had been urging the Indian government to get the Kashmir dispute out of the way to achieve a great power status. This was acknowledged by the Indian prime minister who in May 2004 told Jonathan Power that, “the Kashmir dispute is stopping us from realising our potential”. But if India can still conclude the nuclear and other beneficial deals meant to promote it as a global power why should it seek a settlement on Kashmir with Pakistan? The writer, a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University, can be reached at hussain_ijaz @hotmail.com
However idiotic the headline of this article is "pro-india congressman ..." it has a simple and powerful statement.. http://ia.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/15ndeal2.htm?q=np&file=.htm
Acharya, Both the articles have false reasoning to explain the issues due to agenda or confusion. I will try to rebut them but will take time. The short answer is that there is a sea change in global power dynamics and hence the deal is needed for the US and India. Besides it is not directly against China. By unshackling India, evenif it does not toe the US line, the US has made the Chinese pause and think about what they are embarking on. It will set in course introspection among the Chinese elite. The protests against Bush were due to the cartoon issue. Bush being the leader of the Western world was the power behind the cartoonists. Congress does not want to take the difficult task to explain the need for the deal to its votebank. BTW this article explains twhy there is no progress into the Varanasi terrorist attacks for that would further erode the votebank.
Enjoy it !!! http://www.cpiml.in/060408.htm Red Star April 2006 National Scene Bush-Manmohan Nuke Deal: A Historic Surrender: K.N. Ramachandran