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Thursday, June 01, 2006
  Nuclear Weapons And Indian Security

Posted by: Kaushal Sep 12 2003, 12:23 PM PTI NEW DELHI: Maintaining that there are no hitches in the country's missile programme, the government has said the 700 kms short-range and 1,500 kms medium-range surface-to-surface Agni I and Agni II missiles are being inducted into the armed forces. On the progress of the Agni missiles programme, top Defence Ministry officials said, "these missiles are where they were". Defence Minister George Fernandes recently stated in Parliament that the Agni I and II were in the process of being inducted. On whether India would go ahead with the test firing of the 3,000 kms long-range Agni missile, the officials said the "tests would be undertaken at an appropriate time". More Prithvi missiles were be procured from the State owned Bharat Dynamics Limited, they said when asked about reports of Army and IAF refusing to induct the surface-to-air Akash missiles. In an apparent move to counter Opposition attack in parliament about huge funds remaining unutilised by the three armed forces, the Defence Ministry on Friday released a list of equipment procured since 2001 and the new defence deals cleared recently. Topping the list will be the deal to acquire the much-delayed Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers, frontline T-90 tanks, state-of-art-sensors, advanced UAV's and assortment of radars to fill the gaps in the sky with a new range of Galiel and Travor light weapons for the infantry.

Posted by: rhytha Sep 13 2003, 10:20 AM

Nice thread with Good Relevant Topic thumbup.gif , guys give big K Graduate a hand in collating info and analysis biggrin.gif

Posted by: Kaushal Sep 20 2003, 06:07 AM Josy Joseph in New Delhi | September 20, 2003 12:10 IST

Posted by: muddur Sep 20 2003, 05:02 PM

India needs to build atleast 3000 Prithvi's and a 500 - 1000 AGNI I & II's to take on Pakistani nukes on a first strike. Plus India has to develop atleast 100 AGNI III's to keep Chinese under check. I am sick of Paki nuclear threats. PRE EMPT Pakistani nukes and give them a surprise with complete military readiness. India playing dangerous games in Pak: Musharraf K J M Varma in Islamabad | September 20, 2003 21:54 IST Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has accused India of playing 'dangerous games' in Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan, which could provoke Pakistani retaliation and raise the spectre of a nuclear conflict. "They must know that we can retaliate in a big way and they should know that," an agitated Musharraf told Canadian newspaper Toronto Star in an interview published on Saturday. Also see: Logic of root causes of terror dangerous: Vajpayee "They should never presume that they can do things and they can go unchecked," he said, adding that the "risk of full-fledged conflict with India can never be ruled out in South Asia." He, however, denied that Pakistan is planning a nuclear war against India. "No sane person can ever sit and plan that there will be a nuclear confrontation...we must never even think of that," he said in his characteristic blow hot, blow cold style. "However, what is dangerous is whether there will be a conflict between India and Pakistan which can then lead on to a nuclear exchange," he said in the interview, published ahead of Musharraf's visit to Canada on September 25.

Posted by: Viren Sep 22 2003, 10:44 AM

Posted by: Kaushal Sep 27 2003, 05:40 AM,00110004.htm Indo-Asian News Service Chennai, September 27 Austrian political scientist Anton Pelinka's book Democracy Indian Style says that present day India is more Subhas Chandra Bose's dream than Gandhi's vision. "It is industrial, it is modern, it is socialist, it is change driven, it walks the secular tightrope. It has put aside Mahatma Gandhi's tenets of non-violence and is a nuclear power," Pelinka said. He said the country was more "Bose's India" by virtue of its being a nuclear power as "Bose was not convinced that the best way to fight British colonialism" was by non-violence. He wanted to wrest freedom from the colonial rulers. Pelinka's book explores Bose's impact on India before and after independence and how the controversial leader of the 1940s shaped this nation's political culture. Speaking at a lecture at the Asian College of Journalism, organised by the Madras Book Club in Chennai, Pelinka drew parallels between Gandhi's proteges Nehru and Bose, calling the former "Gandhi's good son" and Bose, the "prodigal son". Pelinka, a professor at the University of Innsburk and director of the Institute of Conflict Research in Vienna, researched extensively on the life and times of Bose in Austria, Kolkata and Washington. Bose, he said, "was a secular nationalist and a socialist moderniser. He understood that Indian identity was above religion, caste and language." Bose led the Indian National Army (INA), formed by Indian nationalists to win India's independence from the British Empire. "He maintained a certain balance of power even in his INA by having one Sikh, one Hindu and one Muslim general," said the author. The book has been published by Transaction Publishers and translated by Rene Schell. It also talks of how Indian democracy is not only moulded by India's hoary past but also shaped by its encounter with the West.

Posted by: muddur Sep 27 2003, 12:35 PM

'Chinese missiles can reach any Indian city''Chinese~missiles~can~reach~any~Indian~city' Chandigarh: Stating that every Indian city was within the reach of Chinese missiles, RSS chief K S Sudershan accused the successive governments at the Centre of paying "little attention" to developing or procuring modern weapons. "China has developed missiles with which they can target every Indian city. In contrast, till India develops missiles with a range of 3000 km and above, the nearest Chinese town is going to be out of bounds for us," he said addressing a seminar on Integrated Management of National Security. "Only now we have started procuring the weapons systems, which we should have had years earlier," Sudershan said. "Over the centuries, we have suffered due to our humanitarian attitude and the belief that why should anyone use weapons against us when we will not be the first to attack. Why we suffered several defeats in history is due to our faulty thinking," he said. "When enemies who waged wars against us had guns, we used to fight them with swords," the RSS chief said. "Over the years, we paid little attention to developing or procuring modern weapons system because of which our enemy had an upper edge. We also did not concentrate much on the need to have an efficient intelligence gathering mechanism." The need of the hour was to equip not only the military with modern weapons system, "but also our para-military and police forces who has a crucial role to play in launching counter-offencive operations," he added.

Posted by: Krishna Sep 27 2003, 01:35 PM

QUOTE(muddur @ Sep 20 2003, 07:02 PM)
India needs to build atleast 3000 Prithvi's and a 500 - 1000 AGNI I & II's to take on Pakistani nukes on a first strike. Plus India has to develop atleast 100 AGNI III's to keep Chinese under check. I am sick of Paki nuclear threats. PRE EMPT Pakistani nukes and give them a surprise with complete military readiness.
3000 or 300, we need enough to make sure that not a single paki** survives in TSP land if they strike or attempt to strike any Indian city, or Indians (Armed forces personnels or civilians) anywhere in thye world. Whether its the pakis or their dogs HUA / LET / JEM. Enough of this nuclear black-mail.........f**ckin pre-emt them and send them to the place they so desire to be at. Now, talking about the numbers of nukes we should have, I think we have enough to make TSP a quiet zone for the next 100 years, but the most, I repeat the most important thing is to make sure they can't drop one on us. For that we need HumanInt and satellite Int. Anytime, our boys pick up that their is a preparation going on for a strike on India..........strike with full force, with everything we've got. No ifs and buts. **If pakis cannot stand up for the rights of innocent Indians on the other side of the border when their Army carries out a nuke strike on India, they are equally responsible for the assault and must pay the same price. Kaushal, apologies if you meant this thread for collection of information of nuclear weapons and not a discussion on it.

Posted by: Kaushal Sep 28 2003, 09:41 AM

Kaushal, apologies if you meant this thread for collection of information of nuclear weapons and not a discussion on it.
Krishna, It is most certainly intended to be a discussion thread, as well as a reporting of news and information gathering. My expectation is that the discussion is thought provoking and discusses various scenarios, such as the following - China and India accidentally get involved in a protracted border war which is drawing large amount of resources from the Indian side. Pakistan taking advantage of the situation attacks India along a fairly long border stretching from POK to Punjab. Effectively India is then in a two front war., the nightmare of Indian defense planners. What then ? If for example China now escalates its border war to a full fledged assault along the entire Arunachal border and a massive attack on Ladakh. What happens to India's NFU pledge. At what stage would india consider using Nukes if at all ... If no nukes then is India capable of conducting a full fledged two front war for more than a month or will China and Pakistan in concert grind India down and in a period of six months or so will be knocking at the approach to India Gate. How should India plan for this scenario.

Posted by: prem Sep 28 2003, 05:12 PM

India needs to build atleast 3000 Prithvi's and a 500 - 1000 AGNI I & II's to take on Pakistani nukes on a first strike. Plus India has to develop atleast 100 AGNI III's to keep Chinese under check. I am sick of Paki nuclear threats. PRE EMPT Pakistani nukes and give them a surprise with complete military readiness. ____________________________________________________________________ I m a firm believer that India should have at leats 1000 nukes and Agni vairents of missiles. We should be able to threaten the existance of any one who supports Pukes in their behaviour toward Indian and all the terrorist activities coming out of puke land. Since they try to show it as Islam versus others, the isalmic countries, especially Wahabi Puke masters should be warned of the consequnenses of Nuke war as if there is unacceptabale damage ,there wont be such thing as Islamic country/ entity left. i think the threat to very existance of these entities will change their behaviour and thinking as they have show the sign of sanity once big hammer is shown. Having said that, we need to have trillion dollar economy first as it will give whole world big stake in India and its safety as well as enough $$ to make the above happen. In fact trillion dollar economy will make Pookes irrelevant without firing shot. prem

Posted by: vishal Sep 29 2003, 11:13 AM

QUOTE(Kaushal @ Sep 28 2003, 10:11 PM)
If no nukes then is India capable of conducting a full fledged two front war for more than a month or will China and Pakistan in concert grind India down and in a period of six months or so will be knocking at the approach to India Gate. How should India plan for this scenario.
I agree ,you raised a valid point.Serious thinking and planning needed on it.

Posted by: G.Subramaniam Oct 3 2003, 09:54 PM

Targeting of Indian nukes If you look at the demographic distribution of pakistan, most of pakistan is desert 60% of Pakistan lives near Lahore 20% lives near Karachi The habitable areas of Pakistan is more densely populated than BD Hence about 10 nukes properly placed will eradicate Pakistan Next we must understand that we are dealing with a civilizational enemy, not a national enemy A nuclear attack on India is an attempt at civilisational eradication so the response must be tit for tat Pakistan is simply a tentacle of the Ummah Octopus The Gulf states fund pakistan and L-E-T and radicalise Indian muslims with their madrasas BD shelters anti-Indian Jihadists So it must be realised that most OIC countries are our enemies With Agni-3, the entire Ummah from Egpyt to Indonesia is within range The interesting thing about the Ummah is that most of the Ummah is desert and the Ummah is food deficient and imports food hence targeting their ports and one or 2 key cities will ensure that a nuclear attack on India is met by Ummah eradication Incidentally, Israel has the same policy of Ummah eradication and they are putting their 200 nukes on submarines

Posted by: Krishna Oct 5 2003, 10:28 AM

India's nuke command chain is in place: Fernandes,0008.htm

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 6 2003, 04:11 PM October 07, 2003 03:32 IST

Posted by: rajesh_g Oct 6 2003, 04:27 PM

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 6 2003, 05:12 PM

rajesh, this initiative has important implications for India as Raja Mohan rightly points out. I will try to put some thoughts down,

Posted by: Krishna Oct 6 2003, 06:35 PM

QUOTE(Kaushal @ Oct 6 2003, 06:11 PM) October 07, 2003 03:32 IST
Kaushal, Any new info on Durga, Kali or Avatar?

Posted by: muddur Oct 6 2003, 07:10 PM

QUOTE(prem @ Sep 29 2003, 05:42 AM)
Having said that, we need to have trillion dollar economy first as it will give whole world big stake in India and its safety as well as enough $$ to make the above happen. In fact trillion dollar economy will make Pookes irrelevant without firing shot. prem
This is WRONG ... The Pakis are anyway going to go down in the drain .... But Even with a MULTI trillion $$$ economy, what you have quoted is wrong. Pakis have a suicidal tendency. They know they are going down, anyways. Mark my words, because of this suicidal nature, the Pakis will try to inflict every possible damage to INDIA. So India winning a war with Pakistan with out a shot being fired is not possible.

Posted by: rajesh_g Oct 6 2003, 07:14 PM

QUOTE(muddur @ Oct 7 2003, 07:40 AM)
This is WRONG ... The Pakis are anyway going to go down in the drain .... But Even with a MULTI trillion $$$ economy, what you have quoted is wrong. Pakis have a suicidal tendency. They know they are going down, anyways. Mark my words, because of this suicidal nature, the Pakis will try to inflict every possible damage to INDIA. So India winning a war with Pakistan with out a shot being fired is not possible.
Well said. Compare OBL and US. Its not all about economy..

Posted by: prem Oct 7 2003, 06:23 PM

Guys, we all know pookes has suicidal tedencies and act rationally only once they are shown big hammer like USA did. We also know they project the conflict ummah vesus kafir and also we all understand that other/some muslims countries support them finnancially and politically on that basis, as no one give a damn that India has 150 millions of muslims living there. As as some one said rightally that they are civilizational threat, how do u suppose to face this challenge unless there is clear cut demonstration and will to show the enemy that we have the capacity to wipe their whole civilization out of existance, if we go so goes the umma or shuuma and rest. For this kind of capabilty we must have big economy as then we can offord to have all kind of options and if the whole world has big stake in Indian economy they will automatically will be on our side and this will open up whole new bag of solutions to treat the problem called pookistan. Once they know that we can destroy them ALL physically , punjabi moslem mind will understand so will their arab/ chinese masters and others. i say buy the time and prepare the remedy and then apply accordingally. i agree that They are going down the tube. They believe they are Islam and its Glory etc etc crap, once we make them realize that their cherished dream of ummah . glory , etc will have no meaning as there wont be any ummah left after we go through them, they will Understand and some to senses and act rationally like normal humans. To have that Danda we must have money first. just my 2 cents thx prem

Posted by: Mudy Oct 7 2003, 06:43 PM

Prem, Centuries back India was attacked hundred times because we were rich, according to "The Clash of Civilization" book India's international trade was over 37% before 1700. Now it is less then 2%. When our enemies were using gun we were fighting with bows and arrow. Till we can't protect ourself from enemies, we can't grow. Till we are not strong world will not respect us. To protect our trade and improve Indian citizens life, citizens safety should be first priority. Even in our home we use strongest lock to close door so that rest of family feel safe. Nuke are our best bet. Yes, Pakistan and China is busy destablizing India but they are unable to do it because we are strong now. What happened in 1962? Before war west was not openly against India but our defeat changed India's image. Nobody want to tag with loser and US joined hands with China. So we should have strong danda first to have good economy.

Posted by: Mudy Oct 7 2003, 06:58 PM

Posted by: Mudy Oct 7 2003, 09:20 PM

Pakistan conducts second missile test in less than a week Tuesday, October 7, 2003 (10-07) 20:59 PDT ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) -- Pakistan on Tuesday test fired a medium-range, nuclear-capable missile, the army said. It was the second such test in less than a week. The army said it successfully fired off the Hatf-4 missile, also known as the Shaheen 1, in the early morning hours. The missile has a range of 435 miles, meaning it can hit most major targets in rival India.

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 7 2003, 10:27 PM

The missile has a range of 435 miles, meaning it can hit most major targets in rival India.
435 miles will hit most major targets in India ? This guy is geographically challenged. what about Kolkatta, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Thiruvananthapuram etc.etc.

Posted by: Mudy Oct 7 2003, 11:03 PM

>>>435 miles will hit most major targets in India ? This guy is geographically challenged. what about Kolkatta, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Thiruvananthapuram etc.etc. No doubt. biggrin.gif

Posted by: muddur Oct 8 2003, 12:38 AM

Pact on space equipment, N-tech likely IANS[ TUESDAY, OCTOBER 07, 2003 04:15:41 AM ] The US is close to completing an agreement with India that will allow an expansion of trade in high-tech areas, space launch equipment and the nuclear industry, says secretary of state Colin Powell US, India talk nuclear technology transfer By Sultan Shahin NEW DELHI – The carrots dangled before India earlier this year to persuade it to send troops to Iraq – a promise by the then United States ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, to sell "defensive nuclear, biological and chemical equipment, special forces gear and P3 Orion Maritime Patrol aircraft" – are beginning to take shape now, even though Delhi has not committed any of its troops. In the face of strong objections from a section of US President George W Bush's administration that high technology transfers to India might fuel the spread of weapons of mass destruction, it is not quite clear yet how far the intense bilateral negotiations have succeeded. The media have not even been told exactly what transpired in the recent meeting between Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Bush on this score. In view of the three decades political baggage that the two countries have to contend with, the task cannot be easy. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, resulting in sanctions on high technology transfers. A series of nuclear weapons tests it conducted in May 1998 brought another series of sanctions against high technology transfers from the US. Three sensitive issues have defined the limits of India-US bilateral relationship since 1974: transfer of civilian nuclear technology; cooperation in space research; and sale of dual-purpose technology, which could be diverted to military use. India, which became the first nation to welcome Bush's ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans in May 2001, also hopes to get a share of the technology. A short round of negotiations that has taken place so far is clearly not enough for resolving issues of such far-reaching consequences. Senior officials of the two countries have been busy in the past weeks preparing a broad framework of a nuclear and high technology transfer regime that will allow America to ease restrictions on high technology trade with India in return for credible assurances that New Delhi will prevent the outflow of sensitive technology and material from its soil and put mechanisms in place to preclude the use of imported technology for military purposes. Though nothing concrete appears to have come out so far, these negotiations do reflect a serious political commitment to deal with a long-standing problem in Indo-US relations. One important casualty of the Western desire to monopolize nuclear weapons is public safety. Earlier this year, on March 6, the Indian parliament was informed that India and the US were discussing a mutually-agreed program on nuclear safety cooperation in the direction of resumption of nuclear cooperation between the two sides. Replying to a question, Minister of State in the Department of Space S B Mukherjee said that discussions had taken place on resumption of Indo-US nuclear cooperation between the respective regulatory bodies on a few selected topics. "Our objective is to develop mutually-beneficial international cooperation in the area of nuclear power," Mukherjee said. In the area of nuclear safety cooperation, a mutually-agreed program was being discussed, he said. India and the US revived talks on nuclear safety cooperation with the three-day visit of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman Richard A Meserve at the end of February this year. The talks, initiated in 1994, had been suspended following India's nuclear tests in 1998. But following Vajpayee-Bush talks in November 2001, the two sides agreed to resume the process. The focus of Meserve's visit was cooperation in safeguarded nuclear facilities and identification of specific areas of Indo-US cooperation in the hi-tech areas of peaceful applications of nuclear energy and space research. Several nuclear experts have pointed out from time to time that decades of denying India nuclear technology has forced the country to pursue an indigenous but secretive program which poses the threat of a Chernobyl-type disaster. As India does not accept full-scope international safeguards for its nuclear activities, it has been denied access to technology or equipment from Western countries that follow rules set by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Even the Russian-supplied two light-water reactors for a 2,000 MW nuclear power station in southern Tamil Nadu state did not come with the safety control and instrumentation systems designed by the German engineering giant Siemens, which has set up a plant in Moscow especially for the Russian nuclear equipment industry. The US and its European allies have kept India under various technology transfer regimes since 1974. The May 1998 tests resulted, predictably, in further tightening of technology control regimes. But this has only forced India to develop its own nuclear power technology and safety standards. Despite sanctions, India plans to produce 20,000 MW of nuclear power by the year 2020. India has consistently refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) despite enormous US pressure particularly from former president Bill Clinton's administration. India may be able to withstand the isolation, but fears about dangers to public safety have inevitably grown. A resumption of nuclear cooperation dialogue with the US, therefore, has enormous public safety implications as well. One of India's strategic goals is to be accepted at least as a de facto, if not a de jure member of the nuclear club. From the substance and style of the recent discussions it would appear that this has already happened. At the very least there is a radical shift in the tone and tenor of American interlocutors. Not long ago Clinton announced his intention to "freeze, cap and roll back" the nuclear capabilities of countries like India. But US Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation John Wolf stated earlier this year in July that "there is no near-term prospect of getting India and Pakistan to relinquish their nuclear weapons and missiles". American diplomats have also been saying in private that their government is no longer in the business of telling India not to build a nuclear arsenal. Unlike the more doctrinaire Clinton era, Washington appears now to be promoting in the case of India at least a "one shield, few missiles" doctrine that it also advocates for the US. The implication for India is that it may already have been accepted as a respectable member of the nuclear club, though the US will not give any public indication of that for fear of encouraging other countries that may want the same status. India itself has never aroused fears of nuclear technology proliferation. It has been recognized as a conservative country when it comes to technology export. India's evolving and already close strategic relationship with Iran is, however, another matter. Iran is clearly a nation that wants to and perhaps needs to become a nuclear weapon state in order to retain its sovereignty in a world in which it thinks the sole superpower is a rogue gone berserk. The US has already short-listed Iran as an evil power. No wonder visiting Israeli premier Ariel Sharon objected to Indo-Iranian relations. India, however, considers its ties with Iran non-negotiable. But the present Indo-US nuclear talks are also to determine if India will be allowed to buy the Israeli-made Arrow missile-destroyer. While there is a general acceptance in Washington and Tel Aviv of India's credibility as a non-proliferating nation, there is nevertheless reluctance to export sensitive technologies to a country with such strong ties with a member of Bush's "axis of evil". Incidentally, the remaining member of this famous axis (with Iraq "tamed") is North Korea, with ties to India's bete noire Pakistan. Also, there is concern in Washington that if the US makes India an exception to the various non-proliferation regimes, other nuclear powers like Russia, China and France may all use this as an excuse to sell their missile systems or export other high technology items. What then is going to be the outcome of these talks? Will the two countries be able to sort out the complex issues involved? So far all this remains shrouded in mystery. The only hopeful sign is the relaxed atmosphere in which these negotiations are being held, unlike previous occasions when nuclear talks always used to be tense. The differences between the Indian and US positions flow from the NPT and New Delhi's reluctance to accept "full-scope" safeguards for its nuclear installations. A joint statement issued after the talks between Indian and US officials' talks said that the US had "expressed its readiness to broaden relations in civilian space cooperation". The joint statement said: "The two sides also exchanged views on civilian nuclear cooperation. To this end, the two sides identified proposals which could be operationalized in the near term." The parameters of the current dialogue, it was stressed, "reflect the determination" of the top leadership of both countries. India is taking hope from several media accounts that US officials have uncovered a number of legal loopholes that may allow the US to help India dodge much of the multi-layered sanctions regime.

Posted by: Mudy Oct 8 2003, 09:16 AM

India itself has never aroused fears of nuclear technology proliferation. It has been recognized as a conservative country when it comes to technology export.
This behaviour is because we our confident people and proud of our achievement or we consider seriously "what harm it will cause to world" ???

Posted by: prem Oct 8 2003, 05:34 PM

Hi Mudy, I m all for strong defence and wants coupe of thousands nukes , so that our enemies know the consequences. i know we were attacked repeatidally with all the calamities heaped upon us. But now we are strong enough to repeal any attack but that is not good enough , i think we out to have such strong defence that no one should even dare to do the mischeif. To gather that kind of strength , we must have strong economy which btw way we are on the right track to have that. Military strength without the sound economy is hollow, we ought to have both, but in 21 st century its the economy from which the real strenght flows from as it will buy u anything and i believe that is one of the reasons we are not going to war with pukes as our economy in few years will make them irrelevant and our military strength will grown multifold from what is now. thx prem

Posted by: Krishna Oct 11 2003, 07:41 AM

QUOTE(prem @ Oct 8 2003, 07:34 PM)
Hi Mudy, I m all for strong defence and wants coupe of thousands nukes , so that our enemies know the consequences. i know we were attacked repeatidally with all the calamities heaped upon us. But now we are strong enough to repeal any attack but that is not good enough , i think we out to have such strong defence that no one should even dare to do the mischeif. To gather that kind of strength , we must have strong economy which btw way we are on the right track to have that. Military strength without the sound economy is hollow, we ought to have both, but in 21 st century its the economy from which the real strenght flows from as it will buy u anything and i believe that is one of the reasons we are not going to war with pukes as our economy in few years will make them irrelevant and our military strength will grown multifold from what is now. thx prem
Well said, Prem! No doubt economy is the most important part. And we must target to grow around 9/10% a year. I'm not happy with the 7/8% deal. As the economy continues to grow, High tech toys, weapons, nukes & lasers would take care of themselves. What we need to get is: get in kick-a** mode. For every terrorist strike their should be some big hot-shot in TSP land gone missing, While their is full deniability on our's still visible. B) If you can't make your enemies understand, get rid of 'em all.

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 11 2003, 08:27 AM

The Indo-Iranian-Israeli-US quadrangular games are going to be interesting. India has convinced both US and Israel about her strong bonafides when it comes to terrorism. But both Israel andthe US are still fixated on Iran, partly because of Iran's obsession with acquiring nukes. From Iran's POV , they look upon Pakistan as a potential adversary (more so than Israel) although they will not publicly say so and hence the desire to match Pakistan's nuke status. So the game gets complicated. Of course the heart of the whole problem is the terrorist state. But one of the reasons why TSP is such a pain in the pitoot is that the US(and the UK) insist on propping up that wretched country. The aim of the Indians is to convince the western world that Pakistan is the greater threat to western civilization despite their professions to the contrary. India should somehow convince the west that Iran is a better bet than Pakistan. Unfortunately the reason why the west props up pakistan ( India) remains current even today and is based on the false premise that India remains a greater threat to the west than the Islamists.

Posted by: Krishna Oct 11 2003, 08:35 AM

Kaushal, If you look from another angle, USA doesn't want to counter Pakistan militarily as it might lead to a paki nuke retaliation against Israel, and most importantly India. Importance of India is not due to any love lost, but the chain reaction it starts.

Posted by: Krishna Oct 11 2003, 08:49 AM

Let me expand on chain reaction bit. Say, USA offers Pakistan a last chance to curtail all terrorist activities on its soil else face military invasion ala Iraq. Paksitan responds in a 'No.' Military offensice starts. Within a few days PA starts loosing ground and threatens it would launch nukes against India as they can't go down for good freeing India to move up the food chain. So they launch nukes on India. Say, 4/5 big Indian cities are nuked. Death tolls are in 10s of millions - Property loss in billions of dollars. Now the ball's in India's court. What does India do? Realistically all the hard work of the last few decades just went down the drain. It would take another 50 years to get back where we were yesterday. Now who's responsible for this: First of all Pakistan and then China & N. Korea. We not only going to nuke Pakistan but take 'em chicoms down too. So India launches severe retaliation against pakistan, with the idea of erasing them from world map and 10/15 nukes on the chicoms (their east coast cities mainly.) A few of 'em bad toys for N. Korea takes off on board a few Agnis. Now China finds itself a similar situation ala India. So Chicoms do the same type of analysis and decide to nuke India and USA………………….fill it in here the rest……...

Posted by: Mudy Oct 11 2003, 10:01 AM

Credibility of Paki nukes are big question. No one is sure whether they have miniaturize nuke bomb which can be deliveried by missiles. But they can drop bomb by using planes. Which they can use against India only. But Paki can give these nuke to Saudi or Libya to do dirty work. For US it is better to fix source first, which is Pakistan.

Posted by: Krishna Oct 11 2003, 11:29 AM

If it's a matter of delivering by planes, I think IAF can take on the responsibility to make sure none gets through. But with missiles we need something: Kali, Durga or some credible ABM system. Even though it's quiet probable that they are nuke-nooded (n3.gif) we cannot take a chance.

Posted by: rajesh_g Oct 12 2003, 01:54 PM Interesting that China is not on the list of 10 countries - meither is Russia. How effective is this initiative going to be without China and Russia ? What is interesting is how China is not getting directly involved, passing tech to NK and Pak and having US worry about these guys. Isnt this like the proxy war that pakis are waging against us ??

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 12 2003, 03:55 PM

Time and again India will be faced with the choice of running with the hares or hunting with the hounds and she has to make her choice. She cannot waffle her way out of this. Hard choices have to be made. The US has now recognized that it does not make sense to brand India a proliferator just merely because she has deployed nukes. A country must proliferate in order to be known as a proliferator. India has never proliferated any WMD to any country. India must hunt with the hounds on this one. It is not in her interest to see more proliferation happen. and those who blatantly proliferate must be held accountable. But if the US exempts its buddy from all the rules of proliferation than it is an initiative that can easily be abandoned.

Posted by: rajesh_g Oct 12 2003, 06:26 PM

Without China's involvement and commitment there would be no end to proliferation. We may hunt with the hounds - there are lots of advantages in that too. But if the objective is to prevent proliferation then China's involvement is a must. And time and again China has proved to be loose with such technology. Besides that, I hope we wont be *used* to fix the Iranian problem.

Posted by: Mudy Oct 12 2003, 07:43 PM

India should stay away from any treaty. Treaty is meant to control and US knows very well to abuse and use it. Just ignore it.

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 12 2003, 09:38 PM

This s not a treaty. Simply an 'initiative'. Before anything like a treaty happens a lot of things must happen like India should be a member of the UNSC with veto power and be admitted as a dejure NWS which means all sanctions have to be dropped. We must stop thinking of ourselves as a victim and think like a predator. In all these initiatives there will be alternatives to deal with the Americans. if you dont deal with them India will be out of the loop. And there will be little chance that China (as the up and coming superpower) will get any friendlier with India. The China paki axis will only get stronger. By all means Indians should remain skeptical of the intentions of the west in general and US in particular, but that does not mean India should hide in a cave and hope the problems go away. IOW Indians should 'engage' with the americans in a big way ( not marry them) and keep the world guessing as to her true intentions.

Posted by: Krishna Oct 12 2003, 11:01 PM

QUOTE(Kaushal @ Oct 12 2003, 11:38 PM)
We must stop thinking of ourselves as a victim and think like a predator.
We should take it one step further: We should act like one. I say, we start with the BanglaDesh. Let it become an example of our arrival!

Posted by: rajesh_g Oct 12 2003, 11:32 PM

Kaushal, our disagreement is really minimal. Joining such an initiative could have 2 purposes for India. (1) Stop proliferation. (2) Engage US for some other goodies. If we are to join for #2 and that alone then I am cool with this. God forbid, but if push comes to shove we should probably help US fix the Iranian problem if the price is right. But if at all the idea is to stop nuke proliferation this is the worst way of going about it. Joining this initiative or treaty is hardly acting like a predator. The best way to stop China from proliferating is to hand over a few choice warheads to Vietnam and our other friends - that is being a predator - this is not. Stopping pakistan from proliferating is hardly stopping anything. Besides what do you think India is bringing to the table in US's opinion ? We have to understand this in order to demand the right price - we are bringing something that China is not - and somehow I get this feeling that US is perfectly capable on its own to stop pakistan from proliferating. Its something else - dont know what .. unsure.gif

Posted by: Pathmarajah Oct 14 2003, 03:46 AM

I have always felt that India can impose a naval blockade of Pakistan, and maintain that blockade indefinately until that nation capitulates unconditionally. India has the navy now to impose such a blockade and take out the PN if it challenges the blockade. With such a blockade, nothing goes in and nothing comes out and the nation will grind to a halt. Trade will be zero. Not even trawler fishing. The Karakorum highway to China can be taken out and Pakistan will be left only with Afghanistan as its entry point, and at its mercy. India can also impose a 'no fly zone' and that would end all commercial flights into Pakistan. The nation would then be contained and a slow death begins. All this without an invasion of Pakistan by the Indian army or crossing the LoC.. The onus then falls on Pakistan to escalate the blockade and no fly zone by invading India, or, use its nuclear weapons. This would be unlikely as no one really wants to initiate a nuclear war; for Pakistan it would be certain and total annihilation and subsequent non existence. They really have to choose between living with the blockade or self annihilation. The cost to India and its economy would be minimal. Indeed it will drive the price of oil down with one large nation no longer an oil consumer. Why does this scenario not work?

Posted by: Dr. S. Kalyan Oct 14 2003, 05:16 AM

Taking out Paki nukes If there is a semblance of truth in the following news reports, I would welcome Bharat sending troops to Iraq to operate under US command. This is the minimum condition that Islamic nukes should be dismantled to safeguard peace in the world, after 9-11. It is too dangerous to leave the Islamic nukes in Pakistan intact for the security of USA. Kalyanaraman India, Israel plan strikes against Pak nuke facilities Tariq Saeedi Ashgabat—Sources privy to the latest developments have disclosed that Israel and India might be planning a joint strike against the nuclear assets of Pakistan. The revelation comes right at the heels of a news story carried by Haartez and other major Israeli papers that Israel was all set to launch a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. “Israel had been proposing a surgical strike against Pak nuclear assets since the time Moorarji Desai was the prime minister of India but the real breakthrough only came during Ariel Sharon’s recent visit to India,” said the sources. “Bush and at least three of his principals are convinced that, should anything happen to Musharraf, Pakistan’s nuclear hardware could easily fall into the hands of religious extremists or rogue elements,” said the sources. Speculations have been sprouting up for the last couple of years that India-Israel cooperation against ‘terrorism’ was primarily aimed at Pakistan and the best prevention seen by security advisers was to take out the nuclear structures of Pakistan to tilt the geopolitical equation to India’s side permanently. The idea may have been on the drawing boards for many months but the decision-making circles in India and Israel are transmitting a new sense of urgency now. The sources said, “There may be multiple scenarios but the most probable one could be like this: India and Israel, through their lobbies in the US, would put more pressure on Pakistan to deploy maximum forces on the Pak-Afghan border to prevent infiltration of Taliban. This would be simultaneous with renewed complaints by India that renegade elements from Pakistan were crossing the LoC to commit acts of terrorism in Indian part of Kashmir. India would station more troops along the LoC, under the pretext to monitor cross-border movements, and Pakistan would be forced to match the move. While Pakistani forces would be stretched in two different directions, it would be convenient for India and Israel to launch a single joint strike to take out at least essential elements of Pak nuclear assets.” “It is quite possible that the strike planes could come from an entirely different direction and not from the Indian territory directly,” the sources suggested. “Moreover, nothing happens in isolation. You must look at the whole picture,” the sources added. ‘The whole picture’ may be a fluid concept but there are some facts that could possibly indicate the shape of things to come. Fact: USA, Israel and India are moving fast toward strategic partnership against terrorism. Fact: By 2005, Indian ships in the Indian Ocean would be equipped with Israeli nuclear weapons. Fact: US, India, Israel and Russia are the only four countries that have declared intentions to exercise their ‘right of self defence’ in the shape of preemptive strikes. Fact: Pakistan may be a convenient short-term ally for the United States but India is the strategic partner of choice in the region. India, Israel planning strikes on Pak nukes C R JAYACHANDRAN/TIMESOFINDIA.COM TIMES INTERNET NETWORK[ TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 2003 01:26:31 PM ] NEW DELHI: Pakistan continues to be concerned about the increased defence cooperation between India and Israel and its latest fear is an Indo-Israel joint strike against Islamabad's nuclear assets. Pakistani intelligence sources, privy to the latest development in the Indo-Israel ties, apprehend that India and Israel might be planning a joint strike against Islamabad's nuclear assets. WRITING ON THE WALL - USA, Israel and India are moving fast toward strategic partnership against terrorism. - By 2005, Indian ships in the Indian Ocean would be equipped with Israeli nuclear weapons. - US, India, Israel and Russia are the only four countries that have declared intentions to exercise their "right of self defence" in the shape of preemptive strikes. - Pakistan may be a convenient short-term ally for the US but India is the strategic partner of choice in the region The decision taken during the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Arial Sharon to India to keep a mutual, watchful eye on "fanatic Islam" has stirred the current fear. According to analysts, for India and Israel the common potential enemy has always been Pakistan – a Muslim nation committed to helping the Arab countries of the Middle East. "Israel had been proposing a surgical strike against Pak nuclear assets since the time of Morarji Desai was the prime minister of India but the real breakthrough only came during Ariel Sharon's recent visit to India (in September)," sources were quoted as saying by Pakistan Observer. "Bush and at least three of his principals are convinced that, should anything happen to Musharraf, Pakistan's nuclear hardware could easily fall into the hands of religious extremists or rogue elements," said the sources. India had mooted the doctrine of India-Israel-US axis with a commitment of evolving a joint strategy to fight international terrorism and the core alliance or triad was given shape during Sharon's India visit. Speculations have been rife that India-Israel cooperation against terrorism was primarily aimed at Pakistan. The best prevention seen by security advisers of both the countries was to take out the nuclear structures of Pakistan to permanently tilt the geopolitical equation in India's favour. It may be remembered that in New Delhi's critical hour of need of the 1971 war with Pakistan, India had sought Israel's help to supply it with the devastating artillery weapon, 160 mm mortars and ammunition, exclusively manufactured in Israel. Pakistan had expressed concern over Sharon's visit, saying increased defence cooperation between India and Israel could destabilise the region. The sources, according to the paper, said, "There may be multiple scenarios but the most probable one could be like this: India and Israel, through their lobbies in the US, would put more pressure on Pakistan to deploy maximum forces on the Pak-Afghan border to prevent infiltration of Taliban. "This would be simultaneous with renewed complaints by India that renegade elements from Pakistan were crossing the LoC to commit acts of terrorism in Indian side of Kashmir. "India would station more troops along the LoC, under the pretext to monitor cross-border movements, and Pakistan would be forced to match the move. "While Pakistani forces would be stretched in two different directions, it would be convenient for India and Israel to launch a single joint strike to take out at least essential elements of Pak nuclear assets." "It is quite possible that the strike planes could come from an entirely different direction and not from the Indian territory directly," the sources suggested. The revelation comes right on the heels of a news story carried by Haartez and other major Israeli papers that Israel was all set to launch a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, the Pakistani daily said.

Posted by: rajesh_g Oct 14 2003, 11:19 AM PYONGYANG, North Korea, Oct. 2 (UPI) -- North Korea tried to sell missile technology and related parts to Myanmar's military government, but the outcome is unknown, Kyodo news said Thursday. Citing an unidentified U.S. government official, the agency said there was "grave concern" over the activation of military exchanges between the two countries that each maintain isolation from the rest of the world. The transaction is believed to have come about due to the matching of interests between Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, which wants to strengthen its military power without depending on so-called Western countries, and North Korea, which wants to explore new sources for acquiring foreign currency. The official did not disclose details such as the type of missile involved in the deal and said U.S. reconnaissance satellites have not picked up any indications the transaction has been completed. Washington suspects North Korea is exporting Scud missiles to Pakistan as well as to Syria and Iran, the report said.

Posted by: rajesh_g Oct 14 2003, 11:22 AM

No URL. If you click on link for the above article a sulekhite has posted quoting Please see the trend I referred to earlier. China is the one we need to worry about - pakistan is nothing. Cut and past follows. N.Korea ballistic missiles for Burma likely 14 October 2003: China is very likely backing Myanmar’s covert efforts to acquire long-range ballistic missiles from North Korea to offset the loss of North Korea in case of an US attack, to create a new bogey, and to pin down India from the east. In August, a North-Korean delegation visited Yangon to discuss the missile deal with Burmese military officials, and the talks were carried forward in a second secret meeting between North-Korean military-intelligence officials disguised as businessmen and the Burmese side in Phuket in Thailand. Myanmar is expected to acquire the North-Korean missiles by end-2004, and Burmese military officials have been increasingly seen at nuclear-weapons-related seminars and closed-door meetings in Singapore, Malaysia, and other ASEAN nations. Independently, Myanmar has also approached Russia for a civilian nuclear reactor, and during his meeting with Russian president Vladmir Putin in Moscow, General Parvez Musharraf also apparently pressed Burma’s case for a reactor. Since Myanmar’s economy is in the doldrums and it cannot support expensive acquisitions like nuclear reactors and ballistic missiles, top diplomats say that China is very likely funding Burma, to finding an alternative ally to North Korea which is close to US pre-emptive action. "China fears that its political and military clout will be considerably dented if the US attacks North Korea, which could be followed by a massive US military build-up in the region,” a diplomat said. “The additional advantage of an armed Burma is that it would to an extent contain India, like Pakistan does in the west.”

Posted by: prem Oct 14 2003, 11:58 AM

What u guys think of pukes testing all these imported misiles / they seems to be panicking . thx prem

Posted by: Mudy Oct 14 2003, 01:01 PM

What u guys think of pukes testing all these imported misiles / they seems to be panicking
I have two theories: 1) I think Mushy had planned ahead to drop Tariq under US pressure or after release of audio to Al-Jezzera where no.2 was critizing Mushy, which mean Mushy have good knowledge about No2 and his link with Tariq, assisnation of Tariq may cause internal mess, it is a effective way to divert fundoos manhood. 2) India recently announced it NCA programme and it was Mushy ploy to show his manhood. I can name this Cold war between India and Pak.

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 19 2003, 03:45 PM

The cost to India and its economy would be minimal. Indeed it will drive the price of oil down with one large nation no longer an oil consumer. Why does this scenario not work
No reason why it will not work. Infact a big part of the victory of 1971 was the naval blockade of Karachi (there was no other port in those days). The key is swiftness. Because the US and other powers will intervene (in the UN )on behalf of their client state and specifically request india to refrain from doing anything that will lead her to victory. In 1971 Nixon was afraid India would do that, knowing very well India was quite capable of inflicting a crushing victory over Pakistan. We can give a hundred rationalizations why it aint so, but the decision not to pursue the war into the West and let TSP get away scott free was a major blunder. But the next time around a devastating preemptive strike on the airdefenses coupled with a Naval blockade can do the trick.

Posted by: Mudy Oct 20 2003, 04:36 PM By Arnaud de Borchgrave UPI Editor in Chief Published 10/20/2003 7:00 PM View printer-friendly version ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Oct. 20 (UPI) -- Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have concluded a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation, an unimpeachable source said Monday. "It will be vehemently denied by both countries," added this ranking Pakistani source known to this correspondent for more than a decade as a knowledgeable insider, "but future events will confirm that Pakistan has agreed to provide KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) with the wherewithal for a nuclear deterrent." In a lightning, hastily arranged, 26-hour "state visit" in Islamabad, Crown Prince Abdullah Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, flew across the Arabian Sea with an entourage of 200, including Foreign Minister Prince Saud and several Cabinet ministers. The pro-American Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan, who is next in line to succeed to the throne after Abdullah, was not part of the delegation. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf met Abdullah at the airport and saw him off Sunday night with a 21-gun salute. In Washington, Mohammed Sadiq, Pakistan's deputy chief of mission, said Monday the report about Pakistan and Saudi Arabia reaching agreement on nuclear cooperation was "totally wrong." "This is against our policy," Sadiq told UPI. "Pakistan would never proliferate its nuclear technology. It's a very clear policy. This was not even discussed in the talks we held with the Saudis in Islamabad this week. It was not even on the agenda. It is out of the question." The Saudi Embassy in Washington did not immediately comment on the report. A joint Pakistani-Saudi communiqué posted on the embassy's Web site concerning Abdullah's visit to Islamabad mentioned only an agreement for "the maximum utilization of the existing economic potential of the two countries." There was no mention of military cooperation, nuclear or conventional. The CIA believes that Pakistan already exported nuclear know-how to North Korea in exchange for missile technology. Last year, a Pakistani C-130 was spotted by satellite loading North Korean missiles at Pyongyang airport. Pakistan said this was a straight purchase for cash and denied a nuclear quid pro quo. This correspondent and the chief of staff of the North Korean Air Force stayed at the same Islamabad hotel in May 2001. "Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia," the Pakistani source explained, "see a world that is moving from non-proliferation to proliferation of nuclear weapons." Pakistan, under the late dictator Gen. Zia ul-Haq decided to pursue the nuclear option following India's first nuclear test in 1974. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is now estimated at between 35 and 60 weapons. The Sunni Saudis have concluded that nothing will deter Shiite Iran from continuing its quest for nuclear weapons. Pakistan, on the other hand, is openly concerned about the recent armaments agreement between India, its nuclear rival, and Israel, a long-time nuclear power whose inventory is estimated at between 200 and 400 weapons. Iran and India, located on either side of Pakistan, have also signed a strategic agreement whose aim is regarded with suspicion in Islamabad. Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zafrullah Jamali is scheduled to fly to Tehran later this week to sound out Iranian leaders on the reasons for the defense deal with New Delhi. To counter what Pakistani and Saudi leaders regard as a multiregional threats, they have decided quietly to move ahead with a two-way exchange -- free or cheap oil for nuclear know-how and expertise. Pakistani pilots have been employed as contract pilots for the Royal Saudi Air Force for the past 30 years. Several hundred thousand Pakistani workers are employed by the Gulf states, both as skilled and unskilled workers, and their remittances are a hard currency boon for the Pakistani Treasury. In their private talks, according to the United Press International source, Abdullah and Musharraf also discussed the possibility of Pakistan supplying troops, not to Iraq, but to the kingdom. Abdullah can see that the world's largest oil reserves look increasingly vulnerable over the next 10 years. By mutual agreement, U.S. forces withdrew from Saudi Arabia earlier this year to relocate across the border in the tiny oil sheikhdom of Qatar. Saudi officials also remind their interlocutors that a closed meeting -- later well publicized -- of the U.S. Defense Policy Board in 2002 listened to an expert explain, with a 16-slide presentation, why and how the United States should seize and occupy Saudi oilfields in the country's eastern province. Richard Perle was then the chairman of the Pentagon-funded Defense Policy Board. Later in 2002, he resigned the chairmanship following a conflict with his business interests, but he remains a member of the influential panel. Perle is also known throughout the Middle East as one of the key architects of Operation Iraqi Freedom and a former strategic adviser to Benjamin Netanyahu while the latter was Israel's prime minister. The denials of any secret nuclear agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the source said, "must be seen in the same context as Iranian denials about its own nuclear weapons plans." Prior to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, along with the United Arab Emirates, were the only countries that recognized and aided Afghanistan's Taliban regime that had been educated in Pakistan's madrasas (Koranic schools). Taliban is now resurgent along the mountainous regions that straddle the Pakistan-Afghan border. Pakistani and U.S. Special Forces have been working the area in tandem since last summer to flush out Taliban and al-Qaida high altitude hideouts. Pakistani officials are also fearful that the Bush administration will leave them in the lurch after al-Qaida leader Osama bin laden has been killed or captured. They also speculate about what the policy would be in the event of a Democratic Party victory in the 2004 U.S. elections. To this day, the Saudi clergy continues to fund Pakistan's madrasas that are a substitute for the country's non-existent national education system. The only schools outside madrasas are expensive private institutions. Pakistan, with a crushing defense burden, only spends 1.7 percent of GDP on education (vs. 8 percent in India and 16.5 percent in the United States). Some 12,000 Koranic schools provide free room and board to some 700,000 Pakistani boys (ages 6 to 16) where they are taught to read and write in Urdu and Arabic and recite the Koran by heart. No other disciplines are practiced, but students are proselytized with anti-American, anti-Israeli and anti-Indian propaganda. By the time they Graduate, the majority is convinced that becoming a jihadi, or holy warrior, is the only way to block America's alleged plans to destroy Islam. Musharraf, in a milestone speech three months before Sept. 11, 2001, denounced the danger of these schools and urged syllabus reform. "We are producing terrorists," he warned at the time. But all attempts at reform have been blocked by the mullahs with the support of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal -- a coalition of the six major politico-religious parties -- that now governs two of Pakistan's four provinces. Musharraf has opted for appeasement of the MMA rather than confrontation. At the state banquet for Saudi Arabia's Abdullah, the principal MMA chieftains were invited and attended. The two traditional mainstream parties were not present. They were pointedly left off the guest list.

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 20 2003, 11:04 PM

My reply to Robert Windrem apropos "Your article dated Oct.18, titled "Pakistan's nuclear father, master spy" which appeared in MSNBC and is linked above by Mudy.

This is a good investigative report. But it has a few assumptions thrown in for good measure , masquerading as facts. Let me see if I can point out a few. 1. “Abdul Qadeer Khan and Avul Pakir Jainulabuddin Abdul Kalam have a lot in common. It’s too bad they hate each other.” I have heard many of President Kalam’s(He is now president of the Republic) public pronouncements but I have never heard him say he hates A.Q.Khan, or in fact any Pakistani for that matter. This is a facile assumption on your part. As a general rule Indians despise Pakistanis more than they hate them, for having chosen to live in theocratic exclusivity and having cleansed all Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists from their land. The fate of the significant but small Christian minority in Pakistan is similarly very problematic and their days are numbered also. 2.“although each spent productive time overseas.” While it is true that Khan spent many years in Europe first while studying there and later as an employee of URENCO, President Kalam has rarely stepped out of India except for a short 3 month stint at NASA. It has never been a consequential part of either his education or his training which took place wholely in India. Unlike Khan he has never been accused of stealing any technology. This facile attempt to make their backgrounds look similar is silly. In reality there is little in common between the two. Khan advocates Jihadi terrorist methods(including taking the lives of innocent civilians) to be utilized by his country. President Kalam does no such thing. 3.“Most important, his joviality masked a bitter past. He had been born in Bhopal in 1935, during the British raj. But his family had been forced to flee India to Pakistan during the partition of British India.” This is another facile assumption , all the more amusing because it is false. Khan’s family never fled India during partition in 1947 and there is hardly any evidence of a bitter past. In fact they stayed on in India till 1955. Bhopal was ruled by a Muslim Nawab(like a sheikh) (one of the so called Princely states that had limited autonomy under British rule) prior to 1947, who elected to stay behind. Both the Nawab and his son became Captains of India’s national cricket team at different periods of time. Eventually Bhopal was merged into the province of Madhya Pradesh (Central state). It was only in 1955 that Khan’s family emigrated to Pakistan, a full 8 years after Partition of the subcontinent into several states (India, Pakistan, Ceylon now SriLanka and other smaller states). Further there is not an iota of evidence that his family was forced to flee. They left of their own volition unlike the vast majority of Indian Muslims who had chosen to stay behind. So much so that India is home to the 2nd largest Muslim population in the world after Indonesia , with a Muslim population(150 million) greater than that of Pakistan. Khan’s family left because they chose to live in an ethnically cleansed, Islamic state, ‘a land of the Pure’ . also known as Pakistan. Today unlike the religious pluralism of India where a Muslim is president of the country and the richest man is a Muslim, Pakistan is an ethnically cleansed state with not a sign of the once thriving Hindu population which formed 15% of the total even after the Partition carnage. Note that the Indus Valley which is now completely in Pakistan was once the cradle of Hindu civilization. The name India is of course derived from the Indus river. The bedraggled remnants of the Hindu population now live in wretched poverty and servitude worse than the serfs of medieval Russia. Pakistan discriminates against all non-Muslims legally , in a set of laws written specifically to do so. It is true that Khan (also known fondly in internet circles as Abdul Xerox Khan for the prodigious amount of Xeroxing he must have carried out at URENCO) gave his country a Nuclear capability (even this is very much in doubt as there is serious evidence that the nuke that was detonated successfully in 1998 was supplied by China and was a Plutonium bomb and not an enriched Uranium one as it would have to be if it was developed by Xerox Khan) but it is a Pyrrhic victory, as India has made clear unequivocally that it will destroy the nation and society of Pakistan if Pakistan so much as fires a nuke at a single Indian city or territory. Sincerely,

Posted by: rhytha Oct 20 2003, 11:11 PM

k where is xerox and kalam compared ohmy.gif :wacko: mentioning kalam and jehadi xerox machine in same sentance is itself an insult furious.gif

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 20 2003, 11:20 PM

rhytha,I have added the link in my post. It appears in MSNBC news

Posted by: Viren Oct 21 2003, 07:11 AM

Great response K. I would have added that Xerox Khan is a registered member of Laskher-e-Toiba (fact published in various Western media) - a org banned by US Govt. Not to mention, LeT guys fighting 'freedom' in Maryland too. And his role in helping NK, Iran etc with puke nuke prolif., should be a cause of concerns to MSNBC readers in US.

Posted by: vishal Oct 21 2003, 11:06 AM

QUOTE(rhytha @ Oct 21 2003, 11:41 AM)
k where is xerox and kalam compared ohmy.gif :wacko: mentioning kalam and jehadi xerox machine in same sentance is itself an insult furious.gif
Don't worry. Americans are in their final days...too much power and wealth has screwed their minds,lost their senses...thats why they are talking such silly without thinking. there is a sloka in sanskrit "Vinashkale viparit-buddhi". This applies to these americans. biggrin.gif

Posted by: Viren Oct 21 2003, 01:09 PM

QUOTE(tovishal2003 @ Oct 21 2003, 02:06 PM)
Don't worry. Americans are in their final days...too much power and wealth has screwed their minds,lost their senses...thats why they are talking such silly without thinking.
Vishal: One can't judge a country based on what one journalist writes here and there. Would be like judging India after reading say Pankaj Mishra or Dinesh D'Souza or Pure fool Bid bye.

Posted by: vishal Oct 22 2003, 11:31 AM

QUOTE(Viren @ Oct 22 2003, 01:39 AM)
QUOTE(tovishal2003 @ Oct 21 2003, 02:06 PM)
Don't worry. Americans are in their final days...too much power and wealth has screwed their minds,lost their senses...thats why they are talking such silly without thinking.
Vishal: One can't judge a country based on what one journalist writes here and there. Would be like judging India after reading say Pankaj Mishra or Dinesh D'Souza or Pure fool Bid bye.
yes,you are right but i didn't said that to backslash that one reporter's view but i said it as my opinion. Don't u think USA is in its recession? :huh: and yes, i don't think all americans are like Bush. smile.gif

Posted by: Viren Oct 22 2003, 12:50 PM

Vishal: 'Officially' the recession in US has What we have is just a slow jobless recovery and we still aren't out of the woods yet. As far as Bush - he's been given far less than credit than what he deserves - IMHO wink.gif All which has nothing to do with purpose of this thread - "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security"

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 22 2003, 10:33 PM

I cam across this by happenstance. Arvind Sharma is a professor of Comparative Religion(or something like that) at McGill University. Their Real Meaning by Arvind Sharma, McGill University -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The real significance of the recent Indo-Pak nuclear tests has been lost in the current buzz around them. The significance which is being attached to them at the moment is at best strategic. Often it does not even rise to that level. India is said to have gone in for tests out of a desire to match China; then Pakistan is said to have felt compelled to follow suit to match India. Even here I think the nations are acting out of motives higher than those of machismo or jingoism. India had to carry out its tests because of its security concerns, and Pakistan, similarly, had to carry out its own tests because of its own security concerns. India needed to feel secure vis-a-vis China, and Pakistan needed to feel secure vis-a-vis India. Thus a geo-strategic adjustment has now taken place in Asia at the higher nuclear level, apart from the usual conventional level. The point worth noting in all this is that the West was powerless to influence the course of events in the subcontinent. The West did not want either India or Pakistan to carry out these tests, and it could stop neither of them. Sixty years ago the West controlled the subcontinent, and now it is powerless to intervene. In 1946 the West had India, in 1998 the West was had by India. A fixation with the Indo-Pak rivalry in this context obscures this remarkable fact, just as a fixation with the partition of the country obscures the fact that, all said and done, and notwithstanding Hindu-Muslim feuding, the British Raj on the subcontinent did come to an end and both India and Pakistan became independent, and co-sharers in this freedom from imperial domination in 1947. The year 1947 therefore signaled the beginning of the end of Western hegemony over the subcontinent. Current events confirm that this process of the recession of Western influence on the subcontinent has now been completed. The fact that it was completed unhindered is significant because, until the recent events, two factors could be identified as possibly hindering, or even reversing it. The first of these is the fact that, after the Second World War, Britain declined as a world power but the United States took its place. Hence the decline of British control over the subcontinent did not automatically entail the decline of Western control over the subcontinent; the United States could have replaced Britain in that role. Current events indicate that this has not happened. The second factor pertains to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the U.S.A. as the sole super-power. This development also could have prevented the subcontinent from slipping out of the West’s control because, as the sole super-power, the U.S.A. could have reasserted Western hegemony over the subcontinent in one form or another. This has not happened either. Thus one can say that the recent developments are historical in significance. The Indian subcontinent began to slip out of Western hands in 1947 and this process has now been completed, in 1998. India and Pakistan may not feel secure vis-a-vis each other but their independence from Western domination has now been secured. It is also worth noting that this retreat of the West from South Asia forms part and parcel of its retreat from Asia in general, with its retreat from East Asia (with the exception of Japan) having been secured already by the rise of China. The differences between India, Pakistan and China make no difference to this retreat, just as differences among England, France and other European countries made little difference to European expansion over Asia and Africa.i am not sure i entirely agree with this, but this is an interesting hypothesis

Posted by: Mudy Nov 18 2003, 10:22 AM China insists its nuclear energy cooperation with Pakistan is for peaceful purposes and denies that exchanges with Islamabad violates commitments on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Beijing was responding to questions about a US Central Intelligence Agency report issued last week, which alleged that Chinese firms may be aiding Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. A foreign ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, says China is a party state to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is opposed to the proliferation of weapons of any kind. He further maintains that the nuclear energy cooperation with Pakistan is being carried out under safeguards put in place by the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency. The CIA report claimed Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the first six months of this year.

Posted by: vishal Nov 18 2003, 11:29 AM

QUOTE(Viren @ Oct 23 2003, 01:20 AM)
Vishal: 'Officially' the recession in US has What we have is just a slow jobless recovery and we still aren't out of the woods yet. As far as Bush - he's been given far less than credit than what he deserves - IMHO wink.gif All which has nothing to do with purpose of this thread - "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security"
Viren, sorry ...for posting it here.But i need to reply your post. What we have is just a slow job[b]less recovery and we still aren't out of the woods yet. [/b] ITS NOT RECOVERY OF US ECONOMY.Iraq war just saved US-economy from collasping.Now US has warned OPEC against making EURO as petro-currency bcoz US economy will collaspe if dollar lost its status as world reserve currency. As far as Bush - he's been given far less than credit than what he deserves - IMHO wink.gif blink.gif for what you want to give him credit? for killling innocents around world? for threatening poor countries? for maintaining CRAP US economy whose base is HOLLOW by maintaining DOLLAR vis-a-vis EURO through iraq,iran ? how can you give credit to a murderer? mad.gif

Posted by: Mudy Nov 18 2003, 02:45 PM,00050004.htm Washington, November 18 The United States will use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend South Korea against North Korea, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said. "We understand that weakness can be provocative, that weakness can invite people into doing things that they otherwise might not even consider." Rumsfeld, appearing at a joint news conference on Monday in Seoul with South Korean Defence Minister Ch Young-kil said. A joint statement by the two countries after the talks said that the US commitment to South Korea includes "the continued provision of a nuclear umbrella for South Korea".

Posted by: Viren Nov 19 2003, 08:27 AM

Vishal, This is not right thread for the topic...can be moved to other relevant thread. Nevertheless will respond to your post:

ITS NOT RECOVERY OF US ECONOMY.Iraq war just saved US-economy from collasping.Now US has warned OPEC against making EURO as petro-currency bcoz US economy will collaspe if dollar lost its status as world reserve currency
Let's get on with facts before we jump into rotting stuff from media. Check the YTD gains on Dow, Nasdaq, SP or any other major index. Compared to last year - yes it is definitely better. Check the job loss/growth numbers. Compared to last year - again numbers are improving. I can point you several other economic indicators such as consumer confidence numbers, productivity numbers, CPI numbers etc. But all this is avaliable on internet if you wish to check. Or even listening to say Bloomberg radio or watching CNBC (in US) might give you these facts published by various financial sources. People who put their money in market look at these numbers and economic indicators than rather op-ed columns. As far as things you mentioned - the jury is still out on whether the war in Iraq saved US economy. The returns on that war won't come anytime soon. Just a week or two ago, Congress & White House just okayed sending couple billions there. In long run US will benefit - right now Iraq is sucking too much energy time and money from US - not mention loss of human lives. As far a US warning OPEC - US is doing what is in it's best interests. So what is wrong with US putting a bunch of towelheads in line - for years they have controlled destiny of world by sitting on their oil taps. I'm glad US is doing what it has to do those no good oil sheikhs. India should do it too. US is duking it out with Europeans on steel traffifs too - in one of my posts I had pointed to just last month US changing rules of the game which had pissed off Europeans.
for what you want to give him credit? for killling innocents around world? for threatening poor countries? for maintaining CRAP US economy whose base is HOLLOW by maintaining DOLLAR vis-a-vis EURO through iraq,iran ? how can you give credit to a murderer?
What killing innocents around the world? Sorry, don't buy that for a minute. Within 2 years, Bush removed two despotic regimes which supported terror around the world - i.e., (i) Talibanis supporting terrorist against US and India and (ii) Sadam who did the same against Israel. Mind you this will come at a very very very heavy price at later date - but someone had to bite the bullet and do it. If Vajpayee declared war on the terror sponsors after say Parliment attack or Nadismarg or Kaulachack incidents would we have called him a murderer? Let's hope Bush takes on Saudi and Paki next. Maybe then you'll join my cheer. wink.gif As far as your comment on "threatening poor countries" - Bush won't be the first and/or last US president doing so. Check as to which countries have been giving US a hard time at say Doha or Cancun for it's imperialist stance.

Posted by: vishal Nov 19 2003, 12:42 PM

Viren, you missed the whole point of what i said. i wanted to say what US does in world is not always just(pardon me if i forgot that there is nothing like "JUST" which exists today.) you said US saved iraqis from saddam.Sir, thank you very much.They did it 20 years late.AND again you missed my point!! US or BUSH never beated SADDAM for saving Iraqis from him.It just happened because it was in US's interest at certain point of time(2003 rather than 20 years ago).So again i slash your credit to US.They don't deserve it.You mistook their self-interest as their desire to liberate iraqis from saddam. yea....the day US/nush joined india against pak,saudi i am full with them. laugh.gif BUT again i will not give credit to US for that.Because US will do that when its convenient and in self-interest for them.Thanks you very much. As far as american media is concerned (as you used words like "CNBC...CNN?") well,its all rubbish.They are well handled and in hands of MNCs.I am telling you again look at fiscal deficit of US.Its managed bcoz world trade currency dollar helps US to maintain it. I think you have much confidence in US economy. well...let me saerch an article which puts my point with proofs.lemme search it was on

Posted by: Viren Nov 19 2003, 03:29 PM

Vishal - maybe we are both saying the same things in a bit different way.

wanted to say what US does in world is not always just(pardon me if i forgot that there is nothing like "JUST" which exists today.)
I agree 100%, no make it 400% - where have I posted on this or any forum that US is the "just" nation"? Please point that post.
you said US saved iraqis from saddam.Sir, thank you very much.They did it 20 years late.AND again you missed my point!!
Have I really missed your point? Point me to a post by me where I have said so about 'iraqis under saddam'. Even in my earlier post - I pointed to Saddam-Iraq being a menace to Israel. I could care less for Iraqis under Saddam. Sorry I'm not buying the standard US line - and again point to my post where I've supported this standard party-line.
You mistook their self-interest as their desire to liberate iraqis from saddam.
Nations have no permanent friends or enemies - only permanent self interests.
I am telling you again look at fiscal deficit of US.Its managed bcoz world trade currency dollar helps US to maintain it.
About a month ago in another thread of this forum I had pointed a book to you on basics of economy to you. When you buy this book, let me know. I'll point to the pages in that book on fiscal deficit. Mind you the author of that book was advisor to Regan who raked up the highest fiscal defecit in US history. To answer to your point here - yes there is a huge fiscal deficit which is not necessarily a bad thing.

Posted by: Mudy Nov 20 2003, 03:20 PM

Iran's Likely Atomic Suppliers: Russia, China, Pakistan Wires Thursday, Nov. 20, 2003 VIENNA, Austria – The International Atomic Energy Agency has identified Russia, China and Pakistan as probable suppliers of some of the technology Iran used to enrich uranium in its suspect nuclear programs, diplomats told The Associated Press on Thursday. The disclosure came as the IAEA's board discussed how to react to Iran's nuclear activities. The board is debating the wording of a resolution that would satisfy U.S. calls for strong condemnation of Iran's past cover-ups and European desires to keep Iran cooperating by focusing on its recent openness. Though Iran has acknowledged nearly two decades of concealment, it has recently begun cooperating with the agency in response to international pressure. As part of that cooperation, it has suspended uranium enrichment, an activity that the United States had linked to what it says was Iran's nuclear weapons agenda. Iran insists it enriched uranium only to produce power. Though acknowledging that some of its enrichment equipment had traces of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, it insists those traces were inadvertently imported on material it bought abroad. Iran has said it cannot identify the countries of origin because it bought the centrifuges and laser enrichment equipment through third parties. The Vienna-based IAEA needs to establish where the equipment came from, however, to ascertain whether Iran is telling the truth about the source of the traces. The diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, declined to say how the agency established the probable origin of the equipment. Pakistan has denied all involvement in Iran's enrichment program. Moscow's public nuclear link with Tehran is a still-to-be-finalized $800 million deal to help build Iran's first nuclear reactor. The United States says the facility in Bushehr on the Persian Gulf could help Iran develop weapons. The Kremlin has said it shares some of the U.S. concerns and has prodded Tehran to accept tighter IAEA controls. Good News, Bad News The IAEA's meeting lasted less than two hours, with discussions set to continue Friday. The discussions were being held behind closed doors, but the agency released a copy of the opening remarks by Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei. ElBaradei told the agency's 35-nation board of governors that he expected it to address "the bad news and the good news." "The bad news is that there have been failures and breaches. The good news is that there has been a new chapter in cooperation," he said. "There is an intensive discussion right now on the draft resolution. The latest version being discussed is quite strong." Still, the agency doesn't know if Iran has tried to build nuclear weapons. That, he told the board, "will take some time and much verification effort." But he welcomed Tehran's recent cooperation with the agency. "The situation has changed significantly since the middle of last month, when a new chapter of implementation of safeguards in Iran seems to have begun, a chapter that is characterized by active cooperation and openness on the part of Iran," he said. The United States had hoped the IAEA board would find Tehran in noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at its meeting. Diplomats described Thursday's talks as "very fluid," suggesting there was an effort to close the gap between the U.S. and European approaches on how to deal with Iran. On Wednesday, Washington rejected a proposed European draft resolution that would urge Iran to continue cooperation with the agency but refrain from harshly condemning it for concealing parts of its nuclear program, saying it was prepared to opt for no resolution rather than a toothless one. Drawn up by France, Germany and one of Washington's closest allies, Britain, the rough draft minimized nearly two decades of covert nuclear programs that the U.S. administration says point to an effort to develop nuclear weapons. Instead, it focused on positive steps taken by Iran over the past few weeks to deflect international suspicions, including suspending uranium enrichment and agreeing to inspections on demand by IAEA inspectors. A senior diplomat, who reported on the meeting on condition of anonymity, said a compromise resolution satisfying both sides was now in the works. Whereas the initial European wording chastised Iran for "failure to fulfill its obligations," new discussion focused on stronger language, either including past "noncompliance" of IAEA agreements by Iran, or finding it in "breach of its obligations." Both would be more acceptable to the United States and its allies, the diplomat said.

Posted by: Mudy Nov 27 2003, 06:00 PM

UN Probes Possible Iran-Pakistan Nuclear Link November 27, 2003 6:23 p.m. ET By Louis Charbonneau VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear agency is probing a possible link between Iran and Pakistan after Tehran acknowledged using centrifuge designs that appear identical to ones used in Pakistan's quest for an atom bomb, diplomats say. Diplomats said the agency was trying to determine whether the drawings had come from someone in Pakistan or elsewhere. Tehran, accused by Washington of seeking to develop nuclear weapons, told the U.N. nuclear agency it got the blueprints from a "middleman" whose identity the agency had not determined, a Western diplomat told Reuters on condition of anonymity. It was unclear where the "middleman" got the drawings. The U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said in a report Iran told the IAEA it got centrifuge drawings "from a foreign intermediary around 1987." Centrifuges are used to purify uranium for use as fuel or in weapons. Experts say the ability to produce such material is crucial for an arms program and the biggest hurdle any country with ambitions to build a bomb must overcome. Several diplomats familiar with the IAEA said the blueprints were of a machine by the Dutch enrichment unit of the British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco -- a leader in the field of centrifuges. Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, told Reuters he had no knowledge a Urenco design had been used by Iran. "This is new information to me," he said. In a statement to Reuters, Urenco said it had not supplied any centrifuge know-how or machinery to Iran. "Urenco would like to strongly affirm that they have never supplied any technology or components to Iran at any time," it said. PAKISTAN, IRAN DENY NUCLEAR COOPERATION liar.gif Pakistan, which non-proliferation experts and diplomats say used the Urenco blueprint, and Iran have repeatedly denied any cooperation in the nuclear field. Iran had long insisted its centrifuge program was purely indigenous and that it had received no outside help whatsoever -- not from Pakistan or anywhere else. The father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, worked at the Urenco uranium enrichment facility in the Dutch city of Almelo in the 1970s. After his return to Pakistan he was convicted in absentia of nuclear espionage by an Amsterdam court, but the verdict was overturned on appeal. He has acknowledged he did take advantage of his experience of many years of working on similar projects in Europe and his contacts with various manufacturing firms. But David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and head of the Institute for Science and International Security think-tank, said: "Khan is widely believed to have taken these drawings and developed them." Khan is known to have visited Iran, but the diplomats said there was no proof of a link involving him and his laboratories in Pakistan. The United States accuses Iran of using its nuclear power program, parts of which it kept hidden from the IAEA for 18 years, as a front to build an atom bomb. Tehran denies this. On Wednesday, the IAEA Board of Governors unanimously approved a resolution that "strongly deplores" Iran's two-decade concealment of its centrifuge enrichment program, while praising its promises to be transparent from now on. The IAEA is still investigating Iran's enrichment program in order to identify the origin of traces of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) inspectors found at the Natanz enrichment plant and the Kalaye Electric Co. But when IAEA experts visited Iran's pilot enrichment plant at Natanz earlier this year, they saw it bore the marks of the centrifuges outlined in the Urenco designs, diplomats said. They said Tehran later acknowledged it had used the Urenco designs and recently showed them to the IAEA. Iran also admitted to a massive procurement effort to get centrifuge components. Iran says some of these components, purchased through "middlemen" in the middle of 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, were contaminated with HEU. This, the Iranians say, is why the IAEA found HEU traces at Natanz and Kalaye, where centrifuge parts were tested and manufactured. Diplomats and non-proliferation experts say Iran's centrifuge program based on the Urenco design appears to have been more successful than Pakistan's. They say Pakistan eventually abandoned the Urenco model and chose another one.

Posted by: Mudy Jan 24 2004, 06:55 PM

Posted by: Kaushal Feb 19 2004, 01:14 AM

While there is nothing earthshattering in this assessment, it is a sober appraisal of India's strategic sector.'s~strategic~sector Auditing India's Strategic Sector February 18, 2004 The defence reforms initiated by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance in the late 1990s produced several welcome changes in the defence policy making process. It led to the creation of a National Security Council to facilitate long-term strategic planning and ensure continuity in the formulation and implementation of security policies. The Pokhran-II nuclear tests in May 1998 and the subsequent decision to pursue weaponisation led to further changes. The government formed a Nuclear Command Authority to manage India's nuclear arsenal. The NCA is the umbrella organisation comprising the civilian leadership and the military infrastructure needed to design and implement India's nuclear policies. The government also created a Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to serve as a single point interface between the armed forces and the civilian leadership. However, the strategic sector comprising of the Defence Research and Development Organisation and the Department of Atomic Energy has been largely untouched by the reforms process. The first step towards addressing this deficiency is to institute a periodic and systematic audit mechanism for the strategic sector. The audit must investigate the economic and technical aspects of the projects currently handled by the strategic sector. Not surprisingly, the defence reforms package did not broach such a concept. The reasons for avoiding such a delicate issue are not hard to fathom. The initial projects undertaken by the strategic sector, especially by the DRDO, ended in failures and such failures were couched in euphemistic terms like 'technology gathering' to cover them up. Naturally the civilian leadership and the strategic sector did not consider the concept of an audit mechanism since it would have opened a can of worms regarding the functioning of the strategic sector. Second, the secrecy surrounding the projects handled by the strategic sector precluded any public scrutiny. Third, top scientists from the strategic sector have served as scientific advisors to the civilian leadership and wielded significant influence on decisions regarding strategic projects. It is therefore possible that successive scientific advisors used their influence to discourage proposals for implementing a comprehensive audit mechanism since it would have been potentially harmful to their interests. Fourth, the DRDO and the DAE are placed on the high pedestal of patriotism and questioning their capabilities is considered tantamount to undermining India's technical competence. Homi Bhabha, A P J Abdul Kalam, R Chidambaram are considered national icons who could do no wrong. The lack of proper oversight over the strategic sector has resulted in the domination of the policy making process by key members of the community involved in the nuclear weapons program and the strategic missile projects. Managers from the strategic sector have become both the advisors and implementers of strategic projects. The civilian leadership therefore receives inputs from the scientists within the strategic sector and does not possess any mechanism to verify the evidence presented by the scientists. The lack of any feedback from independent analysts confines the defence policy-making process to a closed loop. The decision-making process regarding these strategic projects is at best ad hoc and personalised.this is an important point to make and I have made it many times in my posts at BR, but even in BR the adulation level for the nuclear establishment is very high. The lack of an oversight mechanism has also resulted in a highly centralised style of management within the strategic sector. Top managers within the strategic sector tend to take decisions without proper consultations and dissent against the top management is usually stifled. For example, the government has declared a moratorium on further testing based on the advice from former Atomic Energy Commission chairman R Chidambaram. Chidambaram has indicated that the tests in May 1998 yielded sufficient data to preclude any further testing. Several scientists, however, have stated that the safety of India's nuclear weapons stockpile might necessitate further testing. The government declared the moratorium on further testing even before the scientists had a chance to study crater morphology and conduct radiochemical analysis of the nuclear test site. The question that we need to be asking ourselves is whether this lack of accountability of the strategic sector will enhance or hamper India's national security. Budgetary and technical oversight of the strategic sector will greatly assist in improving indigenous defence production in India. An option for increasing such an oversight is to institute a systematic and periodic audit for the projects undertaken by the DRDO and the DAE. Several factors indicate that a periodic and systematic audit process will be beneficial for India's national security. First, any audit process is likely to assist the policy makers in analysing the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a specific strategic project. Quite often policy makers face the 'Make or Buy' dilemma. Crucial choices have to be made between indigenous production and foreign procurement. The strategic sector has done a good job in linking indigenous defence production with a sense of patriotism. As a result, the civilian leadership and the bureaucracy have repeatedly endorsed the claims of the strategic sector regarding its capacity to indigenously produce any item for the armed forces. Although the aim of achieving total indigenous production is a noble one, it is also critical to identify our strengths and weaknesses and develop a more effective defence procurement strategy. Second, an audit will reveal the inconsistencies within the existing strategic programs and will provide means to streamline the system. India's defence projects have long been associated with missed deadlines, excess budget costs, and long development periods. Projects such as the Advanced Technology Vehicle, the Sagarika ballistic missile, and the Light Combat Aircraft have faced chronic delays. An audit mechanism will serve to identify potential weaknesses in the current development cycles. According to an audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of important DRDO projects for the period till 1998, the Light Combat Aircraft project incurred a whopping Rs 20 billion expenditure without any significant progress towards completion. Please read: Chinks in the Armour Third, such an audit will provide an effective system of checks and balances to prevent the hijacking of decisions concerning strategic projects by a particular entity. Despite the absence of an extensive US style military industrial complex, the history of India's indigenous defence projects reveals the influence of special interest groups in the decision-making process. A periodic audit of the strategic sector will prevent the manipulation of policies by any special interest groups and will provide an effective oversight to curb such activities. Fourth, constituting an audit mechanism will ensure greater transparency regarding government policies and will instill confidence among the public on the proper use of funds. India prides itself in being the world's largest democracy and it behooves the nation to act in a manner that justifies the label. In the past, critics of India's defence policies have pointed to several shortcomings in the policy making process. The non-involvement of the military in policy planning, the lack of institutional processes, and ad hoc and personalised style of management are some of the weaknesses pointed out by critics. The defence reforms initiated in the late 1990s have begun to address some of the shortcomings. The military is getting involved in the decision making process, strategic threats are being analysed in a systematic manner, and the management of defence policies is becoming more institutionalised. Oversight of the strategic sector is an issue that has not received the attention it deserves. Instituting an audit mechanism for the strategic sector should not be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the efforts of the strategic sector. Rather, it is an attempt to identify potential weaknesses and rectify them. Auditing of costs will check runaway expenses and keep the costs from spinning out of control. A technical audit will ensure that the projects meet the Quality Requirements of the end user, i e, the Indian armed forces. It is highly unlikely that India will meet the target of Plan 2005, a ten year plan initiated by A P J Abdul Kalam to strengthen India's military industrial base. However, adopting the right set of steps like instituting a strategic audit will help to strengthen India's defence production capability at least by 2015. Sundara Vadlamudi works at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, California

Posted by: Kaushal Feb 19 2004, 04:55 PM

Methinks there is too much paranoia about this guy in the other forum. All he is saying is that there should be an audit process. It is of course possible that there is an audit process constantly underway and he is unaware of it. After all he is just a Graduate student. I say let us cut him some slack. There is nothing wrong with anything he has said in the article and to say that there should be an audit is not such a crime. Something similar has been said by reputable strategic analysts such as Bharat Karnad in his book on strategic security. The US has long ago separated the advocacy part of the AEC from the regulatory aspects (NRC). India should do something similar and the task of auditing strategic programs should be entrusted to an independent body such as a panel of academics from the high tech institutions. The present setup where the auditors/regulators and the scientists are one and the same is not satisfactory and is tantamount to lack of accountability.

Posted by: Kaushal Feb 22 2004, 07:27 AM Washington: India's proposal to build "nuclear fallout shelters" along its border with Pakistan is more than a defensive maneuver, according to US geopolitical analysts. With Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons, the move would seem a logical defensive mechanism but the size and the scope of the bunkers "indicate their possible use in conventional warfare," analysts at Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor) said. The Indian military has attempted over the last six months to significantly widen its technological advantages over the Pakistani military, Stratfor said, and the proposed shelter construction is another step in that direction. Although as shelters they do not offer a significant tactical advantage, it was likely that the bunkers would be used for a "purposes not entirely related to protection from nuclear fallout". Indian Defence Ministry officials have alluded to using underground border facilities to protect command centers and other key facilities. Representatives of Dass Hitachi -- the construction company for the shelters -- outlined plans for large bunkers that would contain decontamination facilities separate from areas that could house and sustain approximately 30 personnel. "This description -- with separate decontamination, housing and communications facilities -- not only gives an idea of a bunker's size, but also makes it seem like something more than a fallout shelter," Stratfor said. Using underground bunkers to stage troops and equipment is a relatively widespread military tactic, Stratfor said. North Korea is believed to have hundreds of such bunkers peppered across the country. The bunkers are perfect for positioning command and control (C2) centers as well as key artillery and missile systems. Fixed underground C2 facilities grant two key advantages to India, the analysts said. First, a static location near the likely front means communications along this line can be interconnected through high-speed phone and data lines. Second, an underground location means that bunkers and their communications links become essentially invulnerable to enemy attack. "Constant, reliable communication is vital to the success of any modern military; a network of fixed underground facilities easily achieves that goal." "The construction of underground bunkers coupled with India's long-term military buildup and modernization reveals a widening rift in military capability between Pakistan and India."

Posted by: Kaushal Feb 29 2004, 05:11 PM A K Dhar in New Delhi | February 29, 2004 18:57 IST The Indian Air Force is in hectic negotiations with French, Russian and US bidders to purchase 125 frontline multi-role fighters to partially replace about 300 MiG-21 aircraft, which are on the verge of being phased out. The IAF had projected an immediate need for about 125 new fighter planes with the selection to be completed in a few months. Some of the newly-purchased aircraft are likely to be given to the newly-raised Strategic Forces Command. The new fighters would seek to partially replace 300 MiG 21 FL/M interceptors and 100 MiG 23BN ground attack fighters, which are on the verge of being phased out. India, officials said, was expected to go in for direct purchase of the fighters in a bid to allow the Aircraft Development Agency (ADA) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited more time to make progress on the Tejas, country's Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), which may be inducted only in 2009. With the delay in the LCA programme, the IAF is in danger of entering a critical phase as it faces reduction in its fighter fleet from the current 39 squadrons to 32 by 2006. The French-built Mirages, with their proven capability during the Kargil war and in Operation Parakram, are emerging as frontrunners. Dassault, while offering the upgraded Mirage 2000-5, is also ready for technology transfer arrangement to HAL. A high-level team from the company was recently in Delhi for protracted negotiations with the Defence Ministry and Indian Air Force officials. The two major Russian fighter companies Mikoyan, makers of the MiG range of fighters, and Robensoexport, makers of Sukhoi aircraft, have formed a consortium to jointly bid for the Indian contract, according to Defence Ministry sources in Delhi. The joint bid stems from India eliminating the Sukhoi OKB and NPK Irkut's offer of lighter versions of the still-to-be-developed SU-35 and SU-30 fighters. The IAF wants a fighter with a maximum take off weight of 25,000 kg, forcing the Sukhoi company to join hands with Mikoyan to back the upgraded MiG-29MI/M2 for the contract. However, the Russian proposal seems to be a non-starter as Mikoyan cannot meet the Indian time schedule because it will be heavily engaged in the manufacture of the MiG 29K for the Admiral Gorshkov, which India has contracted to purchase. Another contender is US company Lockheed-Martin, which is offering technology transfer of its runway bestseller F-16 Fighting Falcon.

Posted by: amit21mech Mar 28 2004, 03:40 PM

QUOTE(Kaushal @ Oct 11 2003, 08:57 PM)
The Indo-Iranian-Israeli-US quadrangular games are going to be interesting. India has convinced both US and Israel about her strong bonafides when it comes to terrorism. But both Israel andthe US are still fixated on Iran, partly because of Iran's obsession with acquiring nukes. From Iran's POV , they look upon Pakistan as a potential adversary (more so than Israel) although they will not publicly say so and hence the desire to match Pakistan's nuke status. So the game gets complicated. Of course the heart of the whole problem is the terrorist state. But one of the reasons why TSP is such a pain in the pitoot is that the US(and the UK) insist on propping up that wretched country. The aim of the Indians is to convince the western world that Pakistan is the greater threat to western civilization despite their professions to the contrary. India should somehow convince the west that Iran is a better bet than Pakistan. Unfortunately the reason why the west props up pakistan ( India) remains current even today and is based on the false premise that India remains a greater threat to the west than the Islamists.
I think even if India cries with her all out efforts to convince US that Pakis are bigger threat than Iran those cries will fell in deaf ears as at present Pakis are ticket to White House for Bush. Geogrophical location of Pakistan has helped her a lot to win US favours w r t to present situation. I belive that India should concentrate more on developing and exploring ties with other nations like China, GCC, Euros etc along with strong military and economic relations with US and her allies(Israel).

Posted by: Hauma Hamiddha Mar 28 2004, 09:29 PM

amit21mech change you username to meet forum guidelines -moderator

Posted by: Kaushal Apr 20 2004, 08:47 AM

Belatedly i am responding to Viren after several months to repost this in IF and link it in the library and bookmarks section Overt assistance from Pakistan may bring dire consequences Two analyses are presented here from Janes' Security; one is dated 20 Sept. 2001 and another was presented in October 2000, well before the acts of war on Sept. 11, 2001; the latter analysis relates to the growing threat from "asymmetric warfare" - usually involving smaller numbers of protagonists than traditional war, and using unconventional tactics that often have high political or material impact relative to the force involved. USA seeking an alliance with Pakistan is a good example of asymmetric alliance; the consequences for the alliance partner possessing greater force can be devastating. How can this asymmetric war be waged to victory? The war has to be fought premised on a high moral ground and focussed on the root causes of terror. The 'heavy' targets may last for a few seconds of CNN coverage of pyrotechnics or for a few days; the war against fundamental entities can be won only by eliminating the rationale for such entities. Intelligence Digest, 20 September 2001 Overt assistance from Pakistan may bring dire consequences As the United States plans its military response to last week's terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the role of Pakistan — and the position of the country's unelected military leader, General Pervez Musharraf — have become key questions. JID investigates and warns that, should the general fall as a result of offering overt support to the USA in its campaign against the Taliban, the consequences – both for the US-led alliance and the entire region – could be potentially catastrophic. There are many reasons why the present crisis will prove deeply troubling for Pakistan's self-appointed president. Having started the year with the prospect of building a new and more positive relationship with the incoming administration of US President George W. Bush, pressure is now mounting on Musharraf as embarrassing evidence of Islamabad's active support for the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan comes under intense scrutiny. One of the more difficult issues which the general may have to explain is the close links between two Islamic militant groups involved in the Kashmir region and the world's most wanted terrorist, Osama Bin Laden. The two groups in question, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e Tayyiba, were specifically singled-out in the US State Department's Report on the Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2000. Although, the Pakistani government has repeated denied that it has any involvement with these two groups, credible intelligence community sources point to close ties between senior members of Pakistan's military and security services and both organisations. Other awkward questions will focus on allegations that Pakistan has hosted training camps for militant Islamic groups and provided them with financial assistance — charges which Musharraf's officials have repeatedly denied — and that Pakistan has been used as the regular transit route via which Bin Laden's Al-Qa'eda group has travelled. In particular, there are serious allegations that Pakistan's Inter- Service Intelligence organisation has active links with both the Taliban regime's intelligence service and Bin Laden himself. According to local intelligence sources, the Pakistani authorities have provided medical facilities for the ailing Bin Laden, including renal dialysis, at a military hospital in Peshawar. None of this will be unfamiliar to US intelligence operatives who have been compiling extensive reports on these alleged activities. However, it is becoming clear that both the Taliban and Al-Qa'eda would have found it difficult to have continued functioning — including the latter group's terrorist activities — without substantial aid and support from Islamabad. This would, logically, place Pakistan in the category of "states which support terrorism", according to the US government's definition. President Bush's pointed warnings to Bin Laden's backers will have put Musharraf on the spot. The key question is not whether Pakistan will support the US anti- Taliban coalition, but only how far the general will dare to go in his desperate efforts to make amends for past activities that have been very well documented by US intelligence. Above all, Musharraf will realise that having come to power in 1999 by means of a military coup d'etat, he will have to rely on the continued support of Pakistan's army and security services — both of which are alleged to have close links with the US's principal targets. In broad terms, the US administration has three main options for military action against the Taliban and its notorious `guest': 1. Launch a general air-campaign against Taliban targets (government offices, strategic facilities, military forces etc) 2. Undertake selective targeting of Bin Laden's bases and associated locations 3. Attempt a very specific `smash and grab' raid, probably by helicopter and involving special forces, to seize or kill Bin Laden. Having launched an ill-fated Cruise missile strike against Bin Laden in 1998, the US cannot risk a repeat mission that fails to hit its main target yet again. Therefore, highly detailed information about his movements will be essential and Pakistan's intelligence service is very well placed to provide this, not least because of its alleged links to the man and his Al-Qa'eda organisation. For Musharraf, the risks are enormous whichever course he ultimately adopts. Failure to co-operate fully with the US will leave Pakistan isolated and perhaps lead to even tighter and more damaging international sanctions. On the other hand, he is under intense domestic pressure, not least from within his own armed forces. There is also the issue of the militant Islamic groups in Kashmir to consider. What makes the situation even more critical is that Pakistan is one of the world's nuclear powers. Although as JID has previously pointed out, there are serious limitations on the country's nuclear delivery systems, Islamabad may have around 25 nuclear missiles at its immediate disposal (see JID 9 June 2000). While it is highly unlikely that the present Pakistani government would actually resort to the use of such weapons unless in response to an overwhelming military attack, there is no guarantee that a pro-Taliban regime in Islamabad would act with similar restraint. General Musharraf came to power with the support of Pakistan's military. He is extremely vulnerable if the army, or at least a significant element of it, turns against him. If he were to be ousted during an anti-Western, pro-Taliban uprising organised by an alliance between Kashmiri militants and nationalist military officers, then the prospect of a full-scale regional conflagration might become very real. 869 of 3075 words Other features in this week's JID cover the following: · The dilemma faced by the Palestinians; · Potential assistance from Russia regarding bases in the former Soviet Central Asian republics; · The threat facing the Saudi leadership from Bin Laden and his supporters. 0_1_n.shtml Jane Intelligence Review,12 October 2000 Intelligence gathering asymmetric threats - PART ONE Kevin O'Brien is Deputy Director of the International Centre for Security Analysis (ICSA). Joseph Nusbaum is a Researcher at ICSA, working on cyber threats presented by sub-state actors. Visit: Much has been made of the changing security agenda and the emergence of new threats since the end of the Cold War. Most of these threats to national and international security are 'mutations' of existing threats. Kevin O'Brien and Joseph Nusbaum examine the challenge to intelligence communities from asymmetric warfare. The much-vaunted globalisation, new liberalisations in formerly autocratic states, increasing privatisation of state functions and, most importantly, the revolution in computing, telecommunications and data-transference capacities (commonly referred to as the Information Revolution - IR), have all impacted strongly on the international security agenda and on the nature of the threat actors in today's world. These factors have also had a significant impact on the intelligence process, requirements and use, as societies become more open, and as information and knowledge are passed around the world 'at the click of a mouse'. This has given rise to the introduction of the term 'asymmetric threat'. This refers to those threats that have gained prevalence since 1990 and present non-traditional - one heavily equipped military facing down another - threat postures to Western governments, and their defence and national security communities. These threats do not present the danger of a major conventional war to Developed World powers but do present equal (sometimes greater) dangers to the populations and governments of these states. In this new threat environment the world is faced with an increase in low-intensity conflicts (LICs). These include chemical-, biological- and radiological-capable actors, including an ever-increasing number of extremist groups. This has led to a rise in the number of less discriminate attacks perpetrated across the globe daily. To fully anticipate, analyse and investigate these threats, a much wider understanding and appreciation of the circumstances under which an asymmetric attack can develop must be prevalent in any intelligence community. Part one of this study focuses on the nature of asymmetric threats as they have evolved over the last decade from the more traditional perception of these being 'unconventional threats', how they impact (and will impact in the future) on Developed World security concerns, both domestically and internationally, and the concern that they raise for the national security and defence communities of the Developed World. [Part Two of this report, which appeared in the November 2000 edition of Jane's Intelligence Review, focuses on the intelligence requirements needed to respond to asymmetric threats – looking closely at information operations (IOs) and cyber-threats – and the potential for increased intelligence capabilities to deal with them.] Tools for asymmetric warfare In the future, opponents will be faced with a number of options for attempting to deter, disrupt, degrade or defeat Western military power. The approaches that an asymmetric actor can take can generally be divided into three 'families of threats', as the Canadian government calls them, outlining broad categories that potential asymmetric actors might use against Developed World forces. First, the acquisition of WMD, or long-range ballistic or cruise missiles. Future regional opponents could threaten Western forces with military escalation. Even without operational use, the mere presence of such a capability could overshadow regional security concerns and weaken the commitment of key allies to respond militarily to regional aggression. Second, the use of cyber or cyber-based warfare and the acquisition of selected high-tech sensors, communications and weapon systems. This could be called the 'strategy of the niche player', where cyber weapons and tools would be used to disrupt the information technology (IT) capability of military and civilian systems, as well as launch attacks on NII and CNI to disrupt and destroy the information-based economies and infrastructures of Western states. Third, choosing a conflict environment, such as large cities or jungles, not conducive to conventional forces, would degrade the Western military's capacity to find and attack militarily significant targets. These categories, summarised as WMD, IO and non-conventional operations (NCO), have existed in one form or another historically. In the last decade, however, they have become much more significant threats. Less sophisticated means to conduct asymmetric warfare are just as effective, especially at the tactical level. Obscurants to defeat laser-guided weapons; limited communications to thwart electronic sensors; human (non-combatant) shields to protect combatants; heat generators to confuse infrared sensors; and fighting in urban areas where heavy forces are impractical are key examples of non technological means available to asymmetric actors. Determining the types and levels of response to defend the interests and security of the Developed World has become a central aim of these defence and intelligence communities as mass conventional war threats fade into the background over the next decade. Methods and means In the 'families' listed above, a number of common factors exist. The first is that every threat has several acceptable delivery methods. The range, speed and accuracy of delivery continues to evolve rapidly and generally to the advantage of the attacker. While 'traditional' delivery platforms include military aircraft, missiles, rocket systems and special forces, alternative delivery means for asymmetric warfare include suitcases, commercial vehicles or couriers, public transportation systems, and private vehicles in the air, at sea and on land. It is worth noting that the most devastating asymmetric attacks on civilians in North America, Europe and Japan to date have not relied on military platforms for delivery. Similarly, the threat is compounded by the acquisition of high-tech sensors, communications and weapons systems by 'rogue' states and non- state actors, such as transnational organised crime (TOC) syndicates. The exploitation of civilian sources, such as the Internet and commercial satellite imagery, as well as the proliferation of advanced weapons, allow better operational planning, more accurate targeting and greater damage by the asymmetric actor. Finally, and ironically, the Developed World is making the asymmetric actor's job much easier through its over-reliance on large volumes of information provided by a largely unregulated Internet. In most instances, the populations and governments of Western countries rely almost entirely on national critical information infrastructures (NCII), consisting of government and corporate computer servers, telecommunications facilities and Internet Service Providers. All of these present ready targets for an asymmetric attack. Responding to a potentially devastating cyber or cyber-based attack has become one of the key priorities of most Developed World governments today. Non-conventional operations Conventional organised warfare - at least in the Developed World - between conventional powers is rapidly being superseded by LICs. Nuclear weaponry has almost eliminated the possibility of conflict between the major powers due to fears over escalation, and the advances in conventional firepower of Developed World states against Developing World ones (as was seen in the 1998 Gulf War) leaves little room for the more traditional conception of organised warfare between states. As LIC becomes the dominant nature of warfare in the 21st century, the nature of war fighting is also changing. Western powers are being forced to confront this new threat to regional stability. The interactions and ties between such conflicts and the transnational trade in narcotics, weapons, nuclear materials, people and terrorism are becoming indistinguishable. All of these crimes are in evidence in contemporary conflicts throughout Africa and Latin America (for example, the Revolutionary United Front [RUF] in Sierra Leone, the Lord's Resistance Army [LRA] in Uganda, and the drug-lords of Colombia and Mexico), as well as parts of the Balkans, the former Soviet Union (for example, over 40,000 Islamic 'mercenaries', or mujahideen, fought in the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia, compared with 15,000 in Chechnya) and Asia. Attacks such as Pan Am 103 and the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway are examples of asymmetric terrorist attacks. Terrorism is, by its very nature, asymmetric, achieving military-like results against a superior force relatively cheaply and with little friendly bloodshed. Actors can also use terrorism strategically and tactically. The World Trade Center bombing was a strategic act aimed at a symbolic target in the USA; the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia was a tactical attack on Allied troops in the field. Both show the vulnerability of modern societies to such forms of asymmetric attack. NCOs can involve the use of complex terrain, novel tactics and technology (hit-and-run tactics, fighting in large urban areas where the identification of attackers is hampered by large numbers of civilian bystanders and where counter attacks carry the risk of further civilian casualties, and enhanced blast munitions that can facilitate direct attacks on Western forces maximise the physical and psychological impact of an attack, and hinder military and police responses). Economic disruption is another tactic (including attacks on the means of production, the produce itself and on commercial infrastructure. This can lower national productivity, which can lead to critical shortages and directly affect the civilian population). Civil disobedience is also exploited (the use of demonstrations, illegal occupations of facilities, boycotts, strikes and riots to destabilise or discredit the government or its security forces. Terror is also a prime tool of asymmetric warfare (the targeting of non-combatants in locations where attacks were never previously considered, or the hijacking or taking of hostages, causes terror among the population out of proportion to the risks or cost to the attacker). All these offset the advantages enjoyed by Western military and security forces. Lethal agents employed in such operations range from a knife or a home-made bomb to a wide range of military weapons and munitions. Examples include the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Weapons of mass destruction WMD, their proliferation and means of deployment are a dangerous asymmetric threat. They inflict mass casualties, they cause terror and they degrade morale. It is also possible for some of these weapons to be produced by individuals, a factor that increases the scope of the potential threat. Rather than being weapons of deterrence, as they were during the Cold War, they are increasingly becoming the weapons of choice for 'second-rate' military powers and non-state groups. Acquisition of WMD by a potential opponent, with or without long-range delivery mechanisms such as ballistic or cruise missiles, would threaten Western states or deployed Allied forces with a dramatic form of military escalation. The availability and presence of these weapon systems are also significant factors because a threat alone, without the operational deployment of such a capability, could act as a deterrent to military deployment and operations, and even peacekeeping activities. The threatened use of WMD can produce strategic and political effects that may overshadow their military utility. Chemical and biological weapons can be inexpensive, easy to develop and are readily available. Their proliferation is largely due to this. Information to build them is available on the Internet, production technology is often dual use (commercial and military), and the materials to make chemical weapons are available anywhere. Biological agents based on the use of pathogens or toxins are easier and less expensive to produce than either nuclear or chemical weapons. Biological agents can cause casualties on a scale similar to that of nuclear weapons, or threaten the food supply. Their relatively low cost of production is within the capabilities of basic civil biotechnologists. In the short- to medium-term, biological agents must be considered very attractive to potential adversaries. In comparison with biological agents, more is known about chemical warfare agents, and defences against such agents are better developed. Potential threat countries, 'rogue' states and non-state actors are likely to continue chemical weapons programmes. A significant new factor in the chemical threat is that, while rogue states may not have the chemical stockpiles necessary to sustain attacks envisaged during the Cold War, they may have sufficient quantities to support terrorist activity. The threat from non- traditional chemical agents, such as toxic industrial materials, may grow in the short to medium term. Finally, they are easy to weaponise, deploy and hide. Nuclear weapons are perhaps the asymmetric weapon of choice, overmatching any conventional capability and providing a psychological edge. There are seven declared nuclear states, but others will probably have nuclear capabilities in the future, giving them a quantum leap in their warfighting capability. The proliferation of nuclear weapons will continue. In the near term Western states are not likely to face nuclear attack. However, because the effects of nuclear attack are so drastic, this possibility cannot be overlooked, especially where Allied forces deployed overseas could experience the effects of nuclear weapons resulting from a nuclear exchange between proliferating nations. Deriving partly from nuclear developments, devices based on radioactive materials are relatively easy and inexpensive to produce. Many countries, including some that are unstable, have civil nuclear technology. This presents the threat that radioactive materials or radiation-producing devices may be used to cause casualties, or restrict the use of terrain or facilities, both within Western states and in deployed missions. Threats also include exposure to radioactive materials, radiation from damaged civil radiological sources or terrorist attack with crude radiological devices. In the context of future regional conflicts, deterrence through the threat of retaliation could prove less effective prior to and after the use of WMD weapons. It is possible to imagine that a future opponent might brandish WMD weapons to intimidate one or more Western or regional ally. WMD could also be used as weapons of mass 'disruption'. For example, nuclear weapons could be used in a less-than-lethal IW mode through the generation of wide-area electromagnetic pulse effects during a critical phase of a military operation to damage a wide array of allied command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets. 01012_1_n.shtml

Posted by: Mudy May 30 2004, 12:26 PM ISLAMABAD: India has successfully developed a low yield nuclear bomb capable of use in the battlefield, a German newspaper reported on Saturday, quoting diplomatic sources in New Delhi. The daily Berliner Zeitung said Indian nuclear scientists tested a series of mini-atomic bombs in Rajasthan. The addition of mini-nuclear bombs to Indian defence inventory will radically alter the military balance with nuclear rival Pakistan, the report said. The report come just a day after New Delhi agreed to Islamabad’s proposal for talks on nuclear confidence building measures. In May 1998, India stunned the world by conducting five underground nuclear tests in Pokharan. Pakistan responded with three similar tests in Chagi on May 28.The 1998 tests had a capacity of a 43-kilotonne thermonuclear device, a 12 kilotonne bomb, and three miniature bombs of less than one kilotonne, while the mini nuclear bomb will have a yield of less than one kilotonne. The manufacture, maintenance and command and control of mini-nuclear bombs, sometimes known as “boutique bombs” is extremely complex. The daily said that India might be encouraged to test mini-nuclear bombs following a decision by US President George Bush to develop such bombs. In 1993, the United States banned the development of low-yield atomic weapons but Mr Bush lifted it last year. online

Posted by: Kaushal May 31 2004, 02:57 PM

An interesting sidebar to the story of the development of the Nuclear Bomb by the Americans during WW II, has been the interest Robert Oppenheimer (the director of the program)had in the Bhagavad Gita. He is supposed to have quoted a verse from the Gita as he watched the explosion. It turns outhe was a sophisticated connoiseur of the BG and of Vedanta and was very attracted to the whole notion of nishkaama karma (action without consideration of reward). THe following is an interesting essay on the topic. This was orinally posted by pulikeshi in the other forum.

Posted by: Mudy Jun 1 2004, 10:39 AM

I still don't understand, what is the objective behind? What we will achieve? Natwar moots common n-doctrine for India, Pak, China New Delhi, June 1. (PTI): Outlining the broad contours of the new government's foreign policy, External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh today mooted a common nuclear doctrine for India, Pakistan and China, announced that Foreign Secretary-level talks with Islamabad will be held on June 27 and 28 and promised to pursue "constructive" engagement with the US. Declaring that the Congress-led coalition was keen on pursuing the dialogue process with Islamabad, he said that expert-level talks on Nuclear Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan will be held on June 19 and 20. Singh said he was not making any formal proposal for the common doctrine as this has to be discussed at the "highest level". "It is absolutely essential for us (the three countries) to speak the same language" to ensure that all inherent dangers disappear, Singh said at his first press conference after assuming office. Singh fielded an array of questions on Indo-Pak relations, strategic ties with US and China as also New Delhi's approach towards its immediate and near neighbours.

Posted by: Kaushal Jun 2 2004, 06:46 AM

Originally posted by ramana in the other forum, Ashok Mehta in Pioneer....One of the nuggets in this is theadverse effects o f the 'reforms' instituted by MMS during his tenure as FM. I trust he will not repeat that aspect of his 'reforms'.

Fill the void of the CDS Ashok K Mehta It is only natural for the new Government to adopt a holier-than-thou attitude regarding the previous Government which, however imperfectly, introduced some far-reaching reforms in defence and national security. The conduct of nuclear tests, establishing new security structures like the National Security Council, National Security Advisory Board and defence reforms, were some of its main achievements. Between security experts K Subrahmanyam and Arun Singh, following the Kargil Committee report, more institutional changes were brought about by the previous Government than in the past since Independence. All except one of its key 100 recommendations were ordered to be implemented. At least 70 per cent of the recommendations have been implemented. The remainder are stuck in the bureaucratic groove. The one most necessary measure is the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a fourth four star in the constellation of High Command. Without the CDS, there can be no meaningful integration of the Armed forces. It is no secret that a CDS had been chosen and was being appointed in mid-2002. A rehearsal for his ceremonial installation was carried out near the Jai Jawan memorial at Raj Path. At the last minute, the then Opposition, the Congress party led by Mr Suresh Kalmadi and late Madhavrao Scindia, called for "more discussion" during a meeting of the Standing Committee on Defence in Parliament. The CDS was stalled by the Congress and kept mothballed by the ruling party. India, with the second largest standing Army, fifth largest Air Force, sixth largest Navy and probably the largest collection of paramilitary forces in the world, is the only country with such a formidable armada of military capability but no CDS or its equivalent, a permanent Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. Instead, it has a rotating chairman of a Chiefs of Staff Committee, a formality performed by one of the service chiefs in addition to his own duties. Such an ad hoc system has never worked and there are laughable stories on its account during the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan. Knowing it was the Congress that stopped the appointment of the CDS, it was welcome of the new Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to say that his Government was keen on the integration of the services and that the new Government was "open to the idea of a CDS" though this is not included in the Common Minimum Programme. Vacillation over appointing a CDS and putting the blame wrongly on the services, has cost the country dear. Before the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) settles down to the business of governance, it is instructive to look at the Congress's track record on defence and security issues. There are several black marks: The 1962 China war, missed opportunities after 1971's military victory, Operation Blue Star at the Golden Temple, and Operation Pawan, the Sri Lanka expeditionary operations. The management of Defence forces was of equally doubtful quality. Take the case of the PV Narasimha Rao Government from 1991 to 1995. Then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh's brilliant economic reforms programme, as few know of, hit the Armed forces badly throughout the Eighth Plan famous for its huge defence cuts. He had asked the service chiefs to bear with him as the economic reforms were supposed to boost the growth rate of GDP and automatically, Defence allocation. It was easy to force this logic down the throats of the Services, especially later when Mr Rao became his own Defence Minister after Mr Sharad Pawar moved to Mumbai as the Maharashtra Chief Minister. Five consecutive years of Defence cuts impoverished the military, undermining severely its operational capacity and readiness. Defence allocation plummeted from a record high of 3.86 per cent of the GDP in 1986-87 to an abysmal 2.38 per cent of the GDP in 1995-96. This was the percentage GDP at the time of the 1962 war. Service chiefs could no longer contain themselves. Late General BC Joshi, during his briefing at the annual Combined Commanders' Conference in 1994, complained bitterly about shortages and delays in procurement that Mr Rao was forced to take his Defence secretary to his office after the presentation. Not known for showing his pique, Admiral VS Shekhawat on Navy Day, 1995, went ballistic about deficiencies in naval inventory, the aging naval fleet and empty shipyard order books. On an earlier occasion, Vice Admiral DV Taneja, chairman of Mazagaon Docks, went on a virtual dharna before Mr Rao. By the time Army chief, General SR Choudhury, took over after General Joshi's death in harness, he said: "The Army should not be blamed if it is unable to deliver." Defence cuts forced General VP Malik, who took over from General Choudhury, to take the unprecedented step of cutting numbers in order to raise money for modernisation. Fifty thousand jobs in the Army were suppressed to yield Rs 500 crore, though the money actually never came to the Army. One of the reasons commonly cited for Kargil intrusions in 1999 was the virtual freezing of funds for modernisation. The Rao Government was culpable on two other counts: Dithering over establishing the NSC and developing capabilities for recovering PoK. On August 15, 1995, from the ramparts of the Red Fort, Mr Rao declared that for India the unfinished agenda was retaking PoK. This statement of intent was not backed by either tasking the military or creating the capability for recovery of territory. Similarly, he twice expressed the need for an NSC but nothing happened. The NDA Government too has holes in its national security record. It created an innocuous NSC after the most elaborate research, choosing the worst model. No wonder it met only twice in its lifetime. The Cabinet Committee on Security caused its demise. The strategic defence review that was promised was never made public. The Draft Nuclear Doctrine, produced by the NSAB was initially disowned by Government and its revised version, only partially acknowledged. The NSAB was underutilised as there was no strategic guidance and lack of networking with the Armed forces and other security establishments. Not having a full-time National Security Advisor was a grievous error. Mr Pranab Mukherjee is rightly not indulging in any finger-pointing. He has asked the right question: Why is it that the Armed forces are unable (or sometimes unwilling) to spend the allocated capital budget? Over the last four consecutive years, despite defence reforms and a separate track for defence procurement, procurements upwards of Rs 20,000 crore have lapsed. An expert group should investigate the causes for this non-utilisation. Likewise, he should ensure that the non-lapsable revolving fund with Rs 25,000 crore is accessible. The job of the new Government and the Raksha Mantri is to provide the wherewithal for the Armed forces so that they can carry out the mandate given to them. It is time such a mandate was formally and actually given to them. Mr Pranab Mukherjee, if he is serious about integration and implementation of defence reforms, must quickly fill the void of the CDS. It is not sufficient for governments to merely say that national security is their number one concern and that funds would never be withheld for the gallant jawans when the reverse has been the experience. The Common Minimum Programme has spelt out the priorities on defence and internal security. We now have an MoS level advisor to the Prime Minister on internal security as well. Networking the functions of the corps of advisors will not be easy. The appointment of Mr JN Dixit as National Security Advisor is an excellent start. The security of the country is in safe hands. Still, no one should take it for granted.[/QB]

Posted by: Mudy Jun 3 2004, 08:49 AM C O M M E N T A R Y By proposing a new nuclear doctrine, Natwar Singh is destroying the established strategic calculus. 3 June 2004: There are some things countries never change, unless there is a dramatic reversal of circumstances, as tectonic as, say, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 9/ 11, and so on, and one of those immutable things is a state’s nuclear doctrine, should it possess nuclear weapons. A nuclear doctrine is established after considerable strategic calculations, taking into account scores of factors, including, obviously, the nature and military strength of external enmities, a state’s own offensive and defensive powers, scope for firewalls and verification, scope for CBMs to hold up, etc, but once set, the doctrine stays set, because even in the madness of nuclear deterrence, some constants are necessary. Throughout the Cold War, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union changed their nuclear doctrines, not the broad brushstrokes certainly. The US and its other NATO allies opted for a nuclear first-strike doctrine, because of the overwhelming conventional-weapons superiority of the USSR and Warsaw-Pact countries in Europe. To preserve nuclear peace, the Soviet Union had to accept this position, plus the ABM Treaty, which prevented deployment of more than a minimum number of anti-ballistic missile systems, although in the initial years of the Cold War, the Soviets were far ahead in ABM technology. Whatever the give and take, it established a degree of confidence on both sides that a nuclear war would not commence accidentally. Intermeshed, the US and Soviet nuclear doctrines established a pattern of conduct with built-in reprisals. If the Soviets and their allies were to start a conventional war in Europe, and the US and NATO assessed they would lose it beyond a point, then it cleared the first use of nuclear weapons, but with a clear and present danger of an annihilating Soviet second strike. Of necessity, in the play of these competing doctrines, the Soviet Union had to own up to its role of aggressor, not so much aggressor as a ideological bloc on the roll, triumphal, which had pretty much been established at the Yalta Conference when Europe was divided into spheres of influence, and Stalin got the better of an ailing Franklin D.Roosevelt and a self-satisfied Churchill. Whatever be the powerplay, and there are a million interpretations, what held fast were the two complementary Cold-War nuclear doctrines. As the real possibility of nuclear war between the US and USSR receded, so verification mechanisms became stronger, and it lead to such confidence that it became possible to first begin strategic arms-limitation and then arms-reduction talks leading to treaties, which were by and large respected. China was a late entrant in the nuclear race, exploding its first bomb made with Soviet assistance in 1964, before the two Communist powers fell apart. While there are various theories about why the Soviets assisted the Chinese to go nuclear, the most convincing one is that they wanted a second nuclear front to be opened against the US. The Chinese, for their part, played it sensibly, quickly declaring a no-first-use doctrine, so that throughout the Cold War, it remained essentially the Soviet nuclear force against the US one. With China going nuclear, Nehru wanted US nuclear cover, which was refused, and so started, in earnest, India’s own nuclear programme. When Indira Gandhi imploded India’s first atomic weapon in 1974, she chose not to tie it to any doctrine, instead preferring to call it a "peaceful nuclear explosion". The explosion was meant to send a clear message to China and Pakistan which by then had fought, between them, four wars with India, but not so clear a message that needed to be spelt out with a nuclear doctrine. Apartheid South Africa and Israel had perfected a concept called bomb-in-the-basement, and this was the route Mrs Gandhi chose. Mrs Gandhi’s message, in some sense, boomeranged, as American strategists had warned. China, instead of turning bristly against India, quietly transferred bomb technology to Pakistan, whose Z.A.Bhutto had vowed to eat grass to reach atomic parity with India. The rest, as they say, is history. In 1987, Pakistan went covertly-overtly atomic, or acquired recessed deterrence, and either earlier (because government intelligence on these matters is very timely and accurate) or very shortly thereafter, India readied its own minimum deterrent. The phase of recessed deterrence ended when the Vajpayee government ordered the second Pokhran explosions in 1998, and India declared itself a nuclear weapons power. It is debatable what prompted the second explosions and the declaration as a weapons state. Some say the weapons designers were putting pressure, others that India wanted to test its weapons before President Clinton’s Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty came into force worldwide. It was also the NDA policy to go overtly nuclear, and influential strategic experts like K.Subhramanyam wanted too to call Pakistan’s bluff about possessing serviceable weapons. In case Pakistan did test successfully, the US would come down heavily on it, and India need not necessarily worry. Such was at least the thinking, flawed though it was. In the event, Pakistan did test successfully, six bombs to India’s five, as if it was a Diwali competition between two upstart rival neighbouring families. Frankly, that Pakistan would follow suit was never in doubt, although the US was promising it lavish presents of conventional weapons, which its army chief, General Jehangir Karamat, was wont to accept, but not prime minister Nawaz Sharief, for who the Indian testing had come as a slap in the face. But the Pakistani testing within the month in the Chagai Hills of Baluchistan still did come as a shock to the NDA establishment, which deadened all the BJP celebrations of nuclear Hindutva. That was the great mistake of the NDA government, taking pride in the possession of nuclear weapons, and flaunting all the decades of researching and developing them as its own achievement, ignoring the pioneering contribution of Congress governments since Independence. The second mistake, nay blunder, was to pinpoint the reason for the test explosions. Citing the past wars with China and Pakistan, A.B.Vajpayee, presumably at the prompting of his principal secretary, Brajesh Mishra, put the reason in his letter to Clinton and other G-8 leaders, which was promptly leaked to The New York Times. After this, China and Pakistan became India’s certified nuclear rivals, and for the first time in decades, according to intelligence reports, China turned its IRBMs in Tibet and elsewhere against India. But for the two blunders, there was one welcome development. Saner elements prevailed in determining India’s nuclear doctrine, and India adopted a no-first-use policy. India had a choice to go for first use, but it would have put it in direct confrontation with Pakistan, which had itself adopted it, because of India’s 1.5:1 conventional weapons’ superiority over Pakistan. No-first use was also mildly or remotely Gandhian, inasmuch as possession of nuclear weapons can be Gandhian at all, although the Mahatma was in favour of them for self-defence. But no-first use did not go a long way with China, which was superior to India both in conventional and nuclear weapons. But a country cannot have two doctrines, one for each enemy neighbour. Besides, India was – and is still today – in no position to enforce its nuclear threat against China. It neither has long-range nuclear missiles which can hit China’s political nerve-centres, nor strategic bombers that can carry payloads that far afield from the most forward Indian bases in the Eastern Sector. So, with China, no-first use was making a virtue of a necessity, while with Pakistan, it was the only way to bring nuclear sanity. In the six years since the second Pokhran explosions, India’s nuclear doctrine has held good, and all the nuclear CBMs with Pakistan at least are beginning to bear fruit on that principle. Now, Natwar Singh, the new UPA foreign minister, wants India, China and Pakistan to have a common nuclear doctrine, presumably a no-first-use doctrine. Jaswant Singh, who was both defence and foreign minister at various times in the NDA government, has roundly criticised Natwar. "While India subscribes to minimum deterrent and to no-first use, Pakistan does not have a no-first-use policy and China subscribes to a very different no-first use," Jaswant said yesterday. "It is important that the government verifies its thinking and not be given to fanciful individual notions." Fanciful or not, it is incredible that Natwar should toy with the idea of a new nuclear doctrine, when the existing one is found in order, and there is no chance of Pakistan going back on its fist-use policy. Why should anyone submit to India’s order of things, particularly a great power like China? While Natwar’s wooly-headed schemes will get nowhere with Pakistan, it reinforces the impression that India is back to its hegemonistic power-play in the sub-continent. A war of words has already commenced with Pakistan for a new front to be opened on the nuclear doctrine. It is best prime minister Manmohan Singh takes the microphone away from Natwar Singh.

Posted by: Kaushal Jun 3 2004, 09:03 AM

Natwar Singh is not a deep thinker and has a habit of shooting from the hip. A deep thinker like his analogue in chess is one who is capable of thinking 4 or 5 moves or more ahead. India should develop a non partisan foreign policy. There is no such thing as 'secular security ' or 'saffron security. Believe me when that weapon hits it will not stop to ask whether you are secular or saffron. As a matter of fact neither Pakistan nor China gives a hoot whether india is secular or not. I wonder who wrote that column. Has the imprint of an experienced man like KS.

Posted by: rajesh_g Jun 17 2004, 11:04 AM

Boss, I know this is fiction but still you gotta read it.. india.gif

Posted by: Krishna Jun 17 2004, 02:48 PM

Rajesh, That's a good read. Maybe someone from IF can right a real good one. Anyway, anther guy named Sankalp Waingankar (anyone know him?) had written another fiction stuff: Part 1: Part 2:

Posted by: Mudy Jun 19 2004, 05:44 PM

Leave India's security in Commies and Cong hands and forget about india

In this connection, an article by M.V. Ramana an thumbsdownsmileyanim.gif d R. Rajaraman, both physicists, published on the editorial page of The Hindu (June 4, 2004) made two eminently sensible recommendations that "do not compromise national security in any real sense." The first is that the Indian Government should offer not to deploy nuclear weapons. The second is that it should stop installing early warning systems that clearly, in the specific South Asian context where the response time is dangerously short, increase the risk of accidental or unauthorised nuclear war. These two positive elements could constitute the basis of a common nuclear doctrine with Pakistan — and prove far more credible, as confidence building measures, than repetitions of the `no-first-use' mantra that has virtually no practical value. But a red herring must be got out of the way: the quest for some kind of nuclear parity with China, which is in a different league and poses no strategic threat of any kind — any more than nuclear weapons in the hands of the United States, the United Kingdom, France or Russia threaten India.

Posted by: vishal Jun 21 2004, 01:34 PM

Some cold start discussion is going on on BRF. I have uploaded two files(documents as captured images) related with cold start warfare method. Now,my id has been banned due to some undisclosed reasons. wink.gif laugh.gif so i m posting links here : or or will some1 can post these two links on BR then....Thanks. smile.gif

Posted by: Mudy Jul 4 2004, 05:31 PM

Posted by: SSRamachandran Jul 14 2004, 08:18 AM

I have a rather simple question , what do they mean when they say "the reactor went critical on such and such date" ????

Posted by: Mudy Jul 14 2004, 08:23 AM

I have a rather simple question , what do they mean when they say "the reactor went critical on such and such date" ????
In simple term starting nuclear reactor or begining of nuclear reaction process in nuclear plant.

Posted by: Dr. S. Kalyan Jul 16 2004, 11:50 AM Outside View: Washington clueless on Pakistan By Kaushik Kapisthalam A UPI Ouside View Atlanta, GA, Jul. 16 (UPI) -- The July 14 hearing at the Senate Foreign Relations committee on U.S. policy toward Pakistan presented a stark picture for policy watchers. While the ranking Democrat on the committee, Sen. Joe Biden, D-Del., excoriated the Bush administration's Pakistan policy in his submitted opening statement, it was surprising to note that even the Republicans in the panel, led by Chairman Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., expressed a sense of helplessness with what to do with Pakistan. Biden's recounting of conversations with Bush administration officials conveyed the executive branch's unwillingness to do anything different with Pakistan simply because it saw no alternatives to the current course. How did Washington get to this state? U.S. interests in Pakistan are widely agreed to fall under three broad areas -- counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation and regional relationships. With counter-terrorism, American goals have been to arrest or eliminate al-Qaida leadership and the dregs that may have leaked into Pakistan from Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and thwart Pakistani jihadi groups and madrassas that provide the manpower for the next generation of terrorists. On nuclear proliferation, the U.S. would like to roll up the Pakistan-based A.Q. Khan nuclear E-bay and strive to prevent Pakistan's own nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. In terms of regional issues, America would like to see Pakistan avoid meddling in Afghanistan using the Taliban remnants, and, more important, maintain a durable peace with India and to avoid nuclear saber rattling with India over the Kashmir issue. Tied to all these goals is the strategic objective of "stabilizing" Pakistan by building its institutions and foster democracy. The panel included three old South Asia hands -- Ambassador Teresita Schaffer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dr. Vali Nasr of the Naval Postgraduate School, and Dr. Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute. The witnesses' testimony read like a litany of failures of the current U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Ambassador Schaffer, in her own diplomatic way, chastised the Bush administration for creating and making false choices between counter-terrorism and other goals like nuclear proliferation and democracy. She also faulted the current policy for over-relying on one individual, President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. She advised against any major military equipment transfer to Pakistan since it has historically emboldened Pakistan to undertake risky military adventures. Nasr focused on Pakistan's counter-terror efforts. He contended that far from making a clean break with Islamist terror groups, Musharraf had only put them on ice, hoping to use them at a future date of his choosing. Sure enough, said Nasr, Pakistan has arrested 500 or more al-Qaida suspects, but such arrests have been carefully orchestrated to pick up the mainly Arab al-Qaida elements while seeking to avoid harming the Pashtun Taliban and the local jihadi groups that do Pakistan's dirty work in Kashmir. Nasr also noted that Musharraf has done little to reduce the power and influence of madrassas, which continue to produce jihadi fighters at an alarming rate, despite an explicit promise by Musharraf on this front. Weinbaum looked at the role of Musharraf, whom he called a "marginal satisfier." According to Weinbaum, Musharraf has so far shown that he only seeks to do the bare minimum required by the various interests that compete for his time. Given this, Weinbaum contended that Musharraf is unlikely to fully commit to supporting U.S. policies and in fact seeks to keep the various problems alive in order to maximize his value. Weinbaum also noted that at a strategic level, Musharraf has sought to marginalize the mainstream secular political parties within Pakistan, while unapologetically cutting deals with obscurantist parties and jailing or silencing those who disagree with him. He flailed the U.S. policy of lavishly praising Musharraf publicly and said that it emboldens the general to act contrary to U.S. interests with a feeling of impunity. The comments and questions by the senators in response to the testimony indicated an unwillingness to question the assumptions that form the basis of the current and past U.S. policy toward Pakistan. There was a palpable evidence of Groupthink -- the same malaise that the Senate claimed that the U.S. intelligence community was afflicted with in its recent report on Iraq. Social psychologist Irving Janis defined Groupthink as "a mode of thinking ... when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action." Groupthink in the Pakistan policy context is manifested by the ease with which U.S. policy framers accept certain ideas on Pakistan as axioms. The first one is the notion that current Pakistani dictator, Musharraf is striving to be a "moderate" Islamic leader and seeks to wean his country away from jihad-friendly policies. In fact, had the senators heard the panel testimony with an open mind, they would have come to the conclusion that Musharraf's actions since 9/11 have displayed that he has only two goals. The first one is to keep himself in power, and the second one is to zealously guard Pakistan army's corporate interests. The main reason for Musharraf's U-turn after 9/11 was a desire to avoid his army from being targeted by an angry and hurt United States. Since then, he has sought to finesse his counter-terror actions with an aim of keeping his army's interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir unharmed. Had the United States looked at Pakistan as a tactical ally in its quest to take out the 9/11 culprits, it would have made sense. Instead, America tried to turn Musharraf into what Kemal Ataturk was for Turkey and as a consequence is disappointed when that came to naught. The second Groupthink assumption is that the U.S. alliance with Pakistan would collapse were Musharraf to be killed or replaced. This is sheer nonsense. The doomsday scenario of a Taliban-like regime in Pakistan controlling nuclear weapons is unlikely. The main reason Musharraf might get replaced is because his junior commanders' feeling that without a new chief, they cannot get promoted. In such a scenario, the successor to Musharraf is likely to be another general who would seek to do the same things as Musharraf -- keep himself in power and protect the army's pot of gold. A Pakistan sans Musharraf is likely to be no better or worse than the one with Musharraf. Therefore, the idea that "we cannot push Musharraf too far" is just an alibi for paralysis. The biggest Groupthink assumption is the U.S. acceptance that the Pakistan military's interests coincide with the country's interests. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Pakistani military itself suffers from Groupthink when it seeks to obtain a military victory over India in Kashmir and its belief that its superior Islamic warriors have only been kept from a victory over the "weak and cowardly Hindu nation" through a series of international conspiracies and American betrayals. Even a casual reading of writings by retired Pakistani generals would reveal a mindset filled with paranoia and strong belief that only U.S.-Jewish-Indian conspiracies have "kept Pakistan down." The Pakistan army's goals are absolutely in dissonance with what U.S. strategic objectives of regional peace, Islamic moderation and nuclear non-proliferation. The United States can therefore understand why Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, but it cannot tolerate Pakistani army -- the supposed nuclear gatekeeper -- bartering nukes with rogue regimes irrespective of its perceived insecurities and strategic needs. Pakistani generals ought not to be allowed to play the "Give me fighter jets, or I'll be forced to sell nukes" game. While the United States can sympathize with Pakistan's genuine military requirements, it cannot afford to be seen as subsidizing a military that spends millions on golf courses while poor Pakistanis are dying due to drinking contaminated water. Instead of worrying about how to provide the Pakistan army with sops so that "it doesn't have to embark on dangerous adventurism to the east and to the west," as Biden stated, the United States must make it clear that it will not underwrite or encourage irrational Pakistani military adventures seeking revenge for past defeats by India or "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. For a Pakistan policy to succeed, Musharraf needs to be explicitly reminded of U.S. red lines -- no nuclear trade, no adventures on either border and no victimization of secular political parties while enjoying unstinting U.S. support. Every time he reneges on promises, instead of privately nudging him, the United States needs to make its reminders public. Pakistan's generals are not suicidal maniacs like al-Qaida. They might cry wolf, but are likely to fall in line rather than lose face internationally. U.S. policymakers should also cease their public comments that tend to portray Musharraf as indispensable and instead focus aid toward institution building in Pakistan. The Pakistan policy situation is a quagmire only because of America's own faulty assumptions. Sans those assumptions, it is not that hard to frame a meaningful and effective Pakistan policy. -0- (Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance commentator on U.S. policy on South Asia and its effects on the war on terror and non-proliferation.) -0- (United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

Posted by: Dr. S. Kalyan Jul 17 2004, 08:17 AM

This is a book promotion media blitz. What Clinton did by his visit to Bharat and Paki was to reinforce American foreign policy which continues to equate Paki-s and Bharat and turns a blind eye to the danger of the islamic nuke in Pakistan, since, it is, like Taliban a CIA creation, with full connivance of Uncle Sam and China acting in league. The recent admission of China in the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers Group is in line with this geopolitick of the US State department. Success of Bharatiya diplomacy will lie in promoting a change in this mindset of Uncle Sam and Brookings Institution type of think tanks, focussing on the dangers that the islamic nuke and China pose to the only supercop of the world in a unipolar world (and the dhimmi-s of Europe on the sideline). Kalyanaraman Engaging India Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb Strobe Talbott Brookings Institution Press 2004 c. 250pp. DESCRIPTION On May 11, 1998, three nuclear devices detonated under the Thar Desert in India shook the surrounding villages—and the rest of the world. The immediate effect was to plunge U.S.-India relations, already vexed by decades of tension and estrangement, into a new crisis. The situation deteriorated further when Pakistan responded in kind two weeks later, testing a nuclear weapon for the first time. Engaging India is the firsthand story of the diplomacy conducted between the United States and the two South Asian neighbors after the nuclear tests. In this book, the American point man for the dialogue takes us behind the scenes of one of the most suspenseful and consequential diplomatic dramas of our time, reconstructing what happened—and why—with narrative verve, rich human detail, and penetrating analysis. From June 1998 to September 2000, in what was the most extensive dialogue ever between the United States and India, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh met fourteen times in seven countries on three continents. They discussed both the immediate items on the security and nonproliferation agenda, as well as their wider visions for the U.S.-India relationship and the potential for economic and strategic cooperation between the two countries. As the relationship improved over the course of the talks, the United States was to able play a role in averting the possibility of nuclear war over the contested territory of Kashmir in the summer of 1999—the specifics of which are included for the first time in this book, told in way only a protagonist can. The Talbott-Singh diplomacy laid the groundwork for the transformational visit of President Bill Clinton to India in March 2000 and helped end fifty years of estrangement between the world’s two largest democracies. As pursuit of Islamic militants continues across South Asia, the increased cooperation established by Talbott and Singh will be an invaluable asset for current and future leaders of both countries. This book provides, for the first time, an insider’s perspective on the ground-breaking efforts to build a cordial relationship between the United States and India. The general reader will find it accessible, and more important, an indispensable tool for understanding America’s current role in South Asia, and the prospects for improved relations. Strobe Talbott is president of the Brookings Institution. He served as deputy secretary of state from 1994 to 2001. Prior to his service in government, he worked at Time magazine for twenty-one years. He has written nine books, including The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (Random House, 2002), a personal account of U.S. diplomacy toward Russia during the Clinton administration. India's nuclear tests angered Clinton Press Trust of India Washington, July 11 India's nuclear tests in 1998 had angered then US President Bill Clinton leading him to personally suggest to his Russian counterpart Boris Yelstin that the two of them and China should jointly pressure India on the nuclear issue. However, both leaders were dissuaded by advisers from carrying out the proposal, who pointed out that China might regard it as a "harebrained idea," former US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott says in his forthcoming book "Engaging India--Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb". Talbott also disclosed that a Security Council resolution drafted by the Chinese was so anti-Indian that the Americans wanted it changed but it was too late as the Americans had been negligent at the drafting stage. Giving details on Clinton's proposal to Yeltsin to control India on the nuclear issue, Talbott described that the American President told his Russian counterpart that "I think India has made a terrible mistake". "But I also think India should get credit for fifty years of democracy. We need to help them see that they should not define greatness in a way that gives everyone else headaches. The ruling party there seems particularly to feel that earning the full respect of the world depends on India being a nuclear power." Clinton then suggested that he and Yeltsin coordinate their approaches, since both were planning trips to New Delhi in the fall. Yeltsin, who always welcomed demonstrations that the United States and Russia were joining forces to solve the world's most daunting problems, eagerly assented. Moreover, in order to dissuade Pakistan from matching India's 1998 nuclear test, former US President Bill Clinton had offered then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif massive economic and military aid, including F-16s. Former US Deputy Secretary of Stage Strobe Talbott says in his forthcoming book that Clinton told Sharif that if he would desist from testing nuclear weapons, the F-16s would be released besides huge amounts of financial aid and a prize certain to appeal to Sharif--an invitation for him to make an official visit to Washington." But, says Talbott ruefully in his book "Engaging India--Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb" that "Sharif was not swayed." Sharif told Talbott that if he listened to American advice and desisted from testing nuclear weapons in response to Indian tests, "the next time I (Talbott) came to Islamabad, I would find myself dealing not with a clean-shaven moderate like himself but with an Islamic fundamentalist 'who has a long beared." "At issue, he said, was his own political survival." Sharif told Talbott that he did not want to follow the example of Indian leaders but pressure was 'mounting by the hour' from all sides, including from the opposition led by his prodecessor, Benazir Bhutto. 'I am an elected official, and I cannot ignore people's sentiment." Clinton had told Talbott that he would use Sharif's visit to Washington and a Clinton visit to Pakistan in the fall to "dramatize" the world's gratitude if Sharif would just refrain from testing.,00050001.htm

Posted by: Arun_S Jul 23 2004, 11:34 PM

So the recent indian Agni-1 test on 4 July (Happy I-day `America tongue.gif ), was tested with a new RV at longer range the earlier maal. It is clear to me that the new 12 meter long missile confign, had 2 meter conical RV with 1 meter base, designed for 1,300 Km range (no photos yet to positively confirm). Clearly A-1 makes sense to be strategic weapon, but given limited range of Indian tacticle missiles (i.e. Prithvi) there is need for conventinally armed SRBM for SEAD and bunker bursting beyond 500Km range. Thus declaring Agni-1 to be purely strategic will be mistake; no need to tie our hand when we go to war. The new RV will not only be lower cost but may also limit the maximum conventional payload. OR maybe India will have 2 types of RV for A-1 to keep options open.

Posted by: Kaushal Jul 24 2004, 01:53 AM

Welcome Arun. Your knowledge and wisdom will be deeply appreciated in this forum. I trust you will find time to take part in the discussions especially on starategic isssues. You will find many old friends also present here.

Posted by: Arun_S Jul 24 2004, 08:09 AM

Thank you Kaushal. I know I am among friends. Cheers

Posted by: Arun_S Jul 24 2004, 09:41 AM 22 July 2004: For at least the past three months, Pakistan and Israel have been talking secretly, but Pakistan has not been able to convince Israel that A.Q.Khan’s proliferation activities are at an end, and that any Pakistani nuclear materials will not fall into the hands of terrorist groups, rogue states, or Iran. Western diplomats privy to the Pakistan-Israel talks while refusing to give details strongly suggest that Israel has threatened preemptive action against Pakistan’s nuclear installations, forcing the US to intervene and suggest safe-keeping of or taking custody of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals. Two days ago, we reported that the US was moving towards convincing Pakistan to allow its nuclear weapons to be taken into full or partial custody under a maintainability agreement (Intelligence, “Pakistan asks US for nuclear submarines”), and yesterday, Reuters said Pakistani and US officials had met for three days to discuss the safety of Pakistan’s civilian nuclear programme. Israeli intelligence suggests that Khan’s nuclear blackmarket is alive, that Pakistani proliferation continues apace despite Pakistani denials, and that, pushed to the wall, the Pakistani leadership would pass on nuclear technology to Iran, which has had blow-hot-blow-cold relations with the Jewish state since its inception. In their talks, diplomats said, Israel had warned Pakistan of preemptive action, refusing to accept Pakistani assertions that their weapons were secure, and fearing air attacks like the Osirak reactor bombing or sabotage by Israeli intelligence, Pakistan has opted to sue for US help. While Israel and Pakistan have no direct conflict, the fear of Pakistani proliferation has alerted and angered Israel, and diplomats said Israel is acting on definite intelligence that Pakistan’s arsenals may be secretly transferred to Iran, whose late Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa for the destruction of the Jewish state.

Posted by: Arun_S Jul 24 2004, 11:16 AM

For those who may recall most of my earlier missile range projection at BRF was based on propulsion capability only. The useful range however also depends on the RV surviving the thermal and mechanical strain of re-entry without destroying the payload. At this momemt it is interesting to note that TSP GhauriI/II though could be capable of medium range, but the shape of the RV clearly indicate thet it will not survive re-entry at range greater than 500 Km. Thought a well engineered missile of its size can easily reach 800Km and as much as 1,400 Km. So much to speak of TSP missile capability. Indian Missiles however are not limited by RV capability for stated range. The A-II RV will work OK till perhaps 4000Km. JMT.

Posted by: rajesh_g Jul 24 2004, 05:48 PM

QUOTE(Arun_S @ Jul 24 2004, 11:46 PM)
At this momemt it is interesting to note that TSP GhauriI/II though could be capable of medium range, but the shape of the RV clearly indicate thet it will not survive re-entry at range greater than 500 Km. Thought a well engineered missile of its size can easily reach 800Km and as muach as 1400 Km.
Arun, Is this true for NoKo missiles too ? Yanks take them seriously though right ?

Posted by: Mudy Jul 24 2004, 06:49 PM

Israeli intelligence suggests that Khan’s nuclear blackmarket is alive, that Pakistani proliferation continues apace despite Pakistani denials, and that, pushed to the wall, the Pakistani leadership would pass on nuclear technology to Iran, which has had blow-hot-blow-cold relations with the Jewish state since its inception. In their talks, diplomats said, Israel had warned Pakistan of preemptive action, refusing to accept Pakistani assertions that their weapons were secure, and fearing air attacks like the Osirak reactor bombing or sabotage by Israeli intelligence, Pakistan has opted to sue for US help.
Another excuse to hit Iran or to put pressure on Pakistan to handover OBL before election.

Posted by: Arun_S Jul 26 2004, 09:46 PM

rajesh_g: The US believes in taking on potential challenger before it becomes a real threat. NoKo Ding-Dong has the necessary propulsion to get to US, thus is a threat, US response doesn't wait for matching RV development before recognizing/calling it a threat. Very contrasting approch to national security compared to India. What does it take for India to learn from Isreal? SELF-WORTH & BALLS ! The new generation 20 somthing has both, just wait, the moment is arriving soon.

Posted by: amarnath Jul 27 2004, 02:52 AM

Arun_S Could it also be that the new RV would be able to send bunches of boutiques ?

Posted by: Kaushal Oct 17 2004, 09:18 AM

Curreently we do not have a civilian nuclear technology thread. we can spin off one if we need to. My analogy of keeping Iindia chained to an energyless future (prometheus chained to a rock by Zeus) is still valid

Posted by: ramana Dec 1 2004, 12:16 PM

2004-11-19 13:34 * RUSSIA * WEAPONS * ATOM * WHAT NEW NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS DOES RUSSIA HAVE? MOSCOW, Nov 19 (RIA Novosti) - President Vladimir Putin mentioned the successful tests of new nuclear missile systems at a conference with the top leaders of the Russian Armed Forces on November 17. "...They will be supplied to the armed forces in the next few years," he said. "...The other nuclear powers do not have and will not have comparable systems in the near future." Nezavisimaya Gazeta decided to find out what the president meant. Experts believe that he probably meant the Bulava system for Project 995 submarines, which are under construction. The Bulava SS-N-30 ballistic missile with ten warheads has a range of 8,000km. Work on it began in 1986 (project Bark, renamed Project Bulava in 1998), but no apparent results have been achieved. The 2004 tests entailed the launching of a practice round, the goal being to test the launcher that fires the missile from the submarine's silo. So far, Russia does not have a single live Bulava missile or control systems for it. There is only one new missile in Russia, the ground-based Iskander-M, which has been recently put on combat duty in the armed forces. This unique missile is almost invisible to radars, can maneuver in flight and has a cruising speed of Mach 3, which allows it to avoid any of the modern ballistic defense systems. The missile is also a precision weapon. However, it is not a strategic but a tactical frontline missile with a range of 280km. In other words, it does not threaten "the other nuclear powers." Besides, the creation of new nuclear weapons is impossible without tests, and nuclear explosions have not been held in Russia since 1990. "It is impossible to know the physics of a nuclear explosion without tests," said Academician Boris Litvinov, chief designer of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons at the Research Institute of Technical Physics. "The general belief that a perfect nuclear charge can be created only with the help of calculations is not true. The more sophisticated a physical device, the more experiments should be conducted with it."

Posted by: Mudy Dec 1 2004, 12:18 PM

The other nuclear powers do not have and will not have comparable systems in the near future."
Mystery of lost CDs.

Posted by: Spinster Dec 3 2004, 09:12 PM

Besides, the creation of new nuclear weapons is impossible without tests, and nuclear explosions have not been held in Russia since 1990. "It is impossible to know the physics of a nuclear explosion without tests," said Academician Boris Litvinov, chief designer of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons at the Research Institute of Technical Physics. "The general belief that a perfect nuclear charge can be created only with the help of calculations is not true. The more sophisticated a physical device, the more experiments should be conducted with it."
Is there a lesson for India to take in this?

Posted by: k.ram Dec 4 2004, 08:25 AM

New Context for India's Struggle against Nukes By J. Sri Raman t r u t h o u t | Perspective Friday 03 December 2004 Rajasthan is a colorful State of India - colorful in its turbans, saris and history. It is known for its desert landscape and its many tourist attractions, including medieval fortresses and palaces. Today, it is also known for Pokharan, a rural area turned into a nuclear test site. The sandy site witnessed Pokharan I or the PNE ('peaceful nuclear explosion') in 1974 and, more infamously, Pokharan II, the five tests that shook South Asia in May 1998 and led to the proclamation of India as a nuclear-weapon state. The tests also led, within days, to the Chagai tests in neighboring Pakistan and its identical proclamation. Jaipur, capital of Rajasthan and not far from Pokharan, thus made a fitting venue for the second national convention of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), an informal apex for India's peace movement. Hundreds of peace organizations and activists (including this writer) came together in the hugely successful convention of November 26-28. Notably, they did so in a new context for the country's struggle against nuclear weapons and for peace, particularly in South Asia. The issues remain the same but the political context has changed. And the change has brought a new challenge. The convention left activists and organizations, free from official links and lobbies, in no doubt about the challenge. Before proceeding to this challenge, a word about the specific issue of Pokharan, of special concern and symbolic importance to every Indian peace activist. Village Khetaloi, close to the site, has been a victim of the tests. Many villagers have been suffering from throat cancer and some strange disorders since the tests. A study of the matter was officially ordered, but the conclusions remain a closely guarded secret. The CNDP, along with the local activists, has demanded not only a better deal for the victims, but also a permanent closure of the test site. Asked about the villagers' sufferings, former Prime Minister (and father of Pokharan II) Atal Bihari Vajpayee famously observed: "Some people have to make sacrifices." They had to do so, presumably, for the patriotic cause. Identification of nuclear militarism with nationalism, indeed, was a prominent part of the ideology that Vajpayee and his regime in New Delhi proudly represented. Ever since its founding in its first national convention in New Delhi in November 2000, the CNDP has combated this ideology combined with religious 'fundamentalism' and revanchism. It was this ideology that inspired Pokharan II, which in turn provided the excuse for Pakistan's Chagai. It was this ideology, along with 'jihadi' extremism in Pakistan, that took South Asia to the brink of a nuclear war in 2002. The coexistence of the two countries in the US-headed alliance for 'global war against terror' made the confrontation even more deadly and dangerous. thumbsdownsmileyanim.gif The wise Indian voter firmly rejected the ideology and politics of the far right earlier this year. A United Progressive Alliance (UPA), headed by the Congress party and backed by the left, came to power under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The new rulers were officially opposed to the ultra-nationalism of the Vajpayee camp. Did the change end or enfeeble the challenge before the peace movement? Did the new context spell new hope for the anti-nuclear weapon activists? Certainly not, as developments since the change in New Delhi in May 2004 have demonstrated. The feebleness of the centrist Congress opposition helped the far right, more than anything else, over the past few years. The Congress in power has not shed any of its political shyness about espousing the cause of South Asian peace explicitly. Not without reason does the Jaipur Declaration adopted at the convention call upon India and Pakistan to "seriously and sincerely engage in a dialogue." The call represents the consensus in the movement on the India-Pakistan "peace moves." The consensus includes the concern in a significant section about the prospects of the moves. The concern stems from the main motive force of the "peace initiatives": the pressure from the USA, keen to keep within controllable limits the contradiction and conflict within the South Asian segment of the "anti-terror alliance." The "peace moves" are even less promising on the nuclear front. The mountain of pretended official labor on the issue (in the form of a series of talks) has produced only a mouse (in the shape of a decision to set up a 'hotline' between the military commands of the two countries). New Delhi has dismissed with contempt the CNDP demand for the closure of the Pokharan site and, along with Islamabad, for de-deployment of nuclear-capable missiles. Worse, as Pakistani peace campaigner Karamat Ali pointed out at the convention and as many Indian activists would agree, the rulers of the two countries are using these talks actually to "legitimize" the nuclear weapons of each other. Not to recognize this objective of the talks on "confidence-building measures" would be to welcome nuclear militarism in a new form. The worst outcome of the talks was a resolve by official India and Pakistan to seek "parity" with "nuclear powers" (P5) and "consultations" with them on "issues of common concern" as well as to attempt working out "a common nuclear doctrine." This was nothing but a loud and clear knock by both India and Pakistan on the door of the 'nuclear club.' Strangely and very sadly, an even more unacceptable version of the same proposal, calling upon India to convene a meeting of all "nuclear-capable" states (P5 plus Ariel Sharon's Israel and North Korea) for the same objectives, found its way into the convention. The political change in New Delhi does not give such proposals any pro-peace legitimacy. The peace movement cannot let such proposals be peddled as initiatives for nuclear sanity in South Asia. The movement must prepare to meet the new challenge posed by the new political situation. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A freelance journalist and a peace activist of India, J. Sri Raman is the author of Flashpoint (Common Courage Press, USA). He is a regular contributor to t r u t h o u t.-------

Posted by: Arun_S Dec 12 2004, 11:03 PM

For those who want to know nuts and bolts of Nuclear weapons (Fission, Boosted Fission, Fission-Fusion, Fission-Fusion,Fission varients) may start at : by Carey Sublette (it is a another issues that this is same guy who lead Psy-Op against Indian nuclear test) Depending on your interest and how deep you would like to dvelve it may streach from few hours to a few days of reading. But one comes out physics refreshed wink.gif

Posted by: rajesh_g Dec 15 2004, 04:13 PM Has this guy gone insane ????

Posted by: rajesh_g Dec 16 2004, 12:33 PM take on nutwar's stupid statement. i still cannot believe he said that. i have to ask again -> is this guy insane ?

Posted by: rajesh_g Dec 16 2004, 02:12 PM

Stupid response from puppet PM. The man cant reign in his foreign minister and now he lectures people to stay above party politics ? Whats more this new paradigm called answer-to-journalistic-queries is not equal to GOI-policy was conveniently coined. Just ask the senile idiot to resign for god's sake.. mad.gif

After Natwar Seoulspeak, Manmohan pacifies Opp Pioneer News Service/ New Delhi Faced with the charge of having disturbed an unwritten foreign policy code which prescribes bipartisan consensus on and continuity in the country's nuclear and national security policy, the Government on Thursday sought to allay the Opposition's doubts arising from External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh's reported remarks on the nuclear issue in Seoul. Responding to a query by Leader of Opposition Jaswant Singh in the Rajya Sabha, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said there was no uncertainty about India's nuclear policy and that the UPA Government would evolve defence and national security through national consensus and due deliberations. Clarifying his Government's stand on the nuclear policy, the Prime Minister said national security and nuclear issues should be kept above partisan party politics. He reiterated the country's stand on the nuclear issue, asserting, "India is a nuclear power and will remain a nuclear power." He further said the country's policies on nuclear and defence issues would be based on "continuity and national consensus". The Prime Minister suggested, "These are issues best kept outside party politics." Dr Singh said he would check the authenticity of the reports on this issue from the External Affairs Minister when he returns to New Delhi from Seoul, on Friday. He however said it appeared the remarks by the Minister were made in the context of certain journalistic queries. "It was not a statement of policy of India," the Prime Minister said. Subsequent to the Prime Minister's statement in the floor of the House, External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Navtej Sarna too spoke on the issue. While referring to the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament, the spokesperson said, "As far as the External Affairs Minister's remarks are concerned, he acknowledged that the decision to cross the nuclear threshold was taken by the previous Government in 1998. He was merely stating a fact, not expressing any disagreement or agreement with that decision." As for Mr Natwar Singh's reported remark that, "Even though we are ourselves a nuclear power, we support complete nuclear disarmament for Korea," the MEA spokesperson said, Mr Singh was "drawing attention to the fact that India is not a party to the NPT which India regards as discriminatory. However, countries which have undertaken international treaty obligations should abide by their commitments." Mr Sarna said, therefore, the news reports that appeared were "based on misquotation and distortion of facts." In Parliament, articulating the Opposition's fears that the UPA Government was walking against a time-honoured tradition of successive governments maintaining continuity in foreign and national security policies, Mr Jaswant Singh had asked the Prime Minister to clarify Mr Natwar Singh's remark that the 1998 nuclear tests led to a stand off with Pakistan. The External Affairs Minister's statement that the NDA Government was responsible for the decision to enter into a nuclear face-off with Pakistan was widely reported in the media on Thursday in which he was also quoted as saying "regret would be futile. You cannot put it back in the tube, it is out." Mr Jaswant SIngh said this reported remark had created uncertainty; he also sought to reaffirm the principle that there should be continuity of policy in the country's nuclear policy and national security. The former External Affairs Minister pointed out that the nuclear policy had been followed by successive governments starting from Jawaharlal Nehru to Indira Gandhi down to Narasimha Rao and the NDA Government. He reminded the House that Parliament was informed by him during the NDA regime that India's nuclear policy was not Pakistan-centric and that the tests were conducted keeping in view a holistic picture of the world. Mr Jaswant Singh regretted that the External Affairs Minister chose to make these remarks in a foreign country even though he was welcome to criticise the previous Government's policies within the country. While asserting that Mr Natwar Singh had questioned the established policy of the Government, Mr Jaswant Singh said it "falsifies the achievements of the country." He pointed out that, "To take domestic policies to foreign shores was wrong," he said adding, the Minister's remarks had "belittled" the country's nuclear programme, which was a "great disservice to India".

Posted by: rajesh_g Dec 16 2004, 02:17 PM

Pioneer edit on the issue.. Even they think he might have been misquoted. Although I doubt this. I think this guy is senile and in a rare admission of senility he bumbled these things. Or worse, the jerk is floating a baloon only to be picked up by idiots like desouza/patwardhan on how bad nukes are.. Such a sorry lot..

Pokhran poser THe Pioneer Edit Desk Understandably, eyebrows have been raised in Parliament and outside over Foreign Minister Natwar Singh's reported statement in Seoul asking North Korea and South Korea not to follow India's example and become nuclear powers. That the implication was that India had set a bad example by going nuclear is reinforced by his other reported statement apparently criticising the NDA Government for its nuclear tests in May 1998 and nuclear stand-off with Pakistan. Taken in their entirety, his remarks, as quoted, are tantamount to an expression of dissent with the country's nuclear programme. For though the tests in Pokhran, Rajasthan, in May 1998, were conducted when the NDA was in power at the Centre, the policy whose implementation led to them represented a national consensus and followed initiatives taken from the time of Jawaharlal Nehru who, along with the then Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Homi Bhaba, put India on the world's nuclear map. Subsequently, Indira Gandhi gave a new dimension to India's nuclear programme when she ordered a peaceful implosion in Pokhran in May, 1974. This announced to the world that this country had the know-how to make nuclear warheads. Though India desisted, perhaps under global pressure, from immediately actualising its potential, it stayed on course. Mrs Gandhi ordered another round of nuclear tests in 1983 only to hold it back at the last moment. Mr Narasimha Rao similarly backtracked in January, 1996, reportedly under United States's pressure. What the 1998 tests did was to bring to fruition a process whose beginnings can be traced to the 1950s. This was acknowledged in the debates that followed in Parliament and elsewhere both over the tests and the international reaction to it, and in the country's resolve not to bend to sanctions and threats. It was the resolution underlying India's response that made nations that had imposed the sanction to realise the futility of their action, the irreversibility of India's status as a nuclear power, and to gradually remove most of these. India has, since the 1998 tests, formalised its position as a nuclear weapons power by enunciating a nuclear doctrine and laying down a chain of command for weapons use. In this regard, the UPA Government carries forward the baton from where the NDA left it, with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asserting that India would maintain "a minimum credible nuclear deterrent". As External Affairs Minister, Mr Natwar Singh could not have been unaware of the Prime Minister's and the Government's stand. Also a career-diplomat-turned politician, who had been both a Secretary and a Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs in his earlier incarnations, he could not have been unaware of the continuity in the country's nuclear weapons policy. His reported statements, made during an interview with the Korea Times, are, therefore, all the more bewildering. Of course, there is a possibility that he was misquoted. The Prime Minister has, therefore, done well to tell Parliament that he had asked the External Affairs Minister for a clarification. Mr Singh also suggested that the reported remarks may have been taken out of context. As for the Minister, he must make a full statement on the matter in Parliament on his return from Korea.

Posted by: ramana Dec 16 2004, 02:39 PM

rajesh_g, The Hindu correspondent in Singapore (P. S. Suryanarayana) interviewed Natwar Singh and its quite plain that he was not quoted in context. He is not to be blamed. BTW, PS was the Hindu reporter in TSP early on. Howeve this report has caused a slugfest with people who oppose the tests coming out of woodwork. It also unmasked those who want to get rid of Natwar Singh.

Posted by: rajesh_g Dec 16 2004, 03:29 PM

Thanks Ramana Garu.. I lost my bearing for a while. Sincere apologies due to Natwar Singh. I wish he had worded the "no question of regret" more appropriately. I didnt get the "out of tube" thing at all. Although I have to admit the question was loaded to begin with. Hopefully after this FM will be more prepared for these types of questions. Will keep this Shishir Gupta in mind. Wonder what his agenda is..

Posted by: rajesh_g Dec 20 2004, 05:26 PM What the heck is going on ???

Posted by: rajesh_g Jan 4 2005, 10:22 AM

Yesterday I watched a Korean movie called "The Phantom Submarine". Its a ripoff of "hunting for red october" and that other hackman-washington movie (forgot the name). Basically they show that the SOUTH korean navy has a super-secret project of a secret nuke submarine with nuke missiles. None of the crew members are addressed with names (only numbers eg. 202, 413 etc). Anyway they have been noticed by US and Japan. Yet they go out on a trip and then the deputy gets rid of the captain of the sub, takes charge and decides to nuke Japan (not north korea). In general its just a movie with many scenes copied from hollywood movies but the dialogues, Japan as the bad-boy to go after, etc were really interesting. We have always known that the koreans would love to go nuclear but to actually see koreans (even if its just in a movie) say that a nation's sovereinty is guaranteed with the nukes, having nukes will prevent any humiliation of the 5000 yr old civilisation, etc is just something else. Suffice to say, that once NoKo and SoKo unite, they will be a big pain in the a$$ for Japan, China and US. These 3 will do their best to keep them separate. Enjoyed the movie.

Posted by: Mudy Jan 4 2005, 11:30 AM

More questions on AQ Khan Wilson John One of the factors which helped US President George Bush to regain the White House for the second time was the seemingly decisive manner in which his Administration intercepted, exposed and crippled a global nuclear smuggling network led by Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr AQ Khan. Although the US Administration and the media traced the network's footprints in several countries, particularly in Iran and Malaysia, both have conveniently avoided looking at own backyard, and Pakistan. So let us take a look at what the US knew and didn't tell. Exactly three decades ago, the US State Department circulated a confidential note to its top policy-makers titled Pakistan and the Non Proliferation Issue which stated that Pakistan "may well have decided to have the capability to produce a weapon, and they have clearly decided to have the capability to build one." The note was prepared barely three years after Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had called a meeting of Pakistan's top nuclear scientists at Multan, six weeks after the 1971 war ended in surrender at Dhaka. In fact, by the 1970s, the National Security Agency (NSA), responsible for technical intelligence, had already drawn up a list of hi-tech companies in Germany and Switzerland whose communication links were constantly monitored and intercepted to detect nuclear trafficking with Pakistan. In fact, the CIA had so successfully infiltrated the Pakistani nuclear establishment that it was able to smuggle out the entire floor plans for the Kahuta Research Laboratory. By the mid 1980s, the US Administration had also begun receiving information about Dr AQ Khan. A research paper prepared by the CIA Directorate of Intelligence during that time titled 'Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Programme: Personnel and Organisations', said though "Pakistan's scientists had investigated the possibilities of uranium enrichment... as early as 1968, but efforts did not begin in earnest until AQ returned to the country in 1975. Through his extensive network of European contacts, he began to covertly procure the components that would ultimately enable the then clandestine facility to manufacture highly enriched uranium." Another report prepared by the CIA Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: A Safeguards Exemption As a Backdoor to Reprocessing?' on May 20, 1983, only confirmed the earlier intelligence estimates. The report said: "...In our view, Zia and his advisers continue to believe that they must acquire nuclear weapons... we have detected continuation of longstanding efforts to acquire components for nuclear devices and to bring into successful operation the only two facilities capable of producing fissile material for nuclear weapons...". Barely a year after the note, three Pakistani nationals were indicted in Houston for attempting to buy a shipment of high-speed switch designed to trigger nuclear weapons. They had offered to pay in gold supplied by the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), an infamous bank set up by a Pakistani businessman, Agha Hassan Abedi, who counted among his close friends men like President Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan (later President), President Carter and a young AQ Khan. The CIA could be faulted for its intelligence on Iraq but it has been doing credible work on Pakistan's efforts to procure nuclear technology and materials clandestinely. In 1993, testifying before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, the agency said Pakistan had received $19 billion in aid from foreign countries and donor agencies like the International Monetary Fund. Of $19 billion, the agency said, $2.7 billion was not designated for any specific purpose, thus enabling Pakistan to spend it on its nuclear programme. According to Leonard Weiss, a counter-proliferation expert and a staff director on the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs between 1977 and 1999, "When Ronald Reagan arrived in the White House in 1981, his Administration came with a desire to send arms to the Afghan Mujahideen. They could only be delivered through Pakistan, and non-proliferation took a back seat to Cold War politics." This pattern continued for several years with no one protesting till a junior CIA intelligence officer, Richard Barlow, whose brief was to track Pakistan's proliferation activities, compiled evidence about Pakistan's clandestine nuclear purchases. However, his reports were shelved, forcing him, subsequently, to resign from the agency. In 1989, he joined the Government as a proliferation analyst in the office of the Under Secretary of Defence Policy where too he found a similar attitude towards Pakistan. One of the reports he prepared for the Secretary of Defence was about Dr Khan's initial attempts to sell nuclear technology and spare materials to countries which the US considered were sponsoring terrorism. The Secretary, Defence, was Mr Dick Cheney. Mr Cheney dismissed the Barlowe report and told a Pentagon official testifying before the US Congress to underplay the threat posed by Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities. Mr Cheney wanted to protect the $1.4 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad. Another issue on which the Bush Administration has maintained an intriguing silence is the involvement of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) which, a US Senate Report in 1992, said, financed "Pakistan's nuclear programme through the BCCI Foundation in Pakistan, as well as through BCCI-Canada in the Parvez case. However, details on BCCI's involvement remain unavailable. Further investigation is needed to understand the extent to which BCCI and Pakistan were able to evade US and international nuclear non-proliferation regimes to acquire nuclear technologies". Needless to say no effort was made, whether then or now, to take the investigation forward. The reason is not far to seek. To quote the Senate report: "Among the Americans who BCCI provided with financial assistance in addition to Carter (President Jimmy Carter), were US Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young, Bert Lance, and Jesse Jackson. Abroad, important figures with extensive contact with BCCI included former British Prime Minister James Callaghan, then United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cueller, Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga, Antiguan Prime Minister Lester Byrd; a large number of African heads of state; and many Third World central bank officials." Not only were the top US leadership bankrolled, the bank had the top hierarchy of the intelligence establishment on its side. The Senate Report throws enough light on this nexus: "Former CIA officials, including former CIA Director Richard Helms and the late William Casey; former and current foreign intelligence officials, including Kamal Adham and Abdul Raouf Khalil; and principal foreign agents of the US, such as Adnan Khashoggi and Manucher Ghorbanifar, float in and out of BCCI at critical times in its history, and participate simultaneously in the making of key episodes in US foreign policy, ranging from the Camp David peace talks to the arming of Iran as part of the Iran/Contra affair." As for Pakistan, the Bush Administration should urgently take the following two actions: Interrogate Dr AQ Khan in detail about the smuggling network. Second, arrest a little-known businessman named Humayun Khan who owns a computer hardware firm in Islamabad, Pakland PME. He is a small fry, but a key link between the smuggling network and the Pakistan Army. There is evidence, in the form of emails exchanged between Dr Khan and a Jewish businessman Asher Karni, that the former had been acting on behalf of the Pakistan Army to buy Sidewinder missiles and infrared sensors from Lockheed Martin Naval Systems and nuclear triggers from two US firms. The question is whether the Bush Administration will come clean on these counts. Only then, perhaps, a serious attempt could be made to prevent rogue nations and terrorist entities from threatening the global order.

Posted by: rajesh_g Jan 7 2005, 12:04 AM

Ramana garu posted this on BR

ABV's revelation about Rao's 'chit' on testing in conjunction with the timeline for the development of the fusion bomb given in WOP by Chengappa allows us to speculate why the tests were not conducted in Dec 1995.. Chengappa quoted Sikka as saying that the authorization was given in 1995 and it was ready in 18 months time (ie in mid 1996). Rao knew that there could be only one series of Indian tests and hence held it in abeyance till the latter was ready. That is why the chit was given to ABV which 'thrilled' him. So all in all Rao was ready to test in Dec. 1995 but held back to ensure that the fusion weapon was tested. It was not the detection by any US satellites. Now we understand his interview with Shekar Gupta in the Ind Express dated May11, 2004. ABV couldnt be thrilled about testing ordinary stuff as he knew that they were ready. It must be the other stuff that would 'thrill' him.

Posted by: ramana Jan 7 2005, 09:59 AM

Thanks rajesh was going to post here too. I think if this true it puts Rao way above all other politicians. He could easily have been re-elected but India would be only a half power. Also if you think about it all the stories about Israeli collobaration are humbug for India was ready even in mid 1996. So why did they offer Green Pine and Arrow system?

Posted by: Mudy Jan 8 2005, 08:50 PM

70 Indian nuke engineers pass out from Russian training centre Agencies/ Moscow Seventy Indian nuclear engineers have successfully passed out of a Russian training centre ahead of their posting in Kudankulam atomic power station in Tamil Nadu. After the training at Russian Nuclear Power Agency's "RosEnergoAtom" centre in Novo-Voronezh in southern Russia, the engineers are to undergo a six-week practical training at Kalinin nuclear power plant in Tver region north of Moscow, where a VVER-1000 nuclear reactor was recently commissioned. Kudankulam power plant, being constructed with Moscow's assistance, is to have two similar light-water nuclear power units. First among them with 1000 mega watt capacity is to be commissioned in 2007. "These are highly qualified engineers, all of them with higher education, which they received from various Indian universities," chief of the training centre, Alexander Ivanchenko, was quoted as saying by the ITAR-TASS news agency. In all 150 Indian specialists are to be trained in Russia to work as operators and maintenance engineers at Kudankulam power plant which would have 2000 megawatt capacity after completion in 2008. The centre in Novo-Voronezh has the most modern training facilities including simulators allowing the future nuclear reactor operators to gain experience in managing crisis situations similar to the Chernobyl disaster.

Posted by: ramana Jan 10 2005, 01:58 PM

The last post is about power reactor training and gives incorrect impression vis s vis the thread title.

Posted by: Mudy Feb 2 2005, 09:55 AM

QUOTE'Pak~may~launch~nukes~against~India' Wednesday, 02 February , 2005, 19:08 Washington: A US-based think tank has said that Pakistan, given the lack of its strategic depth, may use nuclear weapons against India to counter successes of the larger Indian conventional forces. However, it ruled out a similar attack by New Delhi. "India and Pakistan appear to understand the likely prices to be paid by triggering a conflict. But nationalist feelings run high and are not likely to abate," the National Intelligence Council said in a chapter titled, 'Pervasive insecurity: Envisaging possible developments by 2020'. "Under plausible scenarios, Pakistan might use nuclear weapons to counter success by the larger Indian conventional forces particularly given Pakistan's lack of strategic depth," the council report said. It said, "even if conflict would break out over Taiwan or between India and Pakistan, outside powers as well as the primary actors would ant to limit its extent." "Advances in modern weaponry — longer ranges, precision delivery, and more destructive conventional munitions — create circumstances encouraging the pre-emptive use of military force," the report said.

Posted by: rajesh_g Feb 5 2005, 03:32 PM

Interesting moves..

N-man to be NCA head Rahul Datta/ New Delhi In a measure that would clip the powers of the National Security Advisor, the Government is all set to appoint Dr R Chidambaram, former Atomic Energy Commission chief and architect of the 1998 Shakti N-Test series, as the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) head. The NCA looks after the country's nuclear weaponisation programme. As NCA head, Dr Chidambaram would report directly to the Prime Minister and act as a bridge between the political and executive council of the NCA in his capacity as member secretary, sources said here on Saturday. As a consequence, the NSA would merely be looking after the internal and external Intelligence requirements of the nation. Sources said that Dr Chidambaram's appointment would give the nuclear programme a more focussed approach. Dr Chidambaram has already met the Prime Minister in this regard. The NCA comprises the political and executive council. The Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet Committee on Security, including Ministers of External Affairs, Defence, Home and Finance, form the political wing. The three Services chiefs, strategic forces command chief, Bhabha Atomic Centre and DRDO form the executive. The ultimate decision to press the proverbial nuclear button rests with the Prime Minister. The NCA head would have to see to it that the nuclear programme adheres to the stipulated timeframe and ensure that the second strike capabilities are credible. He would also determine that the nuclear programme proceeds as per declared policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. It is learnt that besides Dr Chidambaram, the top leadership is thinking of appointing specialists for different responsibilities, like representatives for talks with China and Pakistan . The NDA's national security advisor Brajesh Mishra was handling five crucial responsibilities, including NCA, PM's personal secretary, NSA, political representative for talks with China and back channel diplomatic initiatives with Pakistan. Mr J N Dixit, who succeeded Mr Mishra as NSA, continued to handle all these assignments, except that of personal secretary to the PM. After his untimely demise, the political leadership thought of segregating the functions of this all important office so as to give it better focus, sources said.

Posted by: Mudy Feb 5 2005, 03:59 PM

the political leadership thought of segregating the functions of this all important office so as to give it better focus, sources said.
Create more power struggle or to confuse everyone by not disclosing information to other. Or not to make one person powerful.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 31 2005, 09:10 PM

NEW DELHI, advertisement Friday April 1, 12:11 AM India agrees to ratify IAEA pact on nuclear safety India said Thursday it would ratify a worldwide pact on maintaining international safety standards at nuclear power plants. India's External Affairs Ministry said New Delhi will ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, but a statement didn't say when. A foreign ministry spokesman traveling with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh couldn't be reached for comment. The IAEA convention legally binds signatories to maintain international benchmarks in the construction, operation and regulation of civilian nuclear power plants, and requires countries to submit regular reports on safety standards. India has six nuclear power plants with seven more under construction, according to the Web site of the federal Nuclear Power Corporation of India. It was unclear Thursday why India decided to ratify the convention now, after it came into effect in 1996.

Posted by: Mudy Apr 14 2005, 04:09 PM

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6 by Joyce Battle biggrin.gif

Posted by: Arun_S Apr 21 2005, 10:26 PM

Have been busy writing a major piece on Indian Strategic Missiles. Finally it was published on Indian Defense Review (Lancer Publishing) in Feb-2005 and ~1500 copies were destributed at Aero India 05 in Feb. A more expanded artical has finally been in last 3 weeks at BR. This is I belive the most comprehensive open source writing on Agni missiles (Agni-1, Agni-2, Agni-2AT, Agni-3 and Agni-4), as well as strategic weapons. This is not to blow own trumpet but I belive this will be of interest to many on this forum, and others as an education to evolving Indian capability & position. Indian citizenary and politicians need to be more informed on this aspect. Any questions or comments are welcome.

Posted by: Kaushal Apr 21 2005, 11:10 PM

Keep up the good work Arun. You are definitely the right person to write such an article.

Posted by: Mudy May 2 2005, 10:59 AM

Posted by: Mudy May 5 2005, 11:48 AM

Posted by: ramana May 10 2005, 01:37 PM

May 11 is the anniversary of the POK II tests.

Posted by: Mudy May 11 2005, 09:19 AM

ramana, These Congressi morons have decided not to celebrate India's power.

BJP celebrates, Govt ignores Pokhran anniversary Pioneer News Service/ New Delhi The seventh anniversary of India becoming a nuclear power was on Wednesday commemorated by the BJP amid deafening silence from the Government. This is the first time the day is being observed with the UPA Government at the helm. Speaking at a symposium organised by the party on the occasion, BJP president L K Advani charged the Left of taking positions inimical to India's national security interests. He advised the Congress to "use the Left as Indira Gandhi did." The implication was that while taking its support, the Left should be firmly kept out of all areas that affect vital national interests. Mr Advani cited some portions of an article written by the CPI(M) chief Prakash Karat to launch a frontal attack on the policies of Left parties. Mr Karat had described the nuclear blasts as "adventurist and very unfortunate," and said that the tests had weakened India. thumbsdownsmileyanim.gif The Leader of Opposition said as he contrasted the communist reaction over Pokhran II to the then Jan Sangh's public endorsement of the 1974 nuclear tests under the Indira Gandhi Government. He said the Congress should "use" the communists like Ms Gandhi had done. Accusing the communists of being "out of tune" with the national mainstream, he advised the UPA government to "use them like Indira Gandhi did" but not work according to them as "it won't be in the national interests". Former External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh claimed the BJP government had initiated the process for the nuclear testing when it first came to power in 1996 for 13 days. "We were in office for a short time only, but it was in 1996 itself that we had set in motion a whole process to ensure that what has all along been a hidden programme could become an explicit and direct programme", Mr Singh said. Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee asserted that his government did not violate any international commitment or treaty by conducting Pokhran nuclear tests. He favoured an alternate platform to the existing discriminative nuclear treaties and control regimes. He said the tests were in themselves the "logical evolution" of an independent nuclear programme, which India had set in motion very early. Mr Vajpayee also traced the roots of Pokhran II to the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation treaty "without any revision, without India being recognised as a nuclear weapon state". "It became vital for the preservation of our national interest that we think afresh on this subject. Therefore, to safeguard our national interest, to serve the needs of national security, and to reject the notion that it is the security of only some in the world that was important and all others were irrelevant, we had to boldly and resolutely assert the autonomy of our decision making", he said. He stressed on the need to explore ideas including "no first use" of nukes by all nuclear weapon possessing countries until all weapons of mass destruction are eliminated. Weapons of mass destruction, he said, were not weapons for fighting wars.

Posted by: Mudy May 11 2005, 10:48 AM

NEW DELHI: "I have an important announcement to make." That is how Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee began his afternoon announcement seven years back to declare India a nuclear nation. After spending decades as a pacifist in the homespun khadi - preaching non-alignment - it was with this dramatic statement that India donned the controversial nuclear suit. A suit that unfolded the nuclear umbrella over South Asia and triggered global sanctions. Monday, May 11, 1998, also capped years of fear and postponements of the tests. It was a rare success of Indian establishment in fooling CIA and other intelligence agencies who had been closely watching India's moves ever since BJP came to power. It also marked the beginning of a new stage of initiatives to complete the metamorphosis of India into a nuclear state. New structures, new weapon systems, new launch pads, new safe houses - all for the deadliest weapons known to mankind. But, according to sources involved in India's nuclear preparedness, those targets are far from being achieved. Many nations which publicly condemned India's nuclear tests are among those who are now actively assisting India in completing its nuclear nation status. But that is a different story. Though the merits of the tests are still debatable, what followed it was the exhibition of India's new found resilience in withstanding sanctions, the strength of its economy, and the inability of international community to pack-off the world's largest democracy...into obscurity and condemnation
DDM at its best.

Posted by: acharya May 11 2005, 12:24 PM

Many nations which publicly condemned India's nuclear tests are among those who are now actively assisting India in completing its nuclear nation status. The same nations made sure that between 1980 to 2000 China was perceived as a large upcoming power

Posted by: utepian May 16 2005, 01:44 PM

LEADERSHIP: Indian Army Plans "Cold Start" War May 14, 2005: Can India ever fight a war against its nuclear armed neighbor and rival Pakistan without provoking a nuclear holocaust? The Indian Army (IA) thinks it has an answer to this question. Until now the India's doctrine for war against Pakistan consisted of combat divisions advancing across the Rajasthan desert border into Pakistan, eventually cutting off Pakistan's population centers in the north from the only port and economic lifeline of Karachi. After both countries went nuclear in 1998, the Indian Army war plans went unchanged. This began to change after the 2002 Indian army build up in response to an attack on India's parliament by Pakistani terrorists. Dubbed operation Parakram (valor), the 2002 operation resulted in some lessons learned for the IA. They include: Slow deployment: Virtually every single field formation of the IA was moved to the border with Pakistan, many traveling over 1500 kilometers or more. Many key formations took over 20 days to mobilize, giving Pakistan had a chance to prepare itself. Forward Logistics improvement: While the army's capital equipment purchases were stalled during the 1990s, the numerous exercises it conducted paid off in terms of conducting a smooth forward deployment. This showed that both Pakistan and the US underestimated the mobility of Indian strike formations No surprise: IA has 13 Corps. Of these three are classified as strike corps while the rest are "holding" (defensive) corps. During Parakram, whenever strike corps elements were moved, it was easily tracked and the element of surprise was lost as to where a potential Indian offensive might come from. Scalability issues: The old IA doctrine envisaged an all or nothing approach to war with Pakistan. There was no scope for a scaled response to provocations. Political weakness: Because of the lengthy mobilization duration, there was enough time for the international community, led by America, to exert pressure on Indian political leadership to call off the dogs. The Emperor has no clothes: The 2002 crisis showed for the first time the enormity of the military imbalance between India and Pakistan. Pakistani generals have always figured that they had a period of "conventional pause" in the event of an Indian attack. This refers to a time window where they believed they can hold the lines while they could implore the international community to intervene. Even Pakistani military analysts noted that this option was essentially nonexistent in 2002. These factors and other led to the evolution of the new IA doctrine, unofficially dubbed "Cold Start." This doctrine forsakes an all out drive to dismember Pakistan in favor of short high-intensity thrusts and withdrawals that result in a visible blow to the enemy while not causing him to fear for his existence. This is to be achieved using Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) comprising the Air Force, Special Forces and the Navy (if necessary). The key to success here is the ability to strike quickly and pull back before the enemy can realize what happened. This sounds good on paper, but can the Indian Army implement Cold Start today? It appears that the IA has years to go and many internal issues to sort out before this becomes a realistic option. For example, Cold Start revolves around IBGs which bring up the question of Joint Operations with the Air Force and potentially the Navy. Given the Cold Start is an Army doctrine, it will take a lot of bureaucratic turf fighting to make it happen with the other services. There is also the question of equipment. A key component of Cold Start is the need for massive and directed firepower. The Indian Army's artillery modernization program is however stuck in the mire of political scandals and appears headed nowhere. On the positive side, in the last few years, the IA has made strides in its Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) as well as Electronic Warfare by purchasing many, less expensive, Indian made systems. There have been some advancements in terms of putting India's space technology to army use. The IA also recently created a new operational "Southwestern command" which conveniently sits across the border from Pakistan's most vulnerable area and is headquartered in Jaipur, 262 kilometers southwest of New Delhi. The IA's two recent exercises Divya Astra (in 2004) and Vajra Shakti (last week) allowed it to put its theories on firepower use and joint operations into practice. The IA has also gone all out to equip its Special Forces with the most modern gear and is expanding those units as well. At the end of the day, with Cold Start , the IA has clearly seized the initiative from its Pakistani counterpart. Given the unpredictability built into the doctrine, the Pakistan army may now be forced to stretch its available resources into a forward deployed stance where they are less useful for offensive actions. It also gives the Indian political leadership to construct calibrated responses to Pakistani provocations in terms of terrorist attacks on Indian soil. Any international intervention would be faced with an Indian fait-accompli and would therefore turn to pressuring Pakistan not to use nukes. The Indian army has made its move. Now it's time for Pakistan. -- Kaushik Kapisthalam May 12, 2005: Without much fanfare, the “Command Post of the Future” has just sort of appeared. This means that commanders can confer from anywhere, with anyone, using network and videoconferencing technology. Most importantly, maps and other data can be shared, in real time, as well. For several decades, the “Command Post of the Future” was much talked about, but didn’t appear much because of cost (high) and technology (not quite there yet) issues. As has happened in the past, wartime tends to eliminate cost and technology issues. In this case, civilian “command post” technology showed up, along with lots of high speed satellite communications capability, just as the war on terror began. That took care of a lot of cost and technology issues. By the time Iraq was invaded, individual combat divisions, and other military organizations, were already taking the civilian software and hardware to create their own “Command Post of the Future” experiments. The U.S. Army had several official projects in development for “Command Post of the Future”, most notably ideas based on the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) project. Parts of this (especially the Blue Force Tracking system) were quickly issued to the troops for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As combat operations continued in Iraq, so did the flow of money for new communications gear, software and communications capability. As a result, there are several improvised “Command Post of the Future” systems in action in combat zones, and headquarters that are supporting them. The tools were available, there was a need, and things just happened. Standardizing all this, and distributing it to the rest of the army, and Department of Defense, will take longer. But with new hardware and software appearing every month, standardization is somewhat elusive. However, many components of this new form of command post (the fast satellite data links, PCs, large flat screen displays and laptops everywhere, plus easy networking) do remain fairly stable. Most of the change is coming in the software. But even this aspect is kept under control because most screw-ups occur in front of senior commanders. This provides an additional incentive to get these things working right. Portable radio, first widely used during World War II, radically changed how commanders operated, especially at the tactical level. But the current revolution is different in that the signals can easily be encrypted, and carry visual, as well as speech, data. Thus commanders at all levels can eliminate face-to-face meetings, and just videoconference, or talk freely about plans. But even Instant Messaging have become a powerful tool, because many times, a few short text messages are all that is needed to solve problems. Finally, the Internet provided, for the military, many new ideas on how to efficiently handle information. The Internet has been militarized much faster than anyone expected. That has led to the military adopting new database and visualization tools as well. In a single decade, the way commanders run their units, and battles has changed more than it has in the past half century. --

Posted by: Mudy May 17 2005, 10:38 AM,0008.htm

India would test-fire its 3,000 kms longest range surface to surface missile Agni III by the year end and has started induction of the short and intermediate range versions - Agni I and Agni II - in the newly raised strategic command, country's top defence scientist Dr M Natrajan said on Tuesday. "Development of Agni III missile is on schedule and it would fly by the year end," Natrajan said in a presentation made at the DRDO Technology day awards function in New Delhi in the presence of the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. His remarks assume significance as DRDO has put off tests of the wholly solid Agni III Missiles twice. Former Defence Minister George Fernandes had announced that the missile, which can give India the capability of developing intercontinental range ballastic missile, would be test-fired in 2003 year end.
With love to China and others biggrin.gif

Posted by: Mudy May 24 2005, 11:17 PM,00050001.htm

"The situation in South Asia also poses unique challenges. Let me reiterate that the United States remains committed to NPT universality. We recognise, however, that India and Pakistan may not join the Treaty for the foreseeable future," the statement, released in Washington on Tuesday, said. "We remain deeply concerned by the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in South Asia and do not believe they enhance regional security." "We welcome recent signs of improved relations between India and Pakistan. We continue to urge both countries to end their nuclear and missile competition, and to discuss and implement confidence-building measures designed to reduce regional tensions and diminish risks that nuclear weapons could be used, either intentionally or accidentally, in a crisis."

Posted by: Mudy Jul 19 2005, 05:20 PM

No new N-bombs for India's arsenal Kanchan Gupta/ New Delhi The India-US joint statement issued after Monday's White House meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George Bush, which focuses on civilian nuclear cooperation, is being hailed as a radical departure by Washington and New Delhi from their respective nuclear policies. But closer scrutiny of the text of the statement suggests that while India has all but jettisoned its stated positions, the US has not travelled too far from policy. Indian commitments have been rewarded with American promises. It is also being claimed that Mr Singh and the UPA Government's exertions have resulted in Mr Bush and the American Administration acknowledging India's status as a nuclear weapons state, thus making it a virtual member of the exclusive P-5 club. This is not quite the case. The New York Times reported on Tuesday: "A senior State Department official, giving a briefing under ground rules in which he could not be identified, said that the Bush Administration still hoped India would eventually give up nuclear weapons, and that the Administration rebuffed an Indian request to be recognised formally as a nuclear weapons state under the treaty. 'The discussions went through various permutations,' he said. 'We didn't feel we could somehow formally recognise India as a nuclear state. Ultimately, we hope they will elect to join the NPT'." The key Indian commitments contained in the joint statement are: * Identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities; * Placing its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; * Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol of IAEA; * Working with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty. In effect, these commitments mean that India will construct a "fire-wall" between its military and civilian nuclear facilities, open its fast breeder reactors to IAEA inspection and cap its nuclear weapons programme which will severely reduce, if not entirely remove, the flexibility of its minimum credible deterrent. India's military nuclear programme is a minute fraction of its overall nuclear programme. Therefore, setting apart nuclear facilities for only military purposes is both impractical and cost prohibitive. This raises an important question: Can India actually set aside a facility or facilities for military nuclear programmes? If it cannot, then India's nuclear weapons programme will be automatically capped. "It is very difficult to separate the civilian and military components of India's nuclear programme because India's three-phase commercial nuclear power planning envisages the development, in the next stage, of fast-breeder reactors, whose fuel comprises weapons-usable plutonium," says Brahma Chellaney, noted security affairs analyst. India's nuclear facilities have till now been free of intrusive monitoring by the IAEA. Once they are opened up to IAEA inspection and safeguards, scientists at these facilities will virtually lose their freedom to innovate. The smallest deviation will be construed as a violation of IAEA norms and guidelines. The UPA Government's decision to embrace the IAEA's controversial 'Additional Protocol' is also cause for concern. The protocol allows international inspectors unhindered access anytime, anywhere in India. thumbsdownsmileyanim.gif As for India "working with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty", what it implies is that India will be a signatory to the treaty as and when it is concluded. This will impose a cap on India's production of fissile material and make the nation's minimum credible deterrent inflexible. "If the UPA Government has taken a considered view and come to the conclusion that the number of warheads India has is sufficient and meets our security requirements, then there is nothing wrong with going along with the FMCT. However, if we do not possess adequate number of warheads, then this will be a dampener," says a former top security official and prime ministerial aide. A policy decision on capping the number of warheads is dependent on the Government's assessment of what constitutes a minimum credible deterrent. To link this quantification with political deal-making could compromise India's military nuclear policy. Scientists who held senior position in India's nuclear facilities and were intimately involved with the nuclear weapons programme are opposed to both "fire-walling" as well as placing fast breeder reactors under IAEA safeguards. "Objections raised by serving scientists have been ignored," says the former official. While the UPA Government's decision "to reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices... as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology" ties India down to an irrevocable position, the Bush Administration has not made any commitments whatsoever. The salient features of the "promises" made by Mr Bush to "achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" are that he will: * Seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies * Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur; * Consult with US' partners to consider India interest in participating in ITER. "In return for Mr Bush's promise to 'work' with Congress to relax US laws and guidelines against India and to 'consult' with friends and allies to soften the impact of technology-control regimes, India has undone all that it stood for," says Mr Chellaney. "All these commitment have been made in return for Mr Bush merely agreeing to 'work with' Congress and 'consult with' friends and allies. No tangible action by Mr Bush to lift technology controls against India is reflected in the joint statement, only a commitment to try and lift those controls," he adds. The UPA Government may hope so, but it is not realistic to expect Mr Bush - weighed down by Iraq and domestic policy discords - to get into a bruising, long fight with Congress to change an American law like the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) or to amend export-control legislation. Waiver is the last resort and it is unlikely that Mr Bush will use that power. The NNPA, as experts point out, was enacted in the first place to target India for its 1974 Pokhran test. Seeking to change the same law now to reward India in the form of fuel for Tarapur Atomic Power Plant or to allow the sale of commercial nuclear reactors will be a Herculean effort. "I will be surprised if this President or the next succeeds in changing US law to the extent that India has open and full access to US commercial nuclear power technology of the kind that China enjoys. US non-proliferation zealots are already calling Mr Bush's intent unrealistic, saying that opening the door to India will allow other states to slip in too," says Mr Chellaney. A small issue on which Mr Bush could have made a confirmatory gesture is on India's inclusion in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), a consortium comprising the US, European countries, China, Russia and Japan, on nuclear fusion. Japan and Russia favour India's inclusion. All that is required is American approval. Mr Bush could have declared that approval. But on the ITER issue, as well as that of Generation IV International Forum, Mr Bush has merely agreed to consult with other participating states "with a view toward India's inclusion." In brief, he has evaded India's request without making a firm commitment. The pomp and pageantry that Mr Bush rolled out for Mr Singh at the White House on Monday, including a 19-gun salute, was to showcase India as a country of rising geo-political importance to the US, and to play to India's sense of pride. The hard-to-implement promises on commercial nuclear power technology may have been designed to show that the visit was far from barren in term of results. In a nutshell, the UPA Government may have committed India to undertake a series of tangible steps fundamentally altering the basis of its nuclear policy in return for Mr Bush's intangible promises. Kaun jeeta * Build fire-wall between military and civilian N-facilities: Will limit their scope * Accept IAEA safeguards for civilian fast breeder reactors: Intrusive inspection * Sign IAEA's Additional Protocol: Any time, any where inspections of facilities * Go with Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty: Can impose cap on India's nuclear arsenal Kaun hara ? * Seek Congress' agreement to adjust US laws and policies: A tough call * Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes: Response unknown * Offer full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India: US vague, NSG unpredictable * Consult with partners on India's participation in ITER: No firm commitment

Posted by: Mudy Jul 19 2005, 05:57 PM's~assurance~to~US~means~a~cap~on~our~n-arsenal

NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON, JULY 19: Brajesh Mishra, who was National Security Advisor during the Pokharan nuclear tests in 1998, today questioned Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s assurance to US President George Bush on segregation of Indian civilian and military nuclear facilities, saying it amounts to acceptance of a ‘‘cap’’ on the size of New Delhi’s minimum credible nuclear deterrent. Speaking to The Indian Express in New Delhi, Mishra said: ‘‘The promise made yesterday in Washington means that we are accepting a cap on the size of our nuclear deterrent with a small number of nuclear weapons.’’ According to Mishra, the NDA government had offered to put a ‘‘couple of existing nuclear facilities under full scope guards but the offer was never accepted’’ by the US. ‘‘The idea was that there would be enough fissile material from the reactors not under safeguards for India’s minimum credible deterrent...But by effecting a separation between civilian and nuclear facilities, India would in fact be agreeing to the basic provision of a future fissile material cut-off treaty even before an international treaty on that crucial subject is negotiated and put into effect by other nuclear weapon states,’’ he said. He said the UPA government’s argument that New Delhi would only be doing what other nuclear weapon states had already done did not hold water. ‘‘The size of their nuclear deterrent is immense in comparison to ours,’’ Mishra said. Observers in Washington are surprised at these comments. Sources in the Indian delegation dismiss Mishra’s main argument that the deal with the US involves a “cap” or a limit on the size of India’s nuclear weapon programme. Sources said hard-ball negotiations with the US were built on the “basic premise that a cap on the size of India’s arsenal will be absolutely unacceptable” to the UPA government. Those familiar with the internal discussions inside the Bush Administration say US non-proliferation hardliners wanted a limit on the size of India’s nuclear weapons material as a precondition for civilian nuclear cooperation with India. At the political level, the American leadership recognised that such a precondition would be a non-starter and rejected it out of the negotiating framework. Sources see little merit in Mishra’s argument that separating the civil and military programmes will limit the production of weapons-useable material for the Indian programme, essentially plutonium. Under the pact it is India’s sovereign right to define which of its facilities are civilian and which are military. The joint statement makes it clear that it is India’s call to first “identify” which are the civilian facilities and then “separate” them from the military programme. The pact with the US obliges India only to “file” a notification with the International Atomic Energy Agency on what it considers are its civilian facilities. Like other nuclear weapon states, India is under no obligation to spell out which of its facilities are “military”. The language of the joint statement is plain enough to suggest that it is entirely up to India to choose which of its facilities it would put under “voluntary” international safeguards. This in essence is no different from the offer of the BJP government, in its earlier negotiations with the US on the nuclear issue, to put some of India’s nuclear reactors under safeguards

Posted by: narayanan Jul 24 2005, 06:51 AM

Mudy look at it this way: WHO HATES THIS AGREEMENT? FOIL. Flush.gif Therefore, it has to be good. Q.E.D. I am very interested to read Reggie's account of the big-power plays in DupleeCity. All I can say is that I have WALKED PAST Blair House and peered into the Gora Ghar from outside the iron-spiked fence - and seen the telescopic rifles peering back at me. BUT .. those were in the context some other stuff that leads me to see a lot more in this agreement than what the experts have written so far. Kanchan Gupta's "Kaun Jeeta / Kaun Hara" list is OK, but incomplete. I believe that one must add: Kaun Jeeta: 1. American nuclear power industry 2. Indian infrastructure industry (cement plants, metal, electric cables, construction industry in general) 3. Indian plumbing/ sensors/ chemical industry (side benefits of huge increase in market size for such things, and relaxed import controls for latest stuff) 4. Indian environmentalists (tough controls and close watch on all Indian industries - swarms of Green types running around, Geiger counters and snooty noses deployed) 5. Indian Space industry - Bush is a huge fan of nuclear power for space propulsion. Till now, he has had a tough time finding other nations willing to go down that road. 6. NON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. (see below) 7. Russia (see below). Kaun Hara: 1. Nonprollotullahs: All the noise from the nonprollotullahs is just noise - they are screeching because their monopoly is about to be knocked loose. They have no solutions, just argue.gif a lot. 2. Chicoms. 3. Pakis. Noooooo P-7 unless it is to include Israel, which will probably be included. 4. Present NPT. The surprise news I have is that the India-US acccord broke through the #1 Mental Block that has been stopping REAL Nuclear Non-Proliferation. NPT was essentially about to expire (or is practically dead). BUsh would like to walk out of it entirely - so as recently as 3 months ago, the mood in the bottom of Foggy Bottom was utter depression - no hope in sight for any new NonProl Initiative. I happen to know a lot of people who have been trying very hard to see what a "New NPT" would look like. This week I think they have reason to perk up, though in the short term they will do some breat-beating about "Oh! What a blow to the NPT!" They have known for a long time that there is no hope of a real NPT without India on board. Well .. Bush just signed on to REAL Non-Prol. Bring India on board, and develop a new non-prol with a firm commitment to disarmament. The stumbling block right now is that Russia claims it needs thousands of nuclear artillery shells (tactical nukes) to counter Red Chinese invasion of Siberia. If this issue can be sorted out, then with some fine Indian negotiating skills, Russia can agree to cut down tactical nukes (the most dangerous weapon w.r.t. being stolen by Abdul) and then US can reduce, and both can reduce to near level of China, then force Chinese reduction (how is another issue). 5. Kofi Anan and UN mafia The other side is that Bush has neatly eliminated Indian opposition to what Bush wants to do to the UN. The G-4 initiative was floundering in that India had already lost hope of Veto. Now who cares? P-6 membership IS the Veto, UN or no UN. And now India and US and Russia are on same side, France is OK, Poodles are barking, but China has been basically isolated, and will hence scamper to pretend to be on same side. US (read John Bolton) can "reform" UN as Bush wants it reformed. Reconstituted UN may be very different. **************************** "Kyon yeh karna tha dubya ko?" But why did Bush see this as a good idea? He's Prez of the US. This agreement means that the severely-depressed US nuke power industry is about to bloom. Right now, from nuclear Arms Reduction, the US is BUYING most of the Russian / FSU enriched uranium fuel, bringing it to US, and using it to run US nuclear power. They tell us that half the bulbs in our homes in US today are burning Russian nuclear weapons. So - the US has a huuuge surfeit of nuclear fuel, and this is ruining the domestic nuclear fuel industry. Now - a huge market for nuclear fuel, close to Russia. The US will do the brokering and collect a nice fee. Price of nuke fuel will rise again in US, American industry happy. Also, tons of money from India pouring back into US. That's not bad for India - much of the money will be spent inside India, and it will be spent on building power plants, the engines that run industry and generate new wealth. Hundreds of thousands of jobs, a fundamental revolution in Indian construction industry and infrastructure. Better roads to carry the reactor vessels. Think about it - right now, nuclear power is 3% of India's meager electric power generation. India wants to multiply the total by some huge factor - AND - nukes are then going to be 25% of the total. Probably, Congress will sign some severe conditions into the laws permitting all these - like - US will use 10% of the revenue from all this to do alternative energy research on fuel cells and hydrogen,a nd 10% for continued arms reduction efforts (i.e., money to Russia). So, in 20 years, with India sinking all money into nuke power, US will coolly announce that it is switching to alternative energy. With Indian money. No point in feeling bad about it - India should use the research and develop alternative energy piggyback, since we clearly have not shown the motivation or organization to do it ourselves instead of going broke buying oil from the Arabs all these years. Win-Win. Most of the whining about "intrusive inspections" is just that - except that the Fast Breeders will have to be removed from civilian program, probably. The P-6 have no intrusive inspections of their MILITARY facilities. Total privacy to do the good stuff. (which is actually what worries me. Do you remember that most of the advanced machine-guns carried by the Chambal Dacoits were straight from Indian MILITARY factories and armories?) Unphortunately, the good parts of this cannot be published under ophishiyal naam onlee. Reggie, if u want the scoop for good causes, pls email u-no-me.

Posted by: Mudy Jul 24 2005, 08:13 AM

Yes, after reading FOIL concern I also feel there is something good which is causing heart burn to FOILies and there masters. My concerns are: Till today Narora is never been fully utilized because of fuel and other issues. Sanctions are US pet goody, relying on uncle for fuel is not a good idea. India needs technology to reuse waste and nuke waste handling. No or miniscule programme to safeguard citizens incase of accident. Very small initiative on research work for alternate energy. They are still in Gobar gas plant era. No major initiative to protect theft from N-plants which are still common. After having separate complex it will be well targeted theft and regular terrorist target. Inspection or not, these babus knows how to deal with papers. They can create factory in sea and destroy in accident and can claim insurance. They can handle anyone everyone.

Posted by: narayanan Jul 24 2005, 08:39 AM

Inspection or not, these babus knows how to deal with papers. They can create factory in sea and destroy in accident and can claim insurance. They can handle anyone everyone.
Mudy, now u hit the crux of the matter. This whole thing is precisely about that. There is a whole (and extremely fast-growing) industry in US researching how to stop exactly that. Consider that they are dealing with how to stop scams designed by the best crooks in Russia, China, North Korea, Iran etc. Inspection regime depends on laws of physics at most basic level, live monitoring, multiple proofs and snap inspections. Not papers. While not meaning to insult our crooks, hey, lets show some respect for the crooks in these countries too. Maybe lot of Retired Babus can get jobs as Red Team Reviewers for IAEA Safeguard Measures. tv_feliz.gif

Posted by: Mudy Jul 24 2005, 10:36 AM

Inspection regime depends on laws of physics at most basic level, live monitoring, multiple proofs and snap inspections. Not papers.
Do they need Visa or they have blanket entry? Saddam gave them real pain and same happened with NK. Inspector’s turnout to be dud everywhere, our great men were able to track Paki jewel much earlier then any jokers. Desi crowd were mainly involved in construction efforts of these jewel in Middle East and other places along with Chini and French. In Iran, even after having camera installed on all critical places, still they managed to show fingers. Our crooks are much smarter but some traitor for easy money can sink boat.

Posted by: Mudy Jul 24 2005, 11:07 AM -By Strobe Talbott

Seeing the outcome of Singh's visit to Washington, some – perhaps many – of those nuclear have-nots will be more inclined to regard the NPT as an anachronism, reconsider their self-restraint, and be tempted by the precedent that India has successfully established and that now, in effect, has an American blessing.

Posted by: narayanan Jul 24 2005, 01:32 PM

Visas? Part of the deal is that they get 5-year multiple-entry visas, no questions asked. 24-hour notification for visits, if that. Nothing new there - at present, all signatories of the Chemical WMD elimination treaty get visits like that. I have a friend in the UN who goes all over the world (incl. parts of the US that you or I will never see, like remote islands in the Pacific) on monitoring visits. If they have reason to suspect some hanky-panky, they are ordered to get on the next plane and land up, and demand access where they need it. They get escorted by military types who may or many not be friendly, but they have to be allowed to visit. But they don't even trust that for the nuke monitoring, say for the Strategic Arms Reduction exercise. They simply put a couple of (advertised) people on site, and probably quite a few unadvertised. Then they set up a "collaborative" regime - in other words, their tactic is a bear-hug, to stay close. Lots of visits back and forth, very pally-pally, but also very tough. They send data back all the time to Oak Ridge or Geneva or wherever. Every bend in the pipe through which the hot stuff goes, has sensors upstream and downstream, counting neutrons or gamma rays or whatever. Note that the concentrations are extremely small - but they use single-particle detectors. Every door has sensors, etc. etc. etc. They simply satisfy Conservation of Mass, Conservation of Charge and maybe even Conservation of Atoms of the hot stuff. If stuff goes missing, they scream. Their aim is to track fissile material from the soil that is dug up, all the way to the spent fuel buried in concrete-sealed containers under the ground. This is going to put a bad dent in the baksheesh regime at desi facilities, for sure, because all these guys willl also have to be cut in, for anything. One may cheat N of the detection systems, but one cannot say what the total number M is, and how many cross-checks there are between the N. *********************** Mudy, I read Strobe Talbott's article with interest. He is Head Honcho of Brookings Institution. I note that he didn't really attack India - what he has done is equivalent of Rajesh Khanna talking down riotous mob of gau-wale ready to go on rampage. So one listens with all antennae out for the noises coming between the lines - i.e., what do they want $$ for? The noise I hear is:

The problem with his whole thesis is that he starts out with the rigid assumption that the original NPT is Uparwale Ki Hukum. India never signed, and that blew their scam out of the water right away. So his claim that India got on the wrong side "irrevocably" etc. etc. is sheer Flush.gif as anyone can see. Trouble is, in the NonProllotullah Tribe, they CANNOT see this, or cannot afford to be seen to see this (I think Talbott must have had the Indian view hammered into his thick skulll by Jawant using a leg of Tandoori chicken, so he must know it all right). No point in attacking Talbott. I am writing praising him for this agreement, which may be the equivalent of standing in downtown Wana and praising General Musharraf for attacking Al Qaida. But Mudy, my take on this agreement is cheers.gif

Posted by: Mudy Jul 26 2005, 09:27 AM

Pinkoo version

Doomed If They Do, Doomed If They Don't: The Indian Nuclear Menace May Get Worse S. P. Udayakumar July 24, 2005 Part I Since the issue at hand is so complicated and steeped in strategic considerations and nucular, sorry, nuclear jargons, let us try to understand the situation with the help of an allegory, "The Largest Singh Meets the Longest Sam, A True Sad Story." There have been living a largest democracy (aka The Largest Singh) and a longest democracy (aka The Longest Sam) in our strange political world. The longest Sam who has always ignored the largest Singh suddenly decides to discover the latter. There is a background to this discovery. The largest Sam has been seeing a dragon-like apparition for sometime now. This stubborn ghost keeps coming and coming (especially after the `iron curtain' was removed and the `rising sun' went into recession). So the longest Sam desperately tries to find an exorcist, who could deal with this ghost locally and stop it from coming to his shores. Finally, the longest Sam finds an exorcist, the largest Singh with many a trick under his turban and with all the potentials (and even some vague aspirations) to be able to `come' himself at some distant future point. So the longest Sam designs a strategy! Tie up the stubborn apparition and the supple exorcist together. So neither of them will be coming! At least for sometime! The largest Singh (exorcist) has indeed had a confrontation with this dragon-like apparition once before and still fosters some ill-will. However, he is more worried about the next-door sorcerer, Hush-Mush-Sharaf who keeps directing little demons and devils to his door. So the largest Singh creates a few blood-sucking parasitic vampires called Bomb-Iyers. Not to be let down in the tussle, Hush-Mush-Sharaf, the sorcerer, creates his own killer conman, Bomb-Sell Khan. Strangely enough, BS Khan has the blessings of the dragon-ghost while his necromancer boss keeps in touch with the longest Sam. So our largest Singh is caught up in a mess now: Bomb-Sell Khan bobs round and round And the dragon dances all around. The longest Sam's watching on the WH-mount; And the Bomb-Iyers nag and nag for more amount. The Bomb-Iyers have been promising radically big and radiantly (or radioactively?) bright things that could stop the BS Khans, scare away the Beijing ghost, make the largest Singh look like the longest Sam, and even secure him a place in history, in future, in the history of future, in the future of history, and all at the same time. Alas, Bomb-Iyers turn out to be idle extortionists. They keep asking for more money, more time, more secrecy, more laws, more (foreign) help, more patience, more waste, more, more, more. In the meantime, the demons still keep coming (albeit in smaller numbers) and the dragon continues to haunt. As the going gets tough in CD (Capital Delhi), the largest Singh goes to DC. In DC, the longest Sam plots a strategy: Hmm…how about I give the largest Singh the technology vampire Just as my good ol' Brit cousins threw his textile knowledge into bonfire. That will certainly pull the rug under the feet of Bomb-Iyers And give me complete control to tie `em all up with just one coir. The longest Sam screams at the top of his voice: "Now Clear…Now Clear… New Clear …Nucular!" Sam beckons Singh; Singh obliges Sam. The largest democracy and the longest democracy meet! In a totally undemocratic manner, of course! The largest Singh had not taken his people into confidence before giving up his independence in important policy matters. Similarly, the longest Sam has had no consultations with his people or policymakers or foreign friends (and fiends). Having agreed upon something (only portions of which have been shared with their respective popular and representative constituencies), the longest Sam and the largest Singh are going back to work - to make the deal democratic. With hands around each other, they mutter in unison: "Strange workings of the democratic spirit!" And the people in the largest Singh's native land who have been trying to get rid of the parasitic Bomb-Iyers and their `vegetarian' and `non-vegetarian' nuclear diets look all worried. Do Singh and Sam do something about this nuclear menace? The largest Singh and the longest Sam swing their bottoms crooning: "Doomed If We Do, Doomed If We Don't."

Posted by: Chacko Jul 30 2005, 12:15 AM

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Posted by: Kaushal Aug 4 2005, 02:23 AM

I am for the most part in the camp of those who believe that the current US India rapprochement on nuclear matters is generally a win win situation. India badly needs technology to accelerate her nuclear program.The progress in the Indian nuclear power program has been painfully slow and india may be superceded by developments in this area. This is not to take away from indian scientists who have done a yoeman job in keeping the program afloat over the decades, despite a plethora of boycotts, emanating especially from our friends the americans. But the fact remains that we lack as of now the manufacturing prowess that a first class nuclear program demands. Absent such a manufacturing base it has been a miracle that we have been able to build even the seven plants that we have. To admit to such a lacuna in our manufacturing capabilities does not take away from our manhood as a nation. So the agreement if in fact it loosens the stranglehoid that america has imposed on india is on balance a good thing. The division into defense and civilian sectors of the AEC is also a good thing and will force india to devote production reactors solely committed to producing fuel for weapons. All thisa will add to the cost of the program, but it will be a small prce to pay if the civilian program is to accelerate, as it must. PS The fact that strobe talbott does not like the accord is another plus for the same. !

Posted by: Bharatvarsh Aug 8 2005, 10:08 AM

India's raw deal with the United States By Brahma Chellaney International Herald Tribune MONDAY, AUGUST 8, 2005 NEW DELHI When President George W. Bush last month announced his support for a deal allowing civilian nuclear technology sales to India, a storm of protests arose. Nonproliferation advocates around the globe were angered that Bush had implicitly legitimized New Delhi's nuclear arsenal, but what has been less noted is that Indian voices were raised also. Why? Because the technology deal involves an unequal bargain in which India gains few benefits even as it agrees to many restrictions - including a limit on its ability to deter its nuclear-armed neighbor China. India claims that under the deal it will assume the same duties and rights as the other nuclear powers, "no more and no less." The truth, however, is different. Indeed, China's welcome and Pakistan's lack of protest indicate their glee over a deal that employs the lure of commercial nuclear power assistance to help constrain the growth of India's nuclear military capacity. The deal has advantages for America. If approved by the U.S. Congress and the other nuclear powers, it would lift a sales ban that dates back to the first Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. The ban has been a major stumbling block to the forging of a true U.S.-Indian strategic partnership. Another advantage for Washington is that the deal opens the way to tens of billions of dollars worth of contracts for U.S. technology. What India gets out of it is less clear. One benefit is that the deal would allow the country to import nuclear reactors and fuel for generating electricity. But the protesters in India are focusing on the deal's implications for the country's nascent nuclear military program. China has always been the primary focus of its nuclear drive; India still lacks missiles that can strike deep into the Chinese heartland. And while Bush has made only a promise that he may not be able to fulfill, the deal lists a lot of requirements for India. This includes bringing civil nuclear plants and materials under international monitoring, allowing foreign inspectors unhindered access, and refraining from further testing. By agreeing to separate its civilian and military nuclear programs, India will raise the costs of its declared policy to build a "credible minimum deterrent." The deal strikes the weak spot of India's nuclear military capacity - its umbilical ties with the civilian program. India's weapons program flows out of the civilian nuclear program. Bush, meanwhile, rejected New Delhi's request that the deal classify India as a nuclear-weapons state. India, however, has agreed to take on obligations that the recognized nuclear powers have not accepted. First, India is to begin "identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner" and then declare the civilian part in full to the International Atomic Energy Agency. (In contrast, China will remain free from any obligation to carry out civil-military segregation.) Second, India has agreed to "voluntarily" allow all its civil nuclear sites to be inspected by the energy agency. The other nuclear powers have not done that in practice, because in a majority of cases there is not even the pretense of civil-military separation. The five recognized nuclear powers, under voluntary accords, offer nuclear materials and plants for agency inspections in name only. The agency, in return, carries out token inspections or, often, no inspections. India, however, will have to accept, on its civilian program, rigorous inspections. The atomic energy agency will treat it like a non-nuclear state. Third, India has pledged "adherence," to the rules of the very nuclear technology cartels that continue to exclude it - the American-led Nuclear Suppliers' Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. For Bush, the deal is an astute move that can result in lucrative business contracts, secure a firm U.S. strategic foothold in India, and bring a large part of the Indian nuclear program under international monitoring. However, is it in the United States's interest to limit India's ability to deter China? Bush faces an uphill task persuading both Congress and America's partners in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (including China) to exempt India from export controls. New Delhi should wait until Bush has delivered his part of the bargain and then meet its obligations to the extent honored by the other nuclear powers, and with the same rights as them - "no more and no less." (Brahma Chellaney is a professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. )

Posted by: k.ram Aug 11 2005, 05:51 AM

Posted by: k.ram Aug 19 2005, 04:49 AM

Former Deputy National Security Adviser Satish Chandra believes the recently concluded nuclear deal between India and the US is dangerous for India's national security, because it exposes India's nuclear weapons programme to external interference. 'The US has not fully delivered' 'World doesn't know how many bombs India has' In the second part of the interview to Senior Editor Sheela Bhatt, Chandra explains why separating India's civilian and military nuclear facilities will adversely impact its weapons programme, which needs to be flexible to adapt to changing circumstances. 'US wants to cap our nuclear programme'

Posted by: Kaushal Aug 19 2005, 03:41 PM

Satish Chandra is the brother(IIRC) of former ambassador to the US Naresh Chandra(Saxena). Both very astute individuals. Doesnt mean they were always right.

Posted by: Manu Aug 24 2005, 03:35 PM

By Madhuprasad N DH News Service Bangalore: India will soon develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a flight range of 9,000-12,000 km. According to sources in the ministry of defence (MoD), based on the experience with the Agni, the medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), the MoD is pressing for the creation of an ICBM. The ICBM would probably be a three-stage ballistic missile with solid fuel rockets in the first and second stages, and a liquid propellant rocket in the third stage. The launch weight of the missile may reach 270-275 tonnes and an impact error of around 2 to 2.8 km, the sources said. The missile may have a 2,490-3,490 kg releasable front section with two to three warheads of 15-20 kilotons each, the sources added. Propellant engines There are plans to use the second stage propellant engine of the Vikas booster rocket during the development of this missile to increase its flight range. The ICBM is likely to be test-fired by 2008 and is expected to be added to the Indian armed forces’ deterrence arsenal by 2015. The Indian armed forces currently possess 12 ground-based Prithvi medium-range missile launchers with conventional warheads and a flight range of 150-250 km with installation capabilities of single warheads with a yield of 10-15 kilotons. The same launchers could be used for the launch of ICBMs rolleyes.gif , the sources added. These launchers are part of the 333-rd missile regiment, based near Hyderabad. The ICBMs developed by other countries use a ballistic trajectory involving a significant ascent and descent, including sub-orbital flight. ICBMs are differentiated by maximum range from other ballistic missiles like intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles, and the newly named theatre ballistic missiles. Developed countries like Russia, the United States, France, the UK, and China currently have operational ICBM systems. While Agni is a two-stage solid fuel ballistic missile capable of delivering a 10-15 kiloton nuclear warhead up to 2,500 km, the ICBM will be a three-stage solid and liquid ballistic missile, the sources said. They also pointed out that there would be no monetary constraint for the project since many of the systems for the ICBM are similar to the current Agni missile which has already shown success and are being developed. MAIN FEATURES OF THE ICBM Range 9,000-12,000 km launch weight 270-275 tons Impact error 2 to 2.8 km Releasable front 2,490-3,490 kg Warheads 2 to 3 of 15-20 kilotons

Posted by: acharya Sep 9 2005, 10:18 AM

Book Review in The Telegraph, 9 Sept., 2005

THE MORE, THE SAFER Strike force SECOND STRIKE: ARGUMENTS ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR IN SOUTH ASIA By Rajesh Rajagopalan, Viking, Rs 395 From 1998 onwards, the view emanating from the Oval Office has been that south Asia has become the most dangerous place on earth owing to the nuclearization of both India and Pakistan. Most nuclear strategists (both Indian and foreign) tend to follow the above line. Ironically, successive Indian governments, by repeating the argument that nuclear weapons in the hands of unstable military dictatorships in the ‘failed’ state of Pakistan has increased the likelihood of nuclear war, have strengthened the American position. In this slim volume, Rajesh Rajagopalan offers an alternative interpretation. He argues that the American concern for the nuclearization of the subcontinent is a part of their policy to roll back the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan. And that since the anti-nuclear lobby engages in polemics, it does not merit attention. De-nuclearization of the region, as demanded by the anti-proliferationists in the US and the anti-nuclear lobby, will not reduce the danger of nuclear war. As long as the big five retain their nukes, the danger to the world will remain. According to Rajagopalan, the small nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan are less dangerous than the big arsenals of the US and Russia which remain on ‘hair trigger alert’. Rajagopalan derives his theory from Kenneth Waltz, who had maintained that the spread of nuclear weapons would make the world safer. The very possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of small and medium powers would prevent the outbreak of conventional war. Deterrence stability, claims Rajagopalan, depends not only on technology and the number of nuclear warheads available, but also on doctrine. In contrast to the two superpowers, whose nuclear doctrine is based on ‘ready to launch’ principle, India and Pakistan have a go-slow policy. The nuclear warheads of India and Pakistan are not mated with their delivery vehicles. Further, Islamabad and Delhi are against the doctrine of massive retaliation or mutually assured destruction. Much heat has been generated over Pakistan not agreeing to the principle of ‘no first strike.’ India, in contrast, has emphasized that it would launch its nukes only if its adversary were to mount a nuclear attack. Pakistan’s logic is that if India decides to exert its conventional superiority in the battlefield, then it would resort to a nuclear attack in order to avert defeat. Rajagopalan has a benevolent interpretation of nuclear opinion in Pakistan. He asserts that Pakistan’s rejection of “no first use” is not equivalent to a preemptive or first strike. The author assumes that in case Indian forces cross over into Pakistan, the latter would merely resort to a local nuclear strike against the Indian forces within Pakistan to stop further aggression. It is to be noted that the author has no data to back his claims. Further, Rajagopalan says that if India acquires a strategic nuclear triad (air-land-sea-based nuclear weapons) and anti-ballistic missiles, then Pakistan would be forced to increase its nuclear missiles and the stable deterrence between the two nations would disintegrate. If Rajagopalan’s thesis is accepted then it means stasis for India’s nuclear arsenal. But India has to take into account China too. As long as Chinese nuclear missiles are stationed in Tibet, India needs submarines equipped with nuclear missiles. Small is not always beautiful for a country’s security. But there is a lot in Rajagopalan’s argument that anti-ballistic missiles are useless. Like the bombers, at least a few missiles will ‘go through’. KAUSHIK ROY
Very important line of ideas.
In this slim volume, Rajesh Rajagopalan offers an alternative interpretation. He argues that the American concern for the nuclearization of the subcontinent is a part of their policy to roll back the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan. And that since the anti-nuclear lobby engages in polemics, it does not merit attention. De-nuclearization of the region, as demanded by the anti-proliferationists in the US and the anti-nuclear lobby, will not reduce the danger of nuclear war.
This may be true. By creating a cycle of crisis in the sub-continent with nuclear dimension the major powers are creating a case for nuclear disarmament. It may also involve an actual use of nuclear weapons which will give international support for nuclear disarmament. By keeping only two non NPT state with nuclear weapons and creating crisis between them they are waiting for the right climate for roll back of nuclear programmes. Hence it is very important for the major powers to make sure that there are no more nuclear weapon states such as Iran, NK etc.

Posted by: Spinster Sep 9 2005, 10:28 AM

"The very possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of small and medium powers would prevent the outbreak of conventional war." 'A bomb in the back yard and an ICBM in the front yard of every country will lead to worl peace and understanding' Spinster 1998

Posted by: Mudy Sep 12 2005, 12:33 PM Wider U.S. Net Seeks Allies Against Iran's Nuclear Plan By STEVEN R. WEISMAN Published: September 10, 2005

Posted by: Mudy Sep 13 2005, 07:01 PM

Double whammy The Pioneer Edit Desk If France is to work to convince the 40 other countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to remove restrictions on supply of civilian nuclear technology and fuel to India, then the logical question is: Will it abandon its own old policy of holding hostage the resumption of supplies for Tarapur to New Delhi signing the CTBT and NPT? In April 2000, the then President of India, KR Narayanan, had stated after an official trip to Paris that France had no problems about rekindling the old relationship but India's refusal to enter the multilateral framework proved a hindrance. There was no clear statement on this at the end of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's talks with French President Jacques Chirac on Monday. One suspects that the foreign policy establishment is on the overdrive to deflect the gaze of sceptics ever since the Washington joint statement in which the US gave a commitment to lift its own restrictions on sale of nuclear hi-tech and fuel. Two significant things have happened since then. First, Washington removed six Indian companies from its discriminating "entities list" and also freed India from the "NP-2" group. But India still remains on "NP-1" which can only be cleared if the NSG approves. The second development is not so encouraging, despite the two governments' announcement of the formation of working groups. Just last week, the Bush Administration came under heavy fire from the US Congress for negotiating a significant civilian nuclear deal with India by ignoring the need to seek the House's opinion first. There still exist reservoirs of doubt on Capitol Hill if a nation that refuses to blindly toe Uncle Sam's line is a friend entitled to an opinion, or, to recall Alfred Dulles, plain "immoral". That militates against Mr Bush's ability to win Congressional support to waive existing sanctions against India because New Delhi's perceived support for Iran's nuclear ambitions is a vexed issue with American law makers. The Congressional hearing saw Under Secretary Nicholas Burns deflect the same tough questions which plagued the Clinton Administration in 2000. It is indeed curious to see the contrasting picture in Islamabad where a regime which should not even be considered for parity with India is already thinking two steps ahead. It is ready to sacrifice the Iran-India pipeline in return for its own nuclear reactors from the US. The strategists in Islamabad are aware of the limitations of the "responsible democracy" line which the US establishment uses to win Indian hearts. Eventually, what matters to the US is a country's ability to play the diminutive to its global designs. Gen Musharraf has certainly queered the pitch for his scheduled meeting with Mr Singh in New York by raising this unilateral offer without considering the other two principals - India and Iran. What comes as a double whammy for India is the tradeoff sought by Gen Musharraf - nuclear respectability. Knowing Pakistan's proliferation record - and the US's tendency to look the other way - this should sober up a foreign office that places a premium on Sufi music over hard-nosed diplomacy.

Posted by: Mudy Sep 15 2005, 11:08 AM NGO Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the Fourth Article XIV Conference on Accelerating Entry-Into-Force To be delivered 22 September 2005

Posted by: Mudy Sep 21 2005, 02:17 PM

Pioneer op-ed

Nuclear doctrines and stability G Parthasarathy On July 8, 1996, the World Court ruled that countries possessing nuclear weapons have not just a 'need' but an 'obligation' to commence negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. The World Court also declared that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to principles of International Law. Some doubts were expressed about use of nuclear weapons when the 'very survival of a state' was threatened. Despite this ruling, the use of nuclear weapons remains central to the national security doctrines of the five NPT 'recognised' nuclear weapons powers. Releasing the Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review in 2002, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that American nuclear strategy aims at providing "a range of options to pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and loss of lives may be very different and more difficult to discern than past adversaries". The recently formulated US Draft Nuclear Doctrine also speaks of the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. In negotiations held with Iran recently, the UK and France have reserved the right to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states in the event of an attack on them, "their dependent territories, their armed forces or other troops, their allies or on a state towards which they have a security commitment". The use of nuclear weapons is an integral part of NATO nuclear strategy, under which nuclear weapons can be used even on the presumption that a potential adversary possesses weapons of mass destruction. The Russian federation too has discarded the Soviet pledge that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Despite their own readiness to use nuclear weapons, many NATO countries implicitly assert that India and Pakistan are less 'responsible' and 'rational' than the five 'recognised' nuclear weapons powers. The Americans despatched the 'Gates Mission' to India and Pakistan in 1990, claiming that both countries had readied their nuclear arsenals for use against each other. President Bill Clinton's Adviser Bruce Reidel has claimed that Pakistan was readying its nuclear weapons for use during the Kargil conflict in 1999. American claims of India and Pakistan being 'saved' from a nuclear holocaust by their diplomacy have been vigorously denied by both the countries. Mercifully, the Bush Administration has not stated that India and Pakistan were on the verge of nuclear conflict in the events following the December 13, 2001, attack on India's Parliament by Pakistani terrorists. Western propaganda about India and Pakistan being less than 'responsible' nuclear weapons states has unfortunately led sections of the Indian elite and the media to actually believe in this propaganda. Pakistan decided to acquire nuclear weapons not because India had nuclear weapons, but because its ruling elite believed that after the dismemberment of the country during the Bangladesh conflict, it needed such weapons because of India's size and conventional superiority. This decision was taken by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in January 1972, well before the Pokhran blast of July 1974. Pakistan has subsequently endeavoured to use its nuclear weapons to blackmail the international community to endorse its ambitions on Kashmir by repeatedly asserting that Kashmir is a 'nuclear flashpoint'. This propaganda no longer works. Pakistan has realised that such an approach lacks credibility and reinforces the international perception that it is 'irresponsible'. Not much has changed since Bhutto decided in 1972 that nuclear weapons were essential for Pakistan to deter India from overrunning his country. Pakistani strategic thinkers like former Foreign Ministers Abdul Sattar and Agha Shahi and Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan have also envisaged use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan for similar reasons. The only authoritative enunciation of when Pakistan would use nuclear weapons has been by the head of the Strategic Planning Division of its National Command Authority Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, who asserted that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were 'aimed solely at India'. Lt Gen Kidwai stated that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistan's territory, or destroys a large part of its land and air forces. He also held out the possibility of use of nuclear weapons if India tries to 'economically strangle' Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation. The last two reasons given by General Kidwai are obviously propagandistic. No Indian Government is ever going to seek to conquer large parts of Pakistan territory. Present international compulsions are such that a prolonged conflict with Pakistan can be ruled out. The possibilities of India and Pakistan resorting to a nuclear conflict are, therefore, virtually nonexistent. It is in this background that Indian military strategists have looked for 'strategic space' to respond militarily to Pakistani provocations in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere. The 'Cold Start' concept recently adopted by the Indian Army is one such strategic option to counter Pakistan's efforts to escalate support for its jihad in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India. It is heartening that young Indian scholars like Dr Rajesh Rajagopalan of JNU are carrying out serious studies on these issues. The public and even parliamentarians in India should be better informed on such crucial issues of national security. Unlike Pakistan, India's nuclear arsenal and strategy is not 'Pakistan centric'. India has categorically committed that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and will never use nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess such weapons. At the same time, as a matter of abundant precaution, we have reserved our right to use nuclear weapons if our territory or Indian armed forces anywhere come under attack by an adversary using weapons of mass destruction. China remains a crucial factor in formulating our nuclear doctrine. China's nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan, its deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles in Tibet and Xingjiang and the signing of a Friendship Treaty with Pakistan during the recent visit of Prime Minister Wen Jiao Bao to Pakistan, are factors that Indian strategic planners cannot overlook in determining our nuclear and missile capabilities. China has offered to sign agreements on 'no first use' of nuclear weapons with the other five NPT 'recognised' nuclear weapons states. It has signed such an agreement with Russia and concluded a "non-targeting" agreement with the Clinton Administration, immediately after India's nuclear tests in 1998. While China claims that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons against any state, it has introduced an element of ambiguity in its nuclear policy on India, by also stating that it's 'no first use pledge' is for those countries that have signed the NPT, or are members of regional nuclear weapons free zones. It is time for New Delhi to formally ask China whether it is prepared to categorically commit itself to a 'no first use pledge' with India. We also need to take some hard decisions on how we are going to counter China's nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan. China has several border problems with its Asia-Pacific neighbours like Vietnam and the Philippines. India's response to China's efforts to 'contain' India should, therefore, involve a more focused approach to security relations with countries like Vietnam. With Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, having been returned to power with an overwhelming mandate for effecting significant policy changes, a more intensive security dialogue with Japan should also be initiated. A stable multipolar world order is feasible only when there is a strategic regional balance of power within the Asia-Pacific region. India has to contribute pro-actively in building such a stable strategic balance.

Posted by: Mudy Oct 24 2005, 08:10 AM,001300850000.htm

Calling for "a new global consensus" on nuclear non-proliferation, India on Monday deplored double standards that have put Iran's nuclear programme under unflinching scrutiny while treating Pakistan's clandestine proliferation with kid gloves. "Our own security interests have been seriously undermined by clandestine nuclear weapon programmes in our neighbourhood aided and abetted, or at the least selectively ignored, by some Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories themselves," Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran told a group of strategy experts and journalists in what was a major foreign policy address .............. "In seeking clarity on such clandestine activities, the international community must focus not merely on recipient states but on supplier states as well; otherwise our global non-proliferation effort would be undermined by charges of motivated selectivity and discrimination," Saran said in a forthright espousal of India's views on the new non-proliferation regime. "With respect to the Iran nuclear issue, we welcome Iran's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accounting for previously undeclared activities, but it is important that remaining issues, which involve the Pakistan-based AQ Khan network are satisfactorily clarified as well," he said.
"India is poised today to enter a new phase in its foreign policy. We aspire to be a permanent member of the Security Council. We are demonstrating a growing capability to shoulder regional and global responsibilities." "We cannot sit out the debates on the big issues of our times. Our interests demand a vigorous and articulate diplomatic effort that explains our position and advance our interests," Saran said in an obvious reference to India's controversial vote in favour of the IAEA resolution that paves the way for referring Iran to the Security Council.

Posted by: Ravish Nov 4 2005, 01:06 PM

[color=blue][i][b]The West does not consider India as a threat; its pro Pakistan stance was based on other factors. The first was that USA felt that a strong Pakistan was necessary to contain the USSR if it tries to expand to the East. One should remember that this was not a new policy of the West which suddenly came into existence after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. This policy had been there since early 1800 when the British decided to back Afghanistan so that Imperial Russia could not expand to the East. The second reason for the pro Pakistan and somewhat anti-Indian stand by the West originated from India’s desire to have an independent foreign policy of its own. India fist got this idea when it realised in the early 1950s that the West is not ready to part with modern technology which was needed at that time for the rapid industrialization of the nation. In fact, the West wanted India to be the main supplier of raw material for their industries, so that the finished goods from the West can still have the large captive Indian market. Now the situation has changed.There is no USSr and India has become sufficiently industrialised to challange the industrailised nations of the West, in the markets of Asia and Africa.It has also developed Human Resources to a level where it can be of help to many of the industries in the4 West to survive in today's world.Therefore, we see the gradual change in attitude of the Western nations towards India.

Posted by: Mudy Nov 4 2005, 04:04 PM

One should remember that this was not a new policy of the West which suddenly came into existence after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. This policy had been there since early 1800 when the British decided to back Afghanistan so that Imperial Russia could not expand to the East.
Extension of British colonial Great Game which started in 18 century and US took over where British left.
It has also developed Human Resources to a level where it can be of help to many of the industries in the4 West to survive in today's world.Therefore, we see the gradual change in attitude of the Western nations towards India
Now it will be "resource war". To support aging Europe/West and to sustain current living standards, west needs India's educated young population.

Posted by: Mudy Nov 14 2005, 02:35 PM

Show us your N-blueprint: US Pioneer News Service / New Delhi The United States on Monday made it clear that India would have to present a "credible" plan of separating civil and nuclear establishments before the American Congress decides on lifting sanctions on it. Reiterating the Bush Administration's commitment to implement the July 18 nuclear agreement with India, US Ambassador to India David C Mulford told journalists, "The deal is a priority for President George Bush. It would not have been possible but for his personal intervention." He said the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would also have to be "positive" on the deal for it to be "fully effective" but noted that officials of the nuclear watchdog had recently made "positive statements" on the issue. Both India and the US wanted to get support of the 35-country Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) whose majority of members were also positive on the deal, except for China which was undecided yet, the US envoy said. Seeking to clear "misunderstandings" in a section of media here, he said under the deal, India had agreed to do certain things, most importantly separating its civil and nuclear industry. "We are waiting to see that separation plan," he said, adding if the US Administration finds it "credible", it will put it before the Congress for legislation to lift sanctions against India. "Token separation is not going to be acceptable," he warned, adding that the credibility of the Indian plan would be judged by experts. The US ambassador underlined that once the agreement was implemented, it would be on permanent basis and involve certain IAEA protocol like inspections. He hoped that India's vote on Iran's nuclear programme at an IAEA meeting this month would be based on its national interests, like it did in September. "In its last vote, India expressed its national interest. I would once again expect India to vote in what it considers to be its national interest." Asked about former external affairs minister K Natwar Singh's recommendation to the Indian Government to revise its vote at the next IAEA meet, Mr Mulford said, "I don't regard these statements as representative of views of the Indian Government." He also sought to dispel the impression that the Volcker committee - which probed irregularities in Iraq's oil-for-food programme and named Natwar Singh and the Congress party as illegal beneficiaries - had anything to do with the US
Lets see how much Mudmohan/Sonua got paid for this deal

Posted by: Mudy Dec 3 2005, 10:18 PM

Agencies Brussels, Dec 3 The European Union agreed on Friday to include India in a €10 billion project to build an experimental nuclear fusion reactor that in the long-run could provide virtually unlimited, cheap and clean energy. The EU's willingness to work with India on a civil nuclear project comes months after the United States said it would support India's nuclear power development despite its refusal to sign a global treaty barring the spread of atomic weapons. That move was seen as a dramatic policy shift as Washington had previously frowned on India's status as an unofficial nuclear power. The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), is a project run at the moment by five partners apart from the EU -- China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States -- and all have to agree to let India into the club. "By bringing in India, more than half on the world's population is represented at ITER," Antonia Mochan, the European Commission's spokeswoman on science and research, said. "It's important to have such a scientific experiment which could have such huge ramifications for energy, and its important to do that with people who could bring so much scientific know-how." European cooperation with New Delhi on the project was a separate issue from India's avoidance of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, she said. "There is the non-proliferation issue and we are pursuing that with the Indians as part of our external relations policy ... This is nuclear fusion to be used as energy -- this doesn't have any military potential," Mochan said. The aim of the reactor is to mimic the way the sun produces energy by heating hydrogen atoms to 100 million Celsius -- much hotter than centre of the sun -- to achieve a fusion which would produce helium and yield huge amounts of energy. What is ITER: ITER is experimental step on studies of plasma physics and power-producing fusion power plants It's based around a hydrogen plasma torus operating at over 100 million °C, and will produce 500 MW of fusion power. It is technically ready to start construction and the first plasma operation is expected in 2016. ITER is to be constructed in Europe, at Cadarache, near Aix-en-Provence, France. One kg of fusion fuel would produce the same amount of energy as 10 million kg of fossil fuels. Who are involved? It is an international project involving China, European Union and Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and United States, under the auspices of the IAEA. By bringing in India, more than half on the world's population is represented at ITER

Posted by: Mudy Dec 6 2005, 02:50 PM,0008.htm

Russia will do all it can to ensure India's energy needs are fulfilled. At the same time it wants New Delhi to sort its differences with the nuclear supplier group (NSG) countries on the separation of civil and military uses of nuclear technology. Also, the two countries said the Iranian nuclear programme issue must be solved within the parameters of the IAEA. ..... “As a strategic partner we will actively work to ensure India is able to cope in all its difficulties and issues regarding the peaceful use of nuclear technology,” said Russian President Vladimir Putin at a joint news conference with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Tuesday. ......... “India is separating nuclear technology for military use from civilian-use technology and has adopted all the necessary legislations,” said Putin. The united stand on Iran also came in response to a question. Putin said, “We believe the potential for the IAEA to resolve the Iranian dossier has not been exhausted.”
They are also towing US line. Why?

Posted by: k.ram Dec 13 2005, 10:22 AM

India after the India-US Nuclear Deal By Ambassador T.P.Sreenivasan (Prepared text for a talk given at a Brookings-Carnegie-Stimson event at the Stimson Centre, Washington D.C at 430 pm on Wednesday, December 7, 2005) I have been a witness to and a part of several defining moments in Indian foreign policy during my 37 years in the Foreign Service. They transformed the way Indian leaders and diplomats looked at the world and dealt with international issues, even though there were no announcements of any change of policy. They coloured our thinking and determined our judgments and clearly marked a break from our past habits and attitudes. Attaining self-sufficiency in food grains, the victory in the Bangladesh war, the PNE of 1974, the declaration of the emergency and the subsequent change of Government, the suppression of the coup in Maldives, economic liberalization and the nuclear tests of 1998 were some of these moments. That India did not have to depend on food imports to feed its millions sharpened the independent edge of Indian foreign policy. The victory in Bangladesh destroyed the notion that religion should determine nationhood. The PNE of 1974 made us proud of our scientific prowess. The emergency made us hang our heads in shame, but the subsequent elections, free and fair beyond doubt, strengthened our democratic foundations. Maldives established Indian pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean. The liberalization of the economy unleashed India’s economic strength. The tests of 1998 removed the last vestiges of insecurity from Indian minds. The India-US nuclear deal of July 2005 marked yet another defining moment. India, which had fought nuclear ostracism of different grades since 1974, finally reached the point of finding a higher place in the nuclear caste system, very close to the Brahmins, the nuclear weapon states. It broke the barriers of NPT and CTBT to transform itself from a non-nuclear weapon state in possession of nuclear weapons to a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology with the rights and obligations similar to those of other such states, “such as the United States”. India overcame its half a century old paranoia about U.S. domination and felt confident about reaching an accommodation with it. It struck a balance between its need for technology and equipment and its fierce desire for autonomy in nuclear maters. It was a major event, as spectacular as the others, which dictated a new mindset for Indian diplomatic practitioners. But, unlike the other major events, the nuclear deal became a bone of contention within India and opened up an unprecedented foreign policy debate. Judging from the views of some former diplomats, it is possible to imagine that there is no consensus on it even within the establishment. One reason for this phenomenon is that the nuclear deal was still a blue print when it was revealed and there were issues to be resolved before it became an accomplished fact. Both its promoters and detractors went to work and new issues emerged. No other bilateral agreement has been the subject of so much analysis before it came into effect. But if such an interregnum were available, many agreements would have been in jeopardy. Of course, there are deeper reasons for the extraordinary attention that the nuclear deal has attracted. Most important among them is the popular suspicion about the motivation of the United States for finding an accommodation with India. There is much admiration in India for the U.S. for its accomplishments and its power. It is the Promised Land that beckons Indians who aspire high. But even after the end of the cold war, there is no change in the basic perception that the U.S has its own agenda in dealing with India. This is particularly grave when it comes to nuclear matters. Before the tests of 1998, even discussing nuclear issues with the United States was considered hazardous. The reaction to the tentative movements made by Mr. Morarji Desai and Mr. P.V.Narasimha Rao in this area was negative. But the Indian public became comfortable after May 1998 in seeking an understanding with the U.S. short of rolling and eliminating our nuclear capability. But the suspicion became deeper after the United States acknowledged Pakistan as a frontline state in its fight against terrorism. In the Indian mind, Pakistan is not just the initiator and promoter of terrorism but also a global supporter of it as an instrument of freedom struggle. So the repeated declarations by the United States that it wishes to see India as a great power have not made much of an impact on public opinion in India. It has been pointed out that no state can make another a great power, this being dependent on various inherent strengths such as economic and military strength and political resilience and a country’s own greatness. No power would want to build up another to compete with it. At best, the mood is to keep an open mind. The Iran issue, first the pipeline and then the nuclear waltz in Vienna further muddled the perception. The question as to why the Bush Administration moved beyond the Jaswant Singh- Talbot exchanges and even NSSP to legitimize the Indian nuclear capability has not been answered fully. The official Indian explanation is that India has become such an important factor in global issues of interest to it that the U.S. wants to build a partnership with it. The interest of the E.U. and others to build partnerships with India supports this view. The more popular understanding is that the U.S. wishes to build a relationship with India to counter the spectacular economic, military and political power of China. Sufficient evidence exists to reinforce this theory, even though India itself does not endorse it. At the same time, it is obvious that the India card is only one among the many tools that the U.S. has in dealing with the emergence of China and, therefore, this factor should not be exaggerated beyond a point. At least one group of strategic thinkers believes that China is no threat to India or the United States. One theory is that the U.S. motivation is to get a hold over the Indian nuclear capability by enticing India into the non-proliferation regime by making illusory concessions. Those who subscribe to this theory see in the deal a Machiavellian strategy to circumscribe the Indian nuclear capability. The Indian public is not convinced as yet that India needs the nuclear deal for its civilian or military needs. The Gandhian insistence on “swadeshi” or indigenous effort is deeply embedded in the Indian psyche and it has been nursed by occasional reports from our scientific establishments that the necessity of denial has become the mother of crucial inventions. The Indian nuclear programme has not been transparent and even the demand for transparency is muted by the awareness of national security considerations. There are half-baked notions about India using its plentiful thorium resources to replace uranium. The wastefulness of re-inventing the wheel does not seem to impress the “swadeshi” fraternity. Since the dire need for nuclear fuel, if not for modern technology and equipment, for energy generation has been a well-kept secret, many in India do not see why India should go out of its way to secure nuclear co-operation. The global debate about nuclear versus conventional energy for development is also present among the Indian intelligentsia. Many believe that India’s quest for electricity on the nuclear route is neither necessary nor desirable. The present low share of nuclear energy in the Indian energy mix and the fear of accidents generated by Chernobyl have impacted Indian thinking. At least one state in India, Kerala, shares the allergy to nuclear power stations. Some do not even accept that nuclear energy is the cleanest form of energy. While it is free of greenhouse gas emissions, it has other hazards that make it unattractive. Even those who understand the imperatives of joining the global nuclear mainstream think that India has made too many concessions in the deal. According to them, the total freedom that India had professed for many years had been sacrificed for the sake of minor benefits. The separation of military and civilian establishments, voluntary placement of the civilian establishments under IAEA safeguards and the signing of an Additional Protocol are seen as violative of our nuclear sovereignty. The U.S. on the other hand, has merely agreed to work with the Congress to change domestic laws and to consult allies to remove the constraints on full nuclear co-operation with India. The subsequent discussions in the Congress and the NSG in Vienna have shown that the U.S. part of the deal may not be delivered. There are also serious attempts to modify the terms of the agreement in a manner prejudicial to the overall balance of the package. The skepticism in India has further increased by the suggestion that the separation of facilities might not be entirely at India’s discretion. The danger of reopening of issues already negotiated and settled stares the deal in the face. India’s present political dispensation casts its own shadow on the deal. For the first time in India, the Communists are part of the ruling coalition, though they are not in the Government itself. The Government operates within a common minimum programme drawn up by the coalition partners and one of the points agreed is that India will have an independent foreign policy. The nebulous concept of independence is subject to interpretation. For the communists, any increase in the U.S. influence in India is an aberration and the nuclear deal, therefore, goes against the grain. The recent murder of an Indian national by the Taliban in Afghanistan has been seen as a consequence of India getting closer to the United States. The votaries of nonalignment too are uncomfortable with signs of abdication of freedom of action. This is based more on ideology rather than on the fact that India was never a part of the consensus on non-proliferation within the Nonaligned Movement because of its position as a non-NPT country. The nonaligned declarations on non-proliferation were attributed only to NPT member states. If anything, the deal will only bring India closer to the nonaligned position on non-proliferation. More than the terms of the nuclear deal, what provoked the leftists and the nonaligned were the coincidental developments with regard to Iran. For more than two years, India has been walking the tight rope in Vienna, striving to balance Iran’s rights and obligations with regard to its nuclear activities. Neither the United States nor Iran was displeased with the natural Indian position that Iran should live up to its obligations under the NPT and that Iran should allay the fears of the international community by providing answers to the questions raised within the IAEA. Referral to the UN Security Council is an action required of the Board of Governors under the Statute in the event of a determination of non-compliance. India and the Nonaligned Chapter in Vienna had never ruled out such a referral and indeed used it as a pressure point on Iran. It is clearly understood that a referral to the Security Council does not mean sanctions or war automatically. But in the wake of the nuclear deal, India’s position on Iran in Vienna became a litmus test of its commitment to non-proliferation. In a situation where Russia and China, two nuclear weapon states and Pakistan, a U.S. ally, abstained, India was pressurized to support the resolution, which it virtually disavowed in its explanation of vote. The Indian vote was cast to save the nuclear deal, not to castigate Iran. The Indian assertion that its vote was to get Iran more time to resolve the remaining issues carried no conviction. The fact that India had never acted against the U.S. interests in Vienna even before was not highlighted and the Vienna vote became a symbol of submission. Whether the Indian vote under duress helped the U.S. in any manner is yet to be established. The linkage established between the nuclear deal and the Vienna vote served only to strengthen the suspicion of the U.S. motives. There was a collective sigh of relief when a vote was averted in November, but the hero this time was Russia. In the IAEA itself, India gained on account of the vote as it moved from the sidelines of the Iran debate to the center stage. One of the reasons for the postponement of a vote in November is attributed to the possibility of India changing its vote on account of leftist pressure. Another unfortunate twist of fate was that the deal came at the very moment when India’s quest for a permanent membership of the Security Council was at its most intense phase. The criteria that the United States spelt out for new members appeared to fit India perfectly well except for the one on non-proliferation and the deal appeared to have removed this last obstacle. Together with the declaration that it would lead India to the high table of great powers, the nuclear deal raised hopes in India that the United States would finally signal support for India to take a place at the horseshoe table at the United Nations. In Indian popular perception, permanent membership is synonymous with global status and its denial is seen as contradicting the declared intentions of the United States. Another anomaly that baffles Indians is the exclusion of India from APEC. Praise of India’s liberalization, economic performance and democracy does not jell with India’s exclusion from a group to which it rightfully belongs in every way. The way the Indian public reacted to the mention of the then Minister of External Affairs and the ruling Congress Party in an annex to the Volcker report was not unrelated to the nuclear deal and the Vienna vote. The first to play up the Volcker report were the leftists on the assumption that the Minister was the architect of the new relationship with the United States. When the Minister sought to distance himself from the new posture in Indian foreign policy, the leftists became his supporters and the opposition his detractors, leaving very little option with the Prime Minister other than of divesting him of the crucial external affairs portfolio. The nuclear deal claimed its first victim. Normally, the uninvestigated reference to the Minister and his Party would not have raised such a storm in India. It simply merited an investigation and the Minister could have continued till the charges were proved. It is the height of irony that those whom Volcker had indicted remain in high places while India loses a Minister who happened to figure in an uninvestigated allegation. Opinions on the nuclear deal are divided both in India and the United States. But the detractors of the deal in India who feel that India conceded too much and those in the United States, who are convinced that the deal strikes at the root of non-proliferation have helped to highlight that the deal has achieved a balance of interests of both the countries. Once this realization dawns on them, there would be acceptance, however reluctant, of its basic merits. The non-proliferation concerns of the United States were essentially over horizontal proliferation and that is no more an issue as far as India is concerned. Vertical proliferation in India is constrained by India’s own policy of minimum deterrence and the moratorium on testing. The constraints imposed by the deal itself, such as inspections under an Additional Protocol will also guarantee that India does not engage in an arms race. The fear of the deal setting a bad example for others is unfounded as the case of India is sui generis. There is no other country with the same attributes and circumstances as India. Above all, smooth implementation of the nuclear deal will finally remove the apprehensions in the Indian mind about the motivation of the United States. The obvious thing to do is to implement the deal as the best in the circumstances. India is conscious that the acceptance of the nuclear deal by the NSG will not be easy, particularly if its advantages are not highlighted by the public opinion in the United States. The threshold countries have hardened their positions as scholars in the United States have called for modifications of the deal. The critics in the United States have the bilateral dimensions in mind even when they assert the demands of non-proliferation, while he NSG members operate in a multilateral environment and tend to miss the wood for the trees. The onus of guiding the NSG into recognizing the merits of India joining them is that of the United States and the other nuclear weapon states. It is a good omen that the Director General of the IAEA, who has great influence on the thinking of the NSG, has welcomed the deal. He, more than anybody else, can vouch for the efficacy of the proposed inspection and spell out how the deal will contribute to the cause of non-proliferation. Both India and the United States have a great stake in the success of the projected visit of President Bush to India early next year. The hope and expectation raised that he will go to India after establishing full nuclear co-operation with India should not be belied. New Delhi will receive him with garlands at any time, but the fragrance of the flowers of welcome will be even greater if he delivers on the promise of the nuclear deal.

Posted by: Mudy Dec 25 2005, 12:34 PM JIM LANDERSThe Dallas Morning News

Posted by: Ramanujan Dec 26 2005, 03:26 PM

QUOTE(Kaushal @ Oct 11 2003, 11:27 AM)
India should somehow convince the west that Iran is a better bet than Pakistan. Unfortunately the reason why the west props up pakistan ( India) remains current even today and is based on the false premise that India remains a greater threat to the west than the Islamists.
Kaushal, If political reforms in Iran eventually lead to a nontheocratic leadership, this would solve the problem to a considerable extent. But is India ready to support such transition even with diplomatic pressure? Isnt it true, that in a manner similar to US coddling Pakistan, India has always courted Iran despite its role in terrorism? The irony of this is that US interests in Pakistan acheived significant importance after the Iranian revolution...a swingback to a status prior to that would lead to considerable atrophy in the importance of Pakistan to US. Also, I sont think that the view that India is a bigger threat than islamists is even remotely prevalent. My first post here...hello to IF members. I usually post at BRF and am familiar with many of you who also do the same. cheers.gif

Posted by: rajesh_g Jan 18 2006, 11:46 PM

Padayatra in Nalgonda against Proposed Uranium Mining Recently a padayatra - marathon walk, meandered its way through the dusty terrains adjoining the Krishna River Reservoir, the Nagarjuna Sagar Dam, in the Nalgonda District of Andhra Pradesh to highlight the gross dangers that the proposed uranium mining pose to the lives of the local populace and also those getting their water supply from the Sagar. The march was a perfect foil, reflecting the ‘real’ concerns of the ‘real’ people as regards ongoing scientific-technological ‘developments’ and its effects on their own lives, for the glittering razzmatazz under way at the same time in the not too far away state capital Hyderabad in the name of deliberating science and technology for the rural folks under the exalted banner of the Science Congress. The Movement Against Uranium Project (MAUP), a constituent of the CNDP took the initiative in organising the people’s protest. Dr. Satya Lakshmi and Dr. Channa Vasavaiah, both CNDP NCC members, played leading roles along with many others. Ms. Saraswati K, a young environmentalist and filmmaker and Mr. Kishan, also an environmentalist, from Hyderabad, were amongst the leading organisers. The CPI, CPIML (New Democracy) and Jana Vigyan Vedike were actively involved. The local CPI(M), Congress and TDP activists publicly proclaimed their support and concerns. The padayatra commenced on January 3 from the Peddagattu village, on the top a hillock, earmarked for underground mining. On the first day the padayatra passed through four villages stretching over 22 kilometres. On the second day it covered eight villages and 26 kilometres. Three major towns on the way joined enthusiastically. On the third day, it started from PeddaVoora Mandal and reached PA Pally Mandal covering 30 kms. and eight villages enroute. The next day, the marchers proceeded to Mallepally and from there to Devarakonda town. By then the support had significantly swelled and major political parties like CPI(M), Congress(I) and the Telegu Desam came forward to express their solidarity. On the fifth and concluding day, the paadayatra started at Devarakonda and ended at Seripally, the proposed site for uranium processing, in the afternoon covering a number of small hamlets and villages on the way. A largely attended public meeting was held as the culminating event. All the groups were represented. The meeting expressed its determination to take the people's struggle further forward and foil the life-threatening Project at all costs. The CPI MLA from Munugodu spoke at length and conveyed the message of solidarity by Mr. Suravaram Sudhakar Reddy, the MP from Nalgonda. Other speakers included Ms. Padma, a state level front ranking woman leader. Dr. Satya Lakshmi talked of the recent MAUP letter to the Secretary, Ministry of Environment & Forests protesting against the Environmental Clearance dated 21.12.2005 accorded to the UCIL for the Uranium Mining Project at Peddagattu- Lambapur in Nalgonda district disregarding the overwhelming opposition from the public, voluntary organizations and experts pointing to and elaborating the dangers arising out of the proposed project abutting the Nagarjuna Sagar Reservoir, catering drinking and irrigation water to about one third population of the state, including the Hyderabad. The prominent activists who had participated in the march includes Dr.Surendra Gadekar and Ms. Kesri Das from Sampoorna Kranti Vidyalay, Vedchi, Gujarat; Mr. Rajan Naidu, a human rights activist from Auroville, Pondicherry; Mr. Gummadi Narasaiah, CPIML (New Democracy) from Yellendu, Khammam; Prof.Vishnu Kamat and Mr. Ramakrishna from CANE (Citizens for Alternatives to Nuclear Energy), Bangalore; Ms. Meera – a social activist from UK; Dr. K Balagopal, a leading human rights activist from Hyderabad. Dr.Srikumar from NIT, Suratkal, Mangalore and Mr.Sukla Sen from CNDP. Apart from the local people, a good number of prominent social activists, filmmakers, writers, journalists, doctors and lawyers from Hyderabad had also joined.

Posted by: ramana Jan 19 2006, 10:06 AM

Ramanujan, Welcome and now that your are here please go to this thread and post your insights. Thanks, ramana

Posted by: k.ram Jan 30 2006, 09:25 AM

The Nuclear poison pill - By Bharat Karnad Op-Ed : Asian Age, Jan 27, 2006 (Bharat Karnad is Professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and author of Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, second edition) The advocates of the proposed nuclear deal with the United States are getting shrill as they see its prospects dimming, a denouement not anticipated by its promoters within the Indian government and the media. To try and sell a patently bad agreement with the capacity seriously to injure national security and India’s strategic interests on the basis that it will enhance relations with America, procure needed civilian nuclear technology from abroad, and gain Indian entry into the big power ranks as "international balancer," is at best to misread the fundamentals of international power politics and, at worst, cynically to engage in trepidation-mongering — fall in line or miss out on the main chance. But history suggests only the strong become decisive players in the international arena. And genuine strategic military power — in the present age, this means high-yield thermonuclear forces with reach provided by intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered submarines — is the key. It requires visioning based on historical constants, rather than on nonsensical notions of Indian "exceptionalism" that translate into riding piggyback on the US, and on expediting policies to acquire the necessary strategic wherewithal. The complementary attribute of a high economic growth rate, on the other hand, would benefit from plugging into the competitive global trade and commercial environment and, at home, from dismantling Socialism-inspired public sector and facilitating private sector efficiency. One of the main reasons why the nuclear deal is hitting road-blocks is because its champions here are incoherent on the technical aspects. How else to explain the charge that rejecting this deal will result in "technology thralldom"? Come again! If ignorance of laws is no excuse for violating them, unfamiliarity with the science and technology involved cannot reasonably be the vehicle for nuclear policy propagation. Importing nuclear technology or nuclear fuel, rather than self-reliant development, surely, will result in dependence, slavery, and "thralldom" (to use a string of synonyms to emphasise the point). This is so obvious a fact, one would have thought it needed no iteration. Further, how many of the indigenously developed power plants and what other nuclear facilities to put under international safeguards is not, as per the July 18 Joint Statement, a matter of negotiation but, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared in Parliament July 29, solely for India to decide and, like in the matter of the four other NPT-recognised nuclear weapon states, for the US to accept. That New Delhi has to produce a "credible, defensible" separation plan which will pass muster with the US Congress is a later construction of American officialdom. Unless Dr Singh was not being candid in Parliament, it is not the Indian government’s responsibility to inflict hurtful measures on the country just so it enables their American counterpart to push this deal on the Capitol Hill. The more the Manmohan Singh regime bends backwards to accommodate the George W. Bush administration, the more dubious the deal becomes in the eyes of the Indian people. India has to do what other major powers have done — surrender no options, give as little ground as possible where its nuclear programme is concerned and restrict international monitoring to the barest minimum. If this is not possible, then to junk the deal and get on with life. The larger issue involved is adherence to a principle of conduct established long ago by Dr Homi J. Bhabha, the great visionary and architect of the country’s nuclear programme, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the most strategic-minded of India’s Prime Ministers. They decided early that international safeguards were acceptable only for installations built with foreign help and material assistance. The reason they adduced was simple: international safeguards hampered and hindered technological innovation and the development of indigenous technology. And they stuck by it at a time when India was vulnerable. Brazil, for example, which had no such far-sighted leaders, is now discovering that for advances to be made in locally produced technologies, like the centrifuge cascades, mindlessly put under safeguards, require prior approval by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. It is the frustration with its loss of freedom and with international red-tape which has led Brazil to not permit IAEA inspection of its newest centrifuge units. Its plea is that technological innovations are protected by Intellectual Property Rights and cannot be disclosed. The irony is that even as India is getting out from under the economic jackboot of a "licence and permit raj," New Delhi is seeking to subject its most valuable technology enclave — the Indian nuclear programme — to an international "licence and permit raj" run by IAEA. There is also plain ignorance about the breeder programme in the pro-deal camp. Few countries other than India are pursuing the fast-breeder route primarily because they have alternatives. President Jimmy Carter closed down the American breeder project in the late Seventies and France shut down its Super Phoenix reactor because, in both instances, this technology was deemed redundant to their needs. The French breeder is run on spent uranium fuel from power plants of which there is aplenty. This is unlike the Indian breeder reactor designed directly to utilise thorium in which India is super-rich, having in excess of 70 per cent of the estimated world reserves. So it is hard to see just how and where foreign technology can help this programme. Moreover, the Indian breeder reactor has definite military uses. A breeder reactor being essentially a "refinery" for bomb-grade fissile material, one 500 MW breeder — like the prototype coming up in Chennai — will produce more weapons-useable plutonium than as many as five power plants operating at low burn-up rates. This is the main reason why the United States desperately wants the Indian breeder programme under safeguards and included as part of the IAEA-monitored, permanently civilianised, nuclear sector in the separation plan, and why New Delhi should zealously protect it. It is significant that other than Dr Anil Kakodkar, the current chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who, perhaps, feels compelled to toe the government line, no eminent nuclear scientist or engineer has expressed support for it. Indeed, stalwart nuclear scientists and engineers, including Dr A.N. Prasad, retired director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, and Dr A. Gopalakrishnan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, have publicly slammed the separation plan as detrimental to sovereignty, national security, and the integrity of the nuclear programme, and have advised a minimalist principle for separation, which paraphrased reads: "When in doubt, keep it out (of the safeguards net)." This conforms better with the Nehru-Bhabha principle than buying into the expansive American non-proliferation line swallowed whole in official quarters who, to invert the adage, are missing the trees for the forest. Strategy conceptualised with an eye to the sky is in danger of stumbling on the shrubs. When you scrape away the questionable premises, what remains in the case made by the pro-dealwallahs is their fear that better relations with the US hinge on this agreement, when actually they do not. Some 12 years back in a book — Future Imperilled: India’s Security in the 1990s and Beyond — this writer had fleshed out a security architecture ("an Indian Monroe Doctrine" — an India-centric concept derived from Nehru’s impracticable "Asian Monroe Doctrine" of the late Forties) and a mutually beneficial strategic tie-up with the US based on the limits of America’s interventionary capability and India’s emerging clout, under its own steam, as a credible military and economic counterweight to China in Asia. This analysis was published at a time when most of the analysts now incessantly cawing about an India-US partnership, had quite different views. The bedrock of strong strategic ties is the "defence cooperation framework agreement" worked out between defence minister Pranab Mukherjee and US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld last summer. The nuclear deal owing to its skewed nature is, as I have detailed in these columns, a "poison pill" that is likely to embitter relations in the future and stop the promise of full-scope defence cooperation from being realised. This argument, incidentally, is echoing in Washington where people like Leonard Spector — one of the principal authors of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center, are pleading that there are too many positive factors animating the India-US relationship for it to run aground because of a failed nuclear deal. Spector, in fact, mentions that India and Israel are in like situation vis-à-vis the US. Tel Aviv has emphatically resisted the imposition by the US of IAEA safeguards on any part of its nuclear programme and has otherwise rejected truncating its nuclear options in any manner for any reason and under any guise. This has not impacted adversely on Israel’s bilateral relations with the US because Washington needs a strong Israel in West Asia. A strategically-oriented India standing up for its nuclear interests will only draw US’ respect and consideration, because a comprehensively powerful India is more beneficial to long term American national interests than the meagre non-proliferation returns from a punitive-minded nuclear deal at the present time.,

Posted by: Ravish Feb 4 2006, 08:18 AM

On Saturday 4th Feb 06 India voted with the EU, USA and 25 other nations at the IAEA meeting in Vienna on a resolution against Iran. It is a decision which had generated considerable amount of debate within the Indian domestic political scene as well as in teh Indian media. However, as the developments leading to today's voting in Vienna gathered momentum, the Indian Left parties who were opposing any Indian move against Iran, fell in line after Russia and China agreed to go with the EU and USA . It's fall out may lead to the suspension of the talks on India-Iran gas pipeline through Pakistan. There may be other issues on which particularly in the energy front, where Iran may not be as forthcoming or as cooperative as in the past towards India.We as a nation as to face the situation with courage , determination and fortitude. Jai Hind

Posted by: Mudy Feb 5 2006, 07:54 PM

As India twiddles thumbs, US, Russia unveil nuclear deal

Posted by: Mudy Feb 5 2006, 08:00 PM

Even today Indian commie's reaction/action are based on their master sitting in Russia and China. Indian Tax money are feeding these traitors everyday.

Posted by: Mudy Feb 5 2006, 08:09 PM

US shifting goalpost on n-deal: Atomic Energy chief Kakodkar Putting Fast Breeder on civilian list affects minimum credible deterrent and long-term energy needs, says DAE Secy PALLAVA BAGLA Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 5 With work on the landmark Indo-US nuclear deal going right down to the wire, the well-entrenched nuclear-scientific-military establishment is getting increasingly wary. Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Anil Kakodkar has said that Washington’s request for placing specific nuclear facilities on the civilian programme amounts to changing “the goalpost.” Calling himself the “biggest champion of the July 18 nuclear deal,” Kakodkar, who is also Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, told The Indian Express in an exclusive interview that as per that agreement, “this determination (of what goes on which list, civilian or military) has to be made by the Indians...(for) India’s strategic interests will have to be decided by India and not by others.” According to Kakodkar, the following were exempted from the civilian list first shared with Washington: the Fast Breeder Reactor programme, all facilities at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, the uranium-enrichment facilities off Mysore and “some” of the indigenously developed power reactors, the ones needed to fuel the Fast Breeder programme. Placing the Fast Breeder programme in the civilian list, Kakodkar said, “will not be in our strategic interest” both for long-term energy security and for maintaining nuclear-weapons capabilities. For, it would push India “into another import trap,” constantly dependent on supplies of imported enriched uranium. “Both, from the point of view of maintaining long term energy security and for maintaining the minimum credible deterrent (as defined by the nuclear doctrine) the Fast Breeder programme just cannot be put on the civilian list. This would amount to getting shackled and India certainly cannot compromise one for the other,” he said. The Department of Atomic Energy, he said, was visualizing that “in the long run, the energy that will come out from the nuclear fuel resources available in India (from domestic uranium and thorium mines) should always form the larger share of the nuclear energy programme as compared to the energy that will be generated from imported nuclear fuel.” “So it is important in the long run that our strategy should be such that the integrity and autonomy of our being able to develop the three-stage nuclear power programme, be maintained, we cannot compromise that.” Admitting that there was a shortage of uranium, Kakodkar said that this is where there are benefits from the Indo-US nuclear deal, since it opens up opportunities for international cooperation especially of civil-nuclear cooperation. According to Kakodkar once that happens “we can get that as an additionality and that additionality is the important word.” According to him, India has never had any problems in sourcing reactors or fuel from outside and then putting those under safeguards. “We have done that in the past, so we can do that again... our track record has been extremely good, so there need not be any fear,” he said. URL:

Posted by: rajesh_g Feb 6 2006, 03:19 AM

QUOTE(Mudy @ Feb 5 2006, 07:54 PM)
As India twiddles thumbs, US, Russia unveil nuclear deal
Sometimes I wonder, who does this guy bat for really !!

Posted by: Mudy Feb 6 2006, 10:09 AM

Pallab Bhattacharya in Manila | February 06, 2006 10:51 IST With complexity gripping talks between India and the United States on the nuclear deal, President A P J Abdul Kalam has said energy independence should be the country's top priority and suggested development of nuclear power using Thorium, which is abundantly available at home. "Nuclear power generation has been given a thrust by the use of Uraninum-based fuel (which US is set to supply to India if the deal comes through). However, there would be a requirement for ten-fold increase in nuclear power generation even to attain a reasonable degree of energy self-sufficiency for our country," Kalam said at the Asiatic Society gathering here Monday night. "Therefore, it is essential to pursue the development of nuclear power using thorium reserves which are abundant in the country," he said adding "technology development has to be accelerated for thorium-based reactors". Kalam said one of the two pillars on which energy security rests is securing access to all sources of energy. At the same time "we should access technologies to provide a diverse supply of reliable, affordable and environmentally sustainable energy," he said. "India must achieve the real goal - that is Energy Independence or an economy which will function well within total freedom from oil, gas or coal imports," Kalam said. "Hence, energy independence has to be India's top priority and highest priority. We must be determined to achieve this within the next 25 years, that is by the year 2030 - a 25-year national mission must be formulated, funds guaranteed and leadership entrusted without delay," the President said. He also urged banks to come out with financial support for these programmes. Kalam said that while energy security, which means ensuring India getting its citizens a supply of lifeline energy at affordable costs, is a very important need, "it must be considered as a transition strategy" as the "real goal is energy independence". Setting a target of around $ 200 billion by 2008 for India's market share in IT services, IT enabled services and Business Process Outsourcing; Kalam said the target was an achievable one. "Since our university system is contributing over three million graduates every year, this is a vital resource needed for growth in the IT services, IT enabled services and BPO," he said. According to Kalam, India needed infrastructural establishments like IT parks, including call centres in large numbers, to achieve its goal.

Posted by: rajesh_g Feb 6 2006, 02:54 PM In the national interest, Dr Singh? (Lavakre)

Posted by: rajesh_g Feb 6 2006, 04:49 PM This Rajamohan is getting more weird by the day. I can almost expect the commies now coming out in full force to support the deal. The day that happens one can almost deduce that the yanks have figured out the political scenario in India. It was in full display during Modi Visa episode and its almost there now.. Lets see what happens.. :unsure

Posted by: Mudy Feb 6 2006, 06:50 PM

Yanks knows how to buy journalist and so-called analyst.

Posted by: rajesh_g Feb 7 2006, 08:12 PM

Solid interview by Shri Kakodkar.. rock.gif

Posted by: Mudy Feb 8 2006, 09:58 AM,001301790001.htm

The two sides on Wednesday began discussions on Washington's new brainwave: an ambitious broad-based Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). GNEP envisages an international programme for the production of nuclear power and exchange of nuclear fuel. US Under Secretary of Energy David Garman met Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and presented the broad outlines of the GNEP that is being touted by the Bush administration as a "nuclear renaissance" crucial to meeting the world's growing energy needs, which were expected to double by 2050. The two top officials will also discuss the possibility of India's participation in new-age Generation IV nuclear reactors and $1 billion dollar FutureGen project aimed at building the world's first "zero-emission" coal-fuelled power plant, sources said. The details of India's participation in the multi-billion dollar International Thermonuclear Energy Reactor (ITER) that aims at producing nuclear energy through the fusion method will also be discussed between the two sides. Garman is likely to meet other officials from the department of energy and environment on Thursday. The discussions on the GNEP begin at a critical stage in negotiations between the two sides over a civil nuclear agreement, with India's Atomic Energy Commission chief Anil Kakodkar saying in an interview that New Delhi was not ready to place its indigenous fast breeder reactor programme in the civilian list. If differences over New Delhi's separation plan of its civilian and military nuclear facilities are anything to go by, the agreement might not be in place before President George Bush comes here in early March.

Posted by: ramana Feb 8 2006, 11:21 AM

If there is a rush to sign up with the US demands, Mulayam is the key. See efforts to muffle him before any sign ups.

Posted by: Mudy Feb 8 2006, 12:40 PM

If there is a rush to sign up with the US demands, Mulayam is the key. See efforts to muffle him before any sign ups.
I think we may see some form of arm twisting or some scandal.

Posted by: ramana Feb 9 2006, 10:06 AM

The complicated world of nuclear deals R. Ramachandran Safeguards are only one of the fallouts from the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Several issues need to be considered before tying down the DAE's hands. INDIA'S VOTE on February 4 at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in favour of referring Iran to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), ensured that, on this count at least, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal of July 18 would not die in the American Congress as Ambassador David Mulford had warned a fortnight ago. The other critical issue, that of separation of civil and military nuclear facilities, however, remains. The deal could die if India's offer is not to the U.S.' satisfaction. The U.S. wants the Indian fast breeder programme, even in its present R&D phase comprising one 40 MWth Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) and the upcoming 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam, to be brought under IAEA safeguards. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) chairman Anil Kakodkar has expressed his inability to do so (see The Hindu , August 12, 2005). He had argued that safeguards can be considered when the indigenously developed breeder technology matures and becomes commercial, but not in its present R&D phase. And since the Indo-U.S. agreement unambiguously states that India would bring in safeguards in a "phased" manner and "voluntarily," the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) perceives the U.S.' bid to tell India what it should put under safeguards as amounting to shifting the goalposts. Since the demand is for separating civil from military, irrespective of whether they are R&D facilities or commercial, Dr. Kakodkar's argument, on the face of it, does not seem convincing. What DAE appears to be really apprehensive about — as Dr. Kakodkar has more recently articulated — are the intangibles that come with safeguards and international inspection, including protecting its proprietary breeder technology. The need to interrupt the R&D process and seek approval of the IAEA whenever there is a change in design or process or material could be a cause for concern, as it requires sending details of the proposals to Vienna. According to DAE insiders, the experience with IAEA safeguards in India and elsewhere does not inspire confidence that sensitive information would be protected. There is also a general sentiment of distrust of the U.S. — legitimate or not — in the DAE that runs down the rank and file of its scientific cadre. There could be historical reasons for this arising from the Tarapur experience but, while the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal is supposed to change all that, Washington has done little in the past to change that sentiment. For instance, the U.S. has shown no interest in resolving the Tarapur spent fuel issue. Even spare parts for the Tarapur plants were denied. These could have been done without any new deal. Denial of a large number of nuclear related dual-use goods — controlled for non-proliferation reasons — to the DAE continues. Export of these does not violate any U.S. law or the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Of the 115 such goods, only 12 — the so-called NP2 items — were decontrolled in August 2005 for export to India as part of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). In fact, this is the only tangible achievement of the NSSP so far. However, it is the mobile telephone companies that stand to gain more by the decontrol than the DAE as they can now import high-end oscilloscopes without licence. The extent of exasperation evident in media commentaries, on the failure to conclude the deal before President George W. Bush arrives in March, is inexplicable. If there are crucial issues to be sorted out, let it take its normal course. If the DAE has genuine concerns, why force it? Why cling on to such a deal if it makes the DAE, and its scientists, unhappy? It is also unfortunate that sections of the media have gone into DAE bashing mode, with intemperate language and derisive remarks about DAE scientists, on the one hand, and disinformation about India's nuclear programme, on the other. It is strange that, even as the negotiations are still under way, they should overwhelmingly argue from the American standpoint rather than Indian. Notwithstanding the fact that the DAE could be faulted on many counts in its functioning or meeting targets, it must be remembered that if the U.S. is willing to talk to India today on near equal terms, it is because of what the scientists have achieved in the nuclear field. So deriding DAE's scientists in this context will not get us anywhere. One issue that the media never appear tired of hammering is the DAE's failure to meet the target set in the mid-1980s of 10,000 MWe by the year 2000. The DAE achieved only 2720 MWe. The criticisms ignore the basic fact that the chief reason for the programme falling way behind the target was the grossly inadequate funding during the 1990s as against what was required (and even as compared to what the Plan had approved) for setting up new plants. Though R&D funding for the DAE has been substantive over the years, capital investment (at Rs.4 crore/MWe then) for new plants was never forthcoming. This was very comprehensively brought out by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) in 2000. Indeed, it is this lack of government commitment to nuclear power that led to the closure of two operational mines at Jaduguda leading in part to the current shortage of natural uranium, the fuel for the indigenous pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs). The government in power during the period was that of P. V. Narasimha Rao and the Finance Minister was none other than Manmohan Singh. Is there a newfound commitment to nuclear power that is driving the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal or are there other considerations? An argument often trotted out by the Government is that the deal will help India meet its short-term energy requirements. As will be presently argued, the deal has little to do with this. It seems to be driven largely by the hypothetical geo-political and other intangible gains, including being recognised as a nuclear weapons state, that the Government expects by getting admitted into the U.S. tent. But in the wake of the nuclear deal, India has only been forced to compromise on several issues including those related to country's energy interests. Therefore, if the proposed separation fails to meet the U.S. benchmark and the deal has to die, let it die. From the perspective of the DAE, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal would be useful only to tide over the present temporary phase of shortage of nuclear fuel — natural uranium for the PHWRs and enriched uranium for the twin boiling water reactors (BWRs) at Tarapur. It is true that the PHWRs are being operated at 10-15 per cent lower capacity factors than their normal 80 per cent keeping in view the fuel availability for the 13 operational PHWRs as well as the five upcoming ones till the new mines in Jharkhand begin to produce the yellow cake. In any case, according to Dr. Kakodkar, the economic feasibility of a nuclear plant is based on 68.5 per cent capacity factor. Unacceptable price The DAE has maintained that if imported reactors come as a spin-off, they will only supplement the three-stage programme already in place and not supplant it. But such an additionality would be welcome only if the attendant costs, tangible and intangible, are not high. In the DAE's perception, the price that is being demanded is unacceptable. At present, the generation capacity of a little over 3000 MWe accounts for just about 3 per cent of the total power generation capacity in the country. So a slight shortfall could not become such a critical issue for the national energy scene. By 2020, the PHWR capacity alone would be about 10,000 MWe, sufficient for getting into a self-sustaining breeder phase. According to DAE estimates, with a chain of breeders in place, a target of about 100,000 MWe should be achievable by 2040. This scenario is based entirely on domestic resources of uranium, its low grade ore notwithstanding (a fact that was known even when the programme began). Of course, potential new sites have been located and if exploited, the PHWR programme can continue alongside. If the deal materialises, the minimum time any imported plant can take off in is 10-12 years: two year for site survey, three years for design approval by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), and 5-7 years for construction. Judging from the time taken by the Koodankulam plant since 1998 (when it was renegotiated), it could be longer. Only in the case of the recently identified coastal site in Ratnagiri, would the survey time be avoided. And if India opts for Russian VVERs, the AERB clearance time could come down as they have already gone through a design review. So the deal with the U.S. cannot really serve the country's short-term energy requirements. And the self-sustaining breeder phase, which should get under way by 2025, if not by 2020, because of the mismatch between mining and the planned projects, promises to ensure long-term energy security. Interestingly, no one is talking of the finances that would be required to install these imported plants at $1.5 million to $2 million per MWe. If there is this money available, over and above what is required for the DAE's own roadmap, it would make more sense to let the DAE put up more PHWRs at lower costs (of Rs.6 crore/MWe) as well as speed up mining operations in new sites and also upgrade the centrifuge facility to meet Tarapur's requirement of enriched uranium. Most importantly, do we have the necessary nuclear-skilled human resource that a rapid expansion with imported systems would require when the DAE itself is facing a shortage of expertise for the existing facilities? All these issues need careful consideration before tying down the DAE's hands. Safeguards are only one, though significant, component of fallouts from the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.

Posted by: rajesh_g Feb 9 2006, 10:19 AM

I look at this from a basic deal-making perspective. When deals are done one goes with an understanding of what one can offer to the other side that the other side might value as equivalent or more to what the other side is offering. I would like to see a list of things that India can offer to the US when this deal is brokered. It is definitely nice to have all these power plants and tech from the US but what is India offering that US finds sooo compelling that it is ready to make this deal ? We need to understand this.

Posted by: Ravish Feb 12 2006, 01:19 AM

The Hindustan Times of date reports the difficulties ahead for a deal with the United States. Quote DESPITE US President George Bush’s visit being just round the corner, the Indo-US nuclear agreement looks like a non-starter. Talks are deadlocked on separating India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities. Standing in the way are not just Indian fears that its nuclear deterrent would be compromised, but also the Bush administration’s compulsions in making a onetime waiver of nuke prohibitions for India. Both governments had always known the deal would lead them into “uncharted territories”. But the extent of the “difficulty” became apparent after the joint working group, headed by Under Secretary Nicholas Burns and Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, began talks. The JWG is likely to meet before the Bush visit, though the US is yet to decide if this is the right time to send Burns to New Delhi again. Sources say that the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership was “offered as a sop” to India as the main civil nuclear deal “might not work out.” Moreover, US Ambassador David C Mulford’s recent warning of “devastating” consequences if India did not vote against Iran at the IAEA was “clear indication” of the difficulty in pushing the deal forward. Sources said Mulford’s warning came only after Washington’s ‘go-ahead’. Again, Atomic Energy chief Anil Kakodkar’s recent criticism of the US’s “shifting goal posts,” was, sources said, a response to criticism within the US nuclear establishment to the deal. It was also intended to ensure that India would “not go beyond or expand on the letter of the text” of the July 18 agreement. Since the Bush visit is not being pegged on a single agenda, as part of other initiatives, Commerce Secretary S.N. Menon will visit Washington next week for talks to remove barriers to bilateral trade — particularly Indian exports. Why no deal ¦ India fears its N-deterrent would be compromised ¦ A ‘yes’ vote in the US Senate is diffi cult with at least three-fourths of India’s reactors needing to be safeguarded ¦ With the deal not working out, both sides are working on other initia tives, including removing barriers on Indian DESPITE US President George Bush’s visit be- ing just round the corner, the Indo-US nuclear agreement looks like a non-starter. Talks are deadlocked on separating India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities. Standing in the way are not just Indian fears that its nuclear deter- rent would be compromised, but also the Bush administration’s compulsions in making a one- time waiver of nuke prohibitions for India. Both governments had always known the deal would lead them into “uncharted territo- ries”. But the extent of the “difficulty” became apparent after the joint working group, headed by Under Secretary Nicholas Burns and For- eign Secretary Shyam Saran, began talks. The JWG is likely to meet before the Bush visit, though the US is yet to decide if this is the right time to send Burns to New Delhi again. Sources say that the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership was “offered as a sop” to India as the main civil nuclear deal “might not work out.” Moreover, US Ambassador David C Mulford’s re- cent warning of “devastating” consequences if India did not vote against Iran at the IAEA was “clear indication” of the difficulty in pushing the deal forward. Sources said Mulford’s warn- ing came only after Washington’s ‘go-ahead’. Again, Atomic Energy chief Anil Kakodkar’s recent criticism of the US’s “shifting goal posts,” was, sources said, a response to criti- cism within the US nuclear establishment to the deal. It was also intended to ensure that India would “not go beyond or expand on the letter of the text” of the July 18 agreement. Since the Bush visit is not being pegged on a single agenda, as part of other initiatives, Com- merce Secretary S.N. Menon will visit Washing- ton next week for talks to remove barriers to bi- lateral trade — particularly Indian exports. Why no deal ¦ India fears its N-deterrent would be compromised ¦ A ‘yes’ vote in the US Senate is diffi- cult with at least three-fourths of India’s reactors needing to be safeguarded ¦ With the deal not working out, both sides are working on other initia- tives, including removing barriers on Indian exports to the United States. Unquote It gives some insight to the very difficult path that both sides have to cover before any workable and useful agreement could be reached on the issue. TOP

Posted by: Mudy Feb 13 2006, 01:21 PM

........... Notice that Kakodkar has said nothing in his interview that goes against the known negotiating posture of the government. He is only specifying the bottomline below which it would be difficult for India to go. While this may seem a clever move, it also demonstrates how unprofessionally the broad contours of the India-US nuclear deal have been negotiated. India went to the US with its preferences and thought that Washington would go along without a gameplan of its own. The important question to ask is: What does the US get out of the deal if it cannot prevent India from producing fissile material to increase its military nuclear capability? If Washington only wanted to help India produce more electricity, then why would it want indigenously built nuclear plants, nuclear material production and research facilities put under international inspection? It should have merely demanded that the imported nuclear technology and material be put under inspection and safeguards to prevent their diversion for military use. India’s horizontal non-proliferation record is impeccable — export controls and requisite laws are in place to prevent leakage of technology to third countries. So that cannot be a matter of US concern. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the US wants to place limits on India’s strategic or military nuclear capability — to prevent vertical proliferation in terms of building greater quantity and quality of nuclear weapons. This is why the FBR has become a bone of contention. It produces plutonium that can be used both for making bombs and for producing energy. Kakodkar made it clear that the FBR was linked to both strategic and energy security of India through the fuel cycle. The FBR is not a proliferation-free reactor.....

Posted by: k.ram Feb 16 2006, 08:43 AM

He also said recognition of a special status for India in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a "priority" to France. Chirac, who arrives here on February 19 on a three-day state visit, in an interview voiced Paris` support to India on modifying NSG rules. Asked about the controversy over the Arcelor case, he said the company willing to takeover was a Dutch company, not an Indian one. "The problem has nothing to do with L N Mittal. It is a Dutch company and Arcelor is a Luxembourg company. It has nothing to do with France and India.

Posted by: Mudy Feb 17 2006, 11:21 AM,001301790001.htm

"On the substantive issue of separation, recent events that have unfolded belie the hope of the freedom to develop an independent nuclear programme," the former PM said. "The entire effort of the US seems to be to force India to put its fast breeder reactor development programme in the civilian area," Singh wrote, while noting Washington's "demands" and "threats" that that deal would be called off if India did not vote against Iran.
All Leftist are united on this issue. But they were against Buddha smiling rolleyes.gif

Posted by: ramana Feb 17 2006, 11:50 AM

One thing is sure. This talks have smoked out the Indian position on the MND. They have unveiled the nature of the sub-Kt tests, the FBR and the number of PHWRs needed for MND, the complexes where strategic activities are expected to be happening. Can expect these to become targets. On an aside. The fact that there is a lot of reactor grade Pu(~9T) that can be used for conversion to weapon grade sub-kt stuff means that the Indian forces will have a measured esclatory ladder but also means they are for a regional emphasis and should not impact golbal strategic balance. In other words they are defensive and not offensive weapons if such a thing can exist and will not effect the strategi arms balance. So US need not worry about China increasing its inventory due to India. If China is increasing it is due its own threat perception from the P-5. On the US side they revealed the true agenda of the US elites- NPA( chatterati and Congress) and SD types. The former want severe limits on Indian even if there are other unnamed as yet benefits from the deal. The latter want India to support the US in its global hegemony as a junior partner. The neo-con political types even after tall talk did not invoke strategic interests clause shows that it was tall talk only. One significant aspect not commented on is the deep US-China tango which has driven the US Congress types to scuttle the deal. Amb T.K. Sreenivasan's talk at CIEP shows lack of understanding of this fact. I would like to see an analysis of the stated reasons of the US for pursing theJuly 18 agreement. Also in India it has revealed the lifafa opinion makers in the media. In the official circles the MEA can always wiggle out as it was operating under PMO guidelines. Anyway only Shyam Saran is tainted , but he has redeemed himslef by reading the riot act to Mulford. What is not unmasked is the PMO cretins who carried on a campaign against the DAE and BARC officialdom. The eight retired diplomats in Bangalore redeemed themselves by coming out first against the shifted goals deal.

Posted by: rajesh_g Feb 17 2006, 11:57 AM

The commie reaction to this whole business needs to be collected. Even if its absence of opinion it needs to be noted. This deal-making has also showed the US understanding of the Indian political situation. More and more I think the commies are being coopted by the US establishment to work within the US set framework, no matter what the outward show is. PS : Channels used in Modi visa episode and in this episode needs to be studied.

Posted by: rajesh_g Feb 17 2006, 12:04 PM

Not related to the nukes, but the article from Jakob has some interesting insight into how the US coopts and guides the seemingly hostile factions to work within the framework.. where Jakob writes..

If I didn't know better, I would suspect that what is happening today is part of a planned strategy. The tremendous success of the NRI community in American society is threatening at several levels: (a) after the Chinese, it is the first time members of a ‘pagan’ culture are this successful in Christian America; (b) this success has made the NRI community aware of the fact that its own culture and its Hindu traditions have something to offer to the world; © hence, they contest the negative portrayal of their culture in Christian America and (unlike the Chinese) they have stridently joined the debates in the media and academia; (d) to the WASP-majority, this is very different from what the Catholics, Jews and Muslims did earlier, since it concerns a ‘heathen religion’, which is as different from the dominant Protestant culture as anything could possibly be. How does one neutralise such a threat? The answer is obvious: by shaping the energy, the vehemence and the intellectual acuity of the American Hindus in a particular way, which defuses the attack. You give them an easy target: the Indologists who speak and write derogatorily about India and Hinduism. You allow them to assert the value of their culture within certain limits: they merely become the next group to demand recognition of their own religious and ethnic identity (after the Catholics, the Jews, the Blacks, etc.). Thus, the NRI community becomes the next church-like ghetto-culture in a society that revolves around identity politics. They no longer pose any threat to the mainstream WASP-culture. They do not even offer an alternative way of being. Naturally, things do not happen in a planned way like this. There is no WASP conspiracy against the NRI-community and its self-assertion. The problem lies at the level of the very structure of American society. Its identity politics has defused any threatening cultural alternative in the past. To borrow one of Rajeev Malhotra’s ploys: at first, the Irish Catholics were not regarded as ‘whites’ by the WASP-community. After a struggle in which the Irish were gradually forced to form a Protestant church with Catholic overtones, they were accepted as a proper white community. Next, the same thing happened to the Jews. Later other communities followed. Now, it is the turn of the Hindus. Their cultural identity will be accepted and recognised once it takes a recognisable, non-threatening form—once it ceases being a true alternative to the dominant WASP-culture. This is the task assigned to the Vedic foundations and the Rajeev Malhotra’s in today’s America. This explains why, for instance, they find support among the conservatives in the California board: these conservatives recognise and acknowledge the fact that the American Hindus are the next community to aspire the proper ‘ethnic community’ and ‘religious identity’ status in American society.

Posted by: Mudy Feb 17 2006, 01:09 PM

This deal-making has also showed the US understanding of the Indian political situation. More and more I think the commies are being coopted by the US establishment to work within the US set framework, no matter what the outward show is. PS : Channels used in Modi visa episode and in this episode needs to be studied.
Very true. It’s not US understanding of the political situation but how US can steer Indian political situation to its own interest. Its more or less same situation when in late 60s and early 70s some Indian politicians were working for foreign government to serve their own personal interest.
What is not unmasked is the PMO cretins who carried on a campaign against the DAE and BARC officialdom. The eight retired diplomats in Bangalore redeemed themselves by coming out first against the shifted goals deal.
It’s very difficult to do. Media is silent.

Posted by: rajesh_g Feb 17 2006, 03:32 PM

Has this been posted before ? Real sensible piece.,00120001.htm Aim before you shoot : Brahma Chellaney

Posted by: Mudy Feb 20 2006, 10:17 AM

NEW DELHI (AFP) - Fuel-hungry India and France, a big nuclear power producer, signed a declaration saying they wanted to pursue nuclear energy cooperation "exclusively for peaceful purposes."

Posted by: Mudy Feb 21 2006, 10:54 AM

Officials in Washington agreed that the differences between the two sides mainly related to the details of the separation of India's civil and military nuclear facilities required under the deal, especially the status of its Fast Breeder Reactors. They also indicated that the formula being worked out was for keeping the FBRs out of the purview of international safeguards for another six years till 2012. The Indian side is understood to have told the US that the FBRs would become operational only by 2010 and would need another two years thereafter to prove themselves. The US response to this proposal would be known after Burns discusses it with Indian officials when he is in Delhi this week. The FBRs are crucial to India's civil nuclear energy programme but US lawmakers also see them as an important element of the country's weapons programme and would like them to be brought under safeguards right away. The US government will be able to take the deal to Congress for ratification only if India comes up with a "credible and defensible" plan for separation of its civil and military nuclear facilities, the officials pointed out.
"We're 90 per cent of the way there," he told the magazine. He said though the negotiations had been "uniquely complicated, we are both committed to it, and as long as both of us show flexibility in the details, I'm confident that we will come to an agreement."

Posted by: Ravish Feb 21 2006, 10:48 PM

The Indian Ambassador to the USA has made several important observations in his address to the National Press Club which are worth noting.Quote Wednesday February 22, 03:51 AM U.S. nuclear deal would not expand Indian arsenal - envoy By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent WASHINGTON (Reuters) - India's ambassador to Washington on Tuesday dismissed fears that a controversial civilian nuclear energy deal with the United States would help New Delhi expand its atomic weapons production. Speaking ahead of President George W. Bush's first visit to India, Ronen Sen said debate over the troubled accord had been "hijacked" by non-proliferation "theologians" in the United States and advocates of Indian self-reliance in his country. Prominent U.S. non-proliferation experts, in analyses made public last week, said the nuclear deal would allow the rapid expansion of India's nuclear arsenal and encourage Pakistan and China to respond. But Sen, speaking at the National Press Club, said this criticism "doesn't hold water ... because ... we don't require any outside assistance with this (nuclear weapons) program. ... So that program is going to continue irrespective of whether you have this agreement or you don't have this agreement." Bush will visit New Delhi next week to further advance a rapidly growing U.S.-India relationship that has the nuclear deal as its centerpiece. Agreed in principle last July, the deal would give India access to long-denied U.S. civilian nuclear technology, including fuel and reactors. Failure to resolve key practical differences would mar Bush's trip, which also includes a stop in Pakistan, officials and experts say. The two governments are at odds over the issue of separating India's civilian and military facilities and subjecting the civilian sites to international inspections while military sites remain off-limits. Americans insist India must put more facilities under international supervision. India's powerful nuclear establishment has complained this would shackle its scientists and leave the country dependent on imported uranium. Although some U.S. experts say the deal is falling apart, U.S. businessmen with interests in India are more upbeat. TALKS IN DELHI Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns will hold talks in New Delhi later this week and U.S. officials said he would not be going if he did not believe there was a basis for resolving the dispute. Sen insisted the agreement was strictly about energy and said: "The debate, I think, has been hijacked over here by nonproliferation theologians and in India by those rallying under the banner of self-reliance, even though it might not be conducive to our overall self-interests." If India were unable to expand its nuclear power industry with the help of U.S. and other imported fuel and technology, the country would have no choice but to burn its own stocks of "dirty coal ... at the cost of our health and health of this planet," Sen told a National Press Club briefing. Sen said India now imported 70 percent of its oil and to sustain the rapidly growing economy, New Delhi had to pursue nuclear energy as an alternative to oil. If that were not possible, he said, "we are going to burn that coal." He refused to discuss specifics of the nuclear dispute but predicted Bush's visit would be "a very successful visit ... a milestone in our relationship." U.S. officials and experts have said that if they could not nail down the nuclear deal, the two governments would shift the focus of Bush's visit to other, less contentious initiatives. U.S. business leaders say the nuclear deal could open the door to billions of dollars in contracts, while U.S. officials say it commits India to play a key role in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. For 30 years, the United States led an effort to deny India nuclear technology because it tested and developed nuclear weapons. Neither India nor neighbor and nuclear-armed rival Pakistan have signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Bush now views India, a rising democratic and economic power on China's border, as an evolving U.S. ally and the new nuclear deal is central to that vision. Unquote He has made it very clear that whether the USA goes ahead with the nuclear deal or not , it will have no effect on India's ability to increase its nuclear weapons, if it so wishes.This should clear the misconceptions in the mind of the opponents of the deal both in the United States and in India.

Posted by: k.ram Feb 22 2006, 07:32 AM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

India Deserves A Nuclear Partnership By K. SUBRAHMANYAM and G. PARTHASARATHY February 22, 2006; Page A14 NEW DELHI -- President Bush will visit India in the first week of March, setting the stage for a far stronger relationship between the two largest democracies. He will arrive at a time when India’s economy has been growing at over 7% annually, and is set for even higher growth as the government embarks on a program of increased liberalization designed to overhaul the country’s creaking infrastructure. But economic attractions aside, the main thrust of the visit will be strategic. The Bush National Security Doctrine of 2002 envisages much closer cooperation with India to build strategic stability in the Indian Ocean region. At the same time, military ties, including joint exercises and weapons sales, are set to increase substantially. Terrorism and energy security are key issues that will figure specifically when President Bush is in New Delhi. There is concern here about whether the U.S. is prepared for a long haul to ensure stability in the Middle East, and, particularly, in Afghanistan. Despite the American military presence of over four years in Afghanistan, not a single senior leader of the Taliban has been killed or captured. And with a substantial program of economic assistance of around $500 million earmarked for Afghanistan, India would like to know more about the long-term implications of U.S. troops there being replaced by forces from reluctant European countries that show signs of nervousness at the possibility of casualties. In the Persian Gulf, a belligerent Iranian regime is looking at the prospects of Shiite assertiveness spilling from Iraq into Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. India and the U.S. have a shared interest in strategic stability in the Gulf. They can cooperate closely to protect sea lanes and respond to security requirements of the Arab Gulf states. The Saudi king, Abdullah, was recently in Delhi, and the prospects for Indian and U.S. companies to collaborate in projects in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar for India’s requirements of oil, natural gas, petrochemicals and fertilizers are extensive. Relations between India and the U.S. have seen a remarkable turnaround over the last eight years. But a major shortcoming has been the absence of cooperation in civilian nuclear energy that would enable the rapidly growing Indian economy to meet its energy needs. This has primarily been because the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 led to measures under which American companies and their counterparts in countries that are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group can supply nuclear power reactors to China, but not to India. The U.S. and India have agreed to develop cleaner, more efficient, affordable and diversified energy technologies, including in the field of civilian nuclear energy. President Bush agreed on July 18, 2005, that as India is a "responsible state with advanced nuclear technology," it "should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states" because of its "strong commitment to preventing WMD proliferation." (India has rejected requests for nuclear cooperation from Libya, Iraq and Iran and seized and impounded North Korean missile shipments.) In return for the pledge by President Bush that he would approach to Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies to achieve full civilian nuclear cooperation with India, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to separate Indian civilian and military nuclear facilities in a phased manner and voluntarily place facilities designated by India as civilian under IAEA safeguards. France, Russia and the U.K. have welcomed the agreement and have indicated that they, too, look forward to cooperating with India to meet its growing needs for environmentally friendly nuclear power stations. The July 18 agreement has faced opposition in both the U.S. and India. In the U.S., those who have for 30 years sought to "cap, roll back and eliminate" India’s nuclear program, while virtually turning a blind eye of China’s transfers of missiles and nuclear weapons designs to Pakistan, have strongly opposed the agreement. In India, it has been argued that the agreement restricts our ability to develop a credible nuclear deterrent. There is also a strong feeling in India that the country should develop indigenous thorium-based fast-breeder reactors and not place energy security at risk by being dependent on imported nuclear fuel. President Bush showed vision and political courage in signing the agreement on peaceful uses of civilian nuclear energy. It was carefully crafted and clearly laid down the responsibilities and commitments that each side undertook. The agreement will fall apart if India is told that it has to take measures not envisaged on July 18, for President Bush to be able to persuade some of those known in India as "the ayatollahs of non-proliferation" that they should support moves in Congress to amend of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Prime Minister Singh, in turn, will have to ensure that his efforts to fulfill responsibilities that India has accepted are not disrupted by those who are used to functioning under secrecy and without public accountability -- or international competition. There now appears to be growing support in the U.S. Congress for approving the July 18 agreement. Can the leaders of the two countries translate the vision embodied in their joint statement into reality? President Bush, who firmly believes that democratic freedoms are the best antidote to terrorism, will get a first hand opportunity to see how a democratic society deals with problems of building prosperity and facing terrorist violence when he visits India. He has spoken of India’s role in securing a stable balance of power in Asia. Both India and the U.S. owe it to each other to ensure that suspicions that clouded relations in the past do not impede larger strategic objectives today. Sorting out the present differences on implementing the July 18 agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation will go a long way toward cementing a new partnership between the most powerful democracies in the world. Mr. Subrahmanyan is a former director of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi and a former convener of India’s National Security Council Advisory Board. Mr. Parthasarathy is a former Indian ambassador to Pakistan.

Posted by: Mudy Feb 22 2006, 09:27 AM

This headline is funny, deserve to be in Humor thread.,001301790001.htm

Posted by: rajesh_g Feb 22 2006, 10:46 AM

I found the headline above the last one even more funnier.. Whats with "deserves" ? As long as India negotiates from this sorry condition it cant negotiate a good deal. Sorry to see people like KS come up with such stupid stuff..

Posted by: Mudy Feb 22 2006, 10:48 AM

He has made it very clear that whether the USA goes ahead with the nuclear deal or not , it will have no effect on India's ability to increase its nuclear weapons, if it so wishes.This should clear the misconceptions in the mind of the opponents of the deal both in the United States and in India.
Once you open one door for inspection, rest will crumble. Seperating civilian and military will be more expensive and open for foreign sabotage and spying. Current setup is confusing for others and unified know-how is helping India and long term strategy. Whether US, UK, China, France, Russia facilities are open for inspection?
Sorry to see people like KS come up with such stupid stuff..
Daughter or son's job security in US biggrin.gif See articles on Manmohan's ALCU daughter is another tool to put pressure on already spineless PM. biggrin.gif

Posted by: ramana Feb 22 2006, 02:51 PM

One point to be kept in mind is that MMS daughter was protesting as an ACLU lawyer and not as MMS daughter. So this MMS picture in the WSJ is creationsim at its best.

Posted by: Mudy Feb 22 2006, 03:38 PM

So this MMS picture in the WSJ is creationsim at its best.
I can bet that story was planted my Paki embassy with hidden commie hand in US.

Posted by: k.ram Feb 27 2006, 05:17 AM

N-deal: Be careful what you wish for S Raghotham February 23, 2006 Part I: Time to redeem or reject nuclear deal The July 18 India-US Joint Statement was a victory of sorts, although it did not warrant the kind of triumphant jubilation that the Manmohan Singh government orchestrated through the media. That 'victory' itself was made up of many objects of desire -- acknowledgement of India as a rising global power; an invitation from the lone superpower to partner it on global issues, co-produce weapons systems and transformational technologies; and certainly vindication, at least in part, of India's decades-old stand against the nuclear apartheid championed against it by that very superpower. How did it all get reduced to one issue -- civil nuclear cooperation -- which now threatens to push us right into the jaws of defeat? Indeed, defeat it is seeming to be. Conditions have been piled up on India like war reparations demands on a defeated power. The answer lies in the multiple levels of failure of Indian diplomacy since the Joint Statement. First, the nuclear deal should never have been raised to the level of 'be all and end all' of India-US partnership building. Yet, this was exactly what the Indian negotiating team did. As Nicholas Burns told the US Congress: 'India had made this the central issue in the new partnership developing between our countries.' It is terrible diplomacy to ask for something by declaring that you can't live without it. When one does so, the price one has to pay for it goes up. The more desperation one shows, as the Manmohan Singh government and a section of the Indian press have done over the nuclear deal, the higher the price shoots up. Wrong signalling began with the triumphant jubilation that marked the Manmohan Singh government's and the Indian media's spin on the import of the Joint Statement. They claimed that India had been acknowledged as a nuclear weapons state and it was to be given the 'same advantages and benefits as the other nuclear powers and would accept the same responsibilities and practices' as them. Bush defends Indo-US nuke deal All of it was false. As Burns told the US Congress, 'We were determined from the start that we could not recognise India as a Nuclear Weapons State.' The Indian embassy in Washington, DC has, in fact, had to remove its backgrounder on India-US Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation, which made those claims . Once the immediate gushing and jubilation were over and some semblance of debate began to emerge, stories were put out in the media, including by those who claimed to have been closely involved in the negotiations, that this was the 'best deal India could have got.' Other stories were put out on the country's increasing energy needs. It was suggested that nuclear energy was critical to fill the presumed large gaps. A ring of false immediacy and alarm was given to both the estimates of energy needs and to the ability and criticality of the India-US nuclear deal to satisfy them. New York Times criticises India-US nuclear deal So shrill and desperate was the orchestration that anyone who questioned the underlying assumptions and logic was ridiculed as either still living in the much-maligned non-aligned era or was alleged to be protecting personal turf. The message went out to the US: the Indian government could not backtrack from something that it had deceived itself and its public into believing was a triumph. India would now do anything to get the nuclear deal. In October, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran confirmed India's desperation to Nicholas Burns when he meekly accepted new conditions that annulled the principles of the Joint Statement -? reciprocity, sovereign decision-making on separation, voluntary offer for safeguards. Second, before the Manmohan Singh government committed its entire diplomatic effort between July 18 and the coming Bush visit to getting the nuclear deal, it should have carried out a realistic assessment of what an agreement with the US would be worth in any case. India's delicate minuet India must understand that even if an agreement is signed, nuclear commerce will still remain hostage to annual presidential certifications and congressional reviews of continued Indian good behaviour. This is true for any sort of nuclear cooperation agreement that the US Congress might finally ratify, except if the Manmohan Singh government can get the US Congress to make India an exception to all current American non-proliferation laws and expressly give up its prerogative to ask for annual presidential certifications and reviews. This is very highly unlikely, if not impossible, especially after the signals of panic and desperation that the Indian government has sent out. With such a 'veto' in hand, the US Congress can stop nuclear cooperation for any reason it deems fit at any point of time -- if India tests a bomb again or an ICBM, if India even changes to a more alert nuclear weapons posture, if India goes to war with Pakistan, if India buys more nuclear technology from France or Russia than from US corporations, if a Gujarat-type event or a 1984 Delhi riot-type event should occur again. That Obscure Object of Desire: Nuclear energy We also know from experience -? cryogenic engines, Seaking helicopter spares, etc -- that if the US decides to stop its own cooperation with India, it will also block third parties from cooperating as well. So, what would you give to secure such an agreement? Third, once India did enter into negotiations, it should have exhibited the nerve to stand up to, even stare down, the US. Instead, Indian diplomats seem consumed by a desire that India should be the 'good boy' of international politics as defined and recognised by America. The Manmohan Singh government and its supporters in the media have been gloating over the 'responsible State with advanced nuclear technology' certificate given out in the Joint Statement. It gives them special pleasure especially when compared with the concerns expressed about Pakistan. The truth, however, is that in international politics, no one really cares for the 'nice guy'. America wouldn't care to acknowledge that India exists if it did not somehow impinge on US national interests. 'No American can treat India like a pet' Especially since the advent of the nuclear age, even the most powerful nations have banked on chicken games -- recklessness and brinkmanship -- not responsible behaviour, to achieve their objectives. During the Cold War, for instance, while India was undergoing a human population explosion, America and the Soviet Union indulged in a population explosion of bombs and missiles. It was reckless behaviour, considering they each built up arsenals that could destroy the whole planet several times over. President Kennedy's risky decisions during the Cuban missile crisis, Reagan's Star Wars (now missile defence) plan, Chinese responses to American threats have all been successful demonstrations of reckless strategies against tough opponents. Indeed, nuclear strategy during the Cold War was based on the logic of the 'rationality of irrationality.' Simply put, the US behaved irrationally to compel the Soviet Union to behave rationally. Even today, America continues to maintain a huge nuclear arsenal on hair-trigger alert, an example of irrationality. Closer home, Pakistan has successfully used its reckless behaviour to achieve political objectives. Its use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy brought Kashmir into international focus and brought pressure on India to talk to it. Pakistan's nuclear bazaar Even its 'Bomb Process Outsourcing' business, as K Santhanam called the A Q Khan affair, forced America to dole out large sums of money for Pakistan's conventional arming, including F-16 fighters, to keep Pakistan from doing more BPO. We may hate to admit it, but India dared not go to war with Pakistan in 2002 because of Pakistan's irrational 'touch-me-not' nuclear posture. Indian strategic policy on the other hand is such that even the king of Nepal laughs at it. A small de-alerted, dispersed, non-threatening, even incredible, nuclear posture; a self-imposed moratorium on testing; no ICBM capability, and a small IRBM production; over-compliant with international rules with regard to proliferating nuclear technology. What did Manmohan Singh expect when he went with this strategic posture to the US and asked for nuclear cooperation based on India's 'responsible behaviour?' Naturally, he was told, 'Good man. Now you must do more to satisfy us. Submit a major portion of your nuclear facilities for perpetual, on-demand inspections and then wait until the US government and Congress are satisfied that you have submitted India enough to the American will.' But then, why blame America for its imperialist designs. As George Perkovitch said on the Rediff Chat last week, the nuclear deal was India's idea, not America's. Srinivasa Raghotham is an associate and columnist for the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Henley-on-Thames, Oxfordshire, Britain. He writes a column titled 'Strategic View'

Posted by: Ravish Feb 27 2006, 05:51 AM

[The following is the text of the statement made today by the Hon'ble Prime Minister of India in the lower house of the Indian Parliament :- Quote Suo-motu Statement by the PM on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States February 27, 2006 New Delhi Mr Speaker Sir, I rise to inform this august House of the status of discussions with the United States on civil nuclear energy co-operation. Substantive aspects of this are reflected in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 that US President Bush and I agreed upon during my visit to Washington DC last year. I would like to use this occasion to outline the context and core elements of the Joint Statement, before detailing the status of the ongoing negotiations. Hon’ble Members are aware that our effort to reach an understanding with the United States to enable civil nuclear energy cooperation was based on our need to overcome the growing energy deficit that confronts us. As India strives to raise its annual GDP growth rate from the present 7-8% to over 10%, the energy deficit will only worsen. This may not only retard growth, it could also impose an additional burden in terms of the increased cost of importing oil and natural gas, in a scenario of sharply rising hydrocarbon prices. While we have substantial reserves of coal, excessive dependence on coal-based energy has its own implications for our environment. Nuclear technology provides a plentiful and non-polluting source of power to meet our energy needs. However, to increase the share of nuclear power in our energy mix, we need to break out of the confines imposed by inadequate reserves of natural uranium, and by international embargos that have constrained our nuclear programme for over three decades. Established through the vision of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and sustained by the commitment of scientists like Dr. Homi Bhabha, our nuclear programme is truly unique. Its uniqueness lies in the breadth of its overarching vision: of India mastering a three-stage nuclear programme using our vast thorium resources, and mastering more complex processes of the full nuclear fuel cycle. Consequently, our civilian and strategic programmes are deeply intertwined across the expanse of the nuclear fuel cycle. There are hardly any other countries in a similar situation. Over the years, the maturation of our nuclear programme, including the development of world-class thermal power reactors, has made it possible to contemplate some changes. These are worth considering if benefits include gaining unhindered access to nuclear material, equipment, technology and fuel from international sources. However, international trade in nuclear material, equipment and technologies is largely determined by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG)—an informal group of 45 countries. Members include the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom. India has been kept out of this informal arrangement and therefore denied access to trade in nuclear materials, equipment and various kinds of technologies. It was with this perspective that we approached negotiations with the United States on enabling full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. The essence of what was agreed in Washington last July was a shared understanding of our growing energy needs. In recognition of our improved ties, the United States committed itself to a series of steps to enable bilateral and international cooperation in nuclear energy. These include adjusting domestic policies, and working with allies to adjust relevant international regimes. There was also a positive mention of possible fuel supply to the first two nuclear power reactors at Tarapur. US support was also indicated for India’s inclusion as a full partner in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Research Project and the Generation IV International Forum. But more importantly, in the Joint Statement, the United States implicitly acknowledged the existence of our nuclear weapons programme. There was also public recognition that as a responsible State with advanced nuclear technologies, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other States which have advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. The Joint Statement offered the possibility of decades-old restrictions being set aside to create space for India’s emergence as a full member of a new nuclear world order. On our part, as Hon’ble Members may recall from my suo motu statement on July 29 last year, we committed ourselves to separating the civilian and strategic programme. However this was to be conditional upon, and reciprocal to, the United States fulfilling its side of the understanding. I had stressed that reciprocity was the key and we expected that the steps to be taken by India would be conditional upon and contingent on action taken by the United States. I had emphasized then—and I reiterate today—that no part of this process would affect or compromise our strategic programme. I now come to the negotiations that have taken place in the past few months. While these have been principally with the US, there have been discussions with other countries like Russia, UK and France as well. At the political level, I have maintained contact with President Chirac of France, President Putin of Russia, Prime Minister Blair of the UK. I have also raised this subject with the Heads of State/Government of Norway, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Czech Republic and Ireland - all members of the NSG. I also met President Bush in New York last September and discussed implementation of the July 18 statement. In the same period, several American Congressional leaders and policy-makers have visited India in the past few months, many of whom met me. We have amply clarified our objective in pursuing full civil nuclear energy cooperation for our energy security and to reassure them of India’s impeccable non-proliferation credentials. At the official level, we have constituted two groups comprising key functionaries concerned with strategic and nuclear matters. They included the Department of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Armed Forces and my Office. These two groups were respectively mandated to draw up an acceptable separation plan, and to negotiate on this basis. The directive given to both groups was to ensure that our strategic nuclear programme is not compromised in any way, while striving to enlarge avenues for full civil nuclear energy cooperation with the international community. The negotiations by our officials have been extensive and prolonged. These have focused on four critical elements: the broad contours of a Separation Plan; the list of facilities being classified civilian; the nature of safeguards applied to facilities listed in the civilian domain; and the nature and scope of changes expected in US domestic laws and NSG guidelines to enable full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. Hon’ble Members may be assured that in deciding the contours of a separation plan, we have taken into account our current and future strategic needs and programmes after careful deliberation of all relevant factors, consistent with our Nuclear Doctrine. We are among very few countries to adhere to the doctrine of ‘No first Use’. Our doctrine envisions a credible minimum nuclear deterrent to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary indulging in a nuclear first strike. The facilities for this, and the required level of comfort in terms of our strategic resilience have thus been our criterion in drawing up a separation plan. Ours is a sacred trust to protect succeeding generations from a nuclear threat and we shall uphold this trust. Hon Members may therefore be assured that in preparing a Separation Plan, there has been no erosion of the integrity of our Nuclear Doctrine, either in terms of current or future capabilities. The Separation Plan that is being outlined is not only consistent with the imperatives of national security, it also protects our vital research and development interests. We have ensured that our three-stage nuclear programme will not be undermined or hindered by external interference. We will offer to place under safeguards only those facilities that can be identified as civilian without damaging our deterrence potential or restricting our R&D effort, or in any way compromising our autonomy of developing our three stage nuclear programme. In this process, the Department of Atomic Energy has been involved at every stage, and the separation plan has been drawn up with their inputs. Therefore our proposed Separation Plan entails identifying in phases, a number of our thermal nuclear reactors as civilian facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, amounting to roughly 65% of the total installed thermal nuclear power capacity, by the end of the separation plan. A list of some other DAE facilities may be added to the list of facilities within the civilian domain. The Separation Plan will create a clearly defined civilian domain, where IAEA safeguards apply. On our part, we are committed not to divert any nuclear material intended for the civilian domain from designated civilian use or for export to third countries without safeguards. Mr Speaker Sir, Negotiations are currently at a delicate stage. In our dialogue with our interlocutors, we have judged every proposal made by the US side on merits, but we remain firm in that the decision of what facilities may be identified as civilian will be made by India alone, and not by anyone else. At the same time, we are not underestimating the difficulties that exist in these negotiations. There are complex issues involved. Several aspects of the nuclear programme lend themselves in the public discussions to differing interpretations, such as the Fast Breeder Programme or our fuel-cycle capabilities such as re-processing and enrichment requirements. The nature and range of strategic facilities that we consider necessarily outside safeguards constitute yet another example. We have however conveyed to our interlocutors that while discussing the Separation Plan, there are details of the nature and content of our strategic requirements that we cannot share. We will not permit information of national security significance to be compromised in the process of negotiation. It is essential to recall that the July 18 Statement was not about our strategic programme. It was intended to be the means to expand our civilian nuclear energy capacities and thereby to help pave the way for faster economic progress. In seeking to achieve this objective, we appreciate the need for patience to remove misperceptions that abound. I reiterate that India has an exemplary record on non-proliferation and this will continue to be so. All in all, one major achievement so far is that a change is now discernible in the international system. We believe that when implemented, the understandings reflected in the Joint Statement will give India its due place in the global nuclear order. The existence of our strategic programme is being acknowledged even while we are being invited to become a full partner in international civil nuclear energy cooperation. Mr Speaker Sir, I must emphasize that the nation is justly proud of the tremendous work of our nuclear scientists and the Department of Atomic Energy in mastering all the key aspects of the full nuclear fuel cycle, often under difficult circumstances. The tremendous achievements of our scientists in mastering the complete nuclear fuel cycle - the product of their genius and perseverance – will not be frittered away. We will ensure that no impediments are put in the way of our research and development activities. We have made it clear that we cannot accept safeguards on our indigenous Fast Breeder Programme. Our scientists are confident that this technology will mature and that the programme will stabilize and become more robust through the creation of additional capability. This will create greater opportunities for international cooperation in this area as well. An important reason why the US and other countries with advanced nuclear technologies are engaging with India as a valued partner is precisely because of the high respect and admiration our scientists enjoy internationally, and the range and quality of the sophisticated nuclear programme they have managed to create under the most difficult odds. This gives us confidence to engage in these negotiations as an equal partner. As I said, many aspects of the proposed separation plan are currently under negotiation. It is true that certain assurances in the July 18 Statement remain to be fulfilled – the supply of imported fuel for Tarapur I and II, for one. Some elements, such as US support for India’s participation in the ITER programme, have materialized. The issue of the nature of safeguards to be applied to facilities designated civilian also remains pending resolution. I seek the indulgence of this House not to divulge every single detail of the negotiations at this time. However, this august House can be assured that the limits are determined by our overarching commitment to national security and the related issue of the autonomy of our nuclear programme. Our Government will take no step that could circumscribe or cast a shadow over either. I am aware that concerns have been raised over information being shared with outsiders, but not with our own citizens. Members may be assured that nothing that could compromise our nuclear deterrent has been shared with anyone. On this aspect there is no reason for concern or doubt. Mr Speaker Sir, As I said at the outset, our approach is defined by the need to utilize the window of opportunity before us, to find a solution to our energy deficit. We have also been guided by the need to dismantle international restrictions, which, when achieved, could unleash our scientific talent and increase commercial potential in the nuclear and related sectors. The nation will be kept informed, through this august House. Thank you. Unquote

Posted by: ramana Mar 1 2006, 01:44 PM


The credibility question Nothing less than a sea-based deterrent should satisfy us. 28 February 2006: On many aspects of the critical and sensitive nuclear negotiations with the United States, prime minister Manmohan Singh has been startlingly clear and lucid in his statement to Parliament yesterday. He has made the important and necessary clarification somewhere in the middle of his speech, though it should have been more upfront, that the 18 July agreement “was not about our strategic programme”. The fiery public debate in India about the agreement did not lose sight of that in the beginning, it is only when the US commenced “shifting the goalposts” that the community of Indian nuclear scientists got alarmed. Stressing on the original intent of the agreement, the PM has tried to put the clock back, and it is a valiant effort. Also welcome is his repeated reiteration, as many as six or seven times, that our strategic programme and the enveloping nuclear doctrine won’t be compromised. “…in deciding the contours of a separation plan,” the PM said, “we have taken into account our current and future strategic needs and programmes after careful deliberation of all relevant factors, consistent with our Nuclear Doctrine.” The PM added, significantly, “Our doctrine envisions a credible minimum nuclear deterrent to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary indulging in a nuclear first strike. The facilities for this, and the required level of comfort in terms of our strategic resilience, have thus been our criterion for drawing up a separation plan.” The PM and the rest of the Indian negotiating side won’t be unaware that a key aim of the United States is to limit India to its current level of deterrence. Their problem with the fast breeder and the entire three-stage nuclear programme anyhow, with its complicated and madly intertwined fuel cycles, is that it gives awesome strategic potential to India, a potential that scares America, in part because it knows so little about it. If the US side was hoping that the 18 July agreement would become a vehicle to gain insights into our strategic programme, well, that is a no-fly zone, and the PM made this very clear yesterday. As he said, and it bears repetition, to tie down our side, “We have…conveyed to our interlocutors that while discussing the Separation Plan, there are details of the nature and content of our strategic requirements that we cannot share. We will not permit information of national security significance to be compromised in the process of negotiation.” Well said, but that won’t alarm the Americans less, but more, and indeed, make it more difficult for the US president, George W.Bush, landing tomorrow, to sell the agreement to the US Congress, and use that to ride out naysayers in the forty-five nation Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. Proliferation is a concern, but in this case, it is becoming a cover for a more pressing American apprehension, that they won’t be able to apply the breaks on an open-ended Indian nuclear programme. This is the real worry, and the Bush administration does not want to get into a negotiating trap where they gift India its legitimacy as a nuclear power, with freedom to import civilian nuclear technologies, fuels, and so on, while the country pursues its weapons’ ambitions with as much or maybe more chutzpah than before. We tested in May 1998 because CTBT was being pressed on us, and we placed our own moratorium on further tests. The Americans would certainly hope and persevere that that moratorium is formalised. Without the means to test, we would be crippled in our weapons design advancements, and as crucially, the push to develop and perfect our sea-based deterrent. Our no-first-use doctrine leaves us fairly vulnerable to a Pakistani or even Chinese air or missile strike to take out our nuclear retaliatory capacity – almost all our national territories are targetable – and this does not even take into account the national paralysis that will set in even if one big city is nuked. One could go on and on, it is depressing, but the point is different, a sea-based deterrent is quite nearly the best bet you can have, currently, and we are not there in any real sense. A cap on testing will kill the thrust to a relatively more secure sea-based deterrent, and almost certainly, the Americans would be smart to apply the cap on our advanced nuclear submarine design and production capabilities. Once the cap applies, nobody would export any half worthy sea-based deterrent equipment or technology, and we could kiss goodbye to all our friendly expectations from Russia. The American fear is solid, but that should not really concern us. What they fear is that any Indian thrust to go beyond a credible minimum deterrent would set off a nuclear arms race with Pakistan, in which China will join to back an ally, and this would re-ignite Iranian and North Korean passions to weaponise all over again. This chain reaction is entirely possible, but for that reason, India cannot be penalised. In any case, the quest is for a “credible” minimum deterrent, and it is up to us to determine what constitutes that “credible deterrence”, and nobody who knows his strategic onions would settle for anything less than a “credible” sea-based deterrent. In Parliament, prime minister Manmohan Singh spelt out, in a sense, his limited mandate to negotiate the details of the 18 July agreement, and this applies as much to keeping India’s strategic programme open-ended. Because of sustained international pressure after the May 1998 tests, we got stampeded into declaring a moratorium on the tests, but it is not a moratorium we can maintain for long. While during the negotiations this week and immediately afterwards, or until the US Congress takes up the agreement for possible ratification, it would be provocative to go our way on the tests, but before long, we have to walk that road. It is best to be prepared, lest we surprise ourselves before the rest of the world.
Something is fishy. Why does sea-based deterrent have to be tested where as the others dont? The writer is trying to convey something.

Posted by: acharya Mar 1 2006, 03:09 PM

Good Nukes, Bad Nukes By David Ignatius Wednesday, March 1, 2006; Page A17 Juxtaposed this week are the two poles of the emerging world: India and Iran. They are alpha and omega, the dream and the nightmare. One symbolizes the promise of globalization, the other the threat of global disorder. What they share, unfortunately, is a passion to be members of the nuclear club. India has nuclear weapons; Iran wants them. Between them stands the United States, trying to set rules that will apply to both -- rewarding the good boy while maintaining an ability to punish the bad one. F. Scott Fitzgerald famously observed that intelligence "is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time." That has always seemed to me like an argument for enlightened hypocrisy. And maybe it's the best explanation for why we should say yes to India's nukes and no to Iran's. The two cases are different because -- they're different. The same rules don't apply to both; one has shown that it is benign and the other behaves like a global outlaw. President Bush's trip to India this week sets the nuclear issue in all its hypocritical glory. The centerpiece of the visit, it is hoped, will be an agreement that, in effect, validates India's accession as a nuclear weapons state in exchange for its acceptance of new safeguards on its civilian nuclear program. An Iranian observing Bush's visit might conclude that the lesson is that if you can somehow manage to build a nuclear bomb despite the West's antiproliferation efforts, you will eventually get away with it. Iran would be dangerously mistaken if it made that assumption. The real lesson may be that rules are sometimes less important than behavior. The world is ready to accept India as a nuclear power because its actions have given other nations confidence that it seeks to play a stabilizing role. A world where behavior matters gets the incentives right: It forces Iran to demonstrate its reliability so that, over time, it can be seen in the same league as India and Pakistan. One common thread in U.S. policy toward India and Iran is the insistence that enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel be under some form of international supervision. The agreement Bush is seeking during his trip -- to separate India's civilian and military nuclear programs -- embodies that idea. So does Russia's proposal to provide enrichment for Iran's nuclear program. Iran suggested last weekend that it might accept this plan. Most observers remain dubious, but if Iran is really willing to outsource its civilian nuclear fuel, that might be a breakthrough. The Bush administration is weighing a more ambitious idea that all nuclear enrichment and reprocessing should be capped -- so that no new country can join the club. Sen. Richard Lugar has submitted such a proposal, based on suggestions from Ashton B. Carter, a Harvard University expert in nuclear policy. Under the Lugar plan, countries that forgo their enrichment and reprocessing programs would have guaranteed access to nuclear fuel at reasonable prices. Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, proposes to take internationalization of fuel supplies a step further -- so that all enrichment and reprocessing would be under the IAEA's control. How can the world foster civilian nuclear power without further proliferation of weapons? That conundrum was the starting point for the drafters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the 1960s, and it has become more urgent today. There's an emerging consensus that nuclear power is the best way for China and India to modernize without adding disastrously to global warming. John Ritch, head of the World Nuclear Association in London, argues that the world will need 10,000 civilian nuclear reactors by the end of the century, compared with 440 today. How can we manage this explosion of nuclear power while avoiding a mushroom cloud? That's the backdrop to our debate about India and Iran. Harvard's Graham Allison tells his students that the Iranian nuclear issue is a "slow-motion Cuban missile crisis." By that, he means that miscalculation on either side could have catastrophic consequences for the world. Allison's famous study of the missile crisis, "Essence of Decision," explained how both firmness and flexibility allowed President Kennedy to avoid war. One of Kennedy's secrets, it could be argued, was a policy of strategic hypocrisy -- responding to a constructive Soviet message that could resolve the crisis and ignoring a subsequent belligerent one. The West is still waiting for the constructive message from Tehran. In the meantime, we should all learn to live with a policy that says yes to India and no to Iran.

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 2 2006, 01:23 AM

The US and India have finalised a landmark nuclear power agreement after talks in Delhi between President George W Bush and India's prime minister. India will get access to US civil nuclear technology and open its nuclear facilities to international inspection. Mr Bush, on his first visit to India, called the deal a "historic agreement". It's a necessary agreement. It's one that will help both our peoples. . . . . 'Historic' deal Speaking at a news conference after the talks, President Bush called the nuclear deal historic. "It's a necessary agreement. It's one that will help both our peoples," he said. India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said India had finalised a plan to separate its military and civilian nuclear facilities, a move contingent on the deal going through. Under the deal, the civilian facilities will be open to international inspection. But Mr Bush also conceded it may be difficult to sell the deal to the US Congress, which has to ratify it. . .. . .

Posted by: Bhootnath Mar 2 2006, 01:28 AM U.S., India Reach Agreement on Nuke Deal U.S., India Reach Agreement on Landmark Civil Nuclear Deal During Bush Visit .................. Under the accord, the United States would share American nuclear know-how and fuel with India to help power its fast-growing economy, even though India won't sign the international nonproliferation treaty. It would represent a major shift in policy for the United States, which imposed temporary sanctions on India in 1998 after it conducted nuclear tests. ...................

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 2 2006, 01:44 AM

QUOTE(Bhootnath @ Mar 2 2006, 01:58 PM)
India won't sign the international nonproliferation treaty.
Anyone here was expecting India to sign NPT?

Posted by: Bhootnath Mar 2 2006, 01:57 AM

Propensity of Indian politician to fall for flattery and crawl when asked to bend is there for all to see. So such expectation (NPT signing ) may not be misplaced. Now what we have to wait for is the details of agreement ... as an Indian I have my own cynical views abt US. Hope that is okay. The way KS and ppl like Shekhar Gupta / certain NSAB member were rooting for US who have in past have not hidden their love for China all raised certain question. Remember protestations of Mr Kakodkar .. So if not signing it directly but indirectly agreeing to various stiffling agreement may amount to same , isn't it ? I am not celebrating yet . PS : BR hacked ?

Posted by: Manne Mar 2 2006, 06:02 AM

China's tushy has started quivering. I find it delectable - at the same time worthy of quiet anger. The eternal Chinese persistence and diplomatese is all over it.

Posted by: ramana Mar 2 2006, 08:28 AM

BR is down again. Could be too many requests also. Will find out soon. Meantime, Manne, now that an accord has been reached post your 'golden nuggets' in this and the BR thread once it opens. In my view Indian diplomacy has ensured that it is medium threat situation that I described in BRM article "What Next?" The next step is mutual detargetting agreement as a follow-up once the US Congress ratifies the this accord. Here is a report

India, US close 'historic' nuclear pact Tarun Basu and Manish Chand, New Delhi: In a move with long-term potential to influence the global power balance, India and the United States Thursday finalised a difficult civil nuclear entente that both saw as "historic" and one that would advance the "strategic partnership" between the fast developing allies. The pact, which officials said was still at the stage of an understanding and did not carry the finality of a signed deal, will form the basis of a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement after the US Congress has amended its domestic laws to enable nuclear commerce with New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced to reporters after a meeting with Bush at the stately Hyderabad House: "We are particularly pleased that we have reached an understanding on the civil nuclear agreement." He said India had "successfully completed" the separation plan of its civil and military nuclear programmes and it was for the US now to reciprocate and get the deal through Congress and change the guidelines of the powerful Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India on its part would go to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to come up with "an appropriate India-specific safeguards agreement" for its nuclear energy programme. The agreement, when it comes, will effectively end India's status as a nuclear pariah, even though it has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the ground that it is discriminatory. The final deal on New Delhi's "mutually satisfactory" separation plan of its civilian and military nuclear programmes, reached after a "hard and difficult bargain", envisages India placing reactors generating 65 percent of its total installed nuclear capacity under international safeguards in return for nuclear technology and fuel, officials said. The US was "very pleased" with this plan, which it will now take to the US Congress and the 45-nation NSG to "adjust" their guidelines in favour of India, officials said. Once the US has amended its domestic laws, India and the US will sign a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. "We have managed a good deal," a top official said. According to reliable sources, 14 reactors will be put in the civilian category that would bring them under permanent safeguards while eight will remain in the military category. India has currently 15 operational reactors while seven will be online by 2008. Most of India's concerns have been accommodated in the separation plan, the official said. For one thing, the fast breeder reactor that runs on indigenously found thorium will not be put under the civilian list and any decision to decide which reactor is civilian or military rests with India in the interest of its strategic programme. A decision on classifying any future reactor as civilian will be the sole prerogative and sovereign decision of India. Manmohan Singh's statement in parliament Monday, wherein he enunciated India's plan to separate its civilian and military facilities, forms the basis of the historic understanding he reached with Bush Thursday, an understanding facilitated no doubt by Bush's strong personal commitment to make it happen. As for the US insistence on India putting civilian reactors under permanent safeguards, New Delhi has conceded it but only after getting an assurance that it has the "sovereign right to take corrective measures" if its needs for continued supply of fuel are not met, as was the case with the Tarapur plants near Mumbai. In agreeing to permanent safeguards, which are applicable only to non-nuclear weapon states, India made it clear that it has to be treated as a nuclear weapon state and it is from this standpoint New Delhi will negotiate India-specific safeguards with the IAEA. Bush arrived here Wednesday evening on a three-day visit, his first to this country, whose centrepiece was the civil nuclear agreement, the seeds for which were sown when Manmohan Singh visited Washington last July. The agreement came against the backdrop of anti-Bush protests across India, with Left and Muslim groups denouncing him as a "killer" and "warmonger". But the protests were unlikely to be seen by Bush and his wife Laura as they were held a couple of kilometres away from Hyderabad House, the venue of the talks and the Maurya Sheraton Hotel, where the Bushes are staying. Marxist leader Sitaram Yechury, whose Communist Party of India (Marxist) was at the forefront of the protests, felt the deal could not be termed as "finally through" and "a lot of water" has to flow through both capitals before the understanding reached Thursday became a binding treaty. Large protests were also held in other parts of India, including Mumbai where an estimated 150,000 Muslims thronged the Azad Maidan ground shouting anti-Bush slogans. All the protests were peaceful. Manmohan Singh, whom Bush praised for his leadership and courage, in turn paid warm tributes to Bush for his vision and the role he has played in the "transformation" of Indo-US ties. "There are no limits to Indo-US partnership," the prime minister said at the press conference, as Bush nodded approvingly. Bush, who called his trip "historic" and "very successful", said it was not an easy job either for him or for the Indian prime minister to reach the nuclear agreement that was hotly debated by strategists, scientists and politicians on both sides. "I know it is not an easy job for the prime minister. It is not easy for the American president," Bush said. He called it a "necessary" agreement "that will help both our peoples". "I am looking forward to working with the US Congress to change laws that will enable us to move forward on this important initiative," he said. Asked why the US should make an exception for India, a non-signatory to the NPT, and what its consequences would be for the international nuclear regime, Bush replied: "What this agreement says is that things change and times change. "Some people don't want to change with time. It's in our interest that India (a major oil consumer) has a nuclear power industry. India has shown the way forward." Bush, who visits the southern city of Hyderabad Friday, is scheduled to leave the same night for Pakistan where a major bomb blast in Karachi threw question marks on the trip, though Bush later said he would go to Islamabad. A joint statement issued after the press conference said the two leaders expressed satisfaction with the "great progress" both countries have made "in advancing our strategic partnership to meet the global challenges of the 21st century". "The successful transformation of the US-India relationship will have a decisive and positive influence on the future international system as it evolves in the new century," the statement said. K. Subrahmanyam, the doyen of India's strategic fraternity, said as a result of the deal "India's standing in the world order is bound to grow". "The world will come to reach out to India," said Subrahmanyam, who heads the prime minister's Task Force on Global Strategic Development. He noted that the deal will result in India's ties and trade with other countries improving and both France and Russia would now agree to sell nuclear reactors to India. "Everybody who thought this deal was a ploy to cap our nuclear arsenal will realise that is not the case," Subrahmanyam told IANS. Top Indian and American officials, including India's National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan and his American counterpart Stephen Hadley, met at the prime minister's office till well past midnight in a bid to iron out remaining differences over the deal that mainly revolved around tussles over the number of facilities that India would put under international safeguards. Opponents of the deal in India had warned the government against succumbing to American pressure and surrendering New Delhi's "strategic options" that centred on an autarkic policy of technological self-reliance after the nuclear nations, led by the US, cut off supplies and technology to its atomic plants following its first nuclear test in 1974. Besides a nuclear agreement, India and the US also made significant progress in boosting trade and economic ties, space cooperation, maritime security and an ambitious agricultural initiative that promises to usher in a second green revolution in India.
Agree this is a landmark deal and has ended the isolation after 1974 tests. I also state that now India's deterrent has become legtimate and credible. In complex variables math lingo the zero of the NPT has been isolated and integration around it has occured. THe NPT is still there but it does not apply to India. Republican President Bush has shown more vision and courage than the Democrats when they were in power. This should be remembered by NRIs at election and fundrising time. KS is gloating now but the early deal before AK went public and previous versions that wanted over 3/4 of the PHWRS declared civilian was not in India's interests. But that its the perogrative of those in power. I still think Bhisma blinked and should read the Vishnu Shasranamam. The run up to the accord showed the lifafa journalists and the mendacity of the Indian opinion makers. Shekar Dupatta is still spouting castiest ideology on international forums like Charlie Rose show.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 2 2006, 08:43 AM

Anyone here was expecting India to sign NPT?
No, Its outdated. NPT was Ms. Halfbright tool to kick India as and when.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 2 2006, 08:50 AM

Today’s Kate Couric (NBC) asked Thomas Friedman - Don't you think there is double standard, we are helping India who is not a signatory of NPT and not allowing Iran or North Korea. His answer was- Yes, it is a double standard but we are telling world that India is a democracy and you are not. biggrin.gif Basically US is trying to sell US citizens that Indian is becoming richer and more people are buying cars, they will consume more oil for development, it will make Gas in US expensive. So let us help India to build nuclear plants which will give jobs to US citizens and less oil price for common US citizens.

Posted by: ramana Mar 2 2006, 08:53 AM

Mudy, you know thats not right. NPT was brought into effect to contain the emergence of nuclear armed states in Europe. A whole lot of states considered going nuclear- Sweden, Germany, and Italy. They signed the NPT once they were given the US nuclear umbrella and access to weapons in case of war with Soviet Union. Ditto with Japan and South Korea. India was collateral damage. Halbright was still in school when it was first discussed in early 1960s. Being an Admin you cant make glib statements like that. Responsibility comes with power.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 2 2006, 09:06 AM

Ramana, My understanding regarding any deal with India on Nuclear issue, Clinton Admin was using sign CTBT first and NPT is for some exclusive club. But with Bush, CTBT is gone but before signing this deal there is no binding. NPT, which means they still beileve India not a "nuclear weapon state" or not part of "exclusive club".

Posted by: acharya Mar 2 2006, 09:12 AM

Nuclear Deal With India a Victory for Bush By DEB RIECHMANN, Associated Press Writer 2 hours, 13 minutes ago NEW DELHI - President Bush got a victory Thursday on his first visit to India, securing a landmark nuclear energy agreement that he says could help ease energy prices in the United States. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the deal, which will open most Indian reactors to international inspections and provide the growing nation with U.S. nuclear technology, during a joint news conference after meeting privately to hammer out details. "We made history," Singh said of the deal that will aid India's quest for more global influence. Under the accord, the United States will share its nuclear know-how and fuel with India to help power its fast-growing economy. It represents a major shift in policy for the United States, which imposed temporary sanctions on India in 1998 after it conducted nuclear tests. "We concluded an historic agreement today on nuclear power," Bush said. "It's not an easy job for the prime minister to achieve this agreement, I understand. It's not easy for the American president to achieve this agreement, but it's a necessary agreement. It's one that will help both our peoples." Critics said the deal undermines the Nuclear Nonproliferation Agreement, which India won't sign. And they say it sends the wrong signal to leaders of North Korea and Iran, who have snubbed their noses at international calls to halt their nuclear weapons programs. The agreement will require U.S. congressional approval. Bush immediately acknowledged that will be difficult to win. Bush said he will tell lawmakers that the U.S.-India relationship is changing for the better and that it is in the United States' interest to cooperate with India on its nuclear programs. He also said the deal could be a boon for U.S. consumers. "Proliferation is certainly a concern and a part of our discussions, and we've got a good faith gesture by the Indian government that I'll be able to take to the Congress," Bush said. "But the other thing that our Congress has got to understand — that it's in our economic interests that India have a civilian nuclear power industry to help take the pressure off of the global demand for energy. ... To the extent that we can reduce demand for fossil fuels, it will help the American consumer." Singh's leftist allies also criticized the pact, saying it paves the way for U.S. meddling in Indian affairs. "Today is one of the most shameful days in the history of independent India," said Shambhu Shrivastava, spokesman for the socialist Samata Party. A top official of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party said the agreement sounded good, but must not compromise national security. India argues that it has been a good steward of nuclear material for five decades, and that there has not been one instance of nuclear proliferation coming from India. Singh repeatedly thanked Bush for shepherding the deal. "But for his leadership, this day would probably have not come so soon," Singh said. Not everyone in India was pleased about Bush's involvement in its affairs. Demonstrators gathered across the country, including an estimated 10,000 people who chanted "Bush go back!" and "Down with Bush!" a few blocks from where the two leaders met. Many carried the red flags of India's leftist political parties or wore white skullcaps indicating they were Muslim. India has the world's second-largest Muslim population, behind Indonesia. Bush and Singh signed an agreement in July to provide India with nuclear fuel for its booming but energy-starved economy. But the deal hinged upon determining how to segregate India's nuclear weapons work from its commercial nuclear program, and place the latter under international inspection, in a way that satisfied both sides. U.S. Undersecretary of State Nick Burns said India agreed to open a majority of its nuclear power plants to international safeguards. A senior administration official said India classified 14 of its 22 reactors as civilian, which would open them to international inspection. Eight were deemed military reactors, making them exempt from inspection. Bush began more than 12 hours of events and meetings on Thursday with a striking arrival ceremony in a sun-drenched plaza at Rashtrapati Bhavan, the president's palace. He reviewed troops of the Indian armed services outfitted in orange turbans and brown dress uniforms with colorful sashes and marveled at a cavalry unit on horseback that earlier had flanked his limousine. "I have been received in many capitals around the world but I have never seen a reception as well-organized or as grand," Bush said. Bush and his wife, Laura, then visited a memorial to India's independence leader, M.K. Gandhi, standing in stocking feet for a moment of silence and wreath-laying at the site of his cremation in 1948. Following tradition, the Bushes tossed flower petals on the cremation platform — a gesture repeated for news photographers. After meeting with U.S. and Indian CEOs and answering questions from the media, Bush and Singh had a lunch of smoked salmon, mutton and vegetables. Singh spoke of how another American-Indian duo — Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi — pushed for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The day was to end with an elaborate State Dinner. After India, Bush was headed to Pakistan where on Thursday at least one bomb ripped through the parking lot of the Marriott Hotel in Karachi, exploding windows in the nearby U.S. consulate. Bush said he had been briefed on the bombing and had been told the victims included at least one U.S. citizen, a foreign service officer he did not identify by name. The attack occurred hundreds of miles from Islamabad, where Bush's events were to take place, but underscored the need for the extraordinary security planned for his visit. "Terrorists and killers are not going to prevent me from going to Pakistan," he said.

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 2 2006, 09:31 AM

From report:

"We have managed a good deal," a top official said. According to reliable sources, 14 reactors will be put in the civilian category that would bring them under permanent safeguards while eight will remain in the military category. India has currently 15 operational reactors while seven will be online by 2008.
and also the same data from Nuclear Deal With India a Victory for Bush By DEB RIECHMANN, Associated Press contrast that with Zee TV news report talk of deal covering only 14 reactors: where 8 will eventually go in Civilan bucket and 6 for Mil. The gap is ostensibly reactors under construction. That means those in construction is 8 reactors of which 6 will be civilian and 2 in mil. Clearly the PFBR is one of the mil. The question is which other unit under construction is also in Mil? Soverign right to determine future reactor build is India's. So my skeptical mind reads the press report towing the US wish to catagorize all current and those being built, where as TV reporting 14 (8+6) reactors, and the last minute negotiations to make sure there is no ambiguity that the future reactors are out side the seperation plan. So an important question is if the soverign Indian decision starts beyond the 14 reactor or after 22 reactors?

Posted by: Mudy Mar 2 2006, 09:32 AM,001301790000.htm

India should sign the NPT and also dismantle its nuclear weapons, a spokesman for China's Foreign Ministry, Qin Gang, told a news briefing in Beijing. "As a signatory country, China hopes non-signatory countries will join it as soon as possible as non-nuclear weapon states, thereby contributing to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime," he said. Qin said current international safeguards on nuclear weapons were the hard-won product of many countries' efforts and should not be weakened by exceptions. "China hopes that concerned countries developing cooperation in peaceful nuclear uses will pay attention to these efforts. The cooperation should conform with the rules of international non-proliferation mechanisms," he said. The NPT grants China, the United States, Russia, France and Britain status as nuclear weapons states, but bars other signatory countries from having such weapons. China has been pursuing nuclear power cooperation with Pakistan, India's long-time rival, and has also hosted stalled six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. Pyongyang withdrew from the NPT in 2003, after the United States accused it of enriching uranium for weapons.

Posted by: ramana Mar 2 2006, 09:32 AM

Mudy, The NPT was waved against India from Johnson's adminsitration. It was not some exclusive thing that the Clinton Admn waved at India in particlular. Lets get to basics. In 1954 Jawahar Lal Nehru proposed the Test Ban treaty after the British tested in 1953. The logic was that testing was a precondtion to becoming a nuclear power and limiting the powers that had nukes was a good thing for world peace especially when India did not have access to such weapons. However the West and Soviet Union rejected the suggestion for they new the club was incomplete. In 1955 Mao told JLN that PRC was pursuing nukes and would not be bound by any treaty. So in 1955 the Second Five year plan was totally changed empahsis from Agriculture to Science and Technology focus and AEC established. India continued pursuing atomic knowledge while advocating world disarmament for it was willing to be a party ot world disarmament of such WMD.(In effect he was pursuing Power Law 48 from above) Before the PRC test in 1964, Dean Rusk of US suggested giving nukes to India as counter. Johnson appointed the Gilpatric Commission to examine the issues. The Gilpatric Commission came back and said that the spread of nuclear weapons was not in the US national interests and a treaty to limit the powers should be negotiated. Since then the US has pursued the idea of NPT whicc India had come up with first but in a radically altered manner that gives permanent prominence or primacy to those states that tested before 1968. India objected to this as a discriminatory clause for it would create permamnent power imbalances and by then the 1962 agression had happened. The NPT clause of peaceful explosions was used by India in 1974 to show its capabilites but it did not violate the letter of the law of the treaty. Since then as the security conditons worsened withthe introduction of nukes in TSP, the GOI took the decsion to waeponize in 1989. All this is old hat in Chengappa's WOP. The objective of every US Admin since the Johnson era was to foreclose Indian capabilities as a part of the Gilpatric Commission report. So it was not just a Clinton Admin thing. If you really followed the debate in the 2005 elections in India, ABV said Richardson offered India weapons so that it would not have to test in 1998. Everyone phoophooed the information. So everything is not black and white.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 2 2006, 09:34 AM,001301790000.htm ramana, Thanks Ramana, very informative. Do you think US Congress will ask India to sign NPT?

Posted by: ramana Mar 2 2006, 09:41 AM


contrast that with Zee TV news report talk of deal covering only 14 reactors: where 8 will eventually go in Civilan bucket and 6 for Mil. The gap is ostensibly reactors under construction. That means those in construction is 8 reactors of which 6 will be civilian and 2 in mil. Clearly the PFBR is one of the mil. The question is which other unit under construction is also in Mil?
No there are two mil reactors being built under DRDO. There was earlier report in ReDiff and posted in the BR thread. All FBRs are out of the scope. MMS has made this clear. My hunch is that these two will augment and eventually replace the CIRUS and DHRUV in future after the end of life is reached. The FBR might provide early MND inventory but eventually all will be research grade materail.
Soverign right to determine future reactor build is India's. So my skeptical mind reads the press report towing the US wish to catagorize all current and those being built, where as TV reporting 14 (8+6) reactors, and the last minute negotiations to make sure there is no ambiguity that the future reactors are out side the seperation plan. So an important question is if the soverign Indian decision starts beyond the 14 reactor or after 22 reactors?
The sovereign rights start after 2014 when the 14 reactors are declared under IAEA safeguards which have to be India specfic. All P-5 have specific IAEA safgaurds.

Posted by: acharya Mar 2 2006, 09:58 AM

February 28, 2006 Q&A: U.S. and India By BERNARD GWERTZMAN From the Council on Foreign Relations, February 28, 2006 Bernard Gwertzman is consulting editor for the Council on Foreign Relations website, George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a leading expert on India's nuclear program, applauds the U.S. goal of trying to reach an accommodation with India over its nuclear program. But he says the details in the draft accord, now being worked on in advance of President Bush's arrival in India next week, were "very under-cooked and not well-considered." "The idea of changing the rules to make some accommodation with India was correct," says Perkovich. "But this particular approach was ill-considered, in essence giving India, or attempting to give India, everything, and to throw out in essence all the rules in return for too little from India. And the reason that you want more from India is to be able to send a signal to the rest of the world that 'Yes, nonproliferation matters also, and we're not throwing out the distinctions that have been made between countries that have nuclear weapons and countries that don't.'" President Bush heads to India and Pakistan next week. In India, which will be the centerpiece of the trip, he's hoping to sign an agreement on nuclear sharing, which will require congressional approval. Do you think this agreement will actually come into being this soon? Certainly the administration and the Indian government in July when they announced the basic outlines hoped and anticipated that by now, yes, they would have been able to clear away the legal issues and actually have something formalized. The proposal ran into a lot more difficulty than either government anticipated, in both countries, interestingly. It ran into considerable opposition in India and a lot of scrutiny in the United States. What were the problems? The original proposal was unusually vague, and it left open some really fundamental questions. For example, the administration in July 2005 said that this deal would augment our nuclear nonproliferation objectives. It said the main way this would happen is that for the first time India would designate certain nuclear facilities as civilian, and put those under safeguards by the [UN nuclear watchdog, the] International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Many of those facilities aren't under such safeguards now. What the administration didn't nail down was how long would the safeguards be accepted or agreed to by India. In other words, all of the world, except for the five recognized nuclear weapon states, have safeguards forever on a facility. You build a facility, you put it under safeguard, safeguards are there eternally, and safeguards on the fuel and the nuclear material are for eternity. People asked, "Is this what India's going to do, when it designates a facility as civilian and puts it under safeguards, is it for eternity?" [Bush] administration leaders kind of shrugged their shoulders. They hadn't thought of it. The Indians, when first asked, said, "No way, because what we've agreed to, and what President Bush has said, was that India now will be treated like all the other advanced nuclear countries, meaning the five recognized with nuclear weapons." And the dirty little secret is that we five--the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, and France--do not accept safeguards forever. We have voluntary safeguards which say, "Yes, you can come look and inspect it today, but if tomorrow I change my mind, I kick the inspectors out, I take the fuel, and do what I want with it." And so Congress and others asked the administration, "Well which is it, is it safeguards forever, in which case, OK; if it's not safeguards forever, you didn't get anything." And the administration scratched its collective head and said, "We're going to have go talk to the Indians about it." So what's happened when we talked to the Indians? The Indians came up with a formula that was very clever. They said, "Well, we don't like it, but we're prepared to accept safeguards on facilities and on fuel as long as you're prepared to continue providing the fuel. So if you say safeguards forever, that means you have to promise fuel forever." The United States will never agree to that. Why is that? I've had this discussion with administration officials. They say, "We will never give up our sovereign right to deny exports to anyone." This comes up in regard to Iran. In many ways, the key to solving the Iran nuclear problem will be to guarantee Iran sources of fuel from outside of Iranto persuade Iran not to make the fuel themselves. And the Iranians say, "We can't do that if we're not going to be guaranteed that fuel supply forever." And the United States says it will never make that guarantee forever because it may want to impose sanctions if Iran takes hostages again, or what have you. The United States will never give up its right to deny export licenses. And so that same principle would have to hold for India. This is one of those issues that's still, I think, being hammered out as we speak. And of course, in India, I gather, there's a strong nuclear lobby? In India, you have a strong nuclear establishment, which is a little different from a lobby. In other words, it's the Department of Atomic Energy, the Atomic Energy Commission, the people who actually wear the white coats and design and build things and get budgets to do that. It's always been a state within a state. It's been highly unaccountable. It's never been subjected to international scrutiny or competition. They were seen as the avatars of modernity and brilliance, the real symbols of great technological prowess, and so they have been powerful over the years, and also, immune from economic accountability and pressure. It's a paradox. On one hand, the nuclear experts realize that, finally, all of the promises they've made about providing nuclear energy for decades always come up woefully short; that they're never going to meet the country's energy needs without significant international cooperation. You mean they don't have enough sources of uranium? They don't have enough sources of uranium to fuel the kind of first-generation nuclear reactors they would need to meet energy requirements for the short term or even the next two decades. So there's a physical limit because of the fuel. There's a technological limit because their programs always kind of run behind in terms of the size of its reactors and its general capability. Now, they're improving that a lot, but they can't build enough reactors soon enough to meet the country's energy targets. So where that leads is that, for a combination of both fuel needs and reactor needs, they're going to have to turn to international cooperation. Now they have a grand plan that they've had since the 1940s, which is to be the only country which relies on a totally different kind of fuel, which is a thorium-based fuel, because India has an abundance of thorium in its sand, in its soil. The problem is that the thorium fuel cycle is always fifty years away. So did the Indians come to the United States first? They have been coming to us for many, many years, saying, "You want better relations, the No. 1 issue has been to open up for nuclear cooperation, end the different kinds of sanctions." So they've been hammering on this for decades. Yes, they came to us saying we want fully open nuclear cooperation. Modestly, they would have settled for fuel right now, but they wanted everything. And then this administration, unlike others, for a variety of reasons said, "Let's give them everything." If we reached an agreement, this would allow American companies like GE [General Electric] or Westinghouse to build reactors for them? Yes, that's right. [It would be an agreement] to build reactors, to supply nuclear fuel, to engage in full-scale civilian cooperation in facilities under IAEA safeguards. And this is what requires a change Also, if the United States were to be faithful to the international rules that it helped establish, we would have to persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which is a cartel of nuclear technology suppliers, to change their rules, which also bar this kind of full cooperation with countries that don't have all of their facilities under IAEA safeguards. And so the president promised that in addition to changing our laws, he would try to change the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines, to make what we want to do consistent with the rules. That would open up the Indian sector to cooperation from France, Japan, and anybody else with which India would want to do business. The question to me is why did India ever set off those bombs in 1998 that led to its problems? From their point of view, it was: "We're going to set off these bombs because, like the United States and China and other great powers we need nuclear weapons, and we face a rising China that's been noted by the United States as a potential major power with which we have a border dispute. They have nuclear weapons targeted at us; we're going to need demonstrable nuclear weapon capability. Pakistan has nuclear weapons and is engaged in violence with us." But at least as important as that was the view: "Look, the countries with nuclear weapons get treated like great powers in this world and the countries that talk about morality and disarmament, as India has for forty years, get dismissed, they get laughed at. And so we are going to speak the language that the United States and China and others respect, which is the language of assertiveness, of military strength and defiance, and so we're going to defy these rules, and we're going to blast the tests and you'll want to sanction us, you'll do it for a while, but eventually, you're going to have to accept us as a great power." That's why they did it. And they're turning out more or less right, aren't they? That's why this is controversial for a lot of people. The administration's view is, in essence, "Yes, we should admit they were right, and the world has changed, and we all are in a contest with China, and India sits in an interesting place on the map. So let's change these rules and recognize thatIndiais a great power and treat it as such." You've written a book about India's nuclear program. What do you think about this pending U.S.-Indian agreement? Is it a good one, or is it not? I think this particular agreement was very under-cooked and not well-considered; very important details were omitted, but the idea of changing the rules to make some accommodation with India was correct. But this particular approach was ill-considered, in essence giving India, or attempting to giveIndia, everything, and to throw out in essence all the rules in return for too little fromIndia. What do we need from India? The safeguards that India puts on facilities it designates as civilian should be permanent. That's key. The number of facilities that India designates civilian as opposed to military should be very high. In other words, they could turn around and say, "You know, half the program is civilian, you can put safeguards on it, but the other half we're calling military and no one's ever going to go near it." And that would be kind of a travesty in terms of diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in the world. So there's that issue. But the biggest issue, and where the administration neglected things, was the world already has much too much raw material, highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. And the United States, France, Great Britain, and Russia have stopped producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. We believe that China has also stopped producing but they've never announced it or formalized it. And it is a high priority of much of the world to have everybody in the world stop making additional materials for nuclear bombs. Now the Indians claim they need to be able to produce fissile material because they only have a minimum stockpile, right? Well, they say several things. They started late, comparatively, and they have a small stockpile, but all they ever want is a minimum credible deterrent, they say, but they never define it. And I think the administration, and much of the criticism the administration faces, is that in essence, this deal not only blesses that India has nuclear weapons--and that's something I think is natural and unavoidable and we should just go ahead and accept--but they've blessed the idea that India has nuclear weapons and is going to continue to make more of them, and that's the part that I think is objectionable, and I think at this time our position should be nobody should be making any more nuclear weapons, period. Now if Bush gets to Indiaand there is no agreement to sign, is that a terrible disaster in the relations? No, I don't think so. I don't think it should be a medium or long-term disaster if it isn't signed, but secondly, if it were, then it proves all the claims about the relationship are a lie anyway. In other words, champions of the deal, in many ways say we should make this deal to demonstrate that the U.S.-India relationship is so strategically important, that we have so much in common, we share such values, we're such natural allies, that we want to reflect that in this deal. Now, if you turn around and then say, "But if you don't do this deal somehow we're going to be adversaries or there's going to be no relationship," then you were lying about the relationship that you say the deal was reflecting. So how could a nuclear cooperation deal carry that much freight? Is Pakistan going to try to get the same thing, or is that just out of the question? They're going to try to get the same thing and it should be out of the question.

Posted by: Manne Mar 2 2006, 10:01 AM

ramana, Will do if I get the time. AG's writings really had a few things that others did not write about. Also, we need to know the details clearly. No clear report so far....bits here and bits there. Meanwhile,

Tom Lantos, the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, gave it a cautious welcome. "A reliable and dependable strategic partnership is in the interest of both our great countries, and this agreement could herald an even closer relationship between the United States and India," he said. "Given the unprecedented nature of this agreement, the Congress will have to carefully examine the details of the separation plan to assure ourselves and our international partners that this agreement will indeed support our shared political and security objectives," he said.
pratipaschandreva vardhishnu...the second tango now begins.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was to start making phone calls to lawmakers later on Thursday, Burns said.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 2 2006, 10:03 AM

So what's happened when we talked to the Indians? The Indians came up with a formula that was very clever. They said, "Well, we don't like it, but we're prepared to accept safeguards on facilities and on fuel as long as you're prepared to continue providing the fuel. So if you say safeguards forever, that means you have to promise fuel forever." The United States will never agree to that.

Posted by: Manne Mar 2 2006, 10:15 AM

GeorgeP is another snake. Here is what he says about our nuclear establishment.

It's always been a state within a state. It's been highly unaccountable.......and so they have been powerful over the years, and also, immune from economic accountability and pressure.
He certainly has no clue.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 2 2006, 11:08 AM -BBC

The nuclear deal with India enshrines a shift in US policy with far-reaching implications. It underscores the special relationship between Delhi and Washington. And it sends powerful - and in many ways contradictory - signals about the Bush administration's attitude towards the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As far as the Bush administration is concerned, this is a win-win deal. A friendly, democratic and powerful regional ally, India gains access to civil nuclear technology to help power its industrial growth ................... Hurdles Not so long ago, of course, India was one of the nuclear bad-guys. It has steadfastly refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and it has developed its own nuclear bomb. The US applied sanctions against India and a battery of US legislation put India into a kind of nuclear isolation. Hurdle one for the Bush administration is to get Congress to unpick this legislation. Attitudes on Capitol Hill are mixed. There is a good deal of unease about the agreement on non-proliferation grounds, a fear that India is being rewarded despite its nuclear weapons programme and a belief that Washington could have struck a tougher bargain. There are concerns, for example, that India will still be able to produce more fissile material for its bomb-making programme and thus will be able to expand its nuclear arsenal

Posted by: Mudy Mar 2 2006, 11:58 AM

India smiling Shobori Ganguli / New Delhi * 14 out of 22 N-reactors open to inspection, FBRs kept out * Armed with separation plan, Bush to seek Congress backing----- India and the United States walked a giant step towards a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement on Thursday, a key that will finally unlock the doors for dual use technology supply to India. Expressing satisfaction with India's separation plan, US President George Bush said he could now take the matter to the US Congress for ratification. Hectic negotiations went into drawing the final parameters of the agreement. Mr Bush is hopeful of selling it to the non-proliferation hawks in the US Congress and get a restrictive law of 1978 vintage amended to permit nuclear cooperation with India. Addressing a joint Press conference with Mr Bush, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, "We have reached an understanding on the implementation of our agreement on civil nuclear cooperation of July 18, 2005." He said he conveyed to Mr Bush that, "India has finalised the identification of civilian facilities to which we had committed." On his part, Mr Bush gave the assurance that he "now intended to approach the US Congress to amend US laws and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to adjust its guideline." Mr Singh said, "We will discuss with the International Atomic Energy Agency in regard to fashioning an appropriate India-specific safeguards agreement." Sources said the "last mile" took the longest to cover but "we finally did manage to agree upon the parameters of the agreement." The US, they said, is "pleased" with the separation plan. For India, major assurances have been woven into the plan. "It was a difficult bargain but we achieved it," said sources. Clarifying that no agreement was signed, they said India only "presented" a separation plan to the Americans on the basis of which the US Congress could amend its law. On a parallel track, India will work with the IAEA to evolve "India-specific" safeguards since it is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and yet possesses nuclear weapons. The separation plan de facto acknowledges India's nuclear power status since it recognises India's military programme. "While the deal has nothing to do with our weapons programme, it recognises that India wants to add to its strategic programme, which it has every right to," sources said. It will be for India to determine which nuclear reactors will be declared civilian. The Fast Breeder Reactors are not included in the list of 14 placed on the civilian list. The separation plan only applies to current and planned reactors, not to future reactors whose classification is to be solely decided by India, sources said. "This had to be clearly enshrined," they said. In effect, future reactors would not be open to debate or question. The two sides spent considerable time in phrasing this clause. "We have been successful in telling the Americans that there should be no ambiguity in the future," sources said. Finally, "safeguards in perpetuity," will be sacrosanct only as long as there is perpetuity in fuel supply. Considering the "unreliability" of the past, as in the Tarapur plant to which the US stopped supplying fuel, sources said, "in case that happens we retain the sovereign right to take corrective measures." They pointed out that, "Complete autonomy over our strategic programme was conceded." Terming Thursday's development "an historic agreement...on nuclear power," Mr Bush admitted, "It's not an easy job for the Prime Minister to achieve this agreement, I understand. It's not easy for the American President to achieve this agreement. But it's a necessary agreement. It's one that will help both our peoples." Applauding Mr Singh for his "courage and leadership", Mr Bush said, "I'm looking forward to working with our United States Congress to change decades of law that will enable us to move forward in this important initiative." Sources said Thursday's agreement is "still a promise that has to be met." Cautioning that the challenges ahead cannot be minimised, they said various bases have still to be covered, like the US Congress and the NSG, before a joint nuclear cooperation agreement can be reached at. "But an important first step has been taken," they added. Mr Singh said, "An important step forward is the preparation of a separation plan, a separation plan which separates the civilian nuclear programme from the military programme. That phase has been successfully completed. Now it is for the United States to go to the Congress for necessary amendments in US laws." The US will then approach the NSG after which India will go to the IAEA for India-specific safeguards, Mr Singh said. Mr Bush promised to tell the US Congress, [B]"that our relationship is changing to the better.... sometimes it's hard to get rid of history, and short-term history shows that the United States and India were divided. We didn't have much of a relationship. And as a result, there are laws on the books that reflect that. Now the relationship is changing dramatically. People in the United States have got to understand that trade with India is in our interests, that diplomatic relations with India is in our interests, that cultural exchanges with India are in our interest."[/B] The nuclear issue is a part of the Indo-US "changing relationship," Mr Bush said, adding "proliferation is certainly a concern and a part of our discussions, and we've got a good faith gesture by the Indian Government that I'll be able to take to the Congress." He was quick to point out that "the other thing that our Congress has got to understand, that it's in our economic interests that India have a civilian nuclear power industry to help take the pressure off of the global demand for energy." Tying the nuclear deal to the increasing demand for oil from America, from India and China, the US President said, "relative to a supply that's not keeping up with demand, causes our fuel prices to go up. And so, to the extent that we can reduce demand for fossil fuels, it will help the American consumer. And so there are several ways for me to make the case, which I'm kind of laying out for you now, so that -- but this is what I'll be telling our Congress." Asked by an American journalist on whether the US was "rewarding" India for its "bad behaviour" back in 1998, Mr Bush said, "What this agreement says is things change, times change, that leadership can make a difference, and telling the world -- sending the world a different message from that which is -- what used to exist in people's minds." Mr Bush said he was "confident we can sell this to our Congress as in the interest of the United States, and at the same time make it clear that there's a way forward for other nations to participate in a -- in civilian nuclear power in such a way as to address nonproliferation concerns." The President pointed out that, "I'm trying to think differently, not to stay stuck in the past, and recognise that by thinking differently, particularly on nuclear power, we can achieve some important objectives, one of which is less reliance on fossil fuels; second is to work with our partners to help both our economies grow; and thirdly is to be strong on dealing with the proliferation issues."

Posted by: acharya Mar 2 2006, 12:48 PM

Bush Ushers India Into Nuclear Community By TERENCE HUNT, AP White House Correspondent 39 minutes ago NEW DELHI - Reversing decades of U.S. policy, President Bush ushered India into the world's exclusive nuclear club Thursday with a landmark agreement to share nuclear reactors, fuel and expertise with this energy-starved nation in return for its acceptance of international safeguards. Eight months in the making, the accord would end India's long isolation as a nuclear maverick that defied world appeals and developed nuclear weapons. India agreed to separate its tightly entwined nuclear industry — declaring 14 reactors as commercial facilities and eight as military — and to open the civilian side to international inspections for the first time. The agreement must be approved by Congress, and Bush acknowledged that might be difficult because India still refuses to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. "I'm trying to think differently, not stay stuck in the past," said Bush, who has made improving relations with India a goal of his administration. Celebrating their agreement, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, "We have made history today, and I thank you." The deal was sealed a day before Bush begins an overnight visit to Pakistan, a close ally struggling with its own terrorism problems. An American diplomat and three other people were killed when a suicide attacker rammed a car packed with explosives into theirs. The bombing was in Karachi, about 1,000 miles south of Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, where Bush will meet with Pervez Musharraf, the military leader who took power in a 1999 coup. "Terrorists and killers are not going to prevent me from going to Pakistan," Bush said at a news conference with Singh in New Delhi. Bush aides said there were security concerns about the president going to Pakistan but that officials were satisfied adequate precautions were in place. "But this is not a risk-free undertaking," said national security adviser Stephen Hadley. The U.S.-India nuclear deal was seen as the centerpiece of better relations between the world's oldest and most powerful democracy and the world's largest and fastest-growing one. India has more than 1 billion people, and its booming economy has created millions of jobs along with consumer demands that have attracted American businesses. India's middle class has swelled to 300 million — more than the population of the United States. Still, 80 percent of Indians live on less than $2 a day. Bush acknowledged that Washington and New Delhi were estranged during the Cold War, when India declared itself a nonaligned nation but tilted toward Moscow. "Now the relationship is changing dramatically," he said. Bush began the day by paying respects at a memorial to Mohandas K. Gandhi, India's independence leader and apostle of nonviolence. Following tradition, the president and his wife, Laura, left their shoes behind. Bush also conferred with the CEOs of Indian and American businesses, religious leaders and the head of India's political opposition. Bush and Singh announced new bilateral cooperation on issues from investment, trade and health to agriculture, the environment and even mangoes. Bush agreed to resume imports of the juicy, large-pitted fruit after a 17-year ban. The president ended the day at a state dinner with Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam under a crescent moon in a lush courtyard of the presidential palace. Waiters in red tunics and red-and-white turbans scurried to serve broccoli-almond soup, seafood and peach ice cream after toasts of mango juice by the two heads of state. The nuclear agreement drew fire from congressional critics. "With one simple move the president has blown a hole in the nuclear rules that the entire world has been playing by and broken his own word to assure that we will not ship nuclear technology to India without the proper safeguards," said Rep. Edward Markey (news, bio, voting record) of Massachusetts, senior Democrat on the House Energy and Commerce Committee. In New York, John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, defended the deal. "India and Pakistan had never signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore they weren't in violation of it by having nuclear programs," he said. Bush said helping India with nuclear power would reduce the global demand for energy which has sent gasoline prices soaring. "To the extent that we can reduce demand for fossil fuels, it will help the American consumer," Bush said. It also could be a boon for American companies that have been barred from selling reactors and material to India. Critics have complained the deal rewards bad behavior and undermines efforts to prevent states like Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. The White House said India was unique because it had protected its nuclear technology and not been a proliferator. The administration also argued it was a good deal because it would provide international oversight for a program that has been secret since India entered the nuclear age in 1974. "In its largest sense, in the geopolitical sense, the agreement today removes a basic irritant in the relations between India and the United States over the last 30 years," said Nick Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs." The agreement has no impact on India's nuclear weapons program. "It's not a perfect deal in the sense that we haven't captured 100 percent of India's nuclear program," Burns acknowledged. The agreement grew out of an accord Bush and Singh signed last July to establish a new relationship in civil nuclear energy. The United States and other countries slapped sanctions on India and Pakistan after they conducted nuclear weapons tests 1998 but those penalties were lifted after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, when the United States sought allies against al-Qaida.

Posted by: ramana Mar 2 2006, 12:54 PM

I think the Selig Harrison articleis more insightful and should be psoted in full here.

Posted by: k.ram Mar 2 2006, 05:20 PM

U.S. and India Reach Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation By ELISABETH BUMILLER and SOMINI SENGUPTA Published: March 2, 2006 NEW DELHI, March 2 — President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India announced here today that they had reached agreement on putting into effect what Mr. Bush called a "historic" nuclear pact that would help India satisfy its enormous civilian energy needs while allowing it to continue to develop nuclear weapons. At the same time, Mr. Bush said that he was going forward with a trip on Friday to Pakistan to meet with its president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf , despite a bombing this morning outside a Marriott hotel and the United States Consulate in Karachi. The bombing, a suspected suicide attack, left four dead, including an American diplomat. "Terrorists and killers are not going to prevent me from going to Pakistan," Mr. Bush said at a news conference with Mr. Singh. "My trip to Pakistan is an important trip. It's important to talk with President Musharraf about continuing our fight against terrorists. After all, he has had a direct stake in this fight — four times, the terrorists have tried to kill him." Islamabad, Pakistan's capital, is about 1,000 miles north of Karachi, but security is expected to be extraordinarily tight during Mr. Bush's visit. The White House has not announced at what time or how he will arrive in the country. In 2000, President Bill Clinton arrived in Islamabad on an unmarked military plane. American and Indian negotiators working all night in New Delhi reached agreement on implementing the nuclear deal at 10:30 a.m. today, only two hours before Mr. Bush and Mr. Singh announced it — after the United States accepted an Indian plan to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities. Under the initial nuclear agreement that both countries announced in Washington in July 2005, India would be allowed to buy nuclear fuel and reactor components from the United States and other countries as long as it worked out a separation plan. In the plan announced today, India agreed to permanently classify 14 of its 22 nuclear power reactors as civilian facilities, meaning those reactors will be subject for the first time to international inspections, or safeguards. The other reactors, as well as a prototype fast-breeder reactor in the early stages of development, will remain as military facilities, and not be subject to inspections. India also retained the right to develop future fast-breeder reactors for its military program, a provision that critics of the deal called stunning. In addition, India said it was guaranteed a permanent supply of nuclear fuel. The separation plan, according to a senior Indian official, also envisions India-specific rules from the International Atomic Energy Agency, effectively recognizing India as a nuclear weapons state in "a category of its own." Both sides appeared eager to announce the implementation agreement as the centerpiece of Mr. Bush's first visit to India, and did so with few details at a triumphal news conference on the lush grounds of Hyderabad House, a former princely residence in the heart of the capital. But Mr. Bush acknowledged that the deal now faces a difficult battle for approval and a change in American law by Congress. "We concluded an historic agreement today on nuclear power," Mr. Bush said, with Mr. Singh at his side. "It's not an easy job for the prime minister to achieve this agreement, I understand. It's not easy for the American president to achieve this agreement. But it's a necessary agreement. It's one that will help both our peoples." Mr. Bush added, speaking of Congress, "Some people just don't want to change and change with the times. But this agreement is in our interest." Indians hailed the agreement as historic and highly advantageous for the country. "It offers access to civilian nuclear energy, it protects your strategic program and it mainstreams India," said Amitabh Mattoo, vice chancellor of Jammu University and a member of the Prime Minister's Task Force on Global Strategic Development. "India couldn't have hoped for a better deal." In the United States, Democratic and Republican opponents of the deal as well as some nuclear experts said that India's willingness to subject some of its nuclear program to inspections was meaningless when the country has a military nuclear program right alongside it. Critics also said that keeping the fast-breeder reactors under military control, without inspections, would allow India to develop far more nuclear arms, and more quickly, than it has in the past. Fast-breeder reactors are highly efficient producers of the plutonium needed for nuclear weapons. "It's not meaningful to talk about 14 of the 22 reactors being placed under safeguards," said Robert J. Einhorn, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington who served as a top nonproliferation official in the Clinton administration and the early days of the Bush administration. "What's meaningful is what the Indians can do at the un-safeguarded reactors, which vastly increase their production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. One has to assume that the administration was so interested in concluding a deal that it was prepared to cave in to the demands of the Indian nuclear establishment." Critics of the deal also said it would now be more difficult for the United States to persuade Iran and other nations to give up their nuclear weapons ambitions. "It will set a precedent that Iran will use to argue that the United States has a double standard," said Representative Edward J. Markey, Democrat of Massachusetts, a leading opponent of the deal. "You can't break the rules and expect Iran to play by them, and that's what President Bush is doing today." Administration officials in New Delhi countered that India is a responsible nuclear power and has earned the right to the nuclear energy technology that it urgently needs for a booming economy and its population of one billion. "India is unique," R. Nicholas Burns, the under secretary of state for political affairs, told reporters at a briefing in New Delhi. Mr. Burns, the administration's point man in the nuclear talks, added: "It has developed its entire nuclear program over 30 years alone because it had been isolated. So the question we faced was the following: Is it better to maintain India in isolation, or is it better to try to bring it into the international mainstream? And President Bush felt the latter." The deal was praised by Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. "This agreement is an important step towards satisfying India's growing need for energy, including nuclear technology and fuel, as an engine for development.," Mr. ElBaradei said in a statement. "It would also bring India closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime." President Jacques Chirac of France also offered his blessings late today, calling India "a responsible power" and saying that access to civilian nuclear energy would help India "respond to its immense energy needs while limiting its emissions of greenhouse gases," Agence France-Presse reported. At the news conference, Mr. Bush and Mr. Singh announced additional cooperative agreements on counterterrorism, fighting AIDS in India, and trade, including the importing to the United States of Indian mangoes, considered by connoisseurs to be among the best in the world. "And oh, by the way, Mr. Prime Minister, the United States is looking forward to eating Indian mangoes," Mr. Bush said at the news conference.

Posted by: k.ram Mar 2 2006, 08:51 PM

Posted by: Mudy Mar 2 2006, 10:31 PM -pdf

Posted by: Mudy Mar 3 2006, 12:01 AM,001302100000.htm

"This agreement is an important step towards satisfying India's growing need for energy, including nuclear technology and fuel, as an engine for development," said IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. He added that it would also bring India closer as an important partner in the non-proliferation regime. "It would be a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety," he said. "It would also be a step forward towards universalisation of the international safeguards regime. This agreement would serve the interests of both India and the international community."

Posted by: Manne Mar 3 2006, 06:14 AM

BR is back again. Will just x-post quickly... Australia - will change position eventually. China is troubled as I their statements and actions hereafter. Read Japan's statement - very important and interesting if you remember history. Finally, watch CEO forum moves. I said second Tango was about to begin. I was wrong. The quick-step has started.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 3 2006, 09:49 AM

India will decide its minimum nuclear deterrent Agencies/ New Delhi The size of India's minimum nuclear deterrent will remain its prerogative under the landmark deal reached with the US. During tough negotiations preceding the deal, New Delhi refused to engage in a debate on the issue, maintaining that it alone would determine what constituted the minimum deterrent. The requirements could change over time, it told the American side which finally agreed to India's right. Under the accord between President George W Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India retains the right to classify its future reactors as civilian or military. The US has agreed to provide uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel to India's civilian reactors which will be placed under international safeguards.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 3 2006, 10:59 AM

Aust accused of scuttling India's nuclear deal AM - Friday, 3 March , 2006 08:08:00 Reporter: Geoff Thompson TONY EASTLEY: The US and India have signed an historic pact which promises to deliver nuclear technology to India even though it has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Speaking in New Delhi, US President George W Bush said that the times had changed and that there were new ways to address nuclear proliferation concerns. In contrast, Australia, which has the world's largest uranium reserves, has ruled out selling uranium to India because of its stance on the Proliferation Treaty. John Howard is due to visit India next week. From New Delhi, South Asia Correspondent Geoff Thompson filed this report. GEORGE BUSH: Our agreement says is things change, times change. GEOFF THOMPSON: Speaking in New Delhi, President George W Bush said that this historic shift in American nuclear policy, to accommodate India, was not rewarding a country which refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. GEORGE BUSH: Because some people just don't want to change and change with the times, I understand that. But this agreement is in our interests, and therefore I'm confident we can sell this to our congresses in the interests of the United States, and at the same time make it clear that there's a way forward for other nations to participate in civilian nuclear power, in such a way as to address non-proliferation concerns. GEOFF THOMPSON: In this unique US-India nuclear deal, the way to address those concerns is for India to seek specific safeguards from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Indeed the IAEA's director himself, Mohamed ElBaradei, has applauded the agreement, which he says would make India an important partner in the non-proliferation regime even though it has not signed the NPT. [B]In President Bush's terms, however, Australia is refusing to change with the times. Speaking to Indian journalists in Canberra this week, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said that Australia would not sell uranium to India because, "the foundation of our policy is that we export only to countries that have signed the NPT," he said. [/B] Until recently, Satish Chandra was the Deputy National Security Adviser to the Indian Government. SATISH CHANDRA: The deal makes it quite clear that if the Indian civilian nuclear program is safeguarded, as is the intention, then supply of fuel for the civilian nuclear program would be perfectly legitimate. And in fact, the Americans are going to work on that. So it does put the Australian position at odds with the deal. GEOFF THOMPSON: How do you think the Indian Government will perceive Australia's position from this point on? SATISH CHANDRA: Well, I think we would negatively. There is no question about that. GEOFF THOMPSON: Professor Brahma Chellaney of the New Delhi Centre for Policy Research believes that Mr Downer's comments send out a message that Australia is intent on scuttling the nuclear deal between the US and India. BRAHMA CHELLANEY: It seems that Mr Downer personally, or as part of Australian foreign policy, believes that the deal that Bush is pushing with India is not a good deal. This is the message that one will read, when one sees Downer's comments on the issue of NPT in India. GEOFF THOMPSON: How much does India want Australia's uranium? BRAHMA CHELLANEY: India can be a major buyer of Australian uranium, because India has a large and growing nuclear power program. GEOFF THOMPSON: This would be big business between Australia and India, potentially? BRAHMA CHELLANEY: Australia has already opened its uranium industry to China. China's a country that is still modernising its nuclear weapons arsenal. It doesn't really hide its ambition to be the dominant power in Asia, and it wants to be even a peer competitor to the United States. Australia's close ally, and if Australia can sell uranium, in fact allow China to own a stake in Australian uranium mines, why does it want to stop India from having similar access? TONY EASTLEY: Professor Brahma Chellaney a specialist in international security at the New Delhi Centre for Policy Research, speaking to Geoff Thompson in New Delhi.

Posted by: ramana Mar 3 2006, 11:45 AM

Reuters reports:

Key atomic states to weigh U.S.-India deal - Germany Fri Mar 3, 2006 11:18 PM IST BERLIN (Reuters) - The world's top suppliers of atomic technology, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, will assess the U.S.-India nuclear agreement at one of their next meetings, Germany's Foreign Ministry said on Friday. "How the international community will deal with this issue will come up at one of the upcoming sessions of the NSG ... which will then take a position on it," Foreign Ministry spokesman Martin Jaeger told reporters. ......
I guess Germany had no problems in exporting to AQK network. Hypocrites.

Posted by: Manne Mar 3 2006, 12:12 PM

ramana, True but they are also "aryan"s - even now. Anyway, India has multiple layers of leverage. Now, these may not be sufficient by themselves but throw US, France, Russia and UK in the couldron and the biryani starts looking delicious. So, Germany will not be a problem I think. China will be an issue and they will try to use their leverage with the likes of Germany and Australia...basically countries that are still on the the fullest extent possible. There are counterpoints to these like the recipe I mentioned above. Then there is the growing economy with a much better banking system and fiscal picture. I dunno much but Norway may be bigger problem than Germany (relatively).

Posted by: Mudy Mar 3 2006, 12:19 PM

Whatever they do, they have no choice left. They can't ignore or bully India anymore. Finally, elephant is moving and moving pretty darn good. China did provided India Nuclear fuel 5-6 years back. Why Oz are crying?

Posted by: Mudy Mar 3 2006, 12:24 PM

But Bush administration officials expressed confidence on Thursday that they could overcome the skepticism of the critics, in part because support is nearly universal in the West and among Republicans and Democrats in Washington for building India's strength as a bastion of democracy and a counterweight to China in Asia. The Defense Department issued an unusually explicit statement hailing the deal for opening a path for more American-Indian military cooperation. "Where only a few years ago, no one would have talked about the prospects for a major U.S.-India defense deal, today the prospects are promising, whether in the realm of combat aircraft, helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft or naval vessels," the Defense Department statement said.
Diplomats familiar with the negotiations with India said Britain, France, Germany and probably Russia would eventually line up to support the agreement, in part because it would clear the way for them to sell nuclear fuel, reactors and equipment to India. They would not agree to be identified, because several countries have yet to signal what stance they would take. More skepticism is expected from China, several diplomats said, because India has made little secret of its desire for a nuclear weapons arsenal to counter Beijing and its longtime ally, Pakistan.
"The comparison between India and Iran is just ludicrous," R. Nicholas Burns, the under secretary of state for political affairs, said Thursday in a telephone interview. "India is a highly democratic, peaceful, stable state that has not proliferated nuclear weapons. Iran is an autocratic state mistrusted by nearly all countries and that has violated its international commitments."
India's nuclear program has previously mixed civilian and military purposes. But the accord announced in New Delhi would place 14 of India's 22 nuclear reactors under civilian inspection regimes by 2014. The phase-in and the possibility that breeder reactors may never come under such a regime have drawn fire from critics. "This deal not only lets India amass as many nuclear weapons as it wants, it looks like we made no effort to try to curtail them," said George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "This is Santa Claus negotiating. The goal seems to have been to give away as much as possible."

Posted by: rajivg Mar 3 2006, 02:33 PM

Somebody tell Perkovich that Santa's got a brand new bag. And that bag is full of dollars from India.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 3 2006, 02:41 PM

I told you - Democrat Strategist James Carvile (Spelling - Bald guy) He is saying if India need help in nuclear technology in return they should send thousands of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. What we will get out US-India nuke deal ?

Posted by: Manne Mar 4 2006, 02:05 AM

Mudy, To be honest, it is not as if they will not have a choice. They will. Always. It is just that they will find themselves wanting to be part of the band of brothers. Germany's involvement with India has been steady and strong in engineering areas. Moreover, important German companies like Siemens are building on India. That gives the govt. better outlook for India. Our problems lie elsewhere. With a little help from our friends - inshallah - we shall overcome.

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 4 2006, 02:19 AM

QUOTE(Mudy @ Mar 4 2006, 03:11 AM)
I told you - Democrat Strategist James Carvile (Spelling - Bald guy) He is saying if India need help in nuclear technology in return they should send thousands of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. What we will get out US-India nuke deal ?
Fantastic, India should immediately do that in Afganistan. Have been itiching for it for a long time. That would be Check-Mate to not only TSP but also China, Iran and U****. India already has a fully ops military base in in Tajikistan..

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 4 2006, 02:55 AM

Here is a key part of the deal:

K.P. NAYAR Bush and his wife Laura wave before boarding Air Force One for Pakistan on Friday. (AFP) Washington, March 3: In the end, the Indo-US nuclear agreement was an exercise in numbers. .. . . . . . . .The Americans wanted 18 of India’s 22 nuclear reactors — including the seven under construction — to be open for inspections. India offered 10. The deal nearly fell through because the gap of eight facilities, which the two sides could not agree on, was too large to bridge. Singh had set up two working groups to push through the separation plan: these groups were made up of officials in the department of atomic energy, the ministry of external affairs, the armed forces and own advisers in the Prime Minister’s office. One group prepared several scenarios as part of the prospective separation effort. If one plan was unacceptable to US negotiators to the point of being a deal-breaker, there would be an alternative to negotiate over. The other group provided steady inputs to foreign secretary Shyam Saran and Indian ambassador to the US, Ronen Sen, who were at the centre of talks with the US under-secretary of state for political affairs, Nicholas Burns, and Bush’s national security adviser Steve Hadley on the opposite side. After negotiating through half the night and again from early morning until 10.30 am on Thursday, the two sides settled for a middle figure. Both India and the US gave in on four facilities and settled for 14. But that does not tell the whole story. The working group set up to detail several separation scenarios was adamant that certain reactors should be kept out of full-scope safeguards and remain in the military sphere. Tarapur IV, for instance. It is India’s largest atomic power plant, which was built ahead of schedule, braving severe international constraints and uses natural uranium as fuel. Tarapur IV went critical only last year. The nuclear scientists also wanted to keep Tarapur III, which was delayed in its construction, out of the civilian scope. In the end, keeping some of the larger plants out of the civilian sphere was a plan that found acceptance, matching Singh’s commitment to Parliament of 65 per cent with a figure of 14 facilities the US agreed to. Meanwhile, Bush took a political decision to exempt India’s existing fast breeder reactors — one prototype fast breeder reactor and one test fast breeder reactor — from safeguards. In return, Singh took a similar decision that any future fast breeders to be built by India will be classified as civilian facilities. The two leaders also agreed that India would continue to produce fissile material even as America looked the other way. This places India in the same category as China. Of the five declared nuclear powers, the US, UK, France and Russia have all agreed to a voluntary moratorium on production of new fissile material. An unstated clause in the agreement is that India can build new nuclear facilities for military purposes, but these will have to be adjuncts to the existing ones in this category. :twisted: {Arun_S: dictionary meaning of adjuncts: Added or connected in a subordinate or auxiliary capacity} This has been made possible because Singh and Bush agreed that India would not share any information with the US or with the international community about its military programme. Having got formal acknowledgement of the existence of a military programme, that leaves India pretty much free to do what it wants with its military nuclear facilities.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 4 2006, 08:56 AM

Deal looks good, but main hurdle is now.

any future fast breeders to be built by India will be classified as civilian facilities.
How it will effect? US Congress will add more restrictions. Even Democrats are coming against this deal.

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 4 2006, 11:23 AM

Mudy that is an important question. Permit me to reuse my response, as to why FBR dependence for strategic use is for relatively short term:

This deal gives almighty dollar a new lease of loooooong life 8) Nandu Sir-India has opposed putting FBR for now! In the future it will designate FBR as civilian and nuclear and those that are civilian will have inspections and those that are military will not-Putting those in the civilian or military realm will be at our sole discretion. We will make those available when we have the FBR tech matured and IPR issues resolved so we can enter global market as nuclear suppliers! Suppliers of Thorium reactors and Thorium.
Correct. Blackwill etc are reciting the initial position of Pres Bush when he took off for India. If you recall the deal was still not closed. Indian interlocuters reported in press that they are taking their time to make sure there is no ambiguity in language for later haggling; perticularly related to what after the 22 reactors now or under construction? That was the stumbling block. My understandign form Indian press reports is that finally Indian position was agreed to. Whereby Indian will have soverign right to determine its needs and assign the plant to civil catagory or not for all future N plants (that are made indigineously) beyond these 22. One has to remember that 8 reactors in mil, two of them FBR is a huge capacity, the PHWR alone are IIRC 500MW(thermal) each. Look at Alok_N post form eons ago, with that kind of power capacity India will genarte fissile material for few thousand warheads every few years. We understand that FBR will be initially used to convert the Reactor grade Pu to clean fissile material for strategic use. Thereafter it will generate enough bred fuel every year to sustain the AHWR (depending on chemistry and how it is run), after initial charge it can be operated to require as low as few hundred Kg of fuel and depending on technology progress require zero sustaining fissile fuel feed rate. Please remember that AHWR is a low flux reactor (compared to FBR), and is not 100% heavy water moderated, meaning its core is large thus requires a heavy initial charge of fuel rods. So why 6 PHWR?
    1.That is clearly to feed the FBR (while spent fuel rods are allowed to cool down and then reprocessed); also when used in FBR mode there is new reprocessing technology (not the universally used PUREX) that is developed and require time to mature and fine tune the safety envelop. Thus it will be some time before FBR stuff starts feeding AHWR.
    2. So Initial AHWR(s) will be sustained by these 6 PHWR.
So gleaning into my crystal ball, come 2012 the 8 mil reactors will be primarily churning out fuel for AHWR, where India has sole/exclusive Thorium cycle Intellectual Property. It is reasonsable to say that after proving basic AHWR design and learning from operating it,the second AHWR plant design be suitably enhanced and built to serve as pre-production civilian AHWR. Thereafter there will be excess fissile material capacity in mil domain; and both India and US know that thus future builds will be almost all civilian. But after say 20 years when the 8 mil reactors are phased out, India will make suitable replacement and have the right to assign it to mil domain. Thus the US Admin crowd at home, are saying what is obvious but is not driven/constrained due to codified deal. Yes it makes selling to ordinary American and Congress easier. (Call that psy-op on aam janata) And I do not care if they sell the deal with Glass is Half Full logic. IMHO Indian have learnt from legal loopholes of previous treateies by Brits and US well enough to make this one a water tight & winning deal; no matter what/how the GOTUS wants to sell it to USA. If I was Indian PMO/MOFA the deal is what is written on paper and not what people brag in US. That deal will be for sure seen by Indian Parliament and they make a determination to makes sure that BARC's concers are incoporated. I sleep well knowing that 2 days ago Pres Bush asked Dr Anil Kakodkar if he is happy with the deal, and Dr Kakodkar replied yes the deal is good (or something to that effect).

Posted by: k.ram Mar 4 2006, 02:14 PM

Be Indian, or oppose deal Swapan Dasgupta The Pioneer March 5, 2006 In 1949, when Sardar Vallabbhai Patel was asked by someone to react to the turmoil in Indonesia, he is reported to have retorted: "Ah, Indonesia. Yes, Indonesia. Just ask Jawaharlal." The story may well be apocryphal but it does suggest that hard-nosed, pragmatic politicians are only too aware that barring times of war, foreign policy rarely intrudes into the domestic discourse of democracies. As some of the BJP's more obtuse strategists discovered in May 2004, people don't change their voting preferences because Atal Bihari Vajpayee hugged General Pervez Musharraf. History may provide some comfort to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who, having successfully negotiated a very fair nuclear deal with the visiting US President, suddenly finds himself buffeted by the visceral anti-Americanism of many of his colleagues in the Congress and, of course, the Communists. That the Communists would oppose any initiative that runs counter to China's hegemonic designs on Asia is well known. In 1999, Indian Communists, after 22 years, realigned with the Congress. China's hysterical response to the Pokhran-II blasts served as the catalyst of rapprochement. Yet, it is not the Communist opposition that worries the Government in the context of the Bush visit. That opposition is a Pavlovian response and lacks both credibility and the numbers. It was, for example, patently disingenuous of the CPI and CPI(M) to suddenly be concerned about the US emasculating India's nuclear arsenal. Many of us remember that in 1998, the Communist parties were protesting the NDA Government's nuclear policy. Their fellow travellers were teaming up with cash-rich American non-proliferation bodies to denounce India's nukes in international circles. These intellectual mercenaries were very much in evidence over the past week. What has alarmed the Government and the Congress is the evidence of massive Muslim mobilisation against the Bush visit. Whether in the metros or the district towns, the opposition to Bush and Indo-US strategic initiatives was almost entirely Islamist. The mobilisation was effected through the network of theological seminaries. Those who carried placards comparing Bush to various four-legged animals and proclaiming their willingness to become suicide bombers for the faith even replicated the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban in dress. It is important to note that the concerns of demonstrators were pan-Islamic and centred totally on happenings in West Asia. Indian Muslims were instigated to view India's foreign policy through the prism of their faith. More ominously, the Government was threatened with political retribution if the Islamist hatred for America was disregarded. The whole country must unite against this communal blackmail. The defence and foreign policy of India has to be based on national interest, not sectarian considerations. Indians may not like what is being done to Iraq but which should get priority - India or pan-Islamism? In 1919, Mahatma Gandhi courted the pan-Islamic Khilafat Movement for short-term gains. India was the long-term loser. All Indian nationalists, whether they happen to be supporters of the Congress or the BJP, must compliment the Prime Minister for so far disregarding these friends of terrorists and doing what is in national interest. The opposition has a right to carp about the political management of nuclear talks but it should have no reason to complain about the outcome of the negotiations. Indeed, with the Indo-US agreement, the UPA and NDA have successfully established the continuity of India's nuclear policy. Today, there is a broad nationalist consensus on the terms of Indo-US strategic engagement. Regardless of their other differences, all nationalist parties must now act in tandem to ensure that the necessary modifications in American law are speedily effected so that India gets international recognition as a nuclear power. This necessitates a mobilisation of the Indian diaspora and the active involvement of political parties, corporates and religious and community groups. On this issue, there is no scope for partisan politics. You are either with India or with the unholy alliance of Green and Reds.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 4 2006, 05:41 PM

Thanks Arun,

where India has sole/exclusive Thorium cycle Intellectual Property
I hope US stay away from India's throium research.
I sleep well knowing that 2 days ago Pres Bush asked Dr Anil Kakodkar if he is happy with the deal, and Dr Kakodkar replied yes the deal is good (or something to that effect).
If he is happy, it make sense. We have to wait bit longer to understand more. We have to see how US Congress draft law and restrictions. Everything sounds "TOO good to be True". Unkil is a good used car sales man.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 4 2006, 05:49 PM

To usher in new, India buries old: Cirus reactor shutdown in 5 yrs Department of Atomic Energy on board; Two of four Tarapur reactors on military list; new details emerge how on night of March 1, DAE chief helped firm up fuel assurance agreement PRANAB DHAL SAMANTA Posted online: Sunday, March 05, 2006 at 0209 hours IST The Cirus reactor in Trombay NEW DELHI, MARCH 4: Silencing hawks in Washington and elsewhere who are against the landmark March 2 nuclear deal, India has decided to shut down the 50-year-old 40 MW Cirus research reactor over the next five years. At the same time, it has decided to keep the two new 540 MW reactors at Tarapur out of safeguards, on the military list. This decision—as well as the roadmap for the separation—has been taken by the Government in consultation with the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The Cirus reactor (acronym for Canada-India-US research reactor) in Trombay was obtained from Canada in 1954. It went operational in 1960 with the US supplying its heavy water. The non-proliferation lobby has used the Cirus to question India’s commitment to safeguards alleging that it diverted weapons-grade plutonium from this reactor to fuel Pokharan-I in 1974. It is widely agreed in the scientific establishment that Cirus has lived its life and, in fact, was shut down in 1997 until the DAE carried out a refurbishment exercise to get it operational last year. The decision to shut the reactor will also help strengthen the hands of those supporting the Indo-US deal which will face the test of the US Congress when the Bush Administration asks it to bring a new law to implement the deal. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is scheduled to brief Parliament on the nuclear deal on Monday. On the military list Sources told The Sunday Express that the separation plan puts eight reactors on the military list. These include: • The two new 540 MW pressurised heavy water reactors in Tarapur. While Tarapur 4 is already operational, Tarapur 3 is under construction. • MAPS 1 and 2 reactors in Kalpakkam. • The remaining four are likely to be from: two reactors each from Kakrapar and Narora. And the four in the Kaiga complex where two 220 MW reactors are working and two more are under construction. The DAE will take the final call. The separation will be done in a phased manner and completed by 2014. While it is true that in the end, 14 of 22 India’s current and under-construction reactors will be on the safeguards list, the fact is that six of the reactors are through international cooperation and have to be kept under safeguards. So, of the remaining 16 reactors, India has gone for a halfway split by declaring eight as civilian. The total number (14) is the same as what had been offered by the NDA government in 2002. Kakodkar, Chidambaram helped strengthen assurances The other key issue was that of permanent safeguards linked to India’s demand for assurances on permanent fuel supply. This is what was the sticking point till the last minute. The end result: • Assurance on supplies will be built into the Indo-US bilateral agreement once US Congress passes the enabling legislation. • It will also be configured into India’s agreement with the IAEA. • US agreed to work with other supplier nations to tie up a long term assurance for India. • A trilateral/multilateral agreement involving India, US and IAEA is being explored The first two conditions were conveyed in advance and discussed at the meeting between NSAs M K Narayanan and Stephen Hadley on the night of March 1 but was not found adequate by DAE chief Anil Kakodkar and PM’s Scientific Advisor R. Chidambaram who were sitting in an adjoining room that night. The Indian negotiating team, which also involved Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and Ronnen Sen, parted with the US side saying it will get back. An indication came to the MEA around 2-30 am that the US was still working on the agreement and it must not be construed otherwise. Finally, on the morning of March 2, the US added the last two conditions and conveyed this at 7.30 pm in a meeting which lasted till 9 am. The final loose ends were tied up by officials when Bush and Singh held their meeting at Hyderabad House. What is Cirus, why this helps push deal • Obtained from Canada in 1954, went operational in 1960. US supplied heavy water. (Hence its name, Canada-India-US research reactor). • Believed to have fueled Pokharan I in 1974. • Capacity: 40 MW • Cirus became non-proliferation lobby’s favourite whipping boy. • Since 1974, India’s nuclear research has advanced with its larger capacity indigenous Dhruva reactor (100 MW). Dhruva will be kept out of safeguards • Cirus shutdown, to be done over five yrs, strengthens India’s case on the deal

Posted by: Aryawan Mar 4 2006, 06:15 PM

QUOTE(Mudy @ Mar 5 2006, 06:11 AM)
Thanks Arun,
where India has sole/exclusive Thorium cycle Intellectual Property
I hope US stay away from India's throium research.
I sleep well knowing that 2 days ago Pres Bush asked Dr Anil Kakodkar if he is happy with the deal, and Dr Kakodkar replied yes the deal is good (or something to that effect).
If he is happy, it make sense. We have to wait bit longer to understand more. We have to see how US Congress draft law and restrictions. Everything sounds "TOO good to be True". Unkil is a good used car sales man.
There is no doubt that USA will always consider its interests first. But this time it seems that Bush is genuinely interested in building a long term alliance with India. However, only the time will tell whether this is a win win situation or a win lose situation.

Posted by: acharya Mar 4 2006, 07:07 PM

BUSH AND THE IDEA OF INDIA Restoring Balance President George W Bush should be evaluated in India not by what he did in Iraq but what his policies are doing for India in rectifying the regional imbalance of power, says K. SUBRAHMANYAM A FEW days after the Chinese nuclear test of 16 October, 1964, as a deputy secretary in the Ministry of Defence, I wrote a note on the implications of the test for India and urged that India should initiate action to counter the Chinese nuclear capability. I suggested immediate formation of a committee under Dr Homi Jehangir Bhabha to consider steps to be taken by India. Totally independent of my move, K.R. Narayanan, then director, China, in the Ministry of External Affairs, had forwarded a similar note to the foreign secretary. Though the committee under Dr Bhabha was constituted, both of us were not in the loop as we were too junior in the official hierarchy. From what Dr Raja Ramanna told me, I gathered that the Department of Atomic Energy got the go-ahead for an underground nuclear test from Indira Gandhi only in October 1972. At that time the government of India was not aware of the decision already taken by Z.A. Bhutto in January 1972 to develop the Pakistani nuclear weapon and the ongoing negotiations between Beijing and Islamabad on the former proliferating to the latter. At that stage China was peddling the Maoist line that all peace-loving countries had a right to have nuclear weapons. The 1974 nuclear test and its aftermath are now history. While in 1961, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk recommended, unsuccessfully, helping India to become a nuclear weapon state ahead of China in 1970s, the US attitude towards India in the aftermath of the Henry Kissinger visit to Beijing was hostile, especially after the Pokhran test. During his visit to Beijing in November 1974, Dr Kissinger even discussed jokingly with Deng Xiao Peng arming Pakistan with nuclear weapons to check Indian hegemonism. It was therefore no surprise that the Chinese concluded an agreement with Bhutto in June, 1976, to proliferate to Pakistan. Bush realised that a nuclear China, on the way tobecoming the second largest market, upset the balance of power in Asia unless the Indian nuclear weapon capability was legitimised. He also realized that India, with a billion people, growing at 8 per cent, would make enormous demands on world oil and gas and exacerbate the problem of emission of green house gases At that stage, China had not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Against this background the US passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and warned Pakistan against nuclear proliferation with the clandestine acquisition of equipment from Europe for Plutonium separation. In April 1979, President Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its persisting with proliferation. However, by 1982, the US agreed to turn a blind eye on Pakistan-China proliferation as a quid pro quo for Pakistani help to provide infrastructural support for Afghan Mujahideen campaign against the Soviet forces. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons in 1987 with active Chinese support and the US looking away. Faced with a Pakistani bomb produced with Chinese proliferation help and US looking away, Rajiv Gandhi decided to assemble the nuclear weapon in 1989. In the early 90’s, the US applied a lot of pressure on India to cap, halt and eliminate Indian nuclear weapon production even as it continued to turn a blind eye on China-Pakistan proliferation not only in respect of nuclear weapons but also in missiles. The recent disclosures of former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers reveal that CIA was having close contacts with Dr A.Q. Khan. There are valid reasons to believe the US also turned a blind eye to Pakistani proliferation to Iran and North Korea at that stage. Though China joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, it continued its proliferation to Pakistan. The US brought out into the open the supply of 5000 ring magnets by China to Pakistan but chose to accept the Chinese explanation of its being a deal without central government approval. The US also shielded Chinese supply of missiles to Pakistan till just a few months before President Clinton demitted office. When India carried out its nuclear tests in 1998, President Bill Clinton joined China in condemning the Indian nuclear tests but also talked of China’s legitimate interests in South Asia. China’s hostility towards India was exhibited not only through its nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan, but in the stand it took against India on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and in the formulation of the Security Council Resolution in the wake of Indian nuclear tests. The arch proliferator, China is now talking of India’s exceptionalisation from the NPT should be within its framework. Ever since US made up with China in 1971, the US had been applying pressure on India to cap, halt and roll back Indian nuclear capability. This policy was consistently pursued from 1967, when US would not extend a nuclear security guarantee to India till the Bush administration took office in 2001. For the nuclear non-proliferation ayatollahs in the US, proliferation by China to Pakistan was acceptable but not legitimate acquisition of nuclear weapons by India. It is to the credit of President George W Bush that he realised that a nuclear China, also the third largest market, on the way to becoming the second, upset the balance of power in Asia unless the Indian nuclear weapon capability was recognised and legitimised. Secondly, he realized that India, with a billion people, growing at 8 per cent, would make enormous demands on world oil and gas and exacerbate the problem of emission of green house gases. Therefore, in the interest of global environment, lessening of pressure of demand on oil and, at the same time, ensuring the fast economic growth of India, necessary as the engine of growth in the industrialised world, India should be exceptionalised from the Non-Proliferation Treaty to enable it to have access to civil nuclear energy. In terms of norms of Non-proliferation Treaty India’s acquisition of weapon was more indigenous than that of China and its proliferation record spotless compared to China’s. Unless there is an understanding of the radical change in US policy towards nuclear India under George Bush, there is bound to be misunderstanding about what the new US strategy towards India is. There can be no doubt that the new policy is intended to further US national interests. Even so, it happens to be more friendly to a nuclear India than that of any other President since John F Kennedy. Secondly, it has a strong component of collective energy security for the world. Since both these are new concepts both for traditional US thinking (including those of the ayatollahs) and the Indian thinking conditioned by six decades of Cold War, there are problems of adjustment to Bush’s views. People also find it difficult to reconcile to the reality that a President whose views may be unacceptable in some respects may come out with policies in other areas beneficial to the Indians. Winston Churchill’s reactionary views on India need not detract from his merit as a great war-leader. Roosevelt was a great liberal in many respects but did little by way of extension of civil liberties for the Blacks. Similarly, George Bush should be evaluated in India not by what he did in Iraq but what his policies are doing for India in rectifying the imbalance in this part of the world. This rectification of imbalance is not unfriendly to China. India did not take a hostile attitude towards China’s rise to power. In a larger sense, such a restoration of balance of power is good for China too and help in its progress towards democracy, which is inevitable. The author is Chairman, national task force on Global Strategic Developments

The Deal Stage1 Agreement on Principles, July 18, 2005 • The US recognised India’s possession of nuclear weapons and offered full civilian nuclear energy cooperation. • India promised to separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes and place the former under safeguards. Stage2 Agreements on Separation and Safeguards, March 2, 2006. • India agrees to put 14 out of its 22 power reactors on the civilian list in a phased manner between 2006-14. • The remaining eight reactors will produce enough plutonium for India's nuclear arsenal in the coming decades. • India will be the sole judge of which future reactors would go under safeguards. n India’s Fast Breeder Test Reactor and Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor would be out of the civilian list. • India would decide whether and which of its future commercial breeders would be placed under safeguards. n India would place the reactors on the civilian list under permanent safeguards. • In return the US will offer both national international guarantees on assured supply of fuel to the reactors placed under permanent safeguards. • India reserves the right to build future military nuclear reactors. • Enriched Uranium supplies to Tarapur would start flowing the moment the US Congress approves changes in non-proliferation law and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group changes its guidelines on nuclear cooperation. Stage3 Next Steps • Bush Administration to introduce draft legislation before the US Congress. • Both the Senate and House will debate the Indo-US nuclear pact before approving or rejecting the legislation. • The US would also approach the NSG to modify rules on nuclear cooperation. The NSG guidelines are not a treaty and can be changed with majority support among the 45 nations. • New Delhi will talk to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna about drafting India-specific safeguards arrangements that will be different from those that apply to either nuclear weapon states or non-nuclear weapon states. • India will also initiate discussions with the IAEA on an additional protocol for safeguards on the civilian reactors. • The US will set up a consortium of major powers who supply nuclear fuel. India would negotiate with this consortium, including US, Russia, France, and Britain, on fuel supply guarantees. • India would also negotiate a trilateral agreement with the US and IAEA on security of fuel supply. • Once the US Congress and the NSG approve cooperation with India, New Delhi would sign formal cooperation agreements with the US, France, Russia and whoever else is willing to enter atomic cooperation with India.

Posted by: acharya Mar 5 2006, 07:10 AM

Washington's Dangerous Nuclear Horse Trading EDITORIAL Translated By Jan de Nijs March 3, 2006 NRC Handelsblad - The Netherlands - Home Page (Dutch) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Yesterday's accord between the United States and India on nuclear cooperation makes it crystal clear that Washington holds an ambivalent attitude when it comes to nuclear horse trading. Friendly nations with nuclear ambitions are held to different standards than unfriendly ones. Arbitrariness occurs when it comes to foreign relations, but the timing of this accord and its blatant overtones are remarkable. While in the middle of difficult negotiations with Iran about Teheran's nuclear program, Delhi is recognized and rewarded for its economic achievements using nuclear technology. Of course, limited to civil purposes, but on the other hand, this appeaser for critics fails to address the fact that India has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyRealVideo]. Nuclear cooperation with India may well intensify the nuclear arms race in the region. This accord also undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Because of this American disingenuousness, it opens the door for Iran to ignore further warnings and any eventual ultimatums. Contrary to India and the other nuclear powers, Iran has actually cooperated with nuclear inspectors. It is a member of the Non Proliferation Treaty. It is clear that Iran doesn't need nuclear weapons. But it can rightfully claim the right to use nuclear power for civil applications. Why is Iran not allowed to pursue what India and America are allowed to? Talks between Tehran and the three European Union members [Britain, France and Germany] were difficult enough. Now they look like an exercise in futility. For nuclear powers Israel and Pakistan, the Americans looked the other way. Now it's India's turn to become involved in the horse trading. In Bush's parlance, this is a "strategic partnership." These were words he used yesterday in a short speech with India's Prime Minister Singh RealVideo. This will have far-reaching consequences, specifically, when the U.N. Security Council has to address the issue of sanctions against Iran, due to its alleged nuclear disobedience. Right now, there is hardly any judicial or moral ground to implement sanctions against Iran. Which doesn't mean that Iran can now embark on an unbridled nuclear development program. It has to make clear what its goals are. And it must abide by the rules, even if it is told to shut its program down. The boundaries between civilian and military use of nuclear technology are vague. More and more countries are pushing toward nuclear energy, which is their complete right. But at the same time, more and more countries have the ambition to own nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Accord is supposed to prevent this from happening, but if the most important nuclear powers show no willingness to disarm, or if they forge deals like the one between United States and India - what is left of this accord? On paper, in any event, not a lot. The E.U. member states that are negotiating with Iran are well advised to follow their own course. Which means: stay well clear of what Washington is doing.

Posted by: rajesh_g Mar 5 2006, 09:53 AM

Somehow there is shortage of what was offered to the US in return of this deal. This containing china or some vague benefit way out in the future doesnt make any sense to me. GWB has to sell this to local audience and what is he going to use ? We didnt get it for free, I am sure. So what was the price ?

Posted by: rajesh_g Mar 5 2006, 10:05 AM

Ramana on BR..

Seriously folks what are the immediate advantages to the US? I think the biggest is that India is legally bound to the non-proliferation regime after the accord is ratified by the US Congress, not that it ever was in that business unlike its neighbors. For a legal society like US this is a major win. Its like the camel in the tent rather than outside. Second biggest win is that India is not competing in the energy sector for a large chunk and that will keep the prices down which propels the US economy in the out years after 2014 when the real growth of India will kick in per the RAND/NIC/BRIC reports. Hence President Bush has acted as a statesmen to protect the US interests in the out years instead of scoring narrow political victories. Third is the removal of sanctions to India will allow the export of high technology items which only US companies can provied contributing to immediate job growth and reduce the trade gap with India. Fourth, and this is a stretch, is that US companies can leverage their presence in India and take advantage of the cost differentials to become cost competetive in the high technology ietms a like aircraft - commerical and military, satellite launch services and even satellites. US companies can synergize their prodcut mix to have high end and leave the medium and low end satellites to India. Such a strategy can allow the US and India to jointly dominate the space satellite and launch services market.
And Manne..
There is a fifth point. Ironically, I had myself dismissed it when I heard it first from MMS but I have come to believe there is some element of truth in it. I am referring to making available nuclear technologists and engineers for US industry wrt power plants. Others (AG/PR?) too have referred to this.
1. This is again a vague gain and I kind of find it hard to believe that GoI side could sell this to Burns. There are hardly any guarantees as such and I am not sure about saleability of this idea. 2. This is perhaps the best saleable thing. When the anti-BPO shatrus were out with knives that study about the value add for each dollar spent on outsourcing was a winner. This has potential of being one but this needs to be expanded with numbers and figures. 3. Not sure of saleability. 4. Not sure of saleability. 5. Not sure what Manne refers to. I seriously think that we have to list these immediate gains by the US, things that are tangible, all media pictures are too rosy for my taste and seem too unrealistic to me. They all say its a win-win - where is it ?

Posted by: Mudy Mar 5 2006, 01:52 PM,,1723276,00.html Nuclear proliferation -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bush and the bomb Leader Saturday March 4, 2006 The Guardian

Posted by: Mudy Mar 5 2006, 01:59 PM

I think the biggest is that India is legally bound to the non-proliferation regime after the accord is ratified by the US Congress, not that it ever was in that business unlike its neighbors. For a legal society like US this is a major win. Its like the camel in the tent rather than outside.
It’s like California State had Legalize medical use of marijuana in California and Federal govt had declared it illegal. Federal agent still can raid licensed shop, now they know who are users and from where they get supply. Loss for weeds user.

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 5 2006, 02:08 PM

Sitting next to Bush was Rice. She broke the good news, "Mr President, we have an agreement." Bush looked around, smiled and said, "Great." A man of few words, Manmohan too broke into a smile, as did all those around. Exuberantly, Bush talked on other issues to his audience. The PM then turned to Sharad Pawar, agriculture minister, and asked, "Would you like to say something?" Pawar spoke, then Pranab, Kamal Nath and Kapil Sibal followed suit. Down the row, in the last chair, sat Kakodkar, the man who had publicly spoken against the advisability of placing the fast breeder reactors under safeguards—and consequently perceived, rather erroneously, as an opponent of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Manmohan pointed at him and said, "Mr President, that is Dr Kakodkar, secretary of our Department of Atomic Energy." To him, too, the PM asked, "Would you like to say something?" Kakodkar looked surprised, as officials on such occasions are rarely asked to speak. Kakodkar said, "Sir, we have a good agreement. I am very happy." At this Bush quipped, "I’m glad you like it." There was laughter all around. It was, in a way, a release for the pent-up pressure of conducting tortuous negotiations over months, that alternately stoked expectations and dashed hopes of cobbling together an agreement between New Delhi and Washington on India’s plan to separate its military facilities from the civilian. "So it’s done," a relieved voice echoed in the room. One fault Bush doesn’t suffer from is lack of candour, that rare ability to call a spade a spade. "What’s done is the beginning of what will be done," he quipped, explaining, "You know, Mr Prime Minister, I have first to go to the US Congress and then we go to the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) and then we go to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)." Bush paused, looked around and dramatically declared, "And then it will be done."
As I said I have no doubt and sleep well when Dr Kakodkar says he is happy. smile.gif

Posted by: rajesh_g Mar 5 2006, 02:24 PM

Arun_S, There are other reasons why we might want to lay out clearly what the yanks got out of this.. 1. Better portrayal of the case so it passes thru congress. 2. Not hear "US *gave* India nuke tech" rather then "US made a deal with India" for the rest of our lives. 3. As a corollary, if there are things to be done in the future as QPQ then the aam-junta has to know how far we have to go. Possibly others. The rosy DDM articles dont give a good picture.

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 5 2006, 05:05 PM

Rajesh G: Absolutely the lessons of California SBE episode is fresh in my mind. We must not fall into the trap laid, to goad and have 2 minutes of glory, so that the opposition can hang us by the rope we give them. No country (not even stupid Indians in early 70's) has given up anything in negotiations except to get a good deal for national self interest. US is the most apt and hard negotiators to preserve their upper hand in world. It will be naive and stupid for India to think otherwise at its own peril. And this is when the deal still not signed till it passes US Congress. As I mentioned in other forum, what GW Bush purchased from India are: 1. A set of very high value Insurance Policies to protect strategic interest of USA. For petty shopkeepers spending money for Insurance is an alien concept and may consider it strange, stupid; and treat it with scorn expected from the un-informed. So one has to look at what Insurance Policy Bush bought and how to value it and convey that to the media and ordinary American and their Congress reps. As some Congressmen said couple of weeks ago, its better to co-opt India (read buy the Insurance that only India can offer) now at a lower price rather than later when they are going to be very expensive. 2. For another aspect of the deal that is more tangible for lay mind, let me use excerpt from the other forum:

Second biggest win is that India is not competing in the energy sector for a large chunk and that will keep the prices down which propels the US economy in the out years after 2014 when the real growth of India will kick in per the RAND/NIC/BRIC reports. Hence President Bush has acted as a statesmen to protect the US interests in the out years instead of scoring narrow political victories..
This is a subject matter argument that I often discuss around water fountain talk. Of all countries in the world outside of OPEC, America has the cheapest gasoline price at the pump. (supposedly the old automobile mafia created and is sustaining the car culture, at expense of public transport and use of railroad). Other countries in Europe and Asia gasoline price have always been higher (at least 50% to 200% higher, due to heavy tax), that has forced these economies and culture to use gasoline efficiently, thus these economies have greater resilience to absorb a repeat of another Global Oil Shock(of 1972 vintage), involving oil price jump to 2 to 3 times of normal (aka in current situation $130 to $200 per barrel). Alas American economy will be the only one[/b[ caught with pants down and thus worst affected. Now who can see this huge economic exposure (PS: pun is also intended) more clearly than a competent administration or oil-baron or both! Now think of GW Bush and Dick Chaney. After last year's peak that took it past $70, the stark reality can't be missed even by the blind. The US options to co-opt India to relieve the pressure (little longer, till economic corrective action can be in place) and also kill other strategic bird with one arrow become very obvious. {BTW I said blind, not 'blind & stupid' at capitol hill).
3. Iraqi misadventure or not, America is not getting off the cross-hair of International Islamist anytime sooner (the way it earlier was by Internationalist Socialism/Communism from 1920 to 1980). America has to defeat International Islamist as thoroughly as it did with Communists, unless it wants to do Hara-Kari when it is at its zenith the sole Hyper power of the world (Surely no American Congressmen wants that either). [b]The mortal battle between Islamist and America is on, and self-preservation demands making use of all resources and allies. Talking of allies, Europeans have deserted America on the opening round of battle againt Islamist at Iraq. Look at how Europe have paid back with politician, military support to US either in Afghanistan or Iraq. You can count in few percentage points the European soldiers and military cost contribution as compared to the bulk bourn by US. Compare that with Cold War times when US was defending Europe? All congressmen know that Europe will remain flat or decline in economic & population growth, they have also become self content politically and do not care to look beyond EU border. Ditto with Japan. It is a foregone conclusion of economist that 21st century will be an Asian century, and China, Russia and India will rise to become other corner of multi-polar world. US economic engine will come under pressure from these power specially if they float a regional currency like EU, that will be death knell to market value of US dollar as well as the huge US Government deficit that was financed by free printing of US Dollar to feed the international trading currency demand. Reversal of US treasury bought by Asian countries and US$ trading currency will is a very serious risk to US, that will bankrupt the US treasury as well as banking system. Forget about depreciation of value of US$ then. Strategic tie up with India at what ever cost, is the insurance to continued US prosperity and dominance. 1. India with second largest world Muslim population that has remain peaceful; a country that has & will remain the bulwark against expansion of International Islamist, India is the only game in town for US to fight and win this mortal battle that Islamist have imposed on US and the world. 2. It is well know that India with go the long haul in economic growth far beyond 15 years that the nearest economic growth competitor China can sustain. India has good 70 to 100 years of sustained 8-10% growth rate in its system. Again India is the only game in town that can stop the flip of current economic order into an upheaval whose biggest loser will be USA and biggest beneficiary will be China. A world order that transitions from US Hyper power to multi-polar world, the economic order that will ensure US stays on top when teamed up with India, from now to next 100 years. Of other countries growing up to economic dominance India is the one that will outlast others in the growth marathon. Again the winning choice to partner up is clear. Unless of course US chooses to become a "me too" in the next few decades. And no price is too high for this Insurance Policy in terms of current assets or marbles that US possesses if it is serious risk to lose all the marbles.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 5 2006, 05:21 PM

Arun, I agree with you. Interesting is to watch good cop n bad cop played by US and Oz. whic make me think, US is still keeping some area for twisting.

Posted by: k.ram Mar 5 2006, 07:40 PM

Bush May Face Fight in Congress Over Nuclear Accord With India

Posted by: k.ram Mar 6 2006, 05:30 AM

Nothing to gloat over By M.J. Akbar TROUBLE is, ma-in-law ain't approved of history yet. Arms-wide-open George Bush and simple-but-hardly-simplistic Manmohan Singh summoned history to witness their alliance. "We have made history today, and I thank you," Dr Singh told his guest in Delhi. Very coy, very nice. But it isn't legal yet. Marriage awaits mother-in-law's approval. Mother-in-law is the Congress of the United States. She is particularly watchful about errant sons who declare victory before she has checked the fine print. Once upon a time, long long ago, a president of the United States of America offered the president of Pakistan a whole bunch of F-16s, and even collected cash on the deal. Pakistan is still waiting to put those fighters to some historic use. I don't want to be a party-pooper at a particularly cosy love-fest, but here are a couple of quotes printed in the March 3 edition of ma-in-law's favourite newspaper, The Washington Post. Republican Ed Royce, chair of the international relations subcommittee on international terrorism and proliferation, thought the Delhi deal had "implications beyond US-India relations" and that the "goal of curbing nuclear proliferation should be paramount." Democrat Edward Markey, co-chair of the bipartisan task force on non-proliferation, called the agreement "a historic failure of this president to tackle the real nuclear threats we face." When ma-in-law talks from the side of her face she can be a tough old bird. If history is made, then it will be certainly made in one respect: it will be the first time that India will sign an international protocol that has implications for its nuclear programme and nuclear military assets. A series of prime ministers, cutting across party lines, has resisted the most serious pressure to sign on any dotted line. The potential to build a nuclear weapon was created by Jawaharlal Nehru; the ability to build it was confirmed by Indira Gandhi; the decision to go public was made by Atal Behari Vajpayee. The one thing they, and others in between, knew was that any signature became a commitment that might fetch flexibility in the present but could become a prison in the future. Since this is the first agreement that India might have to sign, unless the American legislatures sabotage it or the present government in Delhi makes way for a more sceptical successor, I hope those who have drafted it have read every line, checked the top line, bottom line, underline and then checked the little comma hidden in the fine print that discusses the separation of 14 civilian nuclear plants from eight military ones. This is a marriage built on separation, in more senses than one. The two constituencies, Delhi and Washington, are offering distinctively separate narratives. Here, in sum, is what the spokesmen of Dr Manmohan Singh will be telling us as they take their message to the country: — This agreement will permit India to produce fissile materials for its nuclear military needs, despite the fact that the recognised nuclear powers have halted, voluntarily, such production. — The fast-breeder reactors, which can make super-grade plutonium when fully operational, will not be under international inspection or safeguards. — India can now hope to make up to 50 nuclear weapons a year, for the availability of imported uranium frees local supplies for use in military reactors. — India gets the latest technology long denied to its scientists. Listen to the narrative on the American side, some of which has already begun to be articulated, even by the extremely sophisticated and persuasive American negotiator, Nicholas Burns: — India enters the inspection regime, a far better situation than the zero-influence that existed so far. (It needs to be pointed out, of course, that India rose from drawing board to major nuclear power, without indulging in theft, only because of this zero-influence, a status that the Manmohan Singh government is in the process of bartering away.) — The fast-breeder reactors that India possesses will be isolated, and unable to get new technology, thanks to the inspections regime, ensuring, over time, stagnation or decline. Implication: India has been sold a lemon thanks to a gullible government. — The deal brings India into the American zone of influence, and turns it into a virtual ally with a potential for assistance in American strategic interests (that is code word for American intervention). India's conventional arms programme now shifts dramatically into the supply chain of the American industrial-military complex. If the Indo-Soviet treaty kept India within the Soviet camp till the Soviet Union collapsed, then this agreement will keep India in the American parlour for the foreseeable future. — There is a great bonanza to American industry of arms sales (this will be the most persuasive argument in the Senate, because the one thing a legislator does not want to be accused of is preventing jobs). The starting figure, according to Pentagon officials who admittedly have not dealt with Indian bureaucrats so far, is nine billion dollars. That is a lot of dollars. Keep counting, Senator! — There is no political quid pro quo. The Soviet Union intervened when necessary to protect India's position on issues like Jammu and Kashmir with a veto in the Security Council. America has given no such commitment. Indeed, Delhi's leverage with Moscow is reduced with the shift in arms purchases. China will never support India over Pakistan in the Security Council and the West will have the pleasure of balancing Pakistan's interests with India's on issues like Kashmir. With time, the narrative in Washington will doubtless take on other hues, since emerging questions will demand creative answers if the agreement is to be pushed through the Congress. Senator John Kerry publicly worried about fissile material during a visit to Delhi. Others are wondering whether such a reward for a nation that has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not a signal for others to risk going nuclear. And then of course there is the weight of Pakistan's pressure to which there may not be any immediate give, but which will make its play in the coming months. Pakistan remains a frontline state in Bush's war on terror. Such voices may not be consistent, or even necessarily logical, but they will demand to be heard. Some will pick up claims made in Delhi and ask the Bush administration for clarifications, as for instance on the delicate matter of how many nuclear weapons India is capable of making. If Pakistan is truly lucky, it will have the extraordinary good fortune of escaping the Bush embrace. The indications are that Bush will not offer the terms of the deal with India to Pakistan. What does this mean? It means, first, that while India will sign a limiting commitment on its nuclear programme, Pakistan will sign nothing. Pakistan can, therefore, be held down to nothing. Bush is going to be in power for only another two years, and that as a terribly lame duck. His approval ratings are below freezing point, and his own party is distancing itself from him, raising the question as to whether he has the political capital to push anything through Congress. What are Pakistan's options? Pakistan's nuclear programme has been created with China's help. China may not have technology as good as America's, but it isn't a junkyard either. As a friend, China will be much more reliable than America. This is not because of any character defect. America is a democracy, and therefore always vulnerable to democratic discourse. China is a dictatorship. China, most crucially, will not be propelled by mere goodwill or friendship; its policy will hinge on self-interest. Since a critical rationale for the Bush shift is to help India become a counterweight to China, Beijing will respond by playing the Pakistan card against India. China has already assured Pakistan three more nuclear reactors, and you never hear of any fuel shortage problems in Islamabad. President Pervez Musharraf has gone on record to say that Pakistan has its options. Is this what he meant? We may never know what the complete truth is. But keep your ears open when the mother-in-law starts asking questions on Capitol Hill in Washington. The writer is editor-in-chief of Asian Age, based in New Delhi.

Posted by: prem Mar 6 2006, 12:48 PM

MJ Akbar takes simplistic view of the issue. China has already played the Pakistan card. Chinese are smart and most probably know that Pakistan is the weakest link. The Indian option and capaicity to make 2000 bombs can put fear of God in any adversary ..even Communits PRC. Let India play to its strengths to serve its interests. India should not be looking for politcial patrogane in this age and time.We aint poodle or Paki-satan.We are indepenedent, sovereign, separate civilizational entity.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 6 2006, 12:56 PM NATIONAL INTEREST New pitch, front foot forward India’s lower middle order slot in the global batting order has changed. Now is the time to settle with Pakistan, China SHEKHAR GUPTA

I WAS among those who had grave doubts over the NDA’s Pokharan II (although I did not think it was as disastrous an idea as many in the Left, and in the intellectual community now opposing the deal, thought). In hindsight, it was a bold gamble that worked. It could have led to sanctions in perpetuity. But if it did not, it is partly because of the shrewd follow-up work done by Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra (Strobe Talbott’s Engaging India — Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb is a must-read for anybody wishing to understand this phase). The change 9/11 brought about in terms of how the world looked at terrorism under any guise was a fortuitous development. But then three years of eight per cent growth was something that the people and the governments of India worked hard at achieving, in spite of unstable politics, confused coalitions, warlike years (’01-’O3, Operation Parakram) and almost annual natural calamities (the Gujarat quake ’02, tsunami ’04, floods in the south-west and the Kashmir earthquake ’05). The so-called nuclear deal, and India’s new place in the world, is a consequence of all this. It is not pure luck and coincidence. We lambast our political leaders and foreign policy establishments all the time. But we must also give them credit where it is due
We were sure about Pokharan-II then and also now. Shekhar Gupta's non stop rant which lasted till NDA was in power, suddenly why this paid traitor is singing canary. Who paid him this time? my guess same old entity - Congress(I)

Posted by: rajesh_g Mar 6 2006, 04:23 PM

Thankyou Arun_S. It would be fantastic to have a BR/IF article on this. The article has to be for dummies like me, laying it out in as simple terms as possible. Even a small article that puts out the $ amount for point #2 would be a good start. ----------------------------------------- On a different note, in my limited understanding I would have preferred it if we had a genuine thing to offer to the yanks. For example, in the current situation, can we offer a couple of divisions to Afghanistan ? It should relive unkle from atleast one front. And it gives us a lot of leverage in pushing this deal along with others thru congress.

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 6 2006, 06:27 PM

Rajesh_G: IMHO need of hour is to produce well reseacherd and anlayzed material for US Congress (not much to gain by preaching to the coir), and I am spending much time to that end. All of us can help by channeling in their own way, but I think doing it via is a good and efficient way. As for tangibles for Yanks, that is GW BUsh and Condi's problem, let them expend the political capital to carry their part of the burden. Their arses should be on fire not Indian. Let them convey their new found faith/vision to US Congress. These kafirs did enough with fart of US embassodor in Delhi to pressure Indian Goverment to move the gaol post, change the terms of July 18 agreement; whose cardinality centered around reciprocity and equality. They spent no effort reignin or respond to NP Ayothullahs that were let loose to preach the NPA faith in US Congress, expecting Indian Govt to spend the political capital by 1. agreeing to put forward Nuclear plant separation plan + 2. US dictated credible seperation plan (as against Indian soverign decision) + 3. a schedule that India will decide later after US Congress retifies the deal (Instead these SOB's tried to imposed their wish list of before hand determination) + 4. FBR controversy; all unequal terms and against the July 18 statement. So I relish the thought of Bush & Condi stewing in their own juice and save their chestnut from fire. Else any wish of strategtic partnership with India is sayonara, and let US be defeated by International Islamist in Iraq and elsewhere, and India will continue down its own path to sunrise and glory; hastening and making this a Asian Century, albiet making friends with who ever else that makes strategic sense to India. Conversly USA turns out to be the biggest loser, losing all its marbals. Hee heeee ... Who will be more happy savouring that outcome?.. . . That means more heat under the Bush seat; while India has all the time in the world with interesting options.

Posted by: rajivg Mar 6 2006, 08:25 PM

If you watched some of Bush's statements while in India he was very thankful to all of the CEOs. It is these CEOs that will help India in the Congressional hearings to push the deal through. At the same time the MRCA RFP will have cleared the CVC approval and will be out for bid. That will have a big impact on Congress's thinking. There should also be open discussions with GE and Westinghouse on getting reactors built and operational in seven years. By no means do I suggest remaining complacent, and helping USINPAC is very useful at the personal level.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 6 2006, 09:22 PM

Israelis see red over Indo-US nuke deal Press Trust Of India Posted online: Monday, March 06, 2006 at 1438 hours IST Updated: Monday, March 06, 2006 at 1441 hours IST Jerusalem, March 6: Against the backdrop of the recent Indo-US nuclear deal, the Israeli defence industry has expressed concern that the United States' tightening security ties with India will adversely affect their prospects in one of their key markets. "The Americans understood Israel is taking a huge market away from them. It took them time to respond, but they eventually did," a source at Israel's defence industries told local daily 'Yediot Ahronoth'. "From now on it will be much harder to carry out arms deals in India," the source added. "The US plans on turning India into one of its arms industries' main export markets following the recent nuclear deal between the two countries during President Bush's visit to India," the report said. India had emerged as the single largest purchaser of Israeli defence systems capping the Phalcon deal worth $1 billion.

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 6 2006, 11:41 PM

I had a long conversation with USINPAC today. We are helping then provide Subject Matter Expert (SME) and they will connect us to Congressmen and hearing. They are doing a good job attending all session where new law is introduced. Educating congressmen on various aspects of US-India strategic tie up including Civil Nuclear tieup is going to expensive. If the admins allow me some latitude, I request one and all who are reading this to please donate with full heart and soul to USINPAC. We got to sustain Indian organization to protect Indo-American interests. Visit to know more and donate online. Please help them financially. (Do not forget to mention the India forum and/or other forum that motivated you to visit their site & donate. That increases the website influence)

Posted by: rajesh_g Mar 7 2006, 01:34 AM

Although politically weakened by domestic and overseas crises, Bush has the upper hand as he attempts to persuade the U.S. Congress and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group to approve the agreement, in large part because there is broad support for stronger U.S.-India ties. Burns met lawmakers on Capitol Hill to explain Bush's position and leading senators and congressmen have been invited to discuss the issue at the White House on Tuesday. Other public appearances by top officials are planned and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has launched a multi-million lobbying effort for the agreement.

Posted by: Arun_S Mar 7 2006, 08:34 AM

For sure when I got up, the morning was different. The Sun seem to rise for South! ROTFL.gif: No I forgot job of media, analysists and think-tanks is to serve its national Interest ( atleast that is the way US is). Mar. 07, 2006

By Richard Cohen Back behind my high school one day, we all assembled to watch a fistfight. To my immense pleasure, a bully was being defeated by his victim. Then the bully's friend stepped in and ended matters with a swift kick to the other guy's midsection. It was an unfair ending to what was supposed to be a fair fight, but it taught me a valuable lesson: You treat your friends differently than you do your enemies. This elemental principle of life, love and other matters seems utterly lost on so many critics of George Bush's agreement to provide India with civilian nuclear technology. In doing so, we are told, he has done something truly awful -- established a double standard. Well, duh -- yes. India is our friend and Iran, just to pick an example, is not. The cry of ``double standard'' is a bit silly. It asks us not to recognize certain realities -- the difference between friends and enemies, for instance, or good or bad democracies, to give another example. In the case of the nuclear agreement, we are somehow supposed to believe that by favoring India, Bush has made it much harder to put pressure on Iran to abandon its apparent weapons program and become a ``good guy'' nation. This overlooks the fact that Iran is governed by a zealot who has pledged to eradicate Israel and who firmly believes in the inherent evil of the United States of America. As Bush once said about himself, the Iranians do not do nuance. Reality imposes its own rules -- and they have nothing to do with double standards. North Korea probably already has a nuclear weapon. Iran is going that way, and it is going to happen no matter what the United States and its allies do. For Iran, going nuclear has been a national goal ever since the shah headed the government. Now, this is even more the case, especially since the United States, which lumped Iran along with Iraq into the ``axis of evil,'' invaded Iraq. It would hardly be the height of paranoia for Iran to think it is next. The invocation of the term ``double standard'' is often applied where Israel is concerned. Israel is presumed to have a nuclear arsenal. Why should the United States look the other way at Israel's bomb and go nuts over Iran's effort to get one? The answer ought to be clear: Because Israel has not threatened to blow Iran off the map, because it is vastly outnumbered in a tough, belligerent neighborhood and because it is a lone democracy in a region run mostly by thugs. If these distinctions don't make a difference, then I have a bridge I'd like to sell you. The same accusation of a double standard applies to the effort to discriminate between election outcomes. We are supposed to treat the victory of Hamas in Palestine as we would that of the Labor Party in Britain. But the outcome of one democratic election is not threatening and the other is, and we ought to be able to say so -- and do something about it. If, for instance, we are supposed to continue aiding a Palestinian government that has now fallen into the hands of religious fanatics and virulent anti-Semites, then we have lost our minds. It will not matter to some poor Israeli that the terrorist who kills him represented a democratically elected government. This is hardly an advance. The double standard accusation has a schoolyard quality to it. Why a boycott of Cuba and not of China? Because you can with one and not with the other. Why attack Saddam Hussein and not all the other vile dictators? Because you do what you can. Why not ask why you leave your estate to your kids and not strangers? Because your kids are your kids. It is the ultimate double standard. It is true, of course, that Bush has upended 30 years of American nuclear policy -- and there will be consequences. Maybe, as some of the critics say, he has made it easier for India to increase its nuclear arsenal. But India will make all the weapons it feels it needs -- no matter what the United States will or will not do. America is a superpower, but not even a superpower is all powerful. The Israeli bomb threatens nobody. An Iranian bomb does. India has transferred its nuclear technology to no one. Pakistan has. No one worries about India or Israel making the technology available to terrorists. Everyone worries about Iran doing that. These are distinctions with great differences. They are, as critics charge, double standards, but to apply a single standard to both friend and enemy may be fair -- but it is singularly stupid. RICHARD is a Washington Post columnist.

Posted by: Ravish Mar 7 2006, 08:49 AM

The following is the text of the statement made by the Prime Minister in Parliament today on the India-USA Nuclear Agreement.

Tuesday, March 07, 2006 Prime Minister's Office PRIME MINISTER’S SUO-MOTU STATEMENT ON DISCUSSION ON CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES : IMPLEMENTATION OF INDIA’S SEPARATION PLAN -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13:19 IST Following is the text of Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh’s Suo-Motu Statement on Discussion on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States : Implementation of India’s Separation Plan in Parliament today : “In my Statement on February 27, 2006, I had provided an assurance that this august House will be informed of developments in our discussions with the United States on separation of our civilian and military nuclear facilities. I now inform this august House of developments since my suo motu statement of 27 February. The President of the United States, His Excellency Mr. George W. Bush visited India between March 1-3, 2006. His visit provided our two countries an opportunity to review progress made in deepening our strategic partnership since the Joint Statement issued during my visit to Washington last July. Our discussions covered the expansion of our ties in the fields of agriculture, economic and trade cooperation, energy security and clean environment, strengthening innovation and the knowledge economy, issues relating to global safety and security and on deepening democracy. Expanded cooperation in each of these areas will have a significant impact on India’s social and economic development. The full text of the Joint Statement issued during President Bush’s visit is placed on the Table of the House. I have pleasure in informing the House that during President Bush’s visit, as part of the process of promoting cooperation in civilian nuclear energy, agreement was reached between India and the United States on a Separation Plan. Accordingly, India will identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Sir, I place on the Table of the House the Separation Plan that has been drawn up by India and agreed between India and the United States in implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005. I would like to outline some salient elements of the Separation Plan: i) India will identify and offer for IAEA safeguards 14 thermal power reactors between 2006-14. There are 22 thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction in the country. Fourteen of these will be placed under safeguards by 2014 in a phased manner. This would raise the total installed thermal power capacity in Megawatts under safeguards from 19% at present to 65% by 2014. I wish to emphasize that the choice of specific nuclear reactors and the phases in which they would be placed under safeguards is an Indian decision. We are preparing a list of 14 reactors that would be offered for safeguards between 2006-14. ii) We have conveyed that India will not accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage. This technology will take time to mature and reach an advanced stage of development. We do not wish to place any encumbrances on our Fast Breeder programme, and this has been fully ensured in the Separation Plan. (iii) India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian. This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements. (iv) India has decided to permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor, in 2010. The fuel core of the Apsara reactor was purchased from France, and we are prepared to shift it from its present location and make it available for placing under safeguards in 2010. Both CIRUS and Apsara are located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre. We have decided to take these steps rather than allow intrusive inspections in a nuclear facility of high national security importance. We are determined that such steps will not hinder ongoing Research and Development. (v) Reprocessing and enrichment capabilities and other facilities associated with the fuel cycle for our strategic programme have been kept out of the Separation Plan. (vi) One of the major points addressed in the Separation Plan was the need to ensure reliability of fuel supplies, given our unfortunate past experience with regard to interruption in supply of fuel for Tarapur. We have received commitments from the United States for the reliable supply of fuel to India for reactors that will be offered for safeguards. The United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for such reactors. Under the July 18 Joint Statement, the United States is committed to seeking agreement from its Congress to amend domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international market for nuclear fuel, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations. This has been reflected in the formal understandings reached during the visit and included in the Separation Plan. (vii) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies for India, the United States is prepared to take other additional steps, such as : a) Incorporating assurances regarding fuel supply in a bilateral U.S.?India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would be negotiated. b) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement. c) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors. d) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India. In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA. In essence, an India-specific safeguards would provide : on the one hand safeguards against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time, and on the other permit India to take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA. In the terms of the Separation plan, there is hence assurance of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors that would be placed under safeguards together with India’s right to take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are interrupted. The House can rest assured that India retains its sovereign right to take all appropriate measures to fully safeguard its interests. During my Suo Motu Statements on this subject made on July 29, 2005 and on February 27, 2006, I had given a solemn assurance to this august House and through the Honorable members to the country, that the Separation Plan will not adversely effect our country’s national security. I am in a position to assure the Members that that this is indeed the case. I might mention : i) that the separation plan will not adversely effect our strategic programme. There will be no capping of our strategic programme, and the separation plan ensures adequacy of fissile material and other inputs to meet the current and future requirements of our strategic programme, based on our assessment of the threat scenarios. No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes. The integrity of our Nuclear Doctrine and our ability to sustain a Minimum Credible Nuclear Deterrent is adequately protected. Our nuclear policy will continue to be guided by the principles of restraint and responsibility. ii) The Separation Plan does not come in the way of the integrity of our three stage nuclear programme, including the future use of our thorium reserves. The autonomy of our Research and Development activities in the nuclear field will remain unaffected. The Fast Breeder Test Reactor and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor remain outside safeguards. We have agreed, however, that future civilian Thermal power reactors and civilian Fast Breeder Reactors would be placed under safeguards, but the determination of what is civilian is solely an Indian decision. As I mentioned in my Statement on February 27, the Separation Plan has been very carefully drawn up after an intensive internal consultation process overseen by my Office. The Department of Atomic Energy and our nuclear scientific community have been associated with the preparation of the Separation Plan. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Principal Scientific Adviser to the Government of India were actively involved closely at every stage. I am in a position to assure the Hon’ble members that we have not permitted information of national security significance to be compromised in any way during the negotiations. I believe that the significance of the July 18, 2005 Statement is the prospect it offers for ending India’s nuclear isolation. It will open up prospects for cooperation not only with the US but with countries like Russia, France and other countries with advanced nuclear capabilities, including those from the NSG. The scope for cooperation in the energy related research will vastly expand, so will cooperation in nuclear research activities. India will be able to join the international mainstream and occupy its rightful place among the top countries of the nuclear community. There would be a quantum jump in our energy generating capacity with a consequential impact on our GDP growth. It also ensures India’s participation as a full partner in cutting edge multilateral scientific effort in the nuclear field such as ITER and Generation IV Initiative. Sir, successful implementation of the July 18 Joint Statement requires reciprocal actions by the United States as well as India. Steps to be taken by India will be contingent upon actions taken by the US. For our part, we have prepared a Separation Plan that identifies those civilian facilities that we are willing to offer for safeguards. The United States Government has accepted this Separation Plan. It now intends to approach the US Congress for amending its laws and the Nuclear Suppliers Group for adapting its Guidelines to enable full civilian cooperation between India and the international community. At the appropriate stage, India will approach the IAEA to discuss and fashion an India-specific safeguards agreement, which will reflect the unique character of this arrangement. Since such a safeguards agreement is yet to be negotiated it will be difficult to predict its content, but I can assure the House that we will not accept any provisions that go beyond the parameters of the July 18, 2005 Statement and the Separation Plan agreed between India and the United States, on March 2, 2006.We are hopeful that this process will move forward in the coming weeks and months. I would request Hon’ble Members to look at this matter through the larger perspective of energy security. Currently, nuclear energy provides only three per cent of our total energy mix. Rising costs and reliability of imported hydrocarbon supplies constitute a major uncertainty at a time when we are accelerating our growth rate. We must endeavor to expand our capabilities across the entire energy spectrum ? from clean coal and coal-bed methane, to gas hydrates and wind and solar power. We are actively seeking international partnerships across the board and are members of many international initiatives dedicated to energy. Indeed, at the end of my talks with President Bush, we announced Indian participation in two more programmes: the Future-Gen programme for zero emission thermal power plants and the Integrated Ocean Drilling Programme for gas hydrates. The House will appreciate that the search for an integrated policy with an appropriate mix of energy supplies is central to the achievement of our broader economic or social objectives. Energy is the lifeblood of our economy. Without sufficient and predictable access, our aspirations in the social sector cannot be realized. Inadequate power has a deleterious effect in building a modern infrastructure. It has a direct impact on the optimal usage of increasingly scarce water resources. Power shortage is thus not just a handicap in one sector but a drag on the entire economy. I believe that the needs of the people of India must become the central agenda for our international cooperation. It is precisely this approach that has guided our growing partnership with the United States. I would, in particular, draw attention to the launching of the Knowledge Initiative in Agriculture with a three year financial commitment to link our universities and technical institutions and businesses to support agricultural education, research, capacity building, including in the area of bio-technology. Our first Green Revolution benefited in substantial measure from assistance provided by the US. We are hopeful that the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture will become the harbinger of a second Green Revolution in our country. Sir, India and the United States have much to gain from this new partnership. This was the main underlying theme of our discussions during the visit of President Bush. The resumption of civilian nuclear energy cooperation would demonstrate that we have entered a new and more positive phase of our ties, so that we can finally put behind us years of troubled relations in the nuclear field. I am confident that this is a worthy objective that will receive the full support of this House." YSR/HS/HK/CS
The politically sensitive issue of Nuclear energy has been receiving media and political attention around the world. However, there has been very little discussion in this forum on the large number of other agreements that have been reached between the two countries and their likely repercussion on India in the future. Let us analyze the various likely implications of the other agreements reached during the visit.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 7 2006, 02:19 PM

US, Canada pressure shuts down Cirus New Delhi, March 7: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has decided to shut down the Cirus reactor in 2010 following strong pressure from Canada and the United States. In a suo statement in Parliament on Tuesday, Dr Singh said that the government had decided to permanently shut down the Cirus reactor located at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre as it did not want to allow “intrusive inspections in a nuclear facility of high national security importance.” The Apsara reactor will be relocated away from the Barc complex and brought under safeguards in 2010. The announcement has created tremendous concern among nuclear scientists and in strategic circles as Cirus is regarded as an important research reactor, and the Prime Minister’s remarks suggest that the only choice was to either shut down the reactor or to place it under international safeguards. Nuclear scientists are of the view that Cirus should have been placed in the military list of facilities by the government, or, conversely, been replaced by a modern technology research reactor before being shut down permanently. Neither of this has been done, with the Prime Minister failing to explain the reasons for this particular decision. Canada, in an official statement issued late last year, had said: “The separation of the civilian and military fuel cycles, and the scope and nature of safeguards to be applied on the civilian part, is a very important issue and that as part of this process the disposition of the Cirus reactor will be a matter of particular interest to Canada.” The Canadian government indicated that its support in the Nuclear Suppliers Group would be conditional to which category India placed the Cirus reactor, with informed sources now pointing out that both the Canadian and US governments had worked closely on this and had eventually “persuaded” the UPA government to agree to shut down an important research reactor within four years. The Prime Minister also tabled the separation plan for the nuclear facilities in Parliament. Significantly, despite the strong words of praise for the nuclear scientists in his earlier remarks, Dr Manmohan Singh in this separate annexure has maintained that “the Indian nuclear programme has still a relatively narrow base and cannot be expected to adopt solutions that might be deemed viable by much larger programmes.” The document carries a comparison of the installed capacity of India as compared to the Permanent Five nations (US, Russia, Britain, France, China), with the US heading the list with 104 reactors and an installed capacity of 99.21 GWe and China trailing behind, with nine reactors and an installed capacity of 6.602 GWe. The Tarapur power reactor fuel reprocessing plant and the Tarapur and Rajasthan “away from reactors” spent fuel storage pools will all be placed under safeguards. The fast breeder reactors will not be under safeguards although the separation plan admits that this programme is at the research and development stage “and its technology will take time to mature and reach an advanced stage of development.” By the end of 2014, the deadline indicated by the Prime Minister to fully implement the safeguards plan, the total installed thermal power capacity under safeguards would have risen from the present 19 per cent to 65 per cent.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 7 2006, 03:19 PM

PM drops bombshell, concedes 1974 test born in sin By Brahma Chellaney By agreeing to shut down the Cirus research reactor by 2010, India has implicitly acknowledged that it was in breach of its international obligations in carrying out the 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE). The Prime Minister’s statement on the Indo-US nuclear deal brings out the heavy costs India is paying for a dubious benefit — getting the right to import high-priced, uneconomical reactors for generating electricity. The planned shutdown of Cirus confirms that India has agreed to effect a 30 per cent cut in its weapons-grade plutonium production capability. This is on top of the 65 per cent cut that India will have to bear in the present production of reactor-grade plutonium and tritium once a total of 14 Indian power reactors come under IAEA inspection in phases. The Cirus decision hands nonproliferation zealots in the United States and elsewhere a cause to celebrate: not only is India tacitly conceding that its 1974 test was born in sin, but that it is willing to atone for it more than three decades later by shutting down the reactor rather than subject it to international inspections. The US had demanded in recent negotiations that India either close it down or open it to outside monitoring. The surprise decision to shut down Cirus and relocate Apsara, Asia’s first research reactor, negates India’s consistent stand for decades that it breached no obligation of any kind in drawing plutonium from Cirus for the 1974 PNE. Indira Gandhi must be turning in her grave. Cirus was built with Canadian technical assistance and received American heavy water under two separate 1956 contracts that predated the 1957 establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 1968 NPT text finalisation. Because the concept of “safeguards” (international inspections) had not yet been devised, India gave no explicit undertaking to abjure nuclear-explosive uses. Indeed, just after Cirus came on line in 1960, Jawaharlal Nehru had declared: “We are approaching a stage when it is possible for us... to make atomic weapons.” The shutdown decision not only resurrects a ghost from the past but also mocks various international legal opinions clearing India of any wrongdoing. The US state department, in a June 2, 1974 assessment to the US Congress, itself concluded that because heavy water degrades at about 10 per cent a year and India’s Nangal plant had been producing heavy water since 1962, “it is believed that US-origin heavy water was replaced (in Cirus) from this source.” Equally intriguing is the decision on Apsara, a tiny, pool-type research reactor built indigenously in the mid-1950s, with only its enriched-uranium element imported. Its relocation outside the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre complex will involve expense, although opening it to outside inspectors will have no strategic significance. More broadly, the nearly one-third cut in weapons-grade plutonium manufacture capability, along with the two-thirds cut in the availability of tritium and reactor-grade plutonium, will effectively cap the size of India’s nuclear deterrent. These major capability restrictions have been agreed upon even before anybody can claim that India has even a minimal deterrent against its main rival, China. There are contradictions galore in Dr Manmohan Singh’s latest statement. He announced the Cirus shutdown and in the same breath claimed that “such steps will not hinder ongoing research and development.” He averred that his “separation plan” will not “adversely” affect national security, yet is silent on the effects that may not be adverse in his perception. He announced that “India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity”, and then admits that since “such a safeguards agreement is yet to be negotiated, it will be difficult to predict its content.” In other words, India is being taken on a treacherous route. Dr Singh stated: “We do not wish to place any encumbrances on our fast-breeder programme, and this has been fully ensured in the separation plan.” Then he admitted: “We have agreed, however, that future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian fast-breeder reactors would be placed under safeguards, but the determination of what is civilian is solely an Indian decision.” It is also significant that India’s goal of a “credible minimal deterrent” has now officially become “minimum credible deterrent”. Dr Singh’s use of the phrase “minimum credible nuclear deterrent” implies that credibility will be kept at a minimum in the deterrent.
Spineless made a real blunder according to him.

Posted by: acharya Mar 7 2006, 03:48 PM

ANALYSIS - U.S.-India ties play on Pakistani insecurities Tue Mar 7, 2006 3:39 PM IST16 By Simon Cameron-Moore ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Warming U.S. ties with India are playing on Pakistani insecurities at a time when President Pervez Musharraf is under fire for the conduct of a war on terrorism forced on him by the United States. Analysts say by the time U.S. President George W. Bush arrived home on Sunday at the end of a South Asia tour, Pakistan had little new to show for an alliance with Washington that has pitted its army against its own people on the Afghan border. To add to Pakistan's chagrin, before coming to Islamabad Bush struck an accord in New Delhi to provide arch rival India with American know-how for its civilian nuclear programme. "There was a sharp contrast between the treatment meted out to India and Pakistan," said Talat Masood, a retired general turned political commentator. Some analysts believe hardliners in the army could be growing impatient with both the conduct of the war on terrorism, and Musharraf's inability to get more support from the United States in dealings with India. Meeting Pakistani media on Monday, President Pervez Musharraf played down rivalry with India, saying Pakistan did not share its neighbour's "global and regional aspirations". "We are not in competition with India," he said, declaring Pakistan's priorities were defensive and the creation of jobs and reduction of poverty. But Masood said the U.S. aim to build up India as a regional counterweight to China would inevitably fuel Pakistani unease. "Whether the fears of Indian hegemony are real or imagined, it has heightened Pakistan's insecurities." INSECURITIES PLENTIFUL Pakistan has lurched in and out of military rule in the 59 years since it sprang into being from the partition of India. Both India and Afghanistan have regularly accused Pakistan of using militant groups to try to destabilise them. Since joining a U.S.-led war on terrorism in 2001 Musharraf has been the target of several assassination attempts, with several junior military men convicted of involvement in plots. Although Pakistan has caught or killed around 700 al Qaeda members, Osama bin Laden is widely believed to be hiding somewhere in the country and Pakistan's Islamist opposition sympathises with Taliban guerrillas fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Even while Bush was meeting Musharraf at the weekend, Pakistan's army and tribesmen clashed on the border. Pro-Taliban clerics issued a call to arms after Pakistani forces struck a compound killing 45 mostly Central Asian al Qaeda linked militants last Wednesday. And by Monday, after three days of fighting in North Waziristan tribal agency, some 120 people lay dead, including at least five troopers. Following the furore over Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, the bloodshed in tribal regions has given Islamists more ammunition against Musharraf with an election due next year. "The real agenda of Bush in Pakistan is to speed up military operations in the tribal areas," Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of the six-party Islamist opposition alliance, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, wrote in the News on Sunday. "The height of misfortune is that our armed forces are on the warpath with their own nation," wrote Ahmed, who had spent Bush's visit under house arrest to stop him leading protests. FLAWED DIPLOMACY Pakistan constantly seeks U.S. support to make up for its own lack of firepower against a bigger, stronger neighbour, but the United States resists, as Bush did during his visit, any attempt to drag it into the core dispute over Kashmir. Instead, analysts say, Washington pays for its influence with arms supplies and defence accords to please the Pakistan army. Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance. Washington has pledged $1.5 billion of military financing from 2005 to 2009, and last year said it would sell Pakistan the F-16 warplanes it has long wanted. Diplomacy conducted on such terms lacks long-term vision, according to Hussain Haqqani, a former adviser to three Pakistani prime ministers, and now teaching at Boston University. "Pakistan always looks on the (U.S.) relationship in quid pro quo terms, expecting something in return," said Haqqani. "India takes a longer view, building up relations at multi-dimensional levels and ends up getting more." Indeed, according to Haqqani, trying to keep up with the Indians has been Pakistan's preoccupation. "Pakistan never asked for civil nuclear agreement until India got one," he remarked. Bush gave Musharraf short shrift when he raised the possibility of getting a similar nuclear accord for Pakistan, even though it is just two years since its top scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, admitted selling nuclear components to, among others, Iran.

Posted by: rajesh_g Mar 8 2006, 10:10 AM Who is this Shen fellow ? Interesting designation..

Professor Dingli Shen, Executive Dean, Institute of International Studies, and Deputy Director, Center for American Studies Fudan University, Shanghai, filed this from The Hague.

Posted by: acharya Mar 8 2006, 06:29 PM

Thursday, March 09, 2006 VIEW: Nuclear pact launches India into uncharted waters — Pratap Bhanu Mehta If relations between the US and China worsen, India, by aligning with the US, risks becoming a frontline state in that confrontation. While the prospects of such a scenario should not be exaggerated, there is more immediate cause for worry The recently signed Indo-US nuclear deal welcoming India to the world of recognised nuclear powers has been termed historic, and for once that may not be usual media hyperbole. Though only the future will determine its true significance, undoubtedly the nuclear pact is an emphatic acknowledgment of India’s transformation from a regional to a global power, an important step in transforming the rules of the world order to accommodate the aspirations of a rising power. Beyond these obvious implications, the measure of the tectonic shift that the Indo-US entente implies will be revealed in its impact on both the world’s non-proliferation regime as well as India’s strategic posture, its economic development and foreign policy orientation. As the fallout from the nuclear deal becomes clear, India may be seen to have made an immediate strategic gain while underestimating the long-term political consequences. The deal was supposed to be a balancing act between India’s desire to maintain autonomy over its military nuclear programme and the rest of the world’s desire to cap it. While the details are not available, at this juncture it appears that the deal gives a distinct advantage to India at the expense of the global non-proliferation goal. While India has agreed to safeguards for its civilian reactors in perpetuity, it has artfully tied this to assurances on an uninterrupted fuel supply. India has retained the right to designate future nuclear plants as civilian or military, it can divert indigenous fuel entirely for military use, and the number of plants kept outside the purview of inspection seems large enough to allow a credible military programme. It will be difficult to argue that this deal significantly caps India’s nuclear capability. If the deal goes through, India will have managed to transform the rules of the international order without sacrificing its military autonomy. Will accommodating India weaken the non-proliferation regime, as many critics have claimed? It could be argued that states like Iran and North Korea will do whatever they wish, regardless of the choices made with respect to India. The choices of countries to go nuclear will be determined more by their perception of security threats and the compulsions of their domestic politics than choices made by third countries. India’s treatment as an exception is not arbitrary but principled. India satisfies the criteria of what is called a “responsible” nuclear power: a democratic country that does not engage in proliferation. Iran, Pakistan, North Korea or, for that matter, China do not meet this criteria. But while a principled case can be made for accepting India, this deal further legitimises the possession of nuclear weapons. If legitimising nuclear weapons as such poses a risk to the world order, this deal enhances those risks. On the economic front the interdependence of India’s economy with that of the US is only bound to increase. India now becomes an attractive market for nuclear and advanced technologies worth billions of dollars. Both sides justify the deal in economic terms. India’s ruling classes are convinced that nuclear power is necessary for its energy security. It is the only viable answer to India’s acute power shortages. The US also wants to re-legitimise the worldwide use of nuclear power as the only alternative to burning hydrocarbons. But will dependence on nuclear power really give India the energy security its needs? Although the terms of the deal safeguard the import of uranium, will it be wise for India to base its energy security on imported supplies of uranium? And are the economic arguments in favour of nuclear power over alternative sources so compelling that it becomes the cornerstone of India’s development strategy? While the desirability of India’s energy strategy can be debated in technical terms, the political consequences of this deal are far more uncertain than India acknowledges. The nuclear deal is simply one aspect of an Indo-US relationship that is acquiring unprecedented momentum. For the first time in its history, the fortunes of India’s elites are comprehensively and intimately tied with the fate of America. Can India be so materially and culturally bound with the US and yet resist seeing world geo-politics through American eyes? While formally India claims that it will not always align with the US, there are signs that India is subtly internalising the terms of discourse by which the US describes the world order. Take for instance, the war on terrorism. India and the US have emphatically reiterated their common interest in defeating terrorism. But it is still not clear that it makes sense for India to buy into the idea that there is a single kind of terrorism or a united war against it. India was a victim of terrorism that had its roots in the geo-politics of South Asia, not in the militant Islam that targets the West. Both are different entities that require different responses. India’s strategy of military self-restraint in the face of terrorism has also been politically prudent, while US military actions have, arguably, given terrorism more aid and succour. Is India now in the danger of being drawn into the confrontation between militant Islam and the West, a confrontation that is not of its making? Of the foreign policy dilemmas that the deal will produce, the most important one revolves around China. The US projects India as some sort of counterweight to Chinese power. It is odd not to help build India while the Chinese juggernaut roles on unabated. While not acknowledging it overtly, India is also preoccupied with containing Chinese influence. What effect will the deal have on India’s relations with China? The answer to this question depends on how US-China relations evolve in the future. If relations between the US and China worsen, India, by aligning with the US, risks becoming a frontline state in that confrontation. But while the prospects of such a scenario should not be exaggerated, there is more immediate cause for worry. The US has emphatically rejected equating India and Pakistan in any nuclear order, but will China do the same? Some argue that China will assist Pakistan, regardless of what India does. So does an increasing alignment with the US raise China’s stakes in the subcontinent? Will it be licensed to scale up its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan? China has also offered Bangladesh civilian nuclear cooperation. The prospect of Pakistan and Bangladesh possessing significant numbers of civilian nuclear reactors is not one that the world, at this juncture, should contemplate with equanimity. As the Iran crisis has demonstrated, the line between civilian and military nuclear use is, to put it mildly, a contentious one. In the chessboard of great power politics, the moves of every nation, knight or rook, are equally important. Coming months and years will show that the Indo-US deal is not just a bilateral pact; it will have consequences for the behaviour of other nations. Prudence requires that India acknowledge the unpredictability of those consequences and brace itself. Pratap Bhanu Mehta is president of the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, India. This article appeared in YaleGlobal Online (, a publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, and is reprinted by permission. Copyright © 2003 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

Posted by: Ravish Mar 8 2006, 10:35 PM

It is an excellent analysis of the likely short term and long term effect of the India-USA Nuclear Agreement.

Posted by: acharya Mar 9 2006, 05:15 PM

Friday, March 10, 2006 US-India nuclear deal under fire By Khalid Hasan WASHINGTON: The US-India nuclear deal remains under fire from leading experts in the area with one of them, Stephen Cohen of Brookings, arguing that even if the deal fails in Congress, it would still have enabled India to shop around the world to fulfil its nuclear requirements. Cohen told India Abroad that US President George W Bush decided that he would interrupt the negotiations going on in New Delhi between the two sides and accept the last offer made by India. “He wanted to have an agreement while he was in India, and that’s why my guess is that this is not going to help its chances in Congress.” He also pointed out that from an Indian perspective, “they don’t care because they got the deal” and there are plenty of other countries that are nuclear-capable in terms of providing India with uranium fuel. However, he insisted that India is not “serious” about being a major nuclear weapons state and those who believe that this opens the door for India to make a couple of thousand nuclear weapons “just don’t understand India”. Michael Krepon, founder president of the Stimson Centre, who has opposed the deal from the very beginning on proliferation grounds, said, “The Bush administration set three key tests for a worthwhile agreement. The separation plan (between civilian and military facilities) had to be credible and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint, and that it had to be transparent. The administration pledged to Congress that a credible and defensible deal would permit a big growth in India’s electricity but not big growth in India’s nuclear arsenal. This in turn meant that very few nuclear plants would be unsafeguarded, that the safeguards would be in perpetuity, and that India’s breeder programmes would be all safeguarded.” Krepon pointed out that all the early reports “indicate that the administration has not met its own standards for a credible and defensible agreement”. Walter Andersen of Johns Hopkins University’s School of International Studies said the deal “came as a bit of a surprise to even many veteran South Asia watchers who assumed it would take much longer to work out the kind of agreement that was signed in New Delhi”. He said he strongly believed “the strategic gains far outweigh the nonproliferation risks” and would serve US balance-of-power interests in South Asia. He found the apprehensions of the nonproliferation lobby “exaggerated”. He felt that the case for nonproliferation is advanced by bringing in the majority of India’s facilities under international inspection, most for the first time. Karl Inderfurth, head of South Asia at the State Department under Clinton, said “there is much more to commend about this agreement than condemn” and was of the view that once the details had been presented to Congress and the Indian parliament, as well as the international community, “all will be on board and the agreement will go through”. Robert Hathaway of the Woodrow Wilson Centre saw the deal as the “crown jewel” in the transformation that had occurred in US-India relations. However, few experts and commentators here share Inderfurth’s or Hathaway’s optimism or their upbeat assessments. They continue to maintain that the deal offers little to America that it could not have had from India without the nuclear deal, which amounts to a recognition of India as a de facto member of the nuclear club and without having had to pay any penalties either. Meanwhile, in Congress the first stone has already been cast with the impending introduction of a bill by Rep Edward Markey, Democrat member from Massachusetts - or others - who said on learning of the New Delhi deal, “The president appears to have given away the store for an agreement that provides the US with no real benefit. If other nuclear suppliers nations follow the example set in this deal, the entire nonproliferation regime will begin to collapse.” On the separation plan that Bush accepted in New Delhi, the congressman said, “The premise to me is an oxymoron. There cannot be a credible separation plan without full scope safeguards and the entire purpose of the IAEA safeguards is to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from a civilian reactor to military use. But in India we would be imposing safeguards on civilian plants when there would be a military nuclear infrastructure operating in parallel and that renders safeguards illusory. They may give some modicum of comfort that the reactors and our nuclear fuel aren’t directly assisting the Indian military programme freeing up India’s stockpile of fissile material for military rather than civilian use.”

Posted by: acharya Mar 9 2006, 05:19 PM

Friday, March 10, 2006 Bush ‘made fatal error’ by signing N-deal with India WASHINGTON: A leading nuclear and security expert has said that the deal signed by President George Bush in New Delhi “endorses and assists India’s nuclear weapons programme”. “The president may have made a fatal error in putting nuclear weapons at the heart of improved US-India relations. Lawmakers want the latter, but not at the price of the former,” according to Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He points out in an analysis this week that buffeted by political turmoil at home, what Bush sought was a foreign affairs victory in India. “To clinch a nuclear weapons deal, the president had to give in to demands from the Indian nuclear lobby to exempt large portions of the country’s nuclear infrastructure from international inspection. With details of the deal still under wraps, it appears that at least one-third of current and planned Indian reactors would be exempt from IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspections and that the president gave into Indian demands for ‘Indian-specific’ inspections that would fall far short of the normal, full-scope inspections originally sought. Worse, Indian officials have made clear that India alone will decide which future reactors will be kept in the military category and exempt from any safeguards,” he writes. The deal, according to the expert, endorses and assists India’s nuclear weapons programme. US-supplied uranium fuel would free up India’s limited uranium reserves for fuel that would be burned in these reactors to make nuclear weapons. This would allow India to increase its production from the estimated six to 10 additional nuclear bombs per year to several dozen per year. India today has enough separated plutonium for 75 to 110 nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many it has actually produced. Cirincione is not surprised Indian leaders and press are “crowing about their victory over America”. He writes that Bush has done what Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Clinton and his own father had refused to do, namely, break US and international law to aid India’s nuclear weapons programme. Bush has now unilaterally shattered those guidelines and his action would violate the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) proscription against aiding another nation’s nuclear weapons programme. It would require the repeal or revision of several major US laws, including the US Nonproliferation Act. Bush has won no significant concessions from India, as it refuses to agree to end its production of nuclear weapons material, something the US, UK, France, Russia and China have already done. He predicts that Bush will run into trouble precisely here as both parties in Congress are deeply concerned about the deal and the way it was crafted. According to the writer, the deal was “cooked by a handful of senior officials (one of whom is now a lobbyist for the Indian government) and never reviewed by the Departments of State, Defence or Energy before it was announced with a champagne toast by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Congress was never consulted.” Cirincione believes that lawmakers here are concerned about the example the nuclear weapons deal sets for other nations. The lesson Iran is likely to draw is simple: if you hold out long enough, the Americans will cave in. “Pakistani officials have already said they expect Pakistan to receive a similar deal, and Israel is surely waiting in the wings. Other nations may decide that they can break the rules, too, to grant special deals to their friends. China is already rumoured to be seeking a deal to provide open nuclear assistance to Pakistan - a practice it stopped in the early 1990s after a successful diplomatic campaign by the United States to bring China into conformity with the Non-Proliferation Treaty restrictions. Will Russia decide that it can make an exception for Iran?” khalid hasan

Posted by: rajesh_g Mar 9 2006, 05:21 PM

Last time this guy was on NPR on talk of the nation, the only thing he was pushing on was about finding the "weak points" of other nations and then hang some carrots and so on.. This guy is a snake.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 9 2006, 11:18 PM,0008.htm

Once the US Congress clears the Indo-US nuclear deal, it would lead to a rush of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries to access the Indian nuclear power market, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar said on Thursday. However, if the deal does not come through for any reason, "we will continue with our programme and the three-stage programme envisaged by Homi Bhabha will not be compromised at any stage," Kakodkar said at his first press conference after the two countries reached an understanding last week to implement the agreement. Once the deal is cleared by the US Congress, it would open the floodgates for Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to come in a big way to cater to the needs of India, the world's largest market for nuclear power, Kakodkar said. With India's growing GDP, welcoming over 20 new reactors from outside from the NSG would increase the nuclear electricity base in the country, he said adding this is very essential as India is energy-starved. Kakodkar said India has not compromised its indigenous nuclear programmes by signing the deal and the country's Fast Breeder programme will not be put under international safeguards at any time under the March two agreement. Describing the Indo-US deal on civilian nuclear programme as a "very practical" one, he said India is expecting it to be cleared by the US Congress.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 11 2006, 08:47 PM

By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent Sat Mar 11, 12:02 AM ET WASHINGTON (Reuters) - India circumvents other countries' export controls and leaks sensitive technology in procuring materials for its nuclear programs, according to a report by former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright. The Indian Embassy dismissed the report as "baseless." The report, released on Friday, challenges a central U.S. argument in favor of a landmark U.S.-India nuclear deal: that India has such an impeccable record of protecting technology it can be trusted with U.S. and other foreign nuclear materiel. Albright, a physicist who heads the Institute for Science and International Security, said he had "uncovered a well-developed and secret Indian program to outfit its uranium enrichment program and circumvent other countries' export control efforts." The report, co-authored by researcher Susan Basu, said when India seeks bids for nuclear-related equipment, it allows prospective suppliers to buy blueprints and manufacturing instructions for a particular item. Company officials could then sell the item or related technology to other customers. "That's what we think is new, that you could go buy some centrifuge design information through the Indian procurement system," Albright told Reuters in an interview. "This is not a normal way of doing business. It's a very irresponsible way to handle sensitive information," he added. Indian Embassy spokesman Venu Rajamony told Reuters, "This so-called report is ridiculous and filled with all kinds of baseless charges." ......................
Here comes leftist with agenda.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 11 2006, 09:37 PM,5744,18416798%255E25377,00.html In our interests to support India's rise Greg Sheridan, Foreign editor

OCCASIONALLY in foreign affairs you can sense the established order dissolving in front of your eyes and a new order beginning to take shape. That's what we've seen in India over the past two weeks. We also saw, in the reaction of China and in the deadly burst of terrorism in the Indian holy city of Varanasi, that this new order is not going to be uncontested. The US has negotiated a deal with India which, in everything but name, accepts India as a legitimate nuclear weapons state. It is the first such state to be added to the five declared weapons states - the US, Britain, France, Russia and China - all permanent members of the UN Security Council. India will designate 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors as civilian energy reactors and the other eight as related to its attempt to build a credible nuclear deterrent against China and Pakistan. The US will co-operate with only the peaceful elements of India's program and will supply India with nuclear technology and materials. It will seek to convince its friends and allies to do the same. Here's the rub for Australia. Prime Minister John Howard had a good visit to India this week but he had two contradictory responses to the US-India deal. He welcomed it as a highly positive development but said Australia had no intention of changing its policy of not selling uranium to nations that hadn't signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In an exclusive interview at his New Delhi residence last week, India's Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, told Inquirer India wanted Australia to sell it uranium. Then, at a joint press conference with Howard a few days later, Singh repeatedly said he expected Australia to support the US-India agreement. The contradiction in Australia's position is this: If Canberra supports the deal, it cannot logically oppose selling uranium to India, for part of the deal is that India gets international co-operation on peaceful nuclear energy. So you can support the deal and sell uranium to India, or oppose the deal and not sell uranium. You cannot logically support the deal, which is designed to end India's nuclear isolation, but then attempt to continue that isolation by refusing to sell uranium. The Australian contradiction doesn't need to be resolved overnight. But eventually Canberra will have to choose. If the US-India deal goes through, you would have to imagine Australia will co-operate and become a uranium supplier to India. To do otherwise would be not only to oppose the most important strategic play the US has made since Iraq, but also to court long-term Indian hostility. That's the story so far. But now the world gets into quite interesting new territory. For India's new status as a global power, which Washington will do everything it can to confirm, threatens a number of players who will oppose it. The forces that will resist India's new status, in order of importance, are China, Pakistan, the Non-Proliferation Treaty zealots and those who are just unhappy about democracies in alliance with the US, and the domestic voices in India who don't want this new status. Each is significant. India, despite being a democracy, will face much stiffer opposition to its emergence as a global power than China has. This is partly because China was already a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a declared nuclear weapons state accepted as such under the treaty. These are two huge institutional advantages for China over India. What the US has done in the past fortnight is try to redress these disadvantages. China opposes the US-India deal outright and will campaign against it in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and in international diplomatic circles. China could go further than this and play hardball. Beijing has an appalling record of nuclear proliferation, having helped in the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and North Korea's nuclear program. China has generally sponsored Pakistan as a counterweight to India. It could again get into the business of sponsoring Pakistan's nuclear technology as a method of punishing both India and the US for this deal. Similarly, Pakistan asked the US for the same sort of deal as India got and was turned down. There are excellent reasons for this. Pakistan does not have a peaceful nuclear energy program. More importantly, Pakistan, through its disgraced former nuclear supremo, A.Q. Khan, was exposed as running the biggest nuclear proliferation program in human history. Singh made it clear to me that Pakistan is still sponsoring terrorism in India. He said: "Pakistan has to do a lot more to prevent the use of its territory for terrorist acts directed at our country." Pakistan is obsessed with India and the fear that India will accelerate away into global economic and political success, leaving it behind. A characteristic Pakistani response to the Indian deal would be to increase its sponsorship of terror within India with a view to creating internal communal strife between India's 150 million Muslims and more than 900 million Hindus. This would serve Pakistan's interests in two ways. It could increase Indian opposition to the deal and it could make India look unstable and contribute to the international community feeling that it is too risky to help India with its nuclear program. The deadly terrorist bombings in the Hindu holy city of Varanasi, in Uttar Pradesh, this week, for which Lashkar-e-Taiba is prime suspect, fit appallingly well into this analytical framework. Similarly, Muslim-led anti-Bush demonstrations in Lucknow managed to turn themselves into Hindu-Muslim communal disturbances. The domestic opposition to the deal in India is a minority business but potentially quite vicious. There is anti-Americanism in India, as everywhere. But the most important domestic opposition to the deal rests in a potentially lethal combination of Indian Muslims and the Indian far Left. This is an alliance of increasing closeness within India and mirrors a broad alliance internationally. Of course, India's Muslims are not at all monolithic. They have traditionally been moderate politically and deeply committed to India's secularism and its democracy. But the forces of global Islamic radicalism are hard at work on them, trying to radicalise them along the lines of anti-Americanism, with the argument that the US has embarked on a global crusade against Islam. The final important opponents of the US-India deal will be the NPT zealots. Two groups of these will be particularly important: those in the US Congress and those in western Europe. To give effect to the nuclear deal, the US will have to pass legislation through its Congress. GeorgeW. Bush, with his popularity ratings at an all-time low, is in a particularly weak position vis-a-vis Congress and he probably erred in not taking congressional leaders with him to India to help him sell the deal to them later back in the US. However, the US has not made a new friend in a long time. Tearing up this deal, with the world's largest democracy, with an emerging great power, with the second fastest growing economy in the world, with a substantial military power that has a million-man army and is developing a blue-water fleet -- to throw that all away would seem to be an extreme action for the US Congress. If the administration cannot sell this deal to Congress it could not sell ice cream in the desert. The west European NPT zealots, and the UN class generally, will not like the deal but will be reluctant to embark on a jihad against India. Although there are endless complications ahead, you'd have to think the deal will stick eventually. It is overwhelmingly in Australia's interests for India, a stable and exemplary democracy with whom we share deep political, cultural and security interests, to take its rightful place as one of the great powers of the 21st century.

Posted by: acharya Mar 12 2006, 08:20 AM

India, China, and the United States: A Delicate Balance Author: Esther Pan, Staff Writer February 27, 2006 * Introduction * What’s India’s current relationship with China? * What are the major elements of the relationship between India and China? * What’s India’s relationship with the United States? * What’s China’s role in the India-U.S. relationship? * How will improved U.S.-India ties affect the U.S. relationship with China? Introduction President George Bush travels to India March 1 for the first time in his presidency, highlighting the increasingly important role New Delhi is playing in world affairs. Many analysts see a stronger U.S. relationship with India as part of a longer-term effort to check China's influence in Asia. India's leaders have dismissed suggestions their country should be part of any U.S. containment strategy toward China and have cited the importance of booming economic ties with China. But officials in both New Delhi and Washington have stressed what they term is a "natural" partnership based on their traditions as large, multiethnic democracies. What’s India’s current relationship with China? Experts say both India and China are pursuing their foreign policy goals more assertively as each country tries to position itself as the major political and economic force in Asia. "It's the start of the realignment of the balance of power in Asia," says Anupam Srivastava, executive director of the South Asia program at the University of Georgia's Center for International Trade and Security. Others say New Delhi is not quite sure how to deal with Beijing. "The Indians don't know what they want with China," says Sumit Ganguly, the Rabindranath Tagore professor of Indian cultures and civilizations at the University of Indiana, Bloomington. "On one hand, they see China as a major strategic threat," while at the same time a growing economic relationship is bringing the two countries into increasingly closer contact, he says. That economic growth has kept the bilateral relationship, with its potential for conflict, generally positive thus far. "There's a sense right now that they're both rising, and it's not a zero-sum game yet," says Adam Segal, the Maurice R. Greenberg senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Right now it's still win-win." What are the major elements of the relationship between India and China? * Energy. India and China are two of the largest, fastest-growing energy consumers in the world. India imports some 75 percent of its oil needs, while China imports about 33 percent of its oil. Their combined demand has helped drive oil prices to record highs, prompting both nations to try to lock down sources of energy around the world. China's quest for energy has prompted it to strike deals with countries from Africa—it has agreements with Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, and other nations—to Myanmar, Tibet, and Russia. India is also seeking oil in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Sudan, among other nations. In January, China and India agreed to a landmark energy cooperation deal that would prevent them from bidding against each other for energy resources. "The two countries realized that by very aggressively bidding for the same resources, they were pushing prices up for both of them," Srivastava says. "It's a lot cheaper for them to divide resources and cooperate." Both countries are also exploring alternate energy sources, a factor behind the nuclear deal India is negotiating with the United States. * Trade. Bilateral trade between India and China has gone from $332 million in 1992 to $13.6 billion in 2005, according to a paper by Srivastava published in the fall 2005 issue of the Indian Journal of Economics and Business. Trade between the two nations has grown at over 30 percent per year since 1999. India accounts for nearly 80 percent of South Asian economic activity and is a critical gateway to the region's economy. The two countries are increasing their economic cooperation, particularly in areas like technology. "There's this idea that India does software and China does hardware, and the two of them together could make a new Asian market," Segal says. But some experts say India is worried it will be forced into the role of supplier of minerals and low value-added goods to China, unless it can leverage its expertise in services and higher value-added manufacturing into the bilateral trade relationship. * Borders. The two nations have a longstanding territorial dispute in the Himalayas that led to a border war in 1962. Negotiations over the 2,000-mile border are ongoing. Among the areas of contention, India says China is illegally occupying Indian territory in the disputed region of Kashmir. China has claimed the rights to land in the northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. * Security. At the time of India's 1998 nuclear test, Indian officials said they needed nuclear weapons to deter China, an assertion that raised hackles in Beijing. "There are suspicions on the military side, but both leaders have kept it in check," Segal says. India is wary of China's longstanding relationship with its rival Pakistan, including Chinese assistance for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and China's role in a project to upgrade a Pakistani deep-sea port at Gwadar. "The nuclear threat from China and Pakistan is combined, since China has built up Pakistan's nuclear and conventional capabilities," Ganguly says. China has also expanded its security ties with other nations around India, including Myanmar and Bangladesh. But "a direct military conflict doesn't serve either country's interest," Srivastava says, so Bejiing and New Delhi are compartmentalizing their differences so they can move forward on other issues. The two countries are now planning to conduct their first-ever joint naval exercises. What’s India’s relationship with the United States? President George Bush said in a February 22 speech that U.S. relations with India have "never been better," and praised India's commitment to secular government and religious pluralism, saying they made the nation "a natural partner for the United States." Many experts say the United States and India have worked for the last several years to build a close, cooperative alliance. Robert Blackwill, a former U.S. ambassador to India, said at a Council meeting February 23 that while there is not likely to be a formal U.S.-India alliance, the bilateral cooperation between the two nations will continue to increase. Srivastava agrees. "There's a very close partnership between the United States and India," he says, one that spans a range of issues, including counterterrorism, joint protection of critical sea lanes, and close cooperation on security investigations. What’s China’s role in the India-U.S. relationship? Some experts say India is seeking a closer relationship with the United States both to improve its regional standing and to bolster its security position against China and Pakistan. Ganguly says India suffers from "status anxiety" in relation to its northern neighbor, and is "constantly peering over the Himalayas at China, trying to catch up." China began its economic reforms nearly a decade before India did and its per capita income is now nearly three times India's, he says. Beijing also enjoys greater world standing—including UN Security Council membership and a prominent role as a political power broker in situations like the North Korean nuclear issue—which some in India covet, experts say. How will improved U.S.-India ties affect the U.S. relationship with China? While U.S.-China relations have also shown steady improvement, there is a strong awareness from the U.S. side of China as an emerging competitor for everything from international markets to energy resources to military primacy. Some experts suspect the United States is cultivating a closer relationship with India to contain China, a factor they suspect is behind the recent nuclear deal. But some say this would be a mistake. "There's no better way to empty a drawing room of Indian strategists in New Delhi than to start talking about this idea," Blackwill said. Indian officials have "no interest whatsoever in trying to contain China because they believe this could be a self-fulfilling prophesy, and their whole policy is to seek the best possible relationship with China and to try to shape their policy to that end," he says. "Neither India nor the United States is interested in any kind of containment of China," Srivastava agrees. Still, he says, Chinese officials still harbor suspicions about U.S.-Indian intentions.

Posted by: Manne Mar 13 2006, 03:36 PM

QUOTE(Mudy @ Mar 12 2006, 09:17 AM) ...... Here comes leftist with agenda.
That report is a PoS. I have dissected that report but am unable to cross-post here as BR appears to be down. PoS I tell you.

Posted by: acharya Mar 13 2006, 09:43 PM

Congressional hearing on India-US deal this month By Khalid Hasan WASHINGTON: The House of Representatives’ International Relations Committee announced on Monday that it would hold hearings on the India-US nuclear agreement later this month. “This is a complex agreement with profound implications for US and global interests. Congress will need to take a close look at its many provisions in order to come to an informed decision,” said Committee Chairman Henry J Hyde, Republican from Illinois. Last week, Hyde met Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to discuss the proposal. He and the committee’s ranking member, Tom Lantos, Democrat from California, agreed to introduce the agreement’s enabling legislation at the request of the Bush administration, but Hyde suggested that Congress may seek conditions for its approval. According to Lantos, “The issues involved are complicated and technical and it will take some time for Congress to absorb them as we move the agreement to fruition. I view the new strategic alliance between the world’s oldest and largest democracies as a breakthrough, but all members of Congress will undoubtedly wish to see the details of the agreement before deciding how to vote.” Legislation amending the Atomic Energy Act is necessary to authorise US-India nuclear cooperation because India has never adopted the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and therefore cannot meet the prerequisites set out in current US law.

Posted by: rajivg Mar 13 2006, 09:52 PM

NUKEWARS Outside View Emasculating Nuclear India Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. by M D Nalapat Outside View Commentator New Delhi (UPI) Mar 14, 2006 There is zero doubt that India and the U.S. are natural partners. Steady migration to the U.S., the ever-denser interlinking of the hi-tech industry in both countries, and common threats from religious fundamentalism and political authoritarianism mandate that Washington and New Delhi forge an alliance that is as close as that between the U.S. and the UK. However, the caveat to this is that such a partnership can only be on terms that are the same as what the U.S. accords to the U.K. In brief, the U.S. has first to accept India as a nuclear weapons state that deserves permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council. Unfortunately, almost all the formulae trotted out by the "South Asia" brigade in U.S. think tanks and other centers of influence such as the State Department implicitly or otherwise seek to "engage" India on terms that would, if accepted, result in an emasculation of the world's most populous democracy. The proposed Nuclear Deal falls squarely in this category, and will, if sought to be implemented, push official U.S.-India relations back to the frost of the Cold War period. Indians love flattery, and often surrender substance in exchange for a verbal pat on the head. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, by education as well as by his experience in international institutions, is predisposed to uncritical acceptance of the standard Western worldview, which implicitly sees India as a juvenile power needing mother-henning, and definitely not mature enough to be trusted with grown-up implements such as nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems. This mistrust of the country's maturity -- despite New Delhi's impeccable non-proliferation record to date -- infuses the terms of the deal that has been agreed to by the Sonia Gandhi-led coalition government, hungry as always for formal acknowledgment of its improving status. Were the agreement to be implemented, India would almost immediately lose its chance to switch to the thorium cycle, and within 12 years would find its tiny arsenal of nuclear weapons depleted to irrelevance. This would place India not in the category of Germany and Japan, both of whom have a muscular nuclear power capability, but that inhabited by the likes of Burundi and Laos, a supplicant state dependent on technology handouts from "advanced" states. That Manmohan Singh has in effect written his political epitaph by agreeing to this deal speaks for the capacity of the Bush team to bully and cajole enough to get their way, even when -- as in Iraq -- such immediate "victories" lay the seeds for future disaster. The Indian prime minister's obsessive eagerness to conclude a deal -- almost any deal -- with President Bush is not born out of circumstances. Granted, India faces a shortage of uranium, caused partly by the tardiness of successive governments in overcoming "environmentalist" resistance to the opening of new mines. However, India depends on nuclear power for less than 3 percent of its total electricity generation, and given the costs of nuclear power sourced from expensive Western reactors, it would be more prudent to (a) raise funds by selling India-developed technologies for nuclear power generation, to buyers in Southeast Asia and South America (b) use such funds and other grants for fast-tracking the indigenous nuclear energy program, especially the conversion to thorium in place of uranium as the feedstock, as India has ,at over 500,000 tons, more than half the world's proven reserves of this radioactive material and © intensify efforts to exploit India's own uranium reserves. In order to meet a temporary shortfall of uranium, the Sonia Gandhi-led coalition government at New Delhi has agreed to effectively destroy India's robust nuclear program. Now, the basics. India has at present only 15 operational reactors, of which 12 are in the list of 14 that has been offered to be placed under international safeguards. Thus, while Manmohan Singh has claimed that only 65 percent of India's nuclear capacity will enter the safeguards regime, in fact around 85 percent of present operational capacity would go under safeguards. The Bush administration has repeatedly made it explicit that India would not be treated as a Nuclear Weapons State as a consequence of the nuclear deal. This means that the safeguards applied on the "civilian" nuclear capability of India would be of the intrusive kind applied to non-nuclear weapons states. This goes against the Government of India's oft-stated stand that it would not accept any outcome that does not, de facto if not de jure, accept India as a Nuclear Weapons State Such a safeguards regime would effectively cripple India's indigenous nuclear program. The scientists of the Department of Atomic Energy would need IAEA permission even to shift lab equipment from one location to the other. Even more deadly, under "pursuit" clauses, IAEA inspectors can adopt the same harsh measures on entities that they subjectively believe have collaborated in any conceivable way with the "civilian" entities. An email from a scientist working in an unsafeguarded military facility to a friend working in a "civilian" location can be used as the basis for such inspections. Worryingly, any company that is, or is to the subjective satisfaction of the international inspectors, "guilty" of supplying services or products to both a civilian as well as a military facility would be open to inspections that could -- for the benefit of competitors located in countries such as the U.S., France and China, known to access privileged information from the IAEA -- leak to other entities, thus destroying the ability to compete in the marketplace. In effect, these restrictions would ensure that few Indian companies would take the risk of supplying services and materiel to the country's nuclear sector, thus ensuring dependence on outside sources as well as a drastic slowing-down of the military program. This program would already have been hit by the removal from production of the CIRUS reactor located at Mumbai, which has been estimated to produce 35 percent of the highly-enriched uranium and plutonium needed for the cores of India's nuclear weapons. This is on top of the removal of over 80 percent of capacity by the transfer of 14 reactors to the "civilian" list. Initial estimates are that India would need to spend US$ 16 billion over the next five years simply to compensate for this disruption in fuel supply for the military program. This figure would, at a conservative estimate, rise to US$ 40 billion over the next 10 years. Given the huge outlays that would be needed to purchase foreign reactors and fuel, as well as the billions of dollars that would need to be spent on U.S. armaments to keep friends of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney in good humor, this would mean that the Indian military program would get capped, rolled back and finally eliminated over the next 12 years, as the weapon cores degrade and fail to get replaced. Not coincidentally, Prime Minister Singh has stopped talking of a "Credible Minimum Deterrent." It is now a "Minimum Credible Deterrent." Unfortunately, the nuclear deal will ensure that this "minimum" soon ceases to be "credible." This is in a context where China would be free to continue its assistance to Pakistan, North Korea and now Bangladesh, so as to checkmate regional rivals India and Japan. Not merely has the "India-friendly" George W. Bush effectively capped the Indian military program, he has managed to get the Indians to agree to the unprecedented condition of safeguards in perpetuity. Thus, Manmohan Singh has bound all his successor regimes into accepting this emasculating nuclear deal, or facing the risk of sanctions. Under the deal, India would not have the right to move safeguarded entities from the civilian to the military sector even in the case of a military emergency such as a nuclear attack. Of course, the capping and rollback of India's supply of nuclear weapons would make such an attack more rather than less likely. Unlike those vociferous critics of Nuclear India, the Scandinavians, the world's most populous democracy has threats other than otters and seals to contend with. India abuts China, a country whose ruling structure is authoritarian and unpredictable. There are the failing states of Pakistan and Nepal on other borders, as well as the Wahabbizing nation of Bangladesh and the splintered island of Sri Lanka. Close by is Central Asia, where rival kleptocracies joust and a well-funded Wahabbi movement spreads its influence. Next door is Indonesia, not the most stable of republics, and a little away are Iran and the Middle East, not to mention the African coast. Clearly, those who say that India's 1.1 billion people do not need a nuclear umbrella have yet to look at an accurate map. Volleys of opinions generated by the well-funded international non-proliferation lobby (which since the 1970s has ignored China, North Korea and Pakistan in its obsession with India) have painted a picture of economic desolation were the nuclear deal not to be signed. The reality is that the worst-case scenario -- should the Nuclar Suppliers Group continue its blockade of India -- would be the shutdown of one of the Tarapur nuclear power plants in 18 months. For at least the same cost of buying reactors from France, the U.S. and other countries, and high-priced uranium from Australia, India's own thorium-based Fast Breeder Reactor program can be fast-tracked so as to become operational within eight to nine years, ie: the same length of time it would take to make operational imported reactors. Decades ago, India's scientists began work on a three-stage program of nuclear self-sufficiency. First would come the development of pressurized heavy water reactors. Next, the Fast Breeder reactors. Finally, thorium would replace uranium as reactor fuel. Scientists at atomic research establishments in India privately claim that the country is at the cusp of proceeding to Stage II of this three-stage program for generation of adequate volumes of nuclear power. The significance of this is that, once this milestone gets crossed, additional uranium will no longer be needed, as the new processes would "breed" more fuel than it takes in. According to a top scientist, "even at present, India has more than enough known deposits of natural uranium to meet the planned Stage I level of 10,000MW of nuclear power." He and other scientists smell not simply a rat but a giant bandicoot in the tearing hurry of the Bush administration to lock India into a regime of safeguards that would gut the indigenous program and make the country reliant on outside fuel and technology. In his recent Asia Society U.S. President Bush has made it clear that his administration classes India with the 130-plus countries that would be denied the indigenous capability of processing fuel. These would have to depend on "advanced nuclear powers such as "Germany and Japan" to meet their needs. Unlike India, neither of the two is a nuclear weapons power. Clearly, Bush would like to travel the road taken by South Africa and Brazil, who have folded up their indigenous capabilities in exchange for (largely unfulfilled) promises of technological assistance. It must be said to the credit of the Bush administration that they have been transparent about their intention to convert India into a non-nuclear power. It is Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who has repeatedly obscured the truth from his own people, by pretending that the twin elephants of perpetuity and intrusive inspections do not exist. And once India's nukes are dealt with, can there be any doubt that its rockets will follow? Already there are essays on how India's ICBM program "is targeted at the U.S.", something that has thus far remained a secret to the entire Indian military establishment, which is focusing on a Great Power much closer to home. Like the nuclear weapons program, which has piggybacked on the civilian nuclear energy program, the Indian missile program has been powered by the development of rockets designed to launch satellites into space. Although Bush began to make noises about participating in the Indian space program three years ago, as yet there has been zero contribution from the U.S. side. Once the anti-nuclear lobby has its way, can the anti-rocket enthusiasts be far behind? Manmohan Singh can be relied on to somberly inform Parliament that India "desperately needs foreign assistance" in launching an adequate number of satellites, and so he has decided to scrap the Indian program in favor of exclusive reliance on foreign-built launch vehicles. As a sop, perhaps an Indian national would join the team aboard a future space shuttle, taking a call from President Bush and Prime Minister Singh as he surveys the end of the Indian space program. If, despite the one-sided nature of the deal, the non-proliferation lobbies in the U.S., China and Europe are vociferating against the July 18, 2005 Singh-Bush nuclear agreement, the reason lies in their desire to force the Indians to publicly eat crow rather than, as now, pretend that the country's indigenous nuclear ( and subsequently missile) program has not been terminally affected Like China, India is a country with a high degree of immunity to international sanctions. Once the nuclear deal begins to be implemented, the effects it will have on India's nuclear establishment will generate a political firestorm that will kill the deal and -- almost certainly -- the political career of Manmohan Singh. Ties between India and the U.S. are multiplying exponentially, but this is despite rather than because of the two governments. People-to-people, business-to-business and university-to-university contact is growing at an accelerating clip. The nuclear deal, far from giving a boost to this process, has the potential for igniting within India the same suspicion of U.S. intentions that resulted in a mud wall being built within India against U.S. contacts during the 1970s and well into the 80s, a development that harmed the interests of both countries. By seeking to force through a nuclear deal that is scientifically and politically unimplementable on the Indian side, George W. Bush may do for U.S.-India official relations what Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in doing in 1971, when they ordered the nuke-armed USS Enterprise to enter the Bay of Bengal in an effort at blackmailing New Delhi from preventing the slaughter of Bengalis by the Pakistan army. As Iraq has shown, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Professor M D Nalapat is Director of the School of Geopolitics at the Manipal Academy of Higher education, India. United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited. Source: United Press International

Posted by: acharya Mar 14 2006, 10:52 AM

Economy growing at 7-8 per cent: Manmohan New Delhi, March 14 (PTI): Prime Minister Manmohan Singh today asserted India was not surrendering its autonomy on decision-making while engaging with the US, and said foreign capital was central to pushing the economy which is now growing at 7-8 per cent. "In engaging with the US, we are not surrendering our automony in decision-making," he said replying to a debate in Rajya Sabha on the working of External Affairs Ministry. He said the inflow of foreign capital would add another one or two per cent to the GDP growth which would take the growth rate to double digit levels. Singh said "we have a saving rate of about 29 per cent and with another 2 or three per cent of GDP from abroad through foreign capital, we can step up the growth by 1 or 2 per cent per annum." While developing relations with the US, the Prime Minister said in the last two years of the UPA government in office, India's ties with Russia and China had grown overwhelmingly. Referring to relations with Britain, Singh said during the visit of his British counterpart, Tony Blair, last year, the two countries had given a vision and concrete shape to their strategic partnership. He told members that government should be judged from the totality of its work in various fields. Singh, who holds the External Affairs Ministry portfolio, said India was the only nuclear weapon state which believed in universal nuclear disarmament. "This is our objective and we remain committed to it," the Prime Minister said. Replying to foreign policy issues raised by CPI-M member Sitaram Yechury, he said India's independent foreign policy was rooted in the twin principles of civilisational heritage and enlightened national interests as followed by Jawahar Lal Nehru. He said changes had come in since then and these had been incorporated accordingly in the foreign policy of the UPA government. Singh, who holds the External Affairs Ministry portfolio, said India was the only nuclear weapon state which believed in universal nuclear disarmament. "This is our objective and we remain committed to it," the Prime Minister said.

Posted by: acharya Mar 14 2006, 11:05 AM

Beware of pitfalls on N-deal: BJP March 14, 2006 21:20 IST Accusing the United Progressive Alliance government of pursuing a "crippling" foreign policy, main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party on Tuesday asked it to beware of pitfalls while taking follow up action on the nuclear deal with US. Initiating a discussion on the working of external affairs ministry in Rajya Sabha, Leader of the Opposition Jaswant Singh said India has to be very clear and will have to be clinically analytical while assessing where the current US policy is headed". "India is the only country in the world which still has unsettled borders. It is a crippling deficiency in the foreign policy," Singh, a former external affairs minister, said. Noting that the US wanted a deal with India because of its failure in its foreign policy on Iraq, Iran and the West Asia, Singh cautioned, "For each failure of the US in the region, the region has paid, India has paid and we will continue to pay." Accusing the US and other major nuclear powers of adopting double standards on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, he said India must consistently work towards universal nuclear disarmament as otherwise it would be accused of being a partner in double-standards especially after the Indo-US deal. Singh warned that if India worked in this "shadow of dishonesty", its image would get coloured and it might ultimately have to pay a heavy price. He also wanted India to stop raising the issue of cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir with the US. Singh, however, welcomed the Indo-US deal as it aimed at bringing about energy security, which was vital for economic security of the country. He said the government should share with political parties the detailed sketch of the ongoing Indo-Pak dialogue. Referring to the Afghan situation, he questioned the presence of NATO powers in the country and voiced concern over re-emergence of Talibans. Singh said India lay in a tri-junction of collapsed empires -- Ottaman, British and the Soviet Union. The impact of these collapsed empires was huge on India because of the geographical proximity.

Posted by: acharya Mar 14 2006, 03:51 PM

One nuclear deal, two narratives Vidya Subrahmaniam That the Western media have savaged the Bush visit and the nuclear deal shows India acted in its national interest. Yet looked at another way, India is befriending a world leader seen to pursue an agenda against Muslim countries. CONSIDER THE paradox: The United Progressive Alliance Government signs a "historic" civilian nuclear deal with the United States, that, by most reckoning, is tilted in India's favour. Put simply, India's achievements are three-fold: It is now a de facto nuclear weapons power; it has demolished the technology denial regime in force since the first Pokhran tests of 1974, and it has fought and won its right not to subject its fast breeder programme to safeguards. Domestic reaction to the achievement ought to be euphoric. It is not. As the party that heads the Government, the Congress ought to feel elated. There is no evidence that it does. Something is Fishy - THey seem to have prior arrangement with Uncle to Bind India for CRE Consider another paradox: The Government and the Congress Party are thought to be in a rush to woo Muslims. The Bharatiya Janata Party makes the alleged "minority appeasement policy" of the United Progressive Alliance the centrepiece of its plan to revive itself in Uttar Pradesh. But Muslims are not "appeased"; they are so sullen and angry that the Congress fears it has lost whatever little chance it had in Uttar Pradesh, indeed that the community has reverted to Mulayam Singh. The two situations are related and flow from the same perception: Any deal with the U.S. cannot be to India's good. How did the Government manage to convey such an impression about an agreement that cold analysis reveals to be a huge success? Critics who feared the Indian side would barter away vital security interests, concede Manmohan Singh & Co played their cards well. The breast-beating in the Western press dispelled any remaining doubt about who got the better of whom. The New York Times savaged both President George Bush's tour of the subcontinent and the deal with India. The visit was "spectacularly misconceived," while the "disastrously ill-timed" deal threatened to "blast a bomb-sized loophole through the Nonproliferation treaty." In a cover story written on the eve of Mr. Bush's visit, The Economist bristled at the hard bargain India was driving, and argued that any compromise by the U.S. would be a "dangerous mistake." In a visceral follow-up edit, the magazine urged U.S. Congress to veto the nuclear deal with India: "Not only is nuclear-armed India being offered all of the civilian benefits available to countries that have accepted the NPT's anti-nuclear restrictions. It has also accepted few, if any, of the real obligations of the five official nuclear powers recognised by the treaty, America, Russia, China, Britain and France. All at least signed the treaty banning all nuclear tests; India declined. All have ended the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes (only China has yet to say so publicly); India flatly refused America's request to do likewise." The unprecedented bad press forced U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to set out the importance of the deal — as much to the U.S. and the world as to India — in a signed article in The Washington Post. It is accepted wisdom that when the Western media start hyperventilating about a country, that country can be presumed to have acted in its own national interest. Thus, far from compromising its independence, New Delhi clinched a good deal, perhaps a great deal, judging by The New York Times' killer last line: "Mr. Bush should have just stayed home." Yet contrast the outrage abroad with the less than enthusiastic domestic reaction. Is the continuing Indian public suspicion around the deal just nuclear illiteracy? The BJP is miffed because Dr. Singh pulled off what the more-than-eager Jaswant Singh could not through several rounds of negotiations with Strobe Talbott. If anything, the 1998-2000 talks centred on getting India to cap its nuclear programme — a point conceded ironically by Brajesh Misra, the National Democratic Alliance Government's National Security Adviser, in the course of a recent television discussion; the disclosure was intended as a warning that India could similarly be coerced on the civilian nuclear deal. All the more reason for the Congress to have rejoiced in the Government's spectacular breakthrough. Had the BJP swung the deal, it would have been unrestrainedly joyous. In the Congress, the unease is palpable; hushed conversations about the deal stop short of insinuating a "surrender"; the anxiety is less about the specifics of the deal than about its likely impact on domestic politics. biggrin.gif The huge Muslim presence at rallies protesting the Bush visit, in Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata, was a warning the Congress could not ignore. The Government's case that the nuclear pact was foreign policy not subject to shifting voter concerns was technically sound. Yet which Congressperson dared convey the foreign policy logic to the surging crowds that screamed for Mr. Bush's head? The beaming visitor, who threw a friendly arm around the Prime Minister, who seemingly granted India's every wish, though refusing to yield an inch in neighbouring Pakistan, was South Block's dream come true. This flattery is suspicious Another take Yet looked at another way, India was befriending a world leader seen to pursue an agenda against Muslim countries — Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, with Syria shortlisted for future action. Distrust of Mr. Bush was strongest among Muslims but, as newspaper surveys revealed, even those welcoming the President felt he was bad for the world. The irony was difficult to miss: Diplomatic India, with a direct stake in world affairs, wanted to pursue a U.S. policy uncluttered by the superpower's unforgiving conduct in Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. Domestic India, which ought to have felt remote from America's conduct in Afghanistan, Iraq, etc., was aggrieved by it. President Bush's speech at the Purana Qila made Congresspersons cringe. If the deal was the Government's victory, the speech was the Congress' defeat. Mr. Bush invited India to partner him in the pursuit of freedom across the globe, "from North Korea to Burma to Syria to Zimbabwe to Cuba ..." The world, he said, "needs India's leadership in freedom's cause." Iran was singled out for denying basic freedoms, sponsoring terrorism, and pursuing nuclear weapons. The more the Government tried to keep the focus on the civilian nuclear deal, the more the visitors embarrassed it by speaking of a "deeper, longer" relationship with India not contingent on the success of the deal. En route to India, Ms. Rice sang the friendship tune: "This trip is not a civil nuclear power trip. This trip is about a very broad relationship that is deepening." On the same day that Mr. Bush painted a merry picture of India and the U.S. spreading democracy hand-in-hand, Government sources clarified that the nuclear deal was not to be construed as a "paradigm shift." The strategic thinking of India and the U.S. did not necessarily converge, and the deal did not amount to endorsing all of the U.S.' foreign policy initiatives. But the damage was done. On the one hand, there was much American flaunting of the "broadening, deepening" relationship between India and the U.S. On the other, there were stern, "or else" messages, such as the one on the Iran vote from Ambassador David Mulford. The signals converged to project a picture of Indian servility, of an India willing to partner the U.S. in all its crimes. More propaganda value came by way of other seemingly minor but nonetheless discomfiting details: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's decision to break protocol and receive the visiting Head of State, the housing of presidential sniffer dogs in five-star comfort, their objectionable presence at India's holiest of holy sites — the Mahatma's samadhi. The visit over, the Government tabled the nuclear separation plan in Parliament — again acknowledged by experts as being to India's advantage. Prime Minister Singh issued all the necessary clarifications — on the deal, on India's independent foreign policy, on its unwillingness to be a part of the U.S.' regime change plans. But as Congresspersons see it, the intervention came way too late. The Congress' immediate worry is Uttar Pradesh where it was hoping to make some advance in the coming Assembly election. A crucial part of its calculation was the Muslim vote, now substantially with Mulayam Singh. The Bush visit, the party fears, has driven the community back to the Samajwadi Party, which for its part has done everything to stoke minority insecurity. In recent days, the U.P. Chief Minister has happily played to the gallery, deliberately permitting intemperate elements like Yaqoob Quereshi to run away with the agenda. It does not help the Congress that the Muslim factor weighs equally with the Bahujan Samaj Party — and for a different reason with the BJP. Mayawati's party has registered phenomenal progress on the ground, and in the post-Bush situation, is the likely first choice of Muslims disillusioned with the Samajwadi Party. The BJP needs Muslims — but in order to gather Hindu votes. It is only by projecting the community as pampered and aggressive that it can achieve the objective. The loser in all this is quite evidently the Congress. On one side is the SP, determined to harness Muslim anger over the Bush visit. And, on the other, is the BJP, bent on raising the spectre of "Muslim appeasement". The villain in both schemes is the Congress. The party must hope and pray that the two opposing narratives neutralise each other.

Posted by: acharya Mar 14 2006, 04:55 PM

ednesday, March 15, 2006 VIEW: The Bush visit in retrospect — Ijaz Hussain There was also a marked difference in style with President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000. President Clinton had lectured and hectored the entire Pakistani nation and was reluctant to be seen shaking hands with a military dictator. His successor, however, was comfortable hobnobbing with the man with two hats The image that captured the outcome of US President George Bush’s visit to Pakistan most succinctly was the one of his reception at the Islamabad airport. In terms of protocol Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, rather than President Pervez Musharraf, receiving the US president was absolutely correct. As President Musharraf explained in his press conference, the American president, too, had never received him at the airport whenever he went to Washington on an official visit. However, the image stood out because it contrasted sharply with the one that came out from New Delhi — showing Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ignoring protocol to welcome the American president at the airport. It also stood out because not long ago the US president had publicly called President Musharraf a “friend”. There was also a marked difference in style with President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000. President Clinton had lectured and hectored the entire Pakistani nation and was reluctant to be seen shaking hands with a military dictator. His successor, however, was comfortable hobnobbing with the man with two hats. Nor did he speak to the Pakistani nation like a headmaster. In substance, however, the treatment was no different. President Musharraf’s virulent public broadside against Afghan President Hamid Karzai was a sign that President Bush had done in private, what President Clinton had done in public. The difference in the styles of the two American presidents is best explained by the fact that unlike Mr Clinton Mr Bush was visiting after the 9/11 tragedy. While generally correct in his manners, President Bush could not help acting a bit like the boss at the joint press conference saying the purpose of his visit was to ascertain whether or not General Musharraf was still committed to the war on terror. He also lectured his host on the importance of democracy. The latter was left defending his commitment to both fighting terrorism and restoring democracy. He reiterated his unstinting resolve to fight terrorism and promised to hold fair and free elections come 2007. President Bush’s behaviour appeared to be less a reflection of the unequal relationship between the US and Pakistan and more of the perception that President Musharraf’s hold on power depends on US goodwill. US relations with Pakistan and India were ‘de-hyphenated’ sometime back. However, this appeared not to have sunk into the Pakistani consciousness. The Bush visit brought home this point. The Bush Administration had already indicated that it would not extend the civilian nuclear technology deal to Pakistan. However, swayed possibly by the irrational exuberance of the “Busharraf” phenomenon the Pakistani president perhaps hoped to convince his US counterpart to change his mind. The latter, however, sternly observed that “ Pakistan and India are two different countries with different needs and different histories”, and that the US strategy in the region would take into account “those well known differences”. This caused enormous disappointment in Pakistan. The US nuclear deal with India is a corollary of the American commitment to help the latter become a global player. The US is motivated by the desire to preserve its own preeminence by promoting India as a counterweight against a resurgent China. In other words, the Bush visit to India was meant to effect a balance of power — like the Nixon visit to China in the 1970s. An unintended consequence of the present visit, however, could be the creation of a regional imbalance in South Asia. The nuclear deal also has the potential to start a nuclear arms race in the region, principally because of the exemption of the fast breeder reactors from the IAEA purview. The China threat behind the nuclear deal has been compared to the Germany threat in the 19th century. But the comparison is misplaced because unlike the latter, which undertook a policy of “blood and iron” in pursuit of its national objectives, the former insists on harmony and peace. There is nothing to suggest that China is a territorially expansionist power. However, the US is so paranoid about the incubus of rising China that it has not flinched from undermining the NPT which forbids civilian nuclear cooperation with a non-member state. Nor has the fallout this would have in dealing with nuclear weapons ambition of Iran and North Korea deterred the US. According to some Western analysts the Bush visit to India may have laid the foundations of a cold war in Asia. The emerging political and military alignments in the Chinese neighbourhood seem to attest to it. The US has military alliances with many South East Asian countries and Japan. The latter has broadened it by according permission to the US to move the command headquarters of its Army’s First Corps from the US Pacific coast to Camp Zama near Yokohama. The US is also in the process of moving the command operations of its Pacific Air Force fleet from Guam to Tokyo. These developments are worrying for China because they heighten its threat perception. The nuclear and other cooperation with India may come to be viewed no differently. This could lead to Chinese opposition to the Indian quest for SC seat. Let us not forget that China already opposes the Japanese candidature. The Bush attitude towards Kashmir during the visit should disabuse Pakistan of any meaningful US “facilitation” in its settlement. The US president gave an encouraging statement on Kashmir in his Asia Society speech emphasising the need for a settlement acceptable to all parties. However, he did not follow it up during his visit to India. Irrespective of the rosy picture the Pakistan government may paint of behind the scenes US pressure on India, Kashmir was not mentioned in the joint statement issued at the end of the Bush visit to Islamabad. Bush did urge the two countries to intensify their efforts to resolve the issue but that does not mean much. Incidentally, this exhortation came in response to a question by a Pakistani journalist. Much more damaging than President Bush’s failure to pressure India on Kashmir is the conclusion of the nuclear deal for this rules out the possibility of India making any concessions. American and Indian think tanks had been urging the Indian government to get the Kashmir dispute out of the way to achieve a great power status. This was acknowledged by the Indian prime minister who in May 2004 told Jonathan Power that, “the Kashmir dispute is stopping us from realising our potential”. But if India can still conclude the nuclear and other beneficial deals meant to promote it as a global power why should it seek a settlement on Kashmir with Pakistan? The writer, a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University, can be reached at hussain_ijaz

Posted by: rajesh_g Mar 15 2006, 10:03 AM

However idiotic the headline of this article is "pro-india congressman ..." it has a simple and powerful statement..

The lawmaker argued that the US-India nuclear deal "takes a realistic assessment of India's nuclear weapons programme and enhances international nonproliferation efforts by working with the International Atomic Energy Agency and is a country we can trust". "India has had four nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards for decades. Fourteen of their 22 reactors will be under permanent safeguards under this deal. This agreement will create American jobs, burn less fossil fuels, grow our economies, enhance mutual trust, and greatly develop our strategic relationship with India. I urge your support of this historic agreement," Wilson said.
All these points have to be quantified with dollar amounts.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 15 2006, 11:40 AM

"It's OK to supply fuel to India but let's wait until India has taken the steps called for in the joint initiative to bring its program into conformity with NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) standards," the official said.

Posted by: ramana Mar 15 2006, 11:55 AM

Acharya, Both the articles have false reasoning to explain the issues due to agenda or confusion. I will try to rebut them but will take time. The short answer is that there is a sea change in global power dynamics and hence the deal is needed for the US and India. Besides it is not directly against China. By unshackling India, evenif it does not toe the US line, the US has made the Chinese pause and think about what they are embarking on. It will set in course introspection among the Chinese elite. The protests against Bush were due to the cartoon issue. Bush being the leader of the Western world was the power behind the cartoonists. Congress does not want to take the difficult task to explain the need for the deal to its votebank. BTW this article explains twhy there is no progress into the Varanasi terrorist attacks for that would further erode the votebank.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 16 2006, 11:15 PM

SYDNEY (AFP) - Prime Minister John Howard hinted after talks with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that Australia could sell uranium to India following New Delhi's nuclear deal with the US. Australia, which has the world's largest known uranium deposits, previously said it would not change its policy banning the sale of the nuclear fuel to states like India which have not signed the UN's Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But Howard Friday told a joint news conference with Rice:[B] "There isn't going to be any immediate change in government policy. Obviously, like all policies, you never say never."[/B]
Rice able to change Howard. Whats behind deal? Now I am more suspicious.

Posted by: Mudy Mar 20 2006, 12:40 PM

QUOTE WASHINGTON (AFP) - Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in a newspaper opinion piece hailed this month's nuclear deal between the United States and India, which "promises to make a seminal contribution to international peace and prosperity." Kissinger, who served as secretary of state between 1973 and 1977, hailed the historic agreement as heralding "an unprecedented level of cooperation and interdependence between the two powers. "In a period preoccupied with concerns over terrorism and the potential clash of civilizations, the emerging cooperation between the two great democracies, India and the United States, introduces a positive and hopeful perspective," Kissinger wrote in a Washington Post editorial which also appeared in other US media. "Too often America's India policy is justified -- occasionally with a wink -- as a way to contain China. But the reality has been that so far India and America have found it in their interest to maintain a constructive relationshiop with China," Kissinger wrote. "To be sure, America's global strategy benefits from Indian participation in building a new world order. But India will not serve as America's foil with China, and will resent any attempts to use it in that role."

Posted by: Mudy Mar 29 2006, 09:29 AM

Enjoy it !!! biggrin.gif Red Star April 2006 National Scene Bush-Manmohan Nuke Deal: A Historic Surrender: K.N. Ramachandran

Posted by: Mudy Mar 29 2006, 09:41 AM

Bush traps India into CTBT - By Brahma Chellaney The Bush administration has attached a legally binding rider to the nuclear deal with India even before the US Congress has had an opportunity to put conditions of its own. Under the administration’s action plan, India would become a party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) through a congressional piece of legislation. This is the first time in world history that one power has sought to bind another state to an international treaty rejected by its own legislature. The US Senate threw out the CTBT in 1999. Under subsection ‘d’ of the "waiver authority" sought by the administration from Congress, India would be precluded forever from conducting any nuclear-explosive test. If India were to violate that blanket prohibition, all civilian nuclear cooperation with it will cease, leaving high and dry any power reactors it imports, bereft of fuel. That is exactly what happened to the US-built Tarapur power reactors when, in response to India’s 1974 test, America walked out midway through a 30-year civil nuclear cooperation pact it signed in 1963. Although the 1963 pact had the force of an international treaty, the US halted all fuel and spare-parts supplies. Today, with the Indian foreign secretary in Washington to negotiate a new civil nuclear cooperation accord, India is reliving history. For Washington, the nuclear deal has come handy to impose qualitative and quantitative ceilings on India’s nuclear-deterrent capability in order to ensure that it never emerges as a full-fledged nuclear-weapons state. A permanent test ban is part of its effort to qualitatively cap the Indian deterrent, while the quantitative ceiling comes from America’s success in making India agree to reduce to less than one-third the existing number of facilities producing weapons-usable fissile material. Lucky to escape Mr Bush’s nuclear embrace, Pakistan can now seek to overtake India on nukes, as it has done on missiles. It can watch the fun as the Bush administration and the US Congress entangle India in a web of capability restraints, in return for offering New Delhi dubious benefits — the right to import uneconomical power reactors dependent on imported fuel. The White House has ingeniously used the reference to India’s "unilateral moratorium" in the July 18, 2005, nuclear deal to make it legally obligatory for New Delhi to abjure testing perpetually. In other words, India is being compelled to forswear a right America will not give up, even as the US merrily builds nuclear bunker-busting warheads and conducts sub-critical tests. The reference to the Indian moratorium in the July 18 accord is specifically linked to the commitment therein that India "would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the US." The US imposition of both a perpetual test ban and perpetual international inspections, however, shows vividly that India is being denied the "same benefits and advantages" as the United States. While parties to the CTBT can withdraw from the treaty invoking its "supreme national interest" clause, India will have no such option. It will take on US-imposed, CTBT-plus obligations. Instead of repealing or amending provisions of its domestic law, the Bush administration has simply sought a waiver authority under which, if the President were to make seven specific determinations on India’s good conduct, "the President may ... exempt" nuclear cooperation with New Delhi from the requirements of Sections 123(a)(2), 128 and 129 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. The seven good-conduct determinations listed in subsection ‘b’ of the Waiver Authority Bill include the following — that "India is working with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty" (FMCT); and that India is making "satisfactory progress" with the International Atomic Energy Agency to implement an "additional protocol", which will bring India’s entire civil nuclear fuel cycle and its workforce under international monitoring. There is also an eighth determination to be made. Marked, "Subsequent Determination", subsection ‘d’ reads: "A determination under subsection (b) shall not be effective if the President determines India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act." India’s second-class status is being endowed with legal content, so that it stays put at that level permanently. It began with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s announcement earlier this month that, contrary to his solemn pledge in Parliament "never to accept discrimination", he gave his word to Mr Bush that India will accept international inspections of a type applicable only to non-nuclear states — perpetual and immutable. Mr Bush’s waiver-authority request makes clear that he would seek to grant India any exemption only after it has brought into force a legally irreversible international inspections regime. After being the only nuclear power to accept perpetual, enveloping inspections, India now stands out as the only nuclear-weapons state whose test "moratorium" will cease to be voluntary or revocable. Although still to build a single Beijing-reachable weapon in its nuclear arsenal, India will have no right to test even if China, Pakistan or the US resumed testing. Having set out to drag India into the CTBT through the backdoor, the US is positioning itself to also haul New Delhi into a fissile-material production ban even before an FMCT has been negotiated, let alone brought into force. This objective could be facilitated either through a congressionally-imposed condition requiring New Delhi to halt all fissile-material production or through what undersecretary of state Robert Joseph has called "additional non-proliferation results" in "separate discussions". The new bilateral civil nuclear cooperation accord under negotiation offers yet another avenue to Washington to enforce an FMCT-equivalent prohibition on India. In any case, once India places orders to import power reactors and locks itself into an external fuel-supply dependency, Washington will have all the leverage to cut off further Indian fissile-material production. The Bush administration, in its written replies earlier this year to scores of questions posed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, did not seek to dissuade Congress from considering the imposition of additional conditions on India, despite a specific query on new riders. In other words, the administration may not be averse to Congress attaching any additional rider as long as it is not a deal-buster. But given the way India has relinquished the central elements of the July 18 deal, the US might believe that it can make New Delhi bend more. What US-inspired technology controls against India could not achieve over three decades, the Prime Minister has been willing to do, in order to import power reactors that make no economic or strategic sense — retard the country’s nuclear-deterrent capability. He has offered no explanation, for example, for agreeing to shut down the Cirus plutonium-production reactor without ordering a replacement. The irony is that a nominated PM, who has never won a single popular election in his career, has agreed to a deal with an outside power under which India’s nuclear-weapons potential is to be cut by more than two-thirds without he being required to get Parliament’s approval either for the accord or his civil-military separation plan. But the same deal needs to be vetted thoroughly by US Congress! For a country that prides itself as the world’s biggest representative democracy, India needs to ask itself what sort of democracy it is when its Parliament passes its national budget without any deliberation, and limitations imposed on its most important security programme escape legislative scrutiny.

Posted by: ramana Mar 29 2006, 10:39 AM

What is there it enjoy? BC has put all his fears in one article and is spouting bile. He is missing the forest while he is stomping on the bushes. Whenever a news article comes one shuld read it. See what it confirms and what new info it brings. Then look for point of view of the writer. B Chellany and B Karnad think that no Govt of India can do the right thing. They wrote against the NDA and now against the UPA. One wonders what they will agree on? 

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